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Unknown Ukov: Unretouched Portrait in the Mirror of the Epoch

_} o d V.

puppy military; childhood and youth

The next m rsh I was born on November 19 / December 1, 1896 in the village of Trelkovshchina

Godskoy-Vodskoy volost of Loyarosl Vetsky district of the Luga province /. The name of the native village of Marshal was written in the 1931 autobiography and in a questionnaire filled out by himself in the early 50s. RVD, in the memoirs and in the second and last of the surviving autobiographies, dated 1938, Georgy Onstantinovich called the village differently - trailer. It is also referred to in official documents, in particular, in the metric book of the Ikolskaya church, Selgodsky waters (now the city of Ukov). o, although from the middle of the ZhGKh century, names were used, nevertheless, the original, popular name - trelkovsky. Ranks with such a suffix are not uncommon in the Dnorussian lands. Trelkovsky arose in the late 18th century. The old one says that under Peter G, hundreds of serf masters were relocated from the Ural factories to the Luga province. the locals called them "strelkovshchina" because the foreman poured the cannons out of the water and tested them at the shooting range near the large village of gubi, located 5 km away from the waters. Elyism erased the m same, on the outskirts of the ruin. Gradually, their settlement occupied two-thirds of the former village and merged with a well-to-do village, named after the Trelkovshchina. The origin of George Onst Ntinovich is dark. about the paternal line, it is not traced further than the father. The point is that the father of our hero, Onstantin Ukov, was a foundling. A peasant widow, NN Ukov, adopted him in the early 1950s (according to other sources, early 40s) of the 20th century. He paid the adoptive mother a lot of money for those times: three rubles a month. For the poor peasant women of the Luga province, taking adopted children from the Oskovian educational home became a kind of profitable business. from what he wrote about his pedigree in the memo
r xs mm rsh l:

"Om in the village trelkovka ... stood in the middle of the village. It was very stout and at one corner sank firmly into the ground. Since then, the walls and roofs have been overgrown with moss and grass. There was only one room in the house. The children didn't know who and when our house was built. It was known from the tales of the watchmen that a childless widow of nushkas had once lived in it. In order to alleviate his loneliness, he adopted a two-year-old boy from the shelter - my father. those were his real parents, no one could tell, and then his father did not try to find out his ancestry. it is only known that a boy at the age of three months left some women on the threshold of an orphanage with a note: "Call my son onstantin." What made the poor woman leave the child on the porch of the orphanage, whether he did it because of a lack of maternal feelings, most likely because of his hopelessly difficult situation.

it is impossible to say. row

When was the father of the future mrsh I born , is not known for certain. Luzhskiy kreved

Lyanov, thanks to whose tireless work we have reliable information today

about the first years of the commander's life and his genealogy, he considers: "there are grounds to believe that until the end of the 20th century, Constantine decrees lowered their age, in Soviet times, on the contrary, they exceeded it." metric record 1892 marriage of parents Georgiy onstantinovich

1 you until January 19/February 1, 1918 are given according to the strict style (Ling calendar). In the 20th century, it lagged behind the new style (the Rigorin calendar), adopted in Russia from February 1, 1918, for 12 days, in the 20th century - for 13 days. birthday to the Ukov family) Georgiy Onstantinovich is always

noted in

in accordance with the old style, i.e. - December 2 according to the Gregorian calendar, if we take the twentieth century.

The age of Stantin Rtemyevich Ukov was determined to be 41 years old, therefore, he should have been born in 1851. On the monument that Georgiy Onstantinovich erected on his father's grave, it is written that Onstantin Rtemyevich Ukov "died on March 28, 1921, at the age of 77 mm." This also testifies in favor of 1844, the year of birth of the father. Llyanov considers it more reliable, "although he does not exclude the 1843rd Marshal. there. year. Records of registration of the first brk Konstantin Rtem'evich indicated the metric stntin uk, another date of his birth - 1841. where the truth is, we are unlikely to ever know for sure. In the records of dzhen did not have a proper patronymic. rvd „, books in connection with two brothers and the birth of children, he is called Onstantin Rtemievich. about in honor of whom the d but patronymic was, is unknown. the names of the true parents of the In connection with this, there are many legends about the ethnic origin of the famous foundling are covered with other. commander. The eldest daughter, Georgiy Onstantinovich, states: "According to the description, Onstantin Rtemyevich had fine features on his face that betrayed a person of a non-peasant breed." x this is the eternal desire to find a noble breed in the appearance of a person. In real life, the Count sometimes looks like a simple pozhnik, with a pozhnik, if he is combed and dressed in a uniform or tuxedo, he will look like a real Count. It is sometimes said that the unknown grandfather ib bk georgia onstantinovich were Greeks. Perhaps, in this way they want to attribute kinship with the people who gave the world the Cedonian lexander? Another version speaks of Turkish roots - Georgiy Onstantinovich (sn mekom n ingiskh n or tyya?). However, all assumptions about the exotic origin of George Onstantinovich and his relationship with great people are nothing more than beautiful legends. He lived for a short time with his adopted son. he died when he

was only eight years old. The earth in the Trelkov region gave birth badly - the soils are sandy. You can't feed yourself with peasant labor. onstantin went to the apprentices to the reaper in the volost center is the village of GODSKAYA waters. Georgiy ONST NTINOVICH VSPOMIN L, WHAT, PO

r sskzm father, the study was reduced more to helping the master of the house. Nevertheless, he mastered the craft and three years later he went to Moscow, where he entered a German workshop, which was famous for its own shoe store. autobiography 1931 Georgiy onstantinovich wrote: "The father is a worker,

pozhnik", having tried in this way to improve their social origin to the golden proletarian one.

or ukovy difficult. The autumn and winter of 1902 were especially difficult. Ogd from dilapidation covered the roof of the house. I had to move to the emergency room urgently, even before the cold weather,

buy a new frame. One can say that Constantine was lucky: he borrowed money from fellow villagers

And

managed to buy at a reasonable price in r installment, an inferior, but still ki log house. the settlers helped

November to build a house and cover it with straw. Georgy Onstantinovich recalled: "It turned out to be a poor harvest, and there was enough grain only until mid-December. r boots father and

mothers went to bread, salt and payment of debts. thanks to the neighbors, they sometimes didn't help out

That

sh mi, current necks. to help in the villages was ... a tradition of friendship and solidarity of Russian people who lived in dire need.

Gorukov took up peasant labor for the first time when he was not yet seven years old. In a place with adults, he shook the hay with rakes and raked it into shovels. ovil fish (in times of famine, fish became a great help). I rye. During your life, the future commander received

the first rank in his life. Gor accidentally cut with a sickle on the little finger of his left hand. memoir hm rsh I wrote: "How many years have passed since then, the scar on the left little finger was preserved, reminding me of the first unsuccessful agricultural front."

Ukov stated in his memoirs that shortly after the revolution of 1905, the father of many other workers was expelled from the capital to take part in the demonstrations. I am afraid that the reasons why I decided to leave the capital, was much more obvious. O

recognition by George Onstantinovich

„ father drank heavily: "<... someone's father was in good

mood and took me with him to the tavern to drink whose... men and young people liked to gather in the tavern, where they could talk about the news, play loto, cards

And

DRINK ON For someone's reason, then for no reason ... ogd ... father is good at elk

To work on sewing with fire, he usually returned drunk from Godsky waters. It seems that, unlike the small mountain, the senior uk in the tavern did not catch anything, much stronger drinks.

For the first time, Onstantin sent his wife from Moscow two or three rubles a month—not much money for a provincial village. However, soon the transfer was reduced to one ruble, for a certain month. Georgy Onstantinovich recalled: "The settlers said that not only our father, but also other workers in the church, had poor eyesight. I remember that at the end of 1904 my father came to the village. My sister and I were very happy and were always looking forward to the time when the Moscow hotels were ready.

Father said that he couldn't bring anything. I came directly from the hospital, where I had been lying after the operation for appendicitis for twenty days, and the same ticket was taken by my comrades.

I suspect that it was not a matter of appendicitis, but that the money earned was increasingly going to the VKBK. ed romn wuxi say: drink to k with the reaper. whether it is a matter of profession, in an unknown or heredity, it is difficult to say. In 1906, my father returned from Moscow completely. Ynu George said that "the police forbade him to live in the city, allowing him to live only in his native village."

as we will see later,

for an unprofessional writer, and even with almost no education, they are written very well. However, in the face of fact, Mzhukov's "reminiscences and reflections" in many cases do not stand up to criticism. not only because decades later, five minutes later, he often failed the rshl regarding the dates and details of events. one hundred orgies

Onstantinovich consciously corrected "in his own favor" both the pedigree and the military path.

I bet he was not the original here. To a greater or lesser extent, we find something similar in the memoirs of almost all military men, and not just them.

from and the case of another demonstration, because of which they allegedly were expelled from Moscow

Onstan tin ukov , does not look very convincing. Why would an elderly foreman (he was well over sixty in 1906) go on a demonstration against the tsar together with the proletarians? It's no big deal - it's more profitable to look for orders and fulfill them better and faster. because there will be no constitution in the country, people will die with more

sew

do not stop. besides, to to installed novil. county , . Iyanov, in the lists of residents - Loyaroslavets expelled from oscva to their homeland for political reasons, onstantin

rtemyevich ukov no. The version seems more plausible that the residence permit in the capital city of Ostantin Ukov was lost due to a drunken case - because of a fight or someone else's misconduct. maybe, and in the hospital pop I after sweat scoops. I eat more than that, according to the memories

George Onstantinovich punished , he had a heavy hand with me: "<... was there a case when the father strictly me for some wrongdoing and beat me with a thong (with a harness), demanding that I ask for forgiveness. Oya was stubborn - and no matter how much he beat me, he endured, but did not ask for forgiveness.

one razonz for a slight spanking that I ran away from home and lived in hemp with a neighbor for three days. apart from my sister, no one knew where I was. We agreed with her that he would not extradite me and bring me food. They searched for me everywhere, but I camouflaged myself well. Ray ino found me in my shelter of a neighbor and brought me home. Father added more to me, but then he took pity on me and forgave me.

No, ONST NTIN did not at all look like a potential participant in a revolutionary demonstration. If we turn to the nononic work of socialist realism - Nu Orky's rum "t", then the father mrshl rather

reminiscent of the depicted tm "dark workers", in which the not yet appeasing

the light of Marxist teachings, drunkards and brawlers who beat their wives and children in mortal combat. perhaps everything was even simpler. Onstantin sharpened his wits, it became difficult for him to keep up with the rhythm of metropolitan life. I could no longer work with my former speed and dexterity. There were fewer customers, and there were no more salaries to capture the more expensive Moscow life. oti went to his native village. in the only surviving autobiography, written in June 1938 in connection with his appointment as deputy commander of the Belorussian military district, Georgiy Onstantinovich says nothing about the expulsion of his father from the capital. nn wrote about the parent only that he "worked in oscove for 30-35 years, worked hard in a peasant economy until 1921" (the year of death of ostantin ukov). Nislov about participation in a mythical demonstration. The commander needed to make his lineage as "proletarian" and "revolutionary" as possible. Here are the memoirs he wrote after the humiliating removal from the post of Minister of Defense and removal from the leadership. oti appeared to k to i something mythical i

a demonstration to present the father as a victim of political persecution by the tsarist authorities. But he put Ukov in his memoirs with a completely fantastic psalm, though, as if during the revolution of 1905 in the forgotten Trelkovo region, the peasants "heard about Yenin, the spokesman for the interests of the workers and peasants, the leader of the Bolshevik party, the party, which I want to achieve the emancipation of the working people from the king, landowners and

to pit sheets.

The good marshal really wanted to convince the high-ranking party readers of "Memories and Reflections" of his complete reliability, that all the events of his life

evaluates in a right way. It is difficult to say

exactly how the severe beatings suffered in childhood affected the nature of the children. one can only assume that since then the future martyr believed that humiliating a person is not a sin at all. zones once suffered, then let others suffer from him. later, subordinates, and people with a lower military rank who simply fell into a bad mood, repeatedly had to experience the severity of marshal's fists. The year when his father returned from Moscow,

George graduated from the 3rd grade parochial school. he recalled with pride: "I was excellent in all classes and received a commendation sheet. everyone in my family was happy with my successes, diya was happy. on the occasion of the successful completion of school, my mother gave me a new shirt, my father

with a mixed bag.

—[wow; now you are literate, - said the father. - It will be possible to take you to Moscow to learn a craft. — [or maybe he will live in the village for another year, then we will take him to the city, — he noted. - usk Y will grow up a little ... "

It's time to introduce the reader to Stina Rtemyevna Ukova, the mother of our hero.

He was from the village of Ernya Ryaz, neighboring with the Trelkovo region. Stinya was younger than Onstantin by about fifteen years.

to the letter of lukov in 1938 in his autobiography: "I worked until the age of 40. 40 years old, after marrying her husband, he worked in a poor peasant household. h with m teri about 80 years old ...

(i.e., he was born around 1858 - . .) "If we interpret this statement literally, it turns out that the mother of the future marshal married his father only in 1898.

It turns out that George, who was born in 1896, and his elder sister were born out of marriage? true, hence the rumors that Ukov was not horse-born. Thirty years later, in a memoir, Hookow stated that "when father and mother were married, mother was thirty-five, father was fifty." Only entries in registers of births could clarify the question. in the 80s of the XX century to the Luga local historian. . Lyanov discovered them. In the register of births of the Ikolskaya church, the Selgodsky waters, as the parents of the child born on November 19 and baptized on November 20, 1896, the infant George were indicated as "the village of a trelkovsky peasant

Rtemyev Ukov and his legal wife, Ustin Rtemyev, of Religion". the ceremony of baptism was performed by about the Orthodox Onstantin the priest Father Silius Sesvyatsky. four years earlier, September 27, 1892, the wedding of Lonstantin and Stinyu. At that moment, the groom was allegedly 41 years old, the bride - 26. o, as evidenced by the entry in the church metric book, stinya rtemyevn was born on september 26, 1863 in the village of ernya ryaz, 6 kilometers from the track. He was the eldest child in the family of peasants Rtemia Yerkulovich and Limpidyetrovna. In the second half of the 1980s, they and their younger children adopted the surname Ilikha, but never wore the bones of this surname. When the future commander's mother came out - one of the great teachings - she had just turned 29 years old. Consequently, the age of Stina Rtemievna in the memoir of George

Onstantinovičs exalted for six whole years. then, at the wedding, he preferred to look younger and lowered his age by three years. it is more difficult to understand what was the true age of the father. If we assume that the age of onstantin rtemyevich was increased by georgy onstantinovich by the same number of years as the age of stanya rtemyevna, then in reality marshl's father should have been 44 years old when entering into a second marriage. In this case, he should have been born in 1848, at the very least, at the end of 1847. He, as we remember, Georgy Onstantinovich pointed out to the monument that in March 1921 his father was a full 76 years old, i.e., he should have been born in 1844 or at the beginning of 1845. 1844

seems to me the most probable year of birth of Onstantin Rtemyevich Ukov. Most likely, at the wedding, both the groom and the bride rejuvenated themselves to varying degrees. Stinya Rtemievna considered that it was enough to call herself 26 years old. There was no reason to

pretend to be 7 years old, as the future spouse did it - there was no resemblance to a 21-year-old girl more than once. It would also be inconvenient for Onstantin Rtemyevich to take away only three years for himself. Indeed, in this case, the age gap between young people was too large - 19 years. Therefore, he decided to rejuvenate himself for seven whole years. In reality, on the day of the marriage, Stinya Rtemyevna turned 29 years old, Onstantin Rtemyevitch was about 48 years old. It becomes a mystery why both in the

autobiography of 1938 and in the memoirs of Ukov, the age of his parents significantly increased. He erected a monument to his father in the 1960s, when he worked "with reminiscences and reflections". consequently, he clearly represented the true age of his father's father, , and he could not by any means accidentally jot down Stina Rtemyevna for a whole six years. Perhaps, for some reason, back in the 20s and 30s, he needed to emphasize the decrepitude of his mother? an example to explain why he does not work on the collective farm? Stinya and Onstantin had their second marriage. the first onst ntin ukov married on April 19, 1870.,

having taken as his wife "a peasant's daughter in a new way." I note that

in new here - patronymic, not family name. The 18-year-old NN from the skiing was without a miles. In 1874, he gave birth to his husband, the son of rigory, and in the beginning of 1884, the second son, silius, but he died two years later. April 16, 1892

nu new. Onstantin Rtemyevitch remained a widower, but five months later he married Stinya Rtemyevna.

stinya did not have courage until the second s. On January 7, 1885, he was married to Ddey Tef Novich from the villages of Urbinsk, Psskaya volost. zhbyl younger wife , mileless. On March 18, 1886, their son was born vn, after n three years, kkion

four years old, who, having lived in the world for only 23 years, died of consumption. In order to feed the child, the stinya went to work in the neighboring villages. Bir l house, helped prosperous peasants with household chores m.

He wrote that the mother, before she married her father, "became". I had to turn the stinya not only in the garden, but also in bed.

December 30, 1890 in the village of Pzhye

outside

brk, he gave birth to a son, George, whose father was not recorded in the register of births.

probably, the birth of the first George and subsequently gave rise to rumors that the future

George Onstantinovich Ukov was not horse-born. they have nothing to do with reality. It can be assumed that the father of the elder George was a resident of Pzhya and nevertheless rendered some help to the mother of his child. In any case, the stinya continued to live in this village until the death of the babies. same year later, January 2, 1892,,

his

burial service

vzhskoy church to the deceased from "dry dryness". I think, there is no need for readers to explain that tascia spinalis is the last stage of syphilis, which, obviously, in a hereditary or acquired form, the father of the child suffered. Since Stigny's children, who were born later, "French disease" did not cover, it can be assumed that

What

Stinja either fortunately escaped syphilis, or recovered from it rather quickly. The reputation of a widow who gave birth out of wedlock was badly damaged. Now he had to look for a new groom not in his native village, and he didn't have to make a special choice. then the groom turned out to be not the first youth and drank heavily - so you can survive it. that with a reaper, and for a long time in oscove, it's a good thing. Perhaps the rumors about the bride's frivolous behavior did not have time to reach his ears. In the year of the world today George, on March 20, 1894, a daughter, Riya, was born to the Ukovs, a son, Lesh, was born on March 11, 1899, when the future marshal turned two, however, he did not live long - a year and a half. From birth he was very weak - a year. Lesh said the age of the parents: stinya under forty, stantinya under sixty. I cried bitterly and Many said: "Why will the child be strong? water and bread did not have the opportunity to look after the goblin. peasants at that time, in late autumn and winter, when it was time to work in the field, went to work in the city. brought 6 glued goods from the county Loyaroslavl merchants to Godsky waters. the trip was paid , whether?" osm for no more than a ruble and twenty kopecks. ukov remember I:

"He was physically a very strong man. He easily lifted five-pound sacks of grain from the ground and carried them over a considerable distance. they said that he inherited physical strength from his father - my grandfather, who crawled under the horse and lifted it or took off the tail and smashed the croup with one jerk "(it's not clear, right, why grandfather scoffed at e poor ANIMALS). A few months after the birth, Lesha's mother again went to work, although, as Ukov admits, "neighbors dissuaded her from giving advice on how to take care of the boy, who was still very weak and needed mother's milk. about the threat of hunger to the whole family forced them to leave, and only our care remained (i.e., the care of two children of five and seven children. - . .) ... in the shade they buried him in the cemetery in year's water. My sister and I, not to mention our father, were very sad about Lesha and often went to his grave.

Here Georgiy Onst Ntinovich slightly shifted the chronology of events. In reality, the unfortunate lesh died not in his first autumn, in his second. He died on August 18, 1900, in a lean, hungry time. Here, in the same year, one of the ten uks, among other people in need, received oats from the community 3 dogs.

reproaches to the fact that George Onstantinovich wrote in nkeths and autobiographies,

the forks were not poor, , kk and most of the inhabitants of the trlkovka were listed

The middle peasants, although by the standards of, say, the Western European countries and even the richer agricultural regions of the Russian Empire, such as the Oiskonian, Ubni, or Krina regions, their life cannot be considered meager. Nevertheless, during the years of collectivization, many of the Strelkovskaya middle peasants, who did not differ in their property status from the parents of the marshal

, they announced a cool to the mission if they were expelled from their native places.

In particular, those who did not have arrears in paying taxes were considered to be a middle man. January 1896, before leaving for Oskwun

paid all taxes for the previous year in the amount of 17 rubles 3 kopecks. This is when almost half of the villagers were in arrears. The very first arrears with his father Georgy Onstantinovich formed only in 1901, when he paid two taxes - his own and the adult son of rigory, who moved to Moscow. The deterioration of the position of the Ukovs, as well as other Strelkov peasants, did not play the main

role in the crop failure of 1899-1900, the economic crisis that erupted at the turn of the century. In the Luga province, he gave birth badly, so that even in the harvest years there was no way to feed himself from work. The main income was brought by seasonal trades. For example, in 1898, otkhodniki from the skiing area, including Onstantin Rtemyevich, earned an average of 90 rubles - the same as blacksmiths, yielding in this respect only to locksmiths. Some money then was quite enough for a relatively comfortable life. In the summer of the same 1898, in the God's water, a pood of meat cost 4 rubles 40 kopecks, a pood of flour - 2 rubles

50 kopecks, eggs - 2 rubles a dozen, a bucket of wine - 5 rubles 60 kopecks. However, the economic crisis has sharply reduced the demand for the services of blacksmiths, reapers, and locksmiths. There were not enough jobs. Another part of the money was taken away from the Ukovs by the construction of a new house

instead of the one that had fallen in. It got to the point that George and his sister, Riya, were sometimes forced to feed their neighbors. After his father finally settled in the Trelkovo region, his only customers were the same poor

people, Kkions M. Ukov recalled: "His work was exceptionally small, since fellow villagers, not out of need, could rarely get in touch with him. Thank you very much for the fact that he got the job." Despite his addiction to the "green snake", Onstantin Rtemyevich Ukov was respected among his fellow villagers. He was not just elected as a representative of the skirmishing at the volost gathering and went on public affairs. These positions took quite a lot of time, but they were not supposed to be paid. From when, at the end of 1902, Konstantin was elected a tenth police officer, the lowest police officer, the salary, albeit a modest one, was paid for this position. Article, in the protocol on the election of tenths was a decree

zn

and the age of the students is 58 years, which also indicates 1844-And to the year of birth of Onstantin Rtemyevich.

When the mountain was eleven years old, the parents decided that it was time for their son to go to the city and make a living on his own. Ukov went to Moscow. How it happened, Georgy Onstantinovich left a memorable story in his memoirs; "The father asked what craft I was thinking of learning. answered that I wanted to be in the printing press. The father said that he had no acquaintances who could help identify me for

the printing press. My mother decided that he would ask his brother or take me to the furrier's shop. The father agreed, because the furriers made good money. he was ready for any job, just to be useful to the family. In July 1908, my mother's brother, Ikh II Rtemyevich Ilihin, arrived in the neighboring village of Ernya Ryaz. he needs to say a few words. their il ilikhin, for goodness sake, grew up in poverty. For ten years he was separated into apprenticeship in a furrier's shop. Four and a half years later he became master. their silt was very frugal and managed to save up money in a few years and open his own small business. he became a good master furrier and acquired many rich customers, whom he

I

mercilessly. Ilihin

gradually expanded the workshop, brought the number of furriers to eight people, and, in addition, constantly kept four more boy apprentices. to those tki

other exploiters are mercilessly at the bottom. the horse knocked together about fifty thousand rubles for a pit. Here I would like to interrupt the tutorial for a short commentary. The thinking of the mind when it worked with memories and reflections was completely socialist. georgy onst ntinovich seemed to believe that his uncle was purely natural

life is tearing at exorbitant prices from his zchikov-god teev, then his father

By

because of his kindness, he took very little from his fellow villagers. In my case, the laws of the market applied in both cases. Their Iliikhin could take from his clients exactly as much as they were willing to pay, taking into account the quality of work and the speed of order execution. If the master broke at exorbitant prices, no one would sew fur coats for him - after all, there were plenty of good furriers in Moscow and

without orkin. In the same way, the harvester, konstantin ukov, could not demand more from the poor peasants than they could pay. Otherwise, they would have continued to walk in equal footing, or they would have crossed the line. Georgy Onstantinovich strove to present his own uncle as an exploiter-bloodsucker and to show the readers that he had never had anything in common with his mother's brother and that the relative did not enjoy the favor of God. The instructor described his acquaintance with Ilihin: "Because of this, he asked his brother to take me as an apprentice. that the brother did not go to the sure mud where he spent the summer, and, returning, he ordered me to be brought to him to

years ago, he knew him well. The father asked well, there is nothing to it. He offered to lead the Gorkulot four and a half their silt. Two days later, my father and I went to the village of Ern Ya Ryaz. On entering the Ilihins' house, the father

said: "Look, your future master is sitting on the porch. When you come up, bow and say: "Goodbye, their il rtemyevich." — no, I mean: <hello, uncle ish!> — I objected. - be that he is brought to you by an uncle. n your future master, "Godly masters do not like poor relatives. then cut your own nose. Going up to the porch, on which Uncle Yish was sitting in a wicker chair, having a blast, my father greeted me and pushed me forward.

Without answering a greeting, not in the hands of his father, Ilihin turned to me. bowed and sk 3 L: - hello, ih il rtemyevich! - Hey there, well done. then you want to be a furrier? silent I. "Well, furrier work is good, but difficult. "He should not be afraid of difficulties, he is accustomed to work from an early age," said his father. - Are you trained? The father showed me my commendation sheet. - well done! - skzl uncle, then, turning his head to the door, he shouted: - Y, you blockheads, come here! Out of the room came his sons Leksandr and Ikol Y, well-dressed and well-fed guys, to the hostesses.

- from, look, b shibazuki, to kn to study, - said my uncle, showing them my commendation sheet. - you are all troika hkt. shaking, and finally, to his father, he said: - Well, please, I will take your son as an apprentice. - the ren is strong and,

damn it, stupid. I will live here for a few days. Then I went to Moscow, but I can't take it with me. In a week, brother tzheny ergey is coming, so he will bring him to me. that we irst lis. I was very glad that I would live in the country for another week.

— uh, did my brother meet you? — asked mt.

—[it is known that the hosts meet our brother.

— [= what didn't you treat me to?

"But he didn't invite us to get out of the way," answered the father. - I was sitting, we were standing, to the soldiers. - he added angrily: - already rich, my son and I will now go to the tavern and have a drink for our labor heel.

in general, everything is clear. His big brother-in-law, condescendingly, with a sort of lewd indulgence, hurriedly talks to his poor son-in-law and nephew. sit down and drink stknchus

does not offer them a road. no one can understand that already the blessings of those living in poverty

relatives who took an eleven-year-old mountain to his place, saved the family from an extra mouth, and would teach him a profitable craft at a

cheaper price. fishing, they showed their world-eating essence. Ilikhins' life lived, if, again, one believes "reminiscences and beats and thoughts", oh, how easy it is! The owner mercilessly exploited and his nephew almost disrupted his studies at the evening general George Onstantinovich stated: "It has been a year. I quite successfully mastered the initial course, although it was not education courses. easy for me. - the smallest mistake the master of the furrier business, beat him mercilessly. his hands were heavy. or ns master, beat the masters, not far from them and the mistresses. When the owner was not in a good mood - it is better not to long. Sometimes the owner pop d yaemun eyes. he could not beat him without any reason, which was ringing in his ears all day

ordered two delinquent boys to beat each other with honeysuckle (bush, with the rods of which they knocked out the fur), saying at the same time: "Drink it tight, strong!" had to patiently endure. Did you know that everywhere the masters beat the students - such was the law, such was the order. The owner believed that the students were placed at his complete disposal and no one would ever ask him for beatings, for inhuman treatment of minors. no one was interested in how we work, how we live, in what conditions we live. - my highest for n with the judge was

master.

miles and pulled a heavy yoke, which even some adult was able to do. nothing to say! The writing is good, something the owner Ilihin is the grandfather reminds of the village picture, the "evestnik" did not have the "childhood" of the Orky, autobiographical hero to constantly of Samuel with his exploding grandfather in in every possible way, so he forced his skz ucov

convinced many too. I would have seen, perhaps I would have believed him, if I hadn't missed the memory of their son, Ilrtemyevich, or Khinikh Ilikh Ilovich Brtukov, one of the closest people to Marshal. Ilihin Jr. , cousin draws

a completely different picture of life in the furrier's workshop of the father and the history of their relationship with the ukov: "The life of the goruks took place in the village of trelkovka.

When the nish family came from oscova to the village of ernya ryazn to nikula, aunt stinya - the darkness of the mountains - brought him to the house.

Our family always had fun. Time was spent on the river Rotva. they hung the fish and then they ate it at the fire and ate it with great relish. stole in the forest, collected

wild strawberries,
which were very abundant outside. In the evening they were going to play tvlptu with the ball.

the mountain was 9-10 years old. Older brother lex ndr school ss mountain swim. first near the shore, then, as soon as they learned a little, he should have a boat in the middle of the river, suddenly pushing out a lantern. We made it to the shore with great difficulty. This was repeated several times until they learned to swim on their own. In 1957, I had to rest in the Crimea together with Georgy Onstantinovich. nz sailed into the open sea far from the shore. my question is: "Aren't you afraid to swim so far?" George smiled and said to L: "Do you remember how good it was to teach you how to sail Leksndr in the village on the river Rotva?" "I remember, is it possible to forget those distant years that brought me joy."

We were close friends and how big the mountains were. When he was getting ready to go home to his village, we all accompanied him to his house, sometimes we stayed with Aunt Stinya for two or three days. when we repeated our hobbies, only on the Gublyanka river: we fished, swam,
lii
playing in the beautiful grassy, flower-strewn coastal meadows of the river.

It turns out that the scene of a conversation between the fathers and the son of the Ukovs and their il Rtemyevich Ilihin, since the memoir rkhn rshl was vividly written, I came up with it first and to the end. In fact, the Iliykhins and Ukovs had previously known each other well, and the little Gor regularly visited his uncle in the summer months. half a century later, I remember those days very warmly. It could not be that Ilikhin would not treat his relatives to what, although, perhaps, he did not like his son-in-law, who, because of his addiction to "green

serpent" to live a prosperous life. MM-to lkh Ilrtemievich, despite his initial poverty and lack of education, managed to break into the people. from what the younger son wrote about him: "Ih il ilikhin, my father, was illiterate. Because of his poverty, he only managed to attend elementary school

for one year (that's why he admired the mountain so much, . .). ten years of his graduating as much as three grades, and even with a commendation sheet. — by sending Oska on foot along the construction Luga road. There was no money to travel through the cast- was not possible to work them in the village. At that time, a fellow villager lived in Oskar, with whom he iron (as the railway was then called), it maintained friendly relations. I worked as a furrier in the fur company of their ils, where Ililihin arranged for them to study furriery for four years. ehovoy mgzin and msterek yan walked on Uznetsky bridge street, 5. their ililikhin perfectly completed his four-year study as master furrier. t l a good master, the owner of the best company in oscow. their ylov left him in his workshop to fulfill expensive orders. Ilihin had a decent salary, saved up money: he decided to build a new house for his parents

V

village, because the old house was destroyed." Here is what Ilihin

Jr. remembered about the work of the furriers in the furrier's shop: At that time, my father and his family lived in Merger lane, where he rented an apartment in which there was a furrier's workshop. chalk of three masters and three boys-apprentices. this year in the autumn they brought me to my uncle to study furriery and mountaineering. At the end of 1908, the house was assigned for repairs. Father rented an apartment in Ryusovsky Lane. master's or chin's work, everything was added. large fur firms and famous workshops for women's outerwear from Monova, Innitsa, and other workshops have many orders. the furrier season started in July. On December 20, all the sters left for their villages for Christmas, returning on January 10-15. Each student was attached to a master who taught him. The foremen came at seven o'clock with the martyrs. It was their duty to prepare workplaces for the arrival of the foremen, sweep the workshop at the end of the work and clean everything up. When the masters arrived, we set from the sea and prepared everything for breakfast. se m ster

n went to the master's room - whether it was tomorrow, lunch, dinner. it was better for production, go to the tea room, then it was better for them: they will eat well and rest. if they will drink and only have a snack, then the half-starved will return

already more fun. No matter how unproductive workers were, Gorukov studied furriery very diligently and was always obligatory and diligent. After two years of work in the workshop, his uncle took him into the store, and the onythm proved to be efficient and neat. Gor, with great curiosity, looked at everything and studied how to serve customers, and senior brother Leksndr served there, who helped Gor to master all this. yar bot was the youngest student. In 1911, when the mountain was 15 years old, he would be called Georgy Onstantinovich. there is hardly any doubt about Zhukov's diligence and neatness. rztok, then the owner and other masters should not have had an extra reason to tell the diligent student. and exploitation, if you figure it out, in the Pilikha workshop was not so monstrous. Georgy Onstantinovich wrote in his memoir: "The night started at exactly seven in the morning and ended at seven in the evening with a break for lunch. Consequently, the working day lasted eleven hours, when there was a lot of work, the foremen stayed up to ten or eleven hours in the evening. In this case, the weekday went to Friday, twenty nights a day. - overtime they received additional piecework pay. The pupils always get up at six in the morning. After a quick wash, we prepared jobs and everything that the masters needed for work. got to bed at eleven o'clock and cleaned everything up and prepared for the next day. or right there, in the workshop, on the floor, in the evening, when it was very cold - on the floors in the hallway from the back door>.

However, he forgot to mention that the master at work not only had lunch, but also had dinner tomorrow. this reduces the actual operating time by at least another hour to ten hours. In addition, the seasonality of the furrier's trade must not be taken into account. Seven (but not students) had Christmas holidays of 20-25 days, and also returned to the village in May-June to help relatives with the housework.

Of course, the students had a harder time than Mister M. But they worked a few hours more every day: they prepared and cleaned the working places. Oukov seems to be popping into a relatively privileged position pretty soon. two years later, they transferred to cleaner and less hard work in his, as the eldest son is the owner of the master mountain. Total store, and it was no longer necessary to prepare a workplace for his

three years later, the teachings of the teachings, as the masters, were called respectfully. about the name and patronymic, - George Onst Ntinovich.

rshl notes in his memoirs: "I have been working in Lvster for three years now and moved to the senior boys division. Now I also had three boys under my command.

I knew Moscow well, because, more than others, I had to deliver orders to different ends of the city. ih ilikh Ilovich ilikhin in the same 1911 was taken by his father into the workshop as a student on a general basis, without any concessions. he recalled: "Georgiy was sometimes quite demanding and sometimes did not tolerate objections ... Georgiy Ukov took patronage over me, introduced me to his duties: basically, to clean the premises, go to the front for groceries, set for dinner with mov r. sometimes George and I packed the goods in a box and carried them to the office for shipment by rail. o packing time

George used to shout at me, and sometimes I got a slap from him. I didn't stay in debt, I gave up on him and ran away, because the con could give me more (Georgy was three years older than them, ill. - . .). My elder brother Lexander stepped in me, he was the same age as George. for the most part, they lived very amicably, but with a great "trinity".

we have just seen that George Ukov was always ready even at a very young age

to hang a cuff to the neighbor, even to the cousin, with whom they subsequently lived soul to soul. Further, many years of service in the army provided the marshal with great opportunities for improvement in manhandling.

ih il ikh ilovich ilikhin refutes the myth about someone being out of control of the "poor relative" of Ukovo. compared with the master's children:

Lexandr, ate together with everyone at the same table, and everyone got it from their father in the same way. the daughter testifies the same. to our family. tetsnsh was strict with everyone, but he always spoke . ilihin nn:< gore lived in oscove in respectfully:

"Oh, heady crap." but the call of the mountains is the master, but it is remembered not by their ilovna, not by "their silt Rtemevich", simply by "uncle isha".

The owner's special confidence in the new older boy was expressed in the fact that the owner took George with him - the Izhegorod fair, the largest in Russia. ukov remembered I that tm s. . Ilihin "rented himself a shop for the wholesale trade of furs. By that time, he had become very rich, made major connections in the trading world, and much more (we will leave the last accusation entirely to mem- urists - . .). The duties of a physically fit student included packing the sold goods and sending them to their destination from the pier or by rail. George was full of new impressions of decay. "The first I saw the Olga," he wrote in his book, "and was struck by its grandeur and beauty—before that, I had not known rivers wider and more full-flowing than the mouth of the city. it was early in the morning, and all the waves sparkled in the rays of the rising sun. looked at her and could not take his admiring glance off (and half a century later, Marshal Olga involuntarily said

mi verse. — . .). "Now it's clear," I thought, "why they sing songs about Olga and the carcass they magnify her."

their Ililikhin describes how their father took them with George to church: "Sunday

days father br Insv kreml, in the cathedral of spain. He always went to the litur, where the synodal choir was held, which consisted almost exclusively of boys. Father loved to listen to the singing of this choir. sleep left at the exit from the cathedral , tkkkm, kids, could not pass through the crowd to ltrue. Father left for Lt Ryu, and we left the cathedral, wandered around the Kremlin. when, at the end of the service, the bell was rung for the "father sh" prayer, we quickly returned to the entrance to the cathedral and all went home together. an inodal choir of conductors likol YiY Yemenovich olovnov, later chief conductor of the large theater. oh father s. . olnov and his wife ntonina siliyevna every day, a famous singer, was a good sign, and when my father died in December 1922, olnov with the synodal choir took part in the funeral. George Onstantinovich recalls a visit to the Spens Cathedral: "On Saturdays, Muse took us to church for Vespers, on Sundays for Matins and Mass. big feasts, the host brought with him to mass in the Kremlin, to the Spens Cathedral, sometimes, to the church of the christian. We did not like being in church and always tried to get away from there under

to someone's suggestion. We went to the Spenski Cathedral with pleasure - to listen to the magnificent synodal choir and especially the protodeacon calls: His voice was like the trumpets of Jericho. to take into account that at the time of work nd "< memories and

reflections" positive comments about religion, to put it mildly, were not welcomed. o Ilihin finished his memoirs - in the second half of the 80s, when in this. There have already been some improvements in the sphere. about and he does not write about his religiosity or the uks. I remember that even at that moment the boys did not have a special attraction to the church. heap. oud

it's more fun to play football with a model ball from a building cap, and a beaten paper. from them
silt

retyevich firmly believed in God, but it was fundamental to instill the Orthodox faith in his sons and nephew, almost all of whose conscious
life was spent in the era of state rule.

theism „ Apparently, he didn't make it. can a number of uks be attributed to any particular

Christian denomination, like the Orthodox Church in which he was baptized. O, like the majority of professional military men who
did not look death in the face, Georgy Onstantinovich, I think, believed if fate is not possible, or the highest. zoom that keeps him out
of trouble. he had no doubts about his chosenness. after the death of his youngest daughter, Riya wrote I rhim ndrit irilla (Vlov), in
the past - the wind nut lingr d, about the rumors that George Onstantinovich in

the early 60s visited Roitsergieva vruizkzltmp nikhida in honor of the dead warrior M. rhim ndrit irill answered as

follows: "I can't say anything about it definitely, I didn't hear it, because from which things they didn't see then, they could
only know

those in charge are the governors, they, unfortunately, have already departed to the Lord. I heard that Mrshl Silevsky Aleksandrikh Ilovich
came to Vru, he stayed at the hotel, took communion. I heard about George Onstantinovich from the rector of the temple
vodevichy monastery, that he was a

big irogovka, the rotopriest father ikol ikolsky ikolsky, that marshlukov came to their temples, and one day he

gave the lottsu and kolyu money for commemoration, father ikoly asked him whom to remember. Georgy Onst ntinovich skzl - all the
dead soldiers. This is reliable, because the vengeful, elderly archpriest Father Ikolai, who is now no longer alive, told the story. Here is
another testimony about the believing soul of the teachings of George Onstantinovich, Archpriest Father N. Toliy, I don't remember
his name now. he served in the cathedral in Zhevsk. That father and Toliy was also already an elderly archpriest - he was already about
80 years old then. I used to come to lie, dined with my brother,
and one day during a conversation he told us that during the war he was in the rank of Major General

,

when the war ended, he retired, then took over and served as a cleric of the Zhevsky Cathedral. During the war, father ntoly
said, as a general, I met

with marshal ukov, talked with him, and. Once, during a conversation, I asked him if he believed in God.

ukov answered me, says father ntoly, I believe in the power of the almighty, in the wisest mind, who created such beauty
and harmony of nature, and I bow before it. father n toly, then general l-m yor, and says to ukov. ∴ this is what you recognize, and
there is og. What George Onstantinovich felt in his soul is indisputable. It's a different matter that he, perhaps, could not express this
feeling of his in words, because at that time the faith in God was in reproach, in a pen, and he, as a high-ranking boss, had to be careful ,
because then the circle of celebrations was theism and godlessness. If you read his memoirs and articles, you feel that his soul is

Christian: firstly, it is easy to read and perceived with great moral edification for your soul. The spell of God's
chosenness is felt in him throughout his life.

First of all, he was baptized, studied at a parochial school, where he taught the law, attended the services of the christian pastor and
enjoyed the magnificent singing of the church choir, was raised in childhood in a believing family - all it couldn't

Not

and smolder in the soul of his Christian truths. this is evident from the fruits of his life and conduct. his decency, humanity,
sociability,

sobriety, purity of life exalted him, and the God-given chosen to be the savior of Russia in a difficult time of trials. units of rum

Georgy Onstantinovich All Russian people love their national hero and put him on a par with such famous commanders, like stealing utuzes. y, no, it's really surprising that some kind of religious feeling was preserved in the friend and svtukov of Mrshl Silevsky, who was the son of an Orthodox priest. RVD, faith in God did not prevent Lexandr Ilovich from acting completely un-Christian - to renounce his own father in the wild army. Georgy Onstantinovich did not have to make such sacrifices - his parents were with us real poor people. only there is no information about their special religiosity -

neither

in <recollections and reflections", neither in the mem- urs of relatives and friends, nor in the memory of fellow villagers. turn, the latest evidence that onstantin and stinya uki did not go to church even on holidays and were indifferent to religion. about the fact that "all Russian people" love ukov as a national hero and commander, equal to uvorov and utuzov, father irill was definitely mistaken. Among the winds of the Great Patriotic War, so among their children and grandchildren, opinions about the "march of victory" differ - FROM "the savior of the fatherland" to the "destroyer of soldiers' lives." unanimity here is unlikely to ever be achieved. One can argue about the fact that the religious belief, as if inherent in Georgiy Onstantinovich, was clearly reflected in his deeds. we're not yet sure we're one

from

basic Christian principles: to treat others the same way as you would like others to do to you, was completely alien to you. He sincerely believed that the chosen one or someone else for a great mission and the criteria that apply to the actions of most people do not apply to his own actions. What he, Georgy Onstantinovich Ukov, would consider an unacceptable insult for himself, subordinates were obliged to endure without a murmur. the soldiers' lives were not spared. him, marshal, the dispensation of Russia and the great commander's own word, it was not a pity to put countless compatriots. o it is doubtful that he believed in his "chosenness of God" in

those

days when he sewed fur coats in a furrier's shop in Moscow and delivered them to rich customers. case. Did Ukov manage to continue his general education when he was in his uncle's workshop, and did he already show interest in the art of war and the personalities of the great

commanders? Meorgy Onstantinovich answered this question in his memoir: "I have not turned thirteen years old, and I have already learned a lot in the workshop. Despite the heavy workload, I still found the opportunity to read. I always remember with gratitude my teacher, Yergey Ikolevich Emezov

, who instilled in me a passion for books to read

the eldest son helped me , lex ndr. we were of the same age with him, and he treated to

I'm better than others (it turns out that both the owner and his wife, the kindest lion vrilovn, and their cousin, with whom he spent the last years of his life, all treated poor George worse than ever! - ..).

I will also use it to read The Nurse novel, the fascinating stories of The Inkerton, The Earlock Olmsehon OMI scribbles, and a number of adventure books published in the cheap library series. it was interesting, but not very instructive, I wanted to study seriously. ok k? shared with lex ndrom.

He approved my intentions and said that he would help.

We undertook further study of the Russian language and popular science , m tiki, geography and reading books. they usually met together, mainly when he was not at home, he nevertheless recognized master , and on Sundays. okkmy did not hide from the master of the classes. I thought he ,, was going to kick me out or give me a hard time. However, contrary to expectation, he praised a sensible thing.

For more than a year, I was quite successful in studying on my own and enrolled in evening general education courses, which provide education in the volume of city schools.

The master's shop was pleased with me, and the owner was also pleased, although no, no, it was a kick or a crack for me. At first, he did not want to let me go in the evening, but then his sons persuaded him, and he agreed. was very d. r vd ,, the lessons had to

prepare

at night, on the floor, near the lavatory, where the duty officer burned a dozen candles in two.

a month before the final exams, on some Sunday, when the owner went to his friends, we sat down to play games. Gli, as I remember, in twenty one. ez labeled, k

To

The owner returned and entered the kitchen. holding l 6 nk, I was lucky. a friend someone gave me a healthy slap in the face. looked back and -

oh, s! - master! dazed, I could not utter a word.

fuck rushed to sleep. —[x, that's what you

need gr mot for! what to count? this day you won't go anywhere else, and so that school doesn't dare to follow him with you!

A few days later I went to the courses, which were located on Verskaya Street, and told about what had happened. I have only a little more than a month to live. they laughed at me and allowed me to take exams. I successfully passed the exchange for the full course of city schools.

The magic of the zk of the brothers rimm, d and only! A smart student is pursuing an evil master who, after all, prevents our hero from doing a good deed - completing a full course of city schools, then, as if yielding to the persuasion of his sons,

But

at the very last moment, it creates a seemingly insurmountable obstacle in front of the student. But in the end, the student successfully outwitted the master and achieved his goal!

Albeit a fabulous plot, but it cannot be said that it is so impossible in real life. I eat more. my lex ndr georgy loved and respected l. Lexander was an example and a . Ilihin tells the same story very similarly: "rt teacher for him, he worked with George on the part of education, on the subject of the book, together they read about erlock

Holmes, lkrter, who taught young people perseverance, the ability to emerge victorious from difficult situations, courage, which, perhaps, was useful to George Vukov in life, maybe in the art of war.

Lex NDR taught George and German, he spoke German well. itl

him books by various writers. He said what was good and what was bad, and the literature he needed for his formation. we didn't sleep together on the floor (after all, we threw it on the floor, as George Onstantinovich assured. —

. .)it m had conversations ...

- on Sundays we played football in the yard - the ball was served by n mtryash pk, n bit yabum goy. gr whether in the towns, in the big bki, vl ptu with the ball. those times these games were at a premium. rainy days when father was not at home, Are we playing hide-and-seek or

football in the entrance room - the "gates" served as doors for them. s tk messed around with that

neighbors from the first floor came with their foreheads: pieces of Turk were falling from their ceilings. Further on, games in the room were always forbidden. We then began to gather in the kitchen or play cards - at "21" (point). grlin old buttons - we collected them in the yard, they were thrown away by a neighbor - a military tailor. one beautiful day they played with a hard mouth, that they did not hear how the father entered the kitchen.

The father collected the cards and destroyed them, the players fled in all directions. the father, of course, knew that the cards would not lead to good, he tried in every possible way to wean the guys from everything bad in LIFE...

In 1912, George graduated from his studies, and his father gave him a small amount of money in the form of awards and, as it should be after graduation, a three-piece suit, a demi-season coat, a winter coat with fur with a lace collar, shoes and underwear. There was a month's vacation. George went to his parents in the village. rovelt m month, rested and, returning

V

Moscow, continued to work with a monthly salary of 25 rubles. RT Lex NDR also received 25 rubles. George, having a fortune, st ls lexandr go to theaters, movies, concerts

got a job at general education courses, which he graduated with honors.

there are so many reliable details in these memoirs, like the boys playing hide-and-seek and football in the room, to the greater displeasure of the neighbors downstairs, that I was ready to believe that Georgiy Ukov really graduated from general education courses, not in 1911, as much as possible understand from his own memoirs, not in 1912, as follows from the memoirs. . ilihin. From the outside my eyes popped Zhukovsky's autobiography, 1938. It is written in black and white: "Inferior education. 3 years until 1907 he studied at the parochial school in the village. Elichkovo-Godsko-Vodskogo district of Jon, Moscow region, and studied for 5 months at evening courses at the city school in Moscow, Zetnoy Lane. There were no means to study farther - to study furriery separately. 4th class of city schools sdl (exams. - Art. t Rozhilovo ... in 1920. "

. .) externally at 1-x lang n to vkurs x

In 1938, it was completely out of hand for George Onstantinovich to lower his educational level. So, he did not finish the 4th grade of city schools, he really passed the exams as an external student, but not a month after he was forced to stop

twist

classes, twenty years later, when he enrolled in the Leria courses. It is clear what the requirements were for the examinee, especially those of a suitable social background.

M eorgy onst ntinovich, filling out a personal sheet on accounting for firewood in 1948 in connection with

appointed commander of the Ralsk military district, in the column "education" he indicated that he entered the 4th grade of the city school in 1907, and graduated in 1908 (not 1911, kk

n pis lv memu r x). Here, the ukow did not specify that the 4th grade exam had passed only in 1920.

why, in his memoirs, did the rsh I prefer, if only with mercy, to exaggerate his

education? We will see later that this, apparently, was connected with a legend that the Ukov brought to light in the 60s. move the term of study of George

onst ntinovich , most likely, prompted the desire to present their relationship with him in a negative light. One cousin describes an exploiting uncle ,

clearly

the same episode that he rshl - when the owner took the cards from the students who played "point". However, he does not say anything that because of this, Ikhlrtemyevich forbade the mountain to continue his studies in the courses. This episode could not possibly have happened earlier than 1911, the time when they either began to work in the workshop of their father. icefully, after care

It's been at least three years since the uks have left school.

the same applies to Tilikhin's assertions that Ukov graduated from

general education courses, and even with honors, then it certainly goes back to the words in my syllabus or even directly to the text of "memories and reflections."

ih il ikh ilovich was not in his father's workshop during the years when his brother was in the course of art. -on the account of "difference", I think, Ilihin Jr. involuntarily moved in time

a certificate of merit received by brother George after graduating from the parochial SCHOOL.

about what we already know and still learn about the position of George in the workshop, as if he testifies: the owner had an intelligent boy-student of his own kind. Perhaps, over time, he thought of making him a clerk or even a partner. we are unlikely to ever know exactly why he left school. Whether it became difficult for him to combine it with work in the workshop, which affected his progress, or he decided

What

It is better to master the craft, which is a sure piece of bread , history with geography will have to wait.

From the reading circle of the future marshal, there is no doubt. he sees, and his cousin, first place is inkerton and merton oil. One gets the impression that at that time George did not yet read any military literature, lubok biographies of uvors and utuzes, not to mention his favorite book in Orchgin's book - the rom not Fff ello jovnoly "prtk". hardly thought that he would become a commander.

ore years of apprenticeship were coming to an end. In the summer of 1912, George received a vacation in the village, for the first time in four years he met with his parents. For the past few years, he was remembered as a lively and cheerful guy, a "thunderstorm of girls." - they talked about the collision of mountains because of the nielnikova he liked with the post Remili. Or did not like that the ukov was dancing with her. He pulled out a revolver, which the postman relied on by the nature of his service, and threatened: "If you run away with her, I'll kill you!". deftly snatched a revolver from her opponent, threw the weapon into the bushes and the books continued to follow her. or the trace has caught a cold; Later, George Onstantinovich recalled: "When he was young, he loved to dance very much. the girls were gray!"

About not one Elnikov at that time disturbed Zhukovsky's heart. No less passion was fed by the future slogan of Yura Inelytsykova, who many decades later gave "recollection and reflection", the inscription: "my childhood in good memory." When, however, Ineltsikov - . ineltsykova - to a friend nevertheless married another husband, Ukov, having learned about this, came to the village and shouted in a voice not his own: "Yurk, you made 7!" alone, it was hardly possible to calm the mountains and

What

convince him not to do stupid things. We see that Zhukovsky's pride manifested itself even in his youth. all his life it was unbearable for the marshal to know that he was preferred to someone else, whether in matters of love or war.

On the eve of his departure for Moscow, in the neighboring village of Austinka, there was a big fire. the trackers came to the rescue. When extinguishing fires, r eorgy almost died. From kkon described this incident in a memo: "I ran with a bucket of water past one house,

heard a cry: "I pulled psitte, we are on fire!"

out

scared to death children and a sick hen ... in the morning I

discovered two burnt holes, waiting for the size of a heel, on my new jacket - a present the owner

before the holidays (such was usual J). "Uh, the owner doesn't like you LIT," he said. - So,

- I answered, - let him judge what is more important: the

pidge or the guys who managed to save ...

I go with a heavy heart. it was especially distressing to look at the fire, where the unfortunate people were hoarding. Is there a lawsuit, whether anything has survived. I sympathize with their grief, because

I knew what it meant to be homeless. I arrived in Moscow in the morning.

after convalescing with the owner, he told the evil about the fire in the village and showed the scorched jacket. To my surprise, he didn't even scold me, and I was grateful for it.

Otom ok z elk that I was just lucky. By noon, the owner was very profitably extending a batch of furs and worked hard on this. - if not for this, skzl edor v novich (olesov, master-streak, according to the definition of the uk, "my fair, experienced and

second-rate of all masters." - V.S.), - to be an otter for you, to a sidorova

goat.

five before us is a slyly written story, which, however, does not stand up to criticism even from the point of view of simple common sense. it turns out that the owner is a real devil, ready to carve a student for a bottle of holes burned during the rescue of children from

burning house and refusing execution only because after a successful

, deal

was in extremely good spirits. Although this seems to be a charitable cause, their Il Remyevich is a man of God, regularly goes to church, and even strives to accustom his disciples to the faith. why would he flog the mountains, no, sorry, not

Gor, Georgiy Onstantinovich - after all, according to his cousin BRT, he has been magnified since the age of fifteen. orotz what the underdog burned, that is, already, it turns out, his own pidge to? y, express regret that the

good thing is spoiled, their silt

remievich, of course, could. oh no more. He went with me, when he could, he took care of his neighbors. his son recounts: "In 1912, my mother George fell ill and came to Moscow to my brother.

the father invited doctors who, after examining the patient, recommended to immediately put in

hospital where she underwent a complicated operation. When George left the hospital, he stayed for about a month, recovered, rested and asked his brother to send her home. The father asked George to take mt to the village. I went with great joy to see my mother home, to the skiing area, and lived in the village for several days, saw my comrades and relatives and returned to Moscow to uncle Isha.

It turns out, according to the memoirs. . ilihin ,, that in 1912 Ukov went home twice: the first time in the summer, accompanying, the second time - after graduation, n

Christmas, moreover, it occurred during the first holiday. oh see georgy

Onstantinovich does not write anything about his mother's illness, so as not to destroy the image created in the memoir of the owner - a demonic villain. There are few readers who will believe that.

a person at the same time will take care of a sick sister, without

time, no money,
and threaten her son, his nephew, with beatings through the hole in his jacket.

what was the fate of the uks after he became the master? If you believe the memurm mrshl, then Ikhil Rtemyevich again tried to piss him off: "At the end of 1912, my apprenticeship ended. became a young master (undermaster). The owner asked where I thought I should live next: should I stay in the studio apartment or go to a private apartment?

"If you stay at the workshop and continue to eat in the kitchen with the boys, then your salary will be ten rubles; if you go to a private apartment, then you will receive eighteen rubles."

I had a lot of life experience, and I said that I would live at the master's.

Apparently, the owner was quite satisfied with this, because at the end of the work of the masters, I always found some urgent unpaid work for me.

A little time passed, and I decided: "No, that's not going to work. I'll go to a private apartment, I'd better read in the evening.

I note that one detail here immediately arouses suspicion: several pages of peacetime Georgy Onstantinovich writes that extra pay was paid for overtime work, it turns out that for some reason the owner did not pay anything for the hard work . the same

Ilihin testifies that immediately after the end of the teaching, the salary of the uks was not ten or eighteen, as much as twenty-five rubles a month - the same as the eldest son of the owner Leksndr, the same age George. From the time when the marshal was writing his memoirs, it was somehow inconvenient to write a relatively large amount of "under the tsarist regime". From there, Georgy Onstantinovich decided to have fun, and even emphasize his passion for reading. about the desire to highlight his own person in every possible way played a cruel joke with him. because literally on the next page, the memorist informs readers: "The owner trusted me, apparently convinced of my honesty. He sent me to the bank to receive checks or deposit money into his checking account. he enil me and, to bezotk zny worker

, ich one hundred br l in your own shop, where, in addition to furrier work,
to me

ordered the forging of goods and sending them by mail. - overtime underpaid I, one
to

he trusted large sums of money and expensive goods without any idea that George would try to take what was badly lying, and in some way compensate himself for processing.

udes ,d and only.

Great changes were made in the life of the uks in the summer of 1914, the year of the world wars. Georgy Onstantinovich testifies: "I remember the beginning of the First World War as a pogrom of foreign shops in Moscow. under the cover of patriotic slogans, under the cover of patriotic slogans, agents of the militia and the Black Hundreds (often it was one and the same thing.) organized the pogrom of German and Austrian firms. it involved many who simply wanted to profit from something. Because these people could not read signs in foreign languages, then at the same time they smashed other foreign firms - French, English.

Ilihin recalled: "In the fall of 1914, Lexander left secretly from his parents as a volunteer to protect his one. Moscow was already overflowing with wounded exiles. rigl shl lexandr and georgia, but for some reason he refused. Alexander from the front sent the son of his odina, he could not remain without participation. gon front letter where pis l:

seriously wounded, and he was evacuated to a hospital in Moscow. He was discharged from the hospital as an invalid; he returned home to his father in November 1917. Therefore, I left for the village of Vernya Ryaz to visit my mother, whom I and my daughters took care of the peasant economy. Alexander stayed in the village until February 1918 and signed up as a volunteer in the army. defending the revolution from the White Guards, I died in the battles near Ritsyn.

ukov in "< memories and reflections" evaluates a little differently

n triotic impulse of his cousin brt:

"Under the influence of the propaganda, many young people, especially among the well-to-do, overwhelmed by patriotic feelings, left the volunteers for the war. Leksndr Ilikhin also decided to run to the front and all the time tried to persuade me.

At first, I liked his proposal, but still I decided to consult with the newcomer's friend - with my authoritative person for me. listen to me, he said:

"The desire of Lexander is not clear: he has a rich father, he has something to

howl. you fool, why fight? life is that your father was kicked out of

Oskovy, isn't it because your mind swells from hunger? .. if you return to the doctor, no one will need you.

Those words convinced me, and I said that I would not go to war. brug me, he fled from home in the evening to the front, two months later he was brought to

Oscu is heavily wounded.

At that time I was still working in the workshop, but I was already living in a private apartment in Khotny Ryad, opposite the present hotel "Oskv". he was given three rubles a month for a bed at Lysheva's widow. I fell in love with someone's Riya, and we decided to get married. About wars, as it always happens, confused all our hopes and calculations. Due to heavy losses at the front in 1915, an early call-up of youth born in 1895 was made. ling war young men who have not yet reached the age of twenty st. oddhal and my turn.

I didn't feel any particular enthusiasm for the zm, because every time Shguv met the unfortunate clerks who returned from the front, the sons of gods continued to live widely and and immediately saw, to to near carelessly. They rode across the streets of the city on "dashing" in chic exits, playing lyn races and running, or having drunken orgies in the "< p" restaurant. However, I thought that if they took me into the army, I would honestly fight for Russia.

my boss, who appreciated my work, said: "If you want, I will arrange for you to be left for a year due to illness and, maybe, to be left clean." replied that he was quite healthy and could go to the front. "< What, do you want to be such a fool, kk sh? He said that it was his duty to protect one. With this, the conversation ended and did not reappear.

At the end of July 1915, early conscription into the army of the youth of my year of birth was announced. asked the owner to go to the village easier. hang out with your parents, and help them with the harvest."

Georgy-Onstintinovich painted a portrait of a young furrier who did not want to take part in the "imperialist massacre" voluntarily, but who considered it dishonorable to evade military duty when it was time to be drafted along with his peers. For greater persuasiveness, a monologue of a revolutionary-minded alleged reader who read the Bolshevik newspapers Vezd and Rvd was introduced. master olesov of denunciation in enough, the son , the address of lex ndr ilihin: goes de defense. t paternal to pit ly. Indeed, the father, oddly prevents this noble impulse in every possible way, and she has to run away from the front from her parents. my main thing is that we know that he fought in the Red Army, where he joined voluntarily, and died "for the cause of the workers and peasants," to use the official Soviet terminology. albeit, n true, in

Not

to a lesser extent, they were motivated by patriotic motives: in February 1918, German troops invaded Soviet Russia.

the second son of the god ilihin, ihil, fought on the side of the reds, not the whites, as, it seemed, he should have suggested the logic of protecting his father's capital. then he successfully served as a driver in: and by the time of the year, in fact, by the 17th year, Zhukovsky's uncle was no longer there. Illich Ilovich recalls that in 1916 his father liquidated his enterprise. about whether wartime conditions were

unfavorable, or - or Khin Sr. brilliantly foresaw that they would soon begin

"to expropriate the expropriators," and hastened to get rid of the workshop. killin che,

ih ilrtemyevich successfully endured all the storms of the revolution and the civil war and died

in your bed. if he had remained a "bourgeois", you see, his red terror would not have passed. they could calmly shoot kz a liar. sons-kr, it's clear that the Rmeians would not have slept.

I was under the impression that the ukow incorrectly states the time when it was early

Cousin Lex NDR: just two months after his escape to the front. . he does not say exactly when the . ilihin Nilishu was born, but indicates that he returned from the hospital to his father only in November 1917. but if the wound was heavy and lexandr or chin stl

disabled, it still seems unbelievable that he spent three whole years in the hospital.
eat

Moreover, their eldest son, Il Rtemyevich, did not come out of there at all well, and then he was accepted into the army, and even into the combat unit. most likely, A.M. ilihin nili not at the end of 1914, kk leaves the zhukovsky rskz, much later:

v

1915 or even in 1916, already after George was called up for military service. I ordered that the cousin's claim should be treated almost immediately, as if to confirm the words of master olesov. With our proposal, the owner received additional motivation. Bearing in mind the sad fate of his son, lkhilrtemyevich had to try to save one of the few craftsmen who remained with him, besides his own nephew, from the risk of dying or becoming disabled. here's the trouble - < . . ilihin does not remember anything about this conversation, even from the words from my instructions. Did he really never tell his cousin this episode, if you figure it out, Ilrtemyevich, who paints them, is not in such a bad light? Personally, I am inclined to believe that the owner's proposal to "cut down from the army" was invented with my Georgiy Onstantinovich from the very beginning and to the end. How could his uncle have had sufficient connections at all to save his nephew from conscription? in order to get into the service of the unions and cities, to become despised by the front-line soldiers "zemgusrom",

education was required, which the UKS did not have. Besides, in this case, he would no longer be able to work in the workshop. On the other hand, in order for them to recognize a healthy strongman as unfit for service, a colossal bribe was required, which in itself was a risky business and threatened to undermine the material well-being of Ilykhin Sr. Such a proposal should have, albeit not in real life, only in Zhukovsky's memoirs, once again emphasize the nobility of the future marshal. He had the opportunity not to endanger his life and health, to continue to work well in the furrier's craft. He decided that it was not worth hiding behind the backs of his comrades.

wow, everything was so much easier. George refused to go with Alexander

volunteering for the army not for high ideological reasons, because, as the majority of the population of all the states that entered the war, it was assumed that it would not last long. nothing to quit a lucrative job. more than that George was going to

marry. he did not beat the skinner. When the war dragged on and the turn came to be called up, there was no way to evade the common fate. and uncle, nor anyone else reprieve from calling him a prell g l. George and not claiming any delay.

"Faith, Ts ryai flow!": UKS during the First World War

On August 7, 1915, George Onstantinovich Ukov was drafted into the army in the city of Loyaroslavl. th was identified in the 5th zp to the Leri regiment. First, the future cavalymen were trained on foot as part of the 189th Infantry Battalion in the meadow. The first day of classes ngnl for new recruits longing. from which he is described in "reminiscences and reflections": "the separate commander corporal khvorostov ... strictly warned that, except for "need", none of us could go anywhere if he did not want to get into in a disciplinary battle ... he spoke abruptly and sharply, accompanying each word with a wave of his fists. His small eyes shone with anger as if we were his sworn enemies. —,, „—_ the soldiers said, "don't expect any good from this fruit ... then a senior non-commissioned officer approached the ranks. — the corporal command ndov l: "peacefully!" - your platoon commander lyavko, - sk 3 l senior non-commissioned officer. "I hope you understood well what the detached commander explained, so you will faithfully serve the king and the fatherland. - I will not tolerate movolia!

It was the first day of combat exercises. - each of us tried to fulfill the command well, this or that combat technique or action with a weapon. It was not easy to please the bosses, and even more so to wait for

promotion. appreciative of the fact that one soldier lost his way, extra classes. Whether we were on our cold feet, impression of decay from the first day the platoon commander held everyone back with our last ones. The was depressing. calved rather to lie down and burrow out of sleep. oh, as if the time of foreign intentions, the platoon ordered to line up and announced that tomorrow they would be taken out for a general evening verification, therefore we must learn the state anthem "Ozhe, tsryakhrni!". learning and singing continued until night. on the night of the morning we were already on our feet, on the morning exercises.

Subsequently, as he admitted, the service of the back battalion brought joy: "they were monotonous, like two drops of water similar to one another.

the first Sunday came. if they knew how to rest, to swim, but they took them out to clean up the camp in the camp. Bork lasted until lunchtime, after the "dead hour" they cleaned their weapons, repaired the soldier's munition and wrote letters to relatives. Freytor warned that

It's impossible to complain in a letter that it's impossible, because he won't let censorship through.

pulling into the service was not easy. About the life of Nsi before this, most of them got used to, and weeks to the army order in two years.

At the end of the second week of training, our platoon was presented for inspection to the company commander - the headquarters of the battalion of food supply. It was said that he drank heavily and, when he was a PIAN, it was better not to fall into his eyes. Outwardly, he was not particularly smart, he did not differ from other officers, but it was noticeable that he checked our combat training without any interest. Conclusion, he said that we should try harder, because "with the prayers, the services will not be lost during the king."

On our departure to the 5th Cavalry Regiment, we saw our company commander still in the ranks, and, it seems, he was not cheerful. So the commander of the 189th cannon battalion is saying that we didn't see him all the time of our training.

This refers to the general illness of the Russian army, in which between the officers and the soldiers lay a class abyss. officers rarely appeared in their companies x, all s bot about

training soldiers t by entrusting non-commissioned officers and sergeants. those, in turn, bullied the soldiers as they wished. and an officer like an old man, a company, a rank of prongs on the right if appeared in and left and privates, and a non-commissioned officer for a protracted war, with heavy losses and no visible successes of Russian weapons, since the army was not suitable. toi

The Jewish revolution soon ended, during which the role of "fuel material" was played precisely by 6 tons of notes.

In September 1915, Ukov and his comrades were sent to the 5th Cavalry Regiment, stationed in the city of Ller, Rykov province. The newcomers were placed at the nearby station - Vintsy, where marching reinforcements were being prepared for the 10th Qualerian Division. uks and other conscripts from the Luga province were assigned to the dragoon squadron. they were not upset that they didn't hit the hussars: they were more beautiful in form, and the non-commissioned officer, they said, more humane. RVD, at the front, all the same, everyone had to dress in the protective color of the anthem of the eraser. bright hussrian mentics and dragoon shakos were left only for the lines.

Ukov learned the ability to walk in formation and fight on foot. after all, the ragguns were intended for actions on horseback, weaving on foot, they were a kind of "driving infantry". on the other hand, machine guns, rapid-fire guns and solid lines of trenches, covered with many rows of barbed wire, had already clearly forced all the belligerents to dismount. These brushes have become a rarity. about other gunas, first of all, they taught to the Lerian wisdom. it was more difficult, but also more interesting than the training of infantry fighters. Georgy Onstantinovich recalled: "In addition to general classes, training in equestrianism, the use of edged weapons and three-time cleaning of horses was added. I had to go to bed no longer at 6 o'clock, to the quarter infantry - at 5, go to bed

h later.

The most difficult thing was horse training, that is, riding, volting and possession of edged weapons - a pike and a rod. during the ride, many of them rubbed their legs to the blood, but it was impossible to catch. they said only one thing: "erpi, kz k (it would be more correct - other gun. - . .), tm will be. we endured until we sat firmly in the saddle.

the recruits were firmly seated in the saddle already in the spring of 1916. Then, according to Mukov: "Thirty people were selected from among the most trained soldiers to teach them as non-commissioned officers. their number is pop i. I didn't want to go to the training team, but the platoon commander, whom I sincerely respected for his intelligence, decency and love for the soldier,

persuaded
me to go to school.

"You will still be at the front, friend," he said, "now, study military affairs better, it will come in handy for you. convinced that you will be a good non-commissioned officer.

Otom, thought for a bit, added:

- [- I'm not in a hurry to go to the front again. A year on the front line, I learned well what it is, and understood a lot ... it's a pity that our kind is dying so stupidly, from what, one asks?

He didn't say anything to me anymore. It was felt that in the soul of this man a contradiction arose and already broke out into the open between the duty of a soldier and a citizen who did not want to put up with the arbitrariness of the tsarist regime. - thanked him for his advice and agreed to go to the training team, which Yar had settled in the city of Zyumerkovskaya province. kv < reminiscences and reflections, "published in 1969, marshal rszl, to konpopl in the training team. about the writer Konstantin Imonov in the mid-60s, he described this episode in a completely different way: "Sometimes I think about why exactly, not otherwise, my life path in the war and in general in life developed. In essence, I could have ended up in tsarist times at the school of ensigns. GRADUATED In Ryusovsky (former Zetnoy) Lane, a four-class school, which at that time had a sufficient educational qualification for admission to the school of ensigns. When I, a nine-year-old boy, went to war as a soldier, I was just as successful

could go to the school of prorschikov. I didn't want that about me. I did not write about my education, I only said that I had finished two classes at a parochial school, and they took me on as a soldier. to, to kyai wanted. my decision was influenced by a trip to my native village not long before. met m, house ,, two ensigns from our village, so bad, unsuccessful, clumsy that, looking at them, it was somehow embarrassing for me to think that here I am, nineteen years old

little boy , I will graduate from the school of ensigns and go to command a platoon, and to command former soldiers with beards, and in their eyes I will be the same as these ensigns that I saw at home in the village. I didn't want to, it was embarrassing. went soldier tom. then he graduated from the non-commissioned officer school - a training team. This command, I would say, was a very serious educational institution and trained non-commissioned officers more thoroughly than our regimental schools are now preparing. I grew up in the war as a soldier and non-commissioned officer, and after the February Revolution I was elected chairman of the squadron committee. You can't say that I was a politically conscious person in those years. The slogan that took the , then a member of the regiment. living, thrown at that time among the soldiers not only by the Bolsheviks, but also by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, had a great deal of meaning and was picked up by many. Of course, there was a general feeling in my soul, a sense of where to go. about at that moment, in those young years, it was possible to turn off the right path. that, too, was not excluded. Who knows what would have happened if I had turned out not to be a soldier, an officer, I would have received other officer ranks, and by that time the revolution would

have broken out. If I had gone under the influence of certain circumstances, where would I have ended up? perhaps if he had lived his life somewhere in exile? Of course, later, a year or two later, I was already a conscious person, I had already determined my path, I already knew where to go from what to fight, but then

sun

mom

At first, if my fate had turned out differently, if I had turned out to be an officer, who knows

to kbylo. How many crippled destinies turned out to be at that time of the same duck people from the outside, kkyia ...".

Before us is another artistic fantasy, on this topic: it's good that I didn't become a warrant officer and didn't go against the Bolsheviks. rvd, the language is somewhat clumsy, because Imonov tried to convey Zhukov's words as accurately as possible, colloquial speech is not, for example, kliteraturny. olluoplny rsh Ir was talking not just with a writer, but with a member. he tried to convince the interlocutor of the party, he did not allow any deviations. in tsarist times, I felt in my gut that it was not up to becoming an officer. then he that was always before business became conscious and never left the party line. the whole oton is in front of the onstan tin of their ilovich to the prince of the spirit. confesses even that which was not, but could be. Lvog, did not become a warrant officer, did not succumb to the git of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, did not fall for the Whites, then emigrated. We already know that in fact no school of lieutenants came close to George Onstantinovich, since he did not have a completed four-year education. Readers of "Memories and Reflections" did not know about this until 1996, when Zhukovsky's autobiography of 1938 appeared in print. they believed that before the war he had graduated from the city school, as was mentioned in the memo. The bottom of the corpus judgments about a possible career as a sergeant disappeared from there. why? Possibly, the work of yand in "reminiscences and reflections," he thought. If we say that I did not consciously go to the school of

ensigns and even downplayed my education for this, then the teacher of military teachers will immediately have a question:

what did you go to the training team for? then to lead the soldiers "from the faith, the king and the fatherland"? if you're lucky, then become the same ensign? Indeed, in the 16th year, many combat non-commissioned officers became ensigns, having completed short-term courses. by 1917, half of the officer corps was made up of kki uks,

immigrants from peasants and zkovs. Another 21 percent of the officers are from the mesh. Before the war, there were only 22 percent of the representatives of all lower classes among the officers. the bottom gap between the soldiers and the officer is not at all

decreased. the freshly baked ensigns and the bs-k pitna staff felt the taste, albeit small, but of power in people, strove for a further military career, which means that ik

continuation of the war to a victorious end. Old the same, by the end of the 16th year of the wars, managed to thoroughly eat up. Moreover, there were no major victories capable of bringing its End closer. suddenly think that he aspired to the

training team only in order to stay longer in the rear? Ukov decided to prevent unwanted questions and introduced one more character into the story. as we remember, the politically conscious master olosov was a teacher of life for George. On the same squadron, his place was taken by a platoon commander, although he had a dull-sounding surname of urkov, but he cared about the soldiers, demanding and fair. That urkov and cools the ukov rushing into battle, explains that there is nothing to rush to the front, it is better to get a non-commissioned officer rank and pick up military knowledge. It turns out that Georgy Onstantinovich is not deprived of courage, but he begins to understand that one should not rush to lay down one's head for the interests of "landlords and capitalists." Being on the training team was by no means honey-and-chrome for the uks. The head turned out to be a senior non-commissioned officer, nicknamed four and a half - on his right hand, the index finger was half as short as required. This defect, however, did not prevent the sergeant with a fist blow from knocking the soldiers down. sword that is among

Soviet

generals named after rshlov, where scuffle was a common thing, only an uncommissioned officer, with me in the past, a non-commissioned officer, mastered such an art. Four and a half relations between the uks did not work out. Georgiy onstantinovich recollection of L: "No one so often stood "under the arm at full combat", did not drag so many sandbags from the stables to camp shawls, did not take duty on the holiday

m, kky. understand L that all this is the malice of an extremely stupid and unkind person. The reason was that he could not find fault with the classes. Convinced that nothing could catch me, he decided to change tactics, perhaps he simply wanted to distract me from combat training, where I was ahead of the others. someone he called

I was right next to me and said: "From what, I see, you are a scammer, literate, and military affairs are easy for you. Oh,

you are a Muscovite, a worker, why do you sweat every day in class? You will be my non-staff scribe, you will keep lists of orders, reporting on classes and carry out other assignments. to become a "stationary rat", even with the functions of a personal lackey of an unloved non-commissioned officer, Ukov did not have the slightest desire: "I went to the training team not to be an envoy for all sorts of cases, in order to study business and become a non-commissioned officer. Four and a half threatened: "Look, I'll do it so that you will never be a non-commissioned officer!" The author of "reminiscences and reflections" delicately avoids the question of whether he had to endure scuffles from his superiors. in addition to four and a half, a junior non-commissioned officer was distinguished by a special passion for assault

with
a colorful surname from an orod vka, one of the Zhukovsky commanders. n, by definition was George Onstantinovich, the "loud, nervous and cru Yne impudent n hand. From what servants said that he had knocked out the soldier's teeth not without reason. It can, of course, be assumed that neither the Ordovka nor the four and a half wanted to get involved with the physically strong ukov. oh, it's hard to believe. or something they are under a hot hand, not

Very
R zbir I who exactly from what. Ser obviously knowing that no one will dare to resist. resistance will be regarded as non-compliance with orders and sent to a disciplinary 6 tons, with it - almost certain death at the front (penalty boxes were placed in the most hopeless places). then from the orphanage to ukov, nevertheless, a few clods were twisted, perhaps,

Guess from the following story of the marshl: "< the military, having remained in the platoon, rushed with might and main. as soon as he mocked the soldiers! him, drove to the bottom of the classes, swaggering especially at those who lived and worked before the draft in Moscow, because they considered them "literate" and too smart. at night, he checked the inner line several times, caught sleeping daymen and beat them. old you were brought to cr Inosti.

having spoken, we somehow spun him in a dark corner and, throwing a blanket over his head, beat him until he lost consciousness.

It would be impossible for all of us to pass the court-martial, but then our platoon commander returned, who took everything away, and then achieved the transfer of the guard to another squadron.

Undoubtedly, the platoon's comrades gave the platoon leader a nightly "dark" night in retaliation for the daytime beatings, arranged in such a way that the general could not identify his offenders. wallpaper

and the humiliations that Georgy Onstantinovich had to endure in the army before becoming a non-commissioned officer could have a bad effect on his character. Is this why the well-known cruelty of the uks in relations with subordinates, the constant readiness to kick in the face, during the war - to shoot for any reason or without any reason?

Four and a half did everything to keep his promise. two weeks before the end of the course before the formation, it was announced that the commanders were expelled from the team "for indiscipline and disloyal attitude towards the immediate superiors." unexpectedly, George was helped by the volunteer Corino, brother of the deputy commander

from the same squadron, where he served as a commanding officer before joining the training team.

Corino told the commander of the training team about the incident, indicating the admitted

non-commissioned officer injustice. More events, according to the orders, developed as follows: "The team leader ordered me to be called to his place. he was a little cowardly, because before that he had never spoken with officers (and this was a year spent

nia

in army!— . .), „u, dum yu, skip !! Apparently, the disciplinary battle is inevitable."

team member we knew little. It is rare that he received an officer's rank for courage and was awarded almost a full 6 of St. George's crosses. About the war, he served somewhere in the Ulinsky regiment in the Khmistroy for extra-long service. — You saw him sometimes only at evening inspections, they said. then he is ill after a severe wound.

to my surprise, I saw a man with soft and, I would say, even warm eyes and an ingenuous face.

- What, soldier, are you unlucky in the service? they asked, pointing me to a chair. were afraid to sit down. — get out, get out, don't be afraid!

"Exactly, in your honor," I replied, trying to pronounce each word as loudly and clearly as possible.

- after all, he is also a Muscovite, he worked before his service in a river grove, a cabinetmaker by profession. here he is stuck in military service, and now, apparently, he will have to devote himself to military affairs, - softly said the enemy.

otome shut up added fork:

- why, soldier, you were treated badly by a r kteristik. they are looking for you to have a dozen penalties for four months of training and call your platoon commander "skin" and other bad words. kli it?

"In our high nobility," I replied. - I can report one thing, that everyone in my place would have behaved the same way. - Rsksk z lema everything is as it was.

Have you listened carefully to what was said:

- di in the platoon, PREPARE FOR THE EXAMINATION MEN.

here is a happy ending - I successfully passed the exams. r vd, George was somewhat distressed. he was the best in the commander, he believed that he would be the only one to be released in the rank of junior non-commissioned officer and in the position of squad leader in the training team. o all graduates, including uks, received only the rank of vice non-commissioned officer,

i.e. only the candidate for the non-commissioned officer rank.

This whole story is one of the few in the entire text of Zhukovsky's memoirs, which causes

my almost absolute confidence. here George Onstantinovich does not hide his fear

Before a possible punishment, the behavior of the team leader looks quite natural. Ride them with Ukov about -Sch not only countrymen, Muscovites, but also fellow artisans in civilian life. only one is a cabinetmaker, the other is

furrier. JUST THAT THIS, apparently, a kind, languishing officer rarely appeared in his team, almost completely entrusting the training of soldiers to non-commissioned officers like four and a half.

Despite the troubles with the platoon, George Onstantinovich considered the training team his main school, where he had a chance to master military affairs: "Now appreciating the training team of the army, I must say that, in general, they taught in she feels good, especially with the elk drill. Each graduate was a perfect master of equestrianism, weapons and methods of training fighters. By chance, many non-commissioned officers of the military army after the October Revolution became qualified military commanders of the military army.

As far as educational work is concerned, it was based on drill. future non-commissioned officers were not instilled with the skills of human communication with soldiers, they were not taught to delve into the soul of a soldier. One goal was pursued - for the soldier to be obedient to that volume. discipline The practice was built on cruelty. The statute did not provide for corporal punishments, but in practice they were applied quite widely ...

The main foundation on which the army was kept was the non-commissioned officers, who trained, educated and cemented the soldier mass. The candidates for the training of non-commissioned officers were carefully selected. The chosen ones were trained in special training teams, where, as a rule, combat training was exemplary. At the same time... the slightest offense was immediately followed by a disciplinary sanction associated with physical assault and moral insults. Thus, future non-commissioned officers, upon leaving the training team, had good combat training and at the same time had "practice" in influencing subordinates in the spirit of the requirements of the tsarist military regulations.

to say that the officers of the units completely trusted the non-commissioned officers in the training and education of soldiers (which, by the way, is hardly good: on the one hand, the officer actually

withdrew from participation in combat training of soldiers, on the other hand, the soldiers were completely at the mercy of the "pulling right" of non-commissioned officers and sergeants; this practice was preserved in the military army. - ..). Some trust undoubtedly contributed to the development of non-commissioned officers with confidence, initiative, a sense of responsibility and strong-willed qualities. In a combat situation, non-

commissioned officers, especially firemen, were for the most part good commanders.

My many years of practice shows that where there is no trust in junior commanders, where there is a constant guardianship of senior officers over them, there will never be a real junior command staff, therefore, there will be no there will be good subdivisions."

grows in the eye, with which enthusiasm Georgiy Onstantinovich describes the process of military training. One gets the impression that this aspect of the service attracted him the most. In the military army, tests invariably emphasized Zhukovsky's successes in organizing and directing the combat and tactical training of the troops. Perhaps the marshal's true calling was to teach soldiers to junior commanders, being a non-commissioned officer of the training team? (teaching in schools for demia, as we will see later, he had a persistent allergy).

It is hard not to agree with the judgments of the uks. the inter-officer corps of the tsarist army was prepared very well, besides him, they left the non-commissioned officers,

For example, such Soviet marshly kk E udenny, u. imoshenko, okossovsky, .. onnev. ABOUT THAT is what catches the eye. Even before entering the training team, Ukov Half a year having mastered military wisdom in military parts. ST B

non-commissioned officer, he got to the front only a year after mobilization. elikuyu

the current war of luxury for six months to study military affairs georgy onst ntinovich

novice nc m week ow. an untrained, often unarmed reinforcement grew into battle, whose stay in the airborne battalions was calculated in a few weeks. some of the local residents, mobilized on the territory that had just been recaptured from the enemy, were immediately thrown
v

the battle. and sergeant m and sergeant m for six months to study for a long time. Due to the huge irretrievable losses of the military army, some of the junior commanders managed to acquire and pass on combat experience to their subordinates. they all died too quickly.

The falsity of the education system, when the exclusive emphasis was on junior commanders, consisted in the fact that the soldiers lost all initiative, were not accustomed to independent actions and did not dare to do anything without permission. The features of the royal army were preserved in the Russian army, although the role of the junior commanders in the army has undergone significant changes.

At the beginning of August 1916, freshly minted non-commissioned officers began to be sent along marching squadrons. 15 people were sent directly to the front - to the 10th Cavalry Division. ukov remember I:

"In the list of these 15 people, I stood second and was not at all surprised by this, because I knew well whose hands this was. Whether to read the list before building the command.

Four and a half smiled, two to understand that the fate of each wear depends on him. Therefore, we were fed a festive dinner and ordered to pack up for loading. taking our duffel bags, we went to the place of formation of the front team, a few hours later the echelon set off towards the rki. Whether for a long time, they stopped almost at every siding. echelons with the wounded were meeting. the advance of the good front of the general Rusils, heavy losses and gradually depleted the strength of the Russian army.

which began with the breakthrough of the Austrian positions in the area of Utsk, cost

that the . Elipovich, having studied the data of Russian, German and Austrian historians. archives, established overall ratio of deadweight losses was far from in favor of the Russian troops. For the period see December 1916, the troops of the previous front lost 201,000 soldiers and officers killed, 1,091,000 wounded, and 153,000 missing (mostly prisoners). Built-Hungarian troops during the same period in operations against the 1st front, as well as in the battle under the Rovichi with the troops of the 1st Front on the Inumyn Front, lost 45 thousand soldiers and officers killed, 216.5 thousand wounded and about 378 thousand prisoners. The losses of the German troops operating against the good front amounted to approximately 39,000 prisoners and 101,000 killed and wounded. the ratio of prisoners was in favor of the Russian troops - 2.7: 1. then those killed in the armies of the Central Powers were 3.3 times less than in the Russian army, the wounded - 3.6 times less. Such large losses were caused by the scattered, in parts, introduction of reserves to develop the initial success near Utsk. Insufficiently prepared frontal tanks for the Russian army reached the crimson stage of exhaustion. In the fall of 1916, the conscription of 16-17-year-old boys began, who formed the main backbone of the reserve units for the nun of the February Revolution of 1917. Ukov and his comrades were assigned to the 10th Novgorod Dragoon Regiment. When they were unloading in the region of Menets-Odol'sk, an enemy plane flew into the station. bomb explosion killed one soldier tir nilo five horses. to George Ukov

received a baptism of fire. From the unloading area, replenishment in marching order moved to the nest, where a 10th division was in reserve for the front. they arrived at their destination at the end of August, already after the year 14/27 August 1916, under the influence of the successes of Russian weapons, declared war on Germany and its ally at the beginning of September, the 10th Cavalry Division concentrated in yonder ystrina, where providing junction of Russian

9th Army with Romanian troops. The terrain was mountainous and wooded, and the courier operators had to operate on foot. The commander, finally promoted to junior non-commissioned officer, this time had a chance to fight for a very short time - less than a month and a half. Also in October, during a horse reconnaissance near the town of Szegen in France, on my front line, he, along with his comrades, was blown up by a mine. Both of the other gunas were seriously wounded, — George was thrown out of the saddle by the blast wave and severely shell-shocked. with this, the participation of the uks in the battles of the First World War ended. he woke up only a day later already in

hospital le. the contusion turned out to be severe, and the non-commissioned officer evacuated the fighters in the war, the task of the 9th army did not fulfill failing to prevent the onset

the grouping of the Integral-German troops under the command of the German General Rich von Lckengijn, concentrated in rnsylvania, against slander. On September 13/26, the troops of the Lkeng Yin # nchli weave, a month later they reached the passage through

Rnsylvanian Lpy. soon almost the entire territory of the sinking was occupied

Vstro-German troops, who were supported in the south by the Bulgarians and Turks. November 21 (December 4), 1916 p uh rest.

although he stayed at the front for quite a bit, but managed to earn two soldiers

St. George's cross: the first - szkht language - a German officer , the second - s shell shock. By the way, this testifies not only to the courage of George

onst ntinovich , but also about the fact that with the squadron commander at the nineteen-year-old non-commissioned officer developed a good relationship. Otherwise, the squadron drone would not be able to sign award presentations. So, Ukov was able, when necessary, to subdue his pride and to find a common language with the authorities: I think that it was not he who was to blame for George's previous clashes with the non-commissioned officers, but it was not he, the lad and four and a half. Apparently, before arriving at the front, Ukov simply had no luck with the commanders.

George came out of the hospital half deaf. The medical commission sent him to the 6th marching squadron of the 10th Ovgorod Dragoon Regiment at the 5th recep to sleep in the Leri regiment in the village of Geri, not far from I klei. It was the drone from my squadron, from which the Ukov went to the training team. George was glad that he would meet with his old comrades. oldtmzp snogo 6 tons of war already finished eating. the soldiers were in no hurry to return to the trenches, many recruits, especially from large cities, even before the call, managed to fall under the influence of revolutionary gittors, especially the Bolsheviks,

also parts of the Mensheviks and Narchists, who called for a quick end to the war.

Commander of the Life Guards of the Ylovsky Regiment Lieutenant General NT .. illing recalled what the state of the spare parts was like on the eve of the February Revolution: "... I'm invisible, but strong and a harmful hand completely removed these battalions from the subordination of the regimental commanders who were at the front at that time, and instead of the regiment commander being the full owner of the reserve battalion, these battalions and regiments themselves were integral part of the battalion. had a solid connection between were

as if separate, with powerful units, which had a very harmful effect in moral terms, in the sense of understanding subordination, as in the composition of officers, as in the lower ranks. only two weeks before the coup (the Jewish revolution. - . .) with great difficulty it was possible to achieve the right for the commanders of the regiments to demand from their reserve battalions those people who, in their opinion, they needed at the front. The remnant of the reserve regiment was disproportionately large and was larger in number than the military regiment (the marching squadron, where the commanders served, was no less in number than the army regiment on the front. - V.S.), which was completely absurd, and, moreover, this congestion only harmed the cause and widely encouraged concealment from being sent to the front, especially since all the replenishment from reserve battalions upon arrival at the front was not immediately put into service, for them in the rear, with the convoy of the 2nd p zryad „

lion was special b t

reinforcements, where the training of weakly and ineptly prepared arriving reinforcements took place, and only a month later, two arriving reserve troops were assigned to companies at the front (after all, they took care in the tsarist army to save soldiers' lives, despite n

big losses; Rsnia army here does not go to any comparison! - the reserve officers were from those who, . . . eat lo almost from the first day of the war, were sitting in these breeches and by all means or not, they tried to elude the command to the front, and these hiding ones played an unimportant role during the coup, the year 1917, because for them, underground activists, accustomed to acting from behind the corners of cowards, was sent to the front as something terrible. I don't want to say at all that Ukov was a coward, by no means. m has yet to be convinced more than once of the courage of the m rsh l. I have no doubt at all that in his squadron there were those who by any means tried to dig in here until the end of the war, including comrades back in 1915. George was able to go with them a common language. But they would not have elected Ukov after the Jewish Revolution as chairman of the squadron

committee and a member of the regimental council. Some George Onstantinovich admitted in his memoirs: "Despite the fact that I was a non-commissioned officer, the soldiers treated me with confidence and often had serious conversations. Of course, at that time Yamlor was involved in political issues, but he believed that only the rich (and waged in the interests of the ruling classes) would benefit from war, only the Bolsheviks and no one else could give peace, land, and freedom to the Russian people. then, to the best of my ability, I inspired my soldiers, for which I was rewarded by them. I don't know if Ukov really thought of the Bolsheviks as the only party that could bring freedom, land and happiness to the people. And here is what only the Bolsheviks consistently advocate for a speedy peace, I guess I knew. He knew the mood of his comrade soldiers, who were striving to end the war (for barely fledgling youths, a non-commissioned officer with two "georgies" was undoubtedly a great authority).

fire of revolution and civil war

On this morning, February 27, 1917, the drone squadron where the Ukov served was alerted. On command, captain von der oltz moved to Lklea, where the headquarters of the 5th reserve regiment was stationed. All the esc drones lined up on the beach. Demonstrators with red flags soon showed up. From them, the soldiers you recognized him as the revolution that had begun in the metropolitan area. At an impromptu rally, slogans were heard: "Oh, chism! oh war! Hello peace between peoples! Hello to the councils of the workers' and soldiers' deputies! the officers of the regiment were restored. The command passed to the soldiers' committee. The oisk was ordered to return to the places of permanent deployment. the next day, an order was received from the regimental committee to elect delegates to the regimental council

And

form squadron committees. Ukov was elected chairman of the squadron committee and a delegate to the regimental council. Georgy Onstantinovich enjoyed the authority of

subordinates.

In the summer of 1917, the drone squadron was moved to the well-known Vinty station near Rkovo. mistl him the October Revolution or, whether the Bolsheviks preferred to talk to us back in the 1930s, the October coup. autobiography 1938 George onst ntinovich noted:

"A part of the October coup was that the squadron, under the leadership of the committee, had planted itself on the platform of the Bolsheviks and refused to "Ukrainize" (i.e., turn into a Ukrainian national military unit subordinate to the center I I maiden jeve. - ..)".

memu r honn pis I a little more:

"... In the late autumn of 1917, some units went over to the side of the etlyura (that is, the central line - ..).

sh esk drone, which consisted mainly of Muscovites and

to the puddle (of course, who did not have the slightest desire

committee. We gave the ..), was sent home by the soldiers of the squadron "Ukrainize". - soldiers certificates certifying their dismissal from the service, and advised them to take carbines and live cartridges with them. Later it turned out that the guarding detachment of anti-Yonarks seized weapons from most of the soldiers. For several weeks I had to hide in glue and mud, because I was wanted by officers who had gone over to the service of the Ukrainian nationalists.

On November 30, 1917, I returned to Moscow, where in October power was transferred to

and reliable hands - into the hands of the Bolsheviks - workers, soldiers and peasants (? - I'm not sure, they were peasants. - [..) deputies. November 30, called .. ilihin. Possibly, on the very date of the return of the uks,

ih or ih llovich, see and prompted her cousin during the period of work on "Reminiscences and Reflections", because in an earlier autobiography of 1938, Georgy Onstantinovich stated that "with the army he returned in December 1917" (maybe the fact is that the Ukrainians just translated the old style into a new one). his arrival rsnaya rmiyum rsh I remember ltk:

"I spent December 1917 and January 1918 in the village near my father's estate, and after the rest I decided to join the ranks of the Red Guards. At the beginning of February, he fell seriously ill with typhus, and in the end with relapsing fever. I was able to fulfill my desire to fight in the ranks of the Red Army only six months later, having joined in August 1918 as a volunteer in the 4th Cavalry Regiment of the 1st

Oskovskaya to in the Lerian division.

It would be possible to believe that Georgy Onstantinovich went to the red army as a volunteer. ov autobiography 1938 he wrote in black and white:

"- from the end of September 1918 on mobilization. Luzhbin h lv in the 4th Oskov regiment (k in Leri) since October 1918.

In the 38th year, Ukov certainly remembered the events of the 18th year, when he wrote than in the mid 60s memoirs, more accurately. other than that, I think, in his declining years, he remembered everything very well. It was no coincidence that he shifted the date of his entry into the army from the end of September to August, in order to at least slightly reduce the gap between illness and mobilization. Only five months is too long a period of time for which more than once it would be possible to fulfill the "desire to fight in the ranks of the red army", if it really existed. I am afraid, however, that at that time George Onstantinovich did not yet have such a desire. He had clearly lost the habit of peasant labor, but he had to give up his dreams of owning a furrier's workshop under the new government. then the uks are well aware of military affairs. It was possible to choose the career of a professional military man. Since both the Luga province and the Moscow Region were in the zone of constant control of the Reds, the former Dragoon non-commissioned officer did not have much choice on which side to fight. At the same time in 1918, a rebellion of the Czechoslovak Corps broke out. - native army of the Socialist-Revolutionary-Menshevik committee of members

Constituent Assembly (omuch) occupying the Volga region. all the western provinces turned out to be occupied by the Vstro-German troops. it was hard to say what would happen to the Soviet stu.

from the shackles and was in no hurry to link his fate with the red army. When he, as a former non-commissioned officer of the tsarist army, was finally mobilized, the military situation became much more favorable for advice. oysk omuch suffered a defeat with a defeat. odritsyn defeated the kz whose army was supported by the Germans of the midon tmn. r dreams. Possibly, it was in these battles that the cousin of the ukov general was killed. Lex NDR Ilikhin. Unlike George, he joined the army as a the autumn volunteer back in February 1918, out of patriotic feelings, in order to fight the German invasion. Ukov in of the 18th, also made the final choice in favor of the Bolsheviks.

Entering the 1st Moscow Division, he immediately signed up as a sympathizer of the Communist Party (he wrote about this in his autobiography of 1931). already on March 1, 1919, he was accepted as a full member of the party by a cell of the 4th to the Leri regiment. that regiment was formed in oscva, in the ktyabrsky kzrmkhny odinka. First of all, Ukov had to serve as a private, but very soon he was made a squad leader - they took into account combat experience and the former non-commissioned officer. On March 1919, the 4th Regiment, together with the division, moved east against the Ural Cossacks. Commander remembered the first battle on the 19th: a desperate felling on the outskirts of the lpovo station. In June, the 1st Oskovsk Yak Division and the 25th Rifle Division under the command of ..pev were able to connect with the besieged garrison of Rlsk. The ki were forced to retreat. The Russian Front 1st to the division was transferred under Ritsyn, which was stepped on by the Russian Army General Armor .. Rangel. In August, when the division of the uks arrived at the front, the city was already laid. Slowly on the left bank of the Olga, not far from the places where the division was stationed, it was captured by the Whites, who had crossed the Olga between Yerny Romiritsyn. red clerks were drawn into the fighting, which reached a particular ferocity in the first half of September, October, when only clashes of local importance continued under the rhymes, the ukov, already being an assistant to the platoon commander, was wounded by fragments of a hand grenade in the left leg and left side. On the battlefield, it was carried out on a burka by the political instructor of the squadron, an old Bolshevik, Nton and Trof Novichin, also wounded. Friendship with him played an important role in arranging George's personal life

onst ntinovich.

nin on a cart drove the uks to the mouths. I am well acquainted with I, who is ltrif Novich Olin and Kolevn Olokhov from Olva, takes care of him, her younger sister, the junior gymnastics student, takes care of the school. Hospital Leokov was unlucky: he also had typhus. the white month of the weekend is alive I his riya. love arose from them. Nukrii Ikolevna Georgy, named after his grandfather, reports:

me that he would have loved the bush already then. her mercy and marvelous blue eyes." k ukov got to nickname appeared - "I know a year a year ago ... her affectionate

one of his first two wives. After a while, readers will understand why I use such a complex verbal construction. After recovering, Ukov received a month's leave and went to his native village. The Olokhov sisters returned to Oltva, but the omn of George and Riya resumed only three years later, already in Minsk. By skirmishing of the uks, he was convinced that the people would live even worse than under the tsar, but this did not shake his desire to serve in the military army. After the vacation, Georgiy Onstantinovich sent a 6-ton reserve with an order to send him to the Red Commander courses in the future. Party membership and being on the training team played their part. From March to September 1920, Ukov studied at the 1st Yaznsky valery courses, located at the station of trozhilovo in a former noble estate. mon sdl extern ex meny 4th class of city schools. The requirements for the examinees were very gentle. The officers-military experts who taught the course understood that four years of the war did not contribute to the assimilation of grammar rules and decimal fractions. pointing nzn chile rshinoy 1st esq drone. I decided to do a well-known thing: to conduct drill and physical training with the cadets, to teach them bayonet fighting, to show how to properly wield a pike and saber. In July, students of the Yazn courses were transferred to Moscow and placed in the Efortovo camps. Ukov and his comrades were included in the combined cavalry regiment of the 2nd cadet brigade, which was going to be sent to fight Rangel. Georgiy-onstintinovich recalls L: "Once I had many relatives, friends and acquaintances. I wanted to see them before going to the front, especially the one for which the young heart suffered, but, unfortunately, I could not visit anyone. squadron commanders, who often left for various reasons, usually left me as a foreman,

chiefly. I decided to confine myself to letters to the dictator. I don't know, whether because of this or for another reason, a quarrel broke out between me and Riya. I soon found out that he came out of the flies, and since then I have never met her again.

I think George's unemployment was the real reason for the spat. heart

George by that time had already been taken by another riya - Olokhova. In August, the cadets of the Nts were transferred to the r snod r. the water cadet regiment was to repulse the general .

fight partisan detachments of generals ostiks and rykhnovskiy. battle under the station of the warm Ukov received a slight concussion. September, when the landing force was forced to evacuate to the eye, the early graduation of some of the cadets took place in armvir. Ukov was assigned to the 14th Separate Commander-in-Chief Brigade here, on the morrow. The

remaining cadets as part of the combined regiment were thrown into the pursuit of scattered white detachments that had retreated to the Vkzsky mountains. the guest regiment popped up from the air and was almost completely destroyed. - You can say that Ukov was lucky. if he had stayed with the regiment, he would hardly have escaped death. The 14th brig de ukow was the commander of a platoon of one of the squadrons of drones of the 1st k in the lerian regiment. Commander Squadron Ishnevsky did not cause him any sympathy. It seemed to George that he had little interest in squadron affairs. but not too good relations with the commander did not interfere with promotion. soon after one of the successful battles against a small detachment of white uks, he was appointed commander of the 2nd, who was in the squadron. Probably, the recommendation of his strict friend in this squadron, political commissar, end of 1920, the brigade was transferred to the Oronezh province to fight the peasant played a role. At the uprising under the leadership of the Olesnikov. after suffering

a number of defeats in battles with regular troops, the Kolesnikovites were forced to retreat
V

Mbo province to connect with the rebel army .. ntions. ud also moved si 14-yak to the brig of the village of oronezh
province in the last months of 1920, ukov
got acquainted with one of his two first wives, lexandra ievna-uykova. very Georgy Onstantinovich from Riya Olokhova — rrit
according to the mother speaking L:

< at that time in the Oronezh region, Nin and Ukov served in one

esc drone. one night the priest made them in the house. On the stove, the father noticed the frightened girl and asked her:

- who?

- popovn , - answered Comrade Nini Ukovr laughed, Ukov asked
girl:

- Did you know?

- Will you go to the letter, esk drone?

- I'll leave.

- - LKO Girl - skzl father Nina. - Seriously they will kill you, wars, after all. Might be better off with a letter
in an esc drone. - Ordered Lex Ndra levna to issue. to he okzloei in the squadron, which is commanded by lgeorgy
onst ntinovich. in his youth he was a dashing kr from vec to a lerist. lex ndr

yivn POSSIBLY fell in love with him, I consider myself my benefactor and patron.

u, n account popovny here no doubt I'm wrong ,, call nn i that first i meet

Lexndra and George, indeed, there was a priest in the house, with whom Uikov could in fact be related to someone. about the memoirs of
the eldest daughter of the ukovs, otrbk from the uik rya, his mother was a teacher. Leksndra levna's father, ly Lekseevich, served as
a sales agent for the Inger company's sewing machines, her mother, was born in the city of Ipetsk, Mbov province, and
came from an impoverished peasant family, N. Ksimovna. autobiography 1938, in order to make his father-in-law's origin somewhat
more "proletarian", Georgy Onstantinovich wrote that his wife's father

"repaired" Singer's tires "in the villages. In fact, the sales agent must have had occasional repairs to the firm's products.

Here are the circumstances of the acquaintance of Ukov with Uikova, it seems that they really were very dramatic. The
eldest daughter of Lexandra levna spoke of her mother's words in the following way: "It happened in the 20th year in the Oronezh
province, where mm was born nations of the Oronezh province,

most likely, he was mistaken - in the autobiography of 1938 he wrote that Leksndrievn was a native of the village of len-ozlovk of
the "former Mbov province"; probably in

Well, the Uikovs moved later. — . .), the father of the wars Isbndmintons (actually - Olesnikov. - ..) ... one day our mother was pursued by several

krno rmeitsev, and the father shielded her. onr they curled at each other at first sight and more

no longer rst in foxes. - the account "did not spread" is a clear exaggeration here. As we will see, Georgiy Onstantinovich did not just leave Lexandruievna, then he returned and left again, Georgy Onstantinovich recalled that in clashes with the resurrected Tambov peasants, a hair's breadth never came from death: "the battles of the Antonovites fought quite stubbornly, because a member of their side had a quantitative superiority (on the side of the Red Army there was an overwhelming superiority in weapons and especially in

the number of ammunition owls. - . .). nss they had a lot of difficult fights. I especially remember the battle in the spring of 1921 near the village of Yazovya Ocht, not far from the Erdevk station. but in the morning our regiment as part of a brigade was raised on combat alert. O

According to reconnaissance data, a concentration of up to three thousand from Bel-Ntonovites was discovered 10-15 kilometers from the villages. \u003d w 1st k in the regiment of traces I from the language post in the left column; more directly, 4-5 kilometers away, the 2nd regiment of the brigade was moving. not with esc drone at 4 st ncv

machine guns and one gun were ordered to move along the highway in the lead detachment.

having traveled no more than five kilometers, we ran into a detachment of Ntonovites, about 250 from Bel. Despite the numerical superiority of the enemy, having sent the squadron back, we rushed into the tuck. The Antonovites could not withstand the swift blow and retreated, suffering heavy losses.

During a hand-to-hand fight, one of the Nton soldiers killed a horse under me with a shot from a sawn-off shotgun. — yes, the horse pushed me down, and I would have been immediately hacked if the political instructor had not come to the rescue (it means that Nin had not served in the Zhukovsky squadron by that time. — horse, helped me sit in the saddle. . .). with a strong blow of the blade, he cut down 6 undits and, grabbing the reins of his

soon we marked the enemy column, which was trying to outflank the flank of the esc drone.

fire weapons were immediately turned against her and sent to report to the commander of the regiment

the prevailing situation. skoren sh regiment moved forward from the elm to a firefight.

The 2nd regiment of the brigade, faced with a numerically superior enemy, was forced to retreat back. Taking advantage of this, a detachment of the Ntonovites hit us in the flank. The commander of the regiment decided to turn back the language mail in order to replace the enemy in an unfavorable area for him. there was no order to cover the exit of the regiment from the battle. metiv n shm nevr,

the nttonites poured all their forces into my squadron drone, which acts as a back to the ridge rd regiment.

oh, it was extremely difficult for me. rg saw that we were in a considerable minority, and he was sure that he would doubt us. n the fact that the squadron had four machine guns with a large ammo capacity and a 76-mm gun. Nervous with machine guns and guns, the squadron

fired almost at point-blank range at the enemy's

hauling formations and slowly, in stride, fought back. The other ranks thinned out ... the regiment did not take place in the event of your counter-attack: the spring icy river, which had to be forced, could not stand it, and we had to withdraw in a difficult situation

before the yazova

hon.

but in my village, with a machine gun, I rushed to a group of 6 ndits. a horse was killed by a shot from a rifle under me for the second time that day. got into trouble

position. Pulling out his revolver, he began to fight off the attacking 6 ndits, who were trying to jump up with ryksin fighters, to take me alive. five left. In this battle, my esk drone lost 10 men killed and 15 wounded. a swarm joint ventures with political instructor ochevk orshkov and ov of them died on the second day ...

". to assume that the Antonovites, taking into account the inequality

V

armed, suffered even greater losses. This battle, most of the fighters and commanders were awarded awards - from personalized watches and leather jackets to personalized weapons and the Order of the Red Name. That first Soviet Order of the Knights received an order from the European Military Council dated August 31, 1922. m it was said: "Citizen of the Order of the Red Name, the commander of the 2nd squadron of the 1st regiment of the army regiment of the separate army brigade for the fact that in the battle near the village of Yazov

I

October 5, 1921, despite the pressure of the enemy with a strength of 1500-2000 sbel, he with a squadron held back the pressure of the enemy for 7 hours and, then going into counter-attack, after 6 hand-to-hand combat tokr beat 6 ndu.

"beaten" doesn't sound quite right. After all, the Ukov admits that the planned counter-regiment failed due to the fragility of the ice on the river, and, consequently, the main mass of the Antonovites managed to escape safely. and the strength of the enemy ,, K K Found B

victorious reports, but the sure thing is greatly exaggerated. a number of lines with my case, the Ntonovites were 10 or 15 times more than the Zhukovsky horsemen. However, there is no doubt that the young

squadron commander in the battle under the language post skillfully led the actions of his subordinates and honorably led the squadron out of a difficult situation. George Onstantinovich had something to be proud of. Rhont's memoir described this battle in detail. To the writer Konstanty Imonov, Ukov told a lot about how he had dealt with the Stambo peasants: "We believe that we destroyed one or another brigade or detachment of the Antonovites, they simply crumbled and immediately reappeared next to . the seriousness of the struggle was also explained by the fact that among the Ntonovites there were a lot of former front-line soldiers, and among them non-commissioned officers (Georgy Onstantinovich had a clear weakness towards the latter. -.). one who almost sent me to that world. one of the fighting brigade was beaten up by the Ntonovites pretty much on the heaps of m. If there were fifty machine guns with which we covered ourselves, we would have had a bad time in general. We covered ourselves with them, recovered and drove the Ntonovites away. long before that I had an exceptional horse. took it in battle, shooting the owner. here, chasing the Ntonovites with my esk drone, I saw that they turned to me

n meeting. Having followed the appropriate command, we rushed forward, into the weave. do not hold the horse. n took me sh shit a hundred ahead of the whole esk drone. At first everything went well, the Ntonians began to retreat. during the persecution, Iz marked, it seemed to me who then from

their commanders along the snowy path - there was already snow - the forest went to the edge. with him. music me ... I fire him, I see that with his right hand he whips the horse with a whip, shshk In his scabbard. ignited him and, instead of shooting, rushed at him with a shashka in a fever. He lashed the horse with a whip, now on the right, then on the left side, and at the moment when the yaz waved his sword, the whip lashed him on

the left. flattering, he threw her and right on the move, no sm x

, taking the shku out of its scabbard, he cut me. did not have time to hide:
me

The shk was still carried „ he had already rubbed, instantaneously, completely imperceptible to me by the movement, took it out of its scabbard and in the same turn hit me across the chest. I had a sheepskin coat covered with cloth, a chest strap from shshki, a belt from a pistol, a belt from

binoculars. He crossed all these belts, cut through the cloth on the short fur coat, short fur coat and knocked me out of the saddle with this blow. - if my political instructor had not arrived here, who was chopping him with a saber, it would have

been bad for me. Therefore, when they searched the dead man, they looked at his documents, the letter that he did not add to some line, they saw that it was the same non-commissioned officer, kiya, and

also other gong, only the thunder of the day's growth. then for another half a month my chest hurt from him

ud r".

well, George Onstantinovich was ready to pay tribute to a worthy opponent. when he recalled the white battles of his youth, one felt, inspired, younger in soul. The marshal did not want to remember another, shameful thing, in which he, along with the squadron, must have taken part. from the order of the commander of the troops of the Mimbov province M.N. Ukhchevsky No. 130 dated May 12, 1921, supplemented by "R fork on taking hostages." English forces: "... the family of the evader is taken

As hostages, property is subject to rest. If the 6th applicant appears at the headquarters of the military army and surrenders the weapon, the family and property are released from the rest. — in the event that a bandit fails to appear within two weeks, the family is deported for forced labor, property is distributed among the peasants who have suffered from the bandits. all who call this or that

other

assistance to the bandits are subject to severe personal and property liability before the court of the Revolutionary Military Tribunal, as well as to the participants in the betrayal of the working people.

The commander also demanded from subordinates: "Never make impossible threats. These threats must be carried out steadily to the point of cruelty to the end." the peasants of Mbova tried not to be red-faced, no information about the whereabouts of the rebels, their families and property, and even refused to give their last names, so that it would be impossible to calculate the hiding people from the lists of residents of a particular village Ntonovites. Therefore, on June 11, the chairman of the plenipotentiary commission, Sntonov-vseenko and Ukhchevsky, issued an even more formidable order No. 171, which read:

"Citizens who refuse to give their names should be shot on the spot without trial ... if hidden weapons are found, shoot on the spot without trial the senior worker in the family ... families sheltering family members or property of bandits, to consider how 6 bandits and a senior worker of this family are to be shot on the spot without trial. The call had to be carried out "severely and ruthlessly".

I will never believe that the commander and his squadron managed to elude the execution of these Drkon orders. Ukhchevsky was the one to allow the commanders subordinate to him to cheat. I would not see the Order of the Red Name as my ears, if I showed weakness and carried out orders for repressions without proper enthusiasm. he acted "severely and mercilessly", "to the point of cruelty", also kkin lhinole, and in the great current war. He shot the hostages, and the senior worker in the family put up against the wall, and escaped orders

I

burn. about the second of the criminal orders of the uks in the memoirs he responded very warmly: "

We heard a lot of good things from their village and Kolevich Ukhchevsky, and the soldiers were glad that they would be led by such an intelligent commander.

After discussing the upcoming actions, the brigade ih il ikolevich talked to rivls

fighter and commander mi. He was interested in who fought where, what was the mood in the units.

Before leaving, he said:

< Ldimir Lych Yenin considers it necessary to liquidate the kul'k rebellions and their armed bands as soon as possible. in with assigned responsibility jazdch. to do everything in order to fulfill it as quickly and better as possible "...

the appointment of .. Ukhchevsky and . Ntonov - Vseenko's fight against the National Security Council proceeded according to a well-thought-out plan. what exactly this plan consisted of, our hero bluntly does not specify - otherwise it would be necessary to talk about the shooting of the hostages,
O

deportations of rebel families, about burned villages. then elsewhere in Zhukovsky's memoirs we find a real pnehyric to the one who ordered to poison the defenseless Tambov population with poisonous gases:

thoughts, stars of the first magnitude in the galaxy of outstanding military men of the Russian Army.

apparently, he felt some kind of spiritual kinship with Ukhchevskii, kinship not only in adherence to army discipline, but also in the desire to always achieve the fulfillment of the assigned task, without stopping before cruel measures. Although, of course, at that time Georgy Onstantinovich could not have known that he would be destined to play the second world role for which Ukhchevsky was originally intended.

"reminiscences and reflections" on recent suppression operations

Tambov uprising is said literally in one sentence. "At the end of the years of 1921, the final liquidation of the small 6nd, who had fled across the mbov region, was carried out."

More instructions tells how, with a squadron, he was chasing a "band" of a certain rope numbering 150 sbels, so he defeated him, but he vanquished with several comrades-in-arms

after all, they managed to escape. of course, in the censored manuscript of the uks, in any case, could

paint a true picture of exactly how the "small 6nds" were liquidated and how many hostages from "bandit" families were injured in the process.

Oh, maybe at the end of his life, having known bitterness with a blazing rush, he confessed that he did in the 21st year in the impoverished Mbo province, brought to the last extreme by the brutality of the prodrug. Unfortunately, there are no traces of such repentance either in memoirs, or in letters, or in the memoirs of those who are close to the signs, even if the memories appeared in those years when the KK "SR-Kul mutiny" was troubling. Most likely, Georgiy Onstantinovich, even on his deathbed, was convinced that he had acted correctly, destroying, if not the "bandits", then their "accomplices", and did not at all think that the "accomplices" could be can hardly be attributed

all

peasants of the Mbov province.

to or otherwise, but it turned out that the uks acquired their main combat experience during

under the influence of peasant uprisings. During the First World War, he stayed at the front for a little over a month. fought in the civil war against the regular white armies for no more than three months. I fought against the Olesnikov and Antonov rebels for almost a year, moreover, I already held a rather significant position - commanding a squadron. I was awarded my first Soviet award for the war against the rebellious peasants, which I had nothing to do with the big war of the future. Here is a sign that it was recognized in L that "the ntonovites

did not have any medium, let alone heavy artillery, did not have enough shells, there were interruptions in ammunition, and they tried not to take big fights." It was clear that a warrior with any of the European or Asian powers would be completely different.

bustling everyday life: tkom ndir esk drone of doses of the district commander's avenger

About December 1922, on the bottom front, the commanders continued to command the squadron of the 1st Cavalry Regiment of the 14th Cavalry Brigade, then moved to the same position in the 2nd Squadron of the 38th Quarter lerisky regiment of the 7th mrskoy kvalerian division, located in the district of insk. In March 1923 he was promoted to Assistant Commander of the 40th Regiment of the same division. This happened after the squadron in combat and drill training took first place. Commander of the troops of the middle front, Ukhchevsky issued an order, where Ukov was declared to be grateful. The soldiers of the Zhukovsky squadron Leksndrronik recalled: "For a week, the Komesk conducted drills with junior commanders. I built on the dance floor seven or eight stanks with a stick stuck in a vine, on my high stank - a hill of wet clay. quick iv In provoking

line. on the left flank, he attached a pipe of a forging blacksmith, a veterinary paramedic and a medical assistant - a lekpom, which the soldiers called 'modelling', and at the same time

saying: "You wear a zshka - know how to master it!" quickly recalling the words x, what is the essence of the exercise, then he said: ate th, kkya! "- and vg lop. rumbling - all targets

since wife! ,,,, ott to cuts! "- did the re-enlisted men shake their heads, among whom were

excellent rubies. "The squadron commander will drive up with the knees and command: ,, the right one at an open distance to cut the vines at a glop - march! "...

besides, he perfectly mastered the reception of a bayonet fight. intovk in his hands hkzl lightly, to a pen. he cut through wire obstacles with surprising ease.

speed; He delivered unexpected, strong and well-aimed blows with a butt and injections with a bayonet.

Ronikt also told about one interesting case:

"A new replenishment came to the esk drone, a quiet, ungainly peasant

p rnishk. beaten, frightened, he was with my bad fighter in the squadron. nothing worked out for him, even his own horse he beat, the horse, bared his teeth and did not let the fighter come to him. omeskzn I all z seeing his rider,

fighters esk drone,, especially the weak. someone

young kr sno rmeits, teach". comesk skzl: „ go, str rshin , n to Suvorov

"Is this "Suvorov"?" - I thought, not quite imagining how

you can generally teach this guy, who seemed to be all made up of some kind of fears and descriptions ... the omask explained:

"Uvorov said: he's afraid of soldiers

going together in a circle at night - send him alone! until a person is left alone with his own fear, then he will overcome fear. added: "Severe method, music to personality

is brought up."

soon I saw that the commander was having a conversation with this guy. Commanders rarely did what, in the end, junior commanders should have done. He was constantly in the circle of fighters, knew everything that was happening in the squadron, but acted primarily through his assistants. Marking the commander next to the fighter, I came closer and heard the calm voice of the commander: "Don't be afraid. oh horse is your first friend. Without a horse, you are not a fighter ... tone to make the horse love you? approach him with confidence, not with fear. sl skoy - konl sku loves. I'm getting bread, "sometimes I'll save it..." . it's easy to say - sh rku! for each fighter a day, two or three small pieces of shrug were put out in the elk ... where will he take this shrug? and there was not a lot of bread in those days ... the commander, as if he read into my thoughts, took me aside and quietly say to the bird, let this fighter have a little xp>. skzl: "trshin „, ost lyash r ... esherz dv I saw that the commander was talking to someone with this red army man - maybe, it seems to be unprepossessing, he'll do, he'll say a few words, prnishk after that, it was as if he grew taller, straightened his shoulders ... from you, I thought, and I am harsh in Suvorov schools! no, a lot of time has passed - the guy seemed to have been replaced: a good stl fighter, dexterous, stratelny.

Here we will find many features of the myth: a good magician makes a beautiful swan out of a duckling. However, some realistic details, such as an extra portion of stash, which was given to a fighter for a horse, say: it could be. True, at the beginning of his military career,

George Onstantinovich really found a humane approach to his subordinates, was a caring educator. The foreman testifies that the ukov then "lively did not see any manifestation of a disdainful attitude towards junior officials. He did not tolerate bullying and was extremely severe with those

Who

was responsible for it. Thanks in large part to the squadron commander, excellent camaraderie relations developed between the fighters and the commanders. this contributed to the strengthening of reasonable discipline and diligence. —and there was a friendly esc drone, although the commissar was strict. In July 1923, Ukov became commander of the 39th Regiment (the commissar in the regiment was his old friend Nin). In the autumn of the same year, for successful actions in the district exercises in the Rshi area, his regiment and division as a whole were awarded another praise from Ukhchevskii -

"forcing a forced march and a swift move", initiated by Stlukov. after the exercises they returned to insk. It turned out that the camps assigned to the 39th regiment turned out to be occupied by units of the 4th rifle division, which had not yet had time to redeploy to Lutsk. I had to temporarily settle in private apartments. it started to rain here, but there were no stables. The 7th Marine Division could be left without horses. I had a chance, like the heroes of Nikolay Strovskiy's Roman "Steel swore", day and night to work tirelessly on the construction of stables, repair of barracks and warehouses. "They rounded up the communists," said bows, "then the whole regiment, they explained

the created situation. remembering those distant and difficult years, I would like to note that people were ready for any kind of donation, for any deprivation in the name of a better future. Of course, there were also individual whiners, but they were immediately put in their place by the Red Army

public. kya this is a big one and forces - a healthy army team! m, where an energetic social activist operates, tm will always be worthwhile collective friendship. in it is the key to creative enthusiasm and success in combat readiness of the unit.

At the end of November, when the snow had already fallen, we were able to move to the barns and place the horses in the stables. Of course, there was still a lot of work to be done on landscaping, but the main thing had already been done."

it is clearly noted that the need for heroism arises as a consequence of previous slovenliness. then, one might ask, it was wrong to take care of the stables and the kzmrs in vain, if the civil war was already over, the army not only did not increase, but was rapidly declining - from 5.5 million people in 1920 year to 562

thousand people in 1924. it seems that the uks, like millions of workers and peasants, then sincerely believed that a bright future would not be miserable, those who suffered hardships would be saved to the end in the earthly communist world.

As commander of the regiment, the future marshal was intensively engaged in education. "Recollections and reflections" about this skazno Tk; "... when, at the age of 26, commanding a Lerian regiment, what did I have in my life? The army of the tsar's army graduated from the non-commissioned officer training team, in the army of the army - cavalry courses after the end of the civil war for heavily red instructions and all kinds of military literature, commanders. oti all. rvd , studied the regulations, especially books on the issue of the tactic.

Ukov most truly felt himself in the field of combat training: "Then I felt stronger in practical matters than in questions of theory, since I received good training during the First World War. he knew well the methodology of combat training and was carried away by it. in the same field of theory, I understood that I was lagging behind those requirements that, with m

life presents me as a commander of a regiment. thinking, I came to the conclusion: without wasting time, and to study hard. to the same regiment, to which it is not necessary to devote two hundred and fifty owls to

day, to be in time everywhere and everywhere? There was only one way out: to add to the general working schedule of the day another three or four hours with independent study, what concerns sleep, rest - nothing, we will rest when we take it."

soon, however, the young regimental commander had the opportunity to become more thoroughly acquainted with military science. At the end of July 1924, he was summoned by the division commander .. Y.

asked what he was doing to improve his military knowledge.

Ukov later recalled: "Answered that I read a lot and analyze operations

the first world war. He prepared many materials for the exercises that he conducted with the command staff of the REGIMENT.

"Sh_ That's all good and commendable," said skzl .. Y, "but this one is now smacked. military business does not stand still. Our military leaders in the study of military problems need more PIT LN I studies. I think I should go to the higher school in Leria in the fall

eningr d. is very useful for our future activities. He thanked me and said that I would try to make every effort to justify the trust.

Returning to the regiment, wasting no time, sat down to textbooks, regulations and instructions and began to prepare for the entrance exams. Let's put our hero to work on books and try to understand what is the reason for his rather rapid career. Not having a serious military education, the command and a half years that have passed since the end of the civil war, grew from commander of a squadron to commander of a regiment. now he is also directed by the command to study with a clear aim at a subsequent promotion. what's the matter here? answer is simple. Immediately after the end of the civil war, former tsarist officers began to be dismissed from the Red Army in an accelerated manner. They were replaced by "blessed" commanders from among the workers and the poorest peasants. if a person with a suitable social background was a communist, and even a non-commissioned officer who graduated from a training team and had experience in commanding a squadron in a civil war, then the "green light" for promotion was opened to him. ukow pop I into this updraft. Oh, of course, George Onstantinovich's personal honors also played a big role. with a drone and a regiment, he commanded well. He developed a rather warm relationship with the commander of the division commander. . Ukhchevsky noticed the young regiment commander (who had been the district for only three years, the youngest of them, romance with Lexndra Uikova Ikolevich) and did not single him out in the prik 3 times. Insk, George's should have and Riya Olokhova were developed. The third daughter of Lexndra levna recalled: "I followed my father everywhere. shaking with wrecked chaises, tchanks, lived in unheated huts. having decided for himself the anthem of Sterkin skirts, red army calico shirts - and underwear, he wove "sandals" from ropes ... 3-3 of these nomads he lost his first child, they said - a boy. Isn't it better to give birth to advice - fragile health. " Uykov's eldest daughter claims that for the first time, the Uykovs "were written off in the 22nd year. oh, apparently, over the years of endless moving, the documents were lost, and for the second time, my father and me were registered already in the 53rd year in the Moscow registry office. I note that no documentary evidence of the registration of the marriage in 1922 was found. Most likely, here we have before us the legends , the invention of Lexndra levna, in order to prove: the legal wife — he, with Riya and Kolevna Ukov, had only a fleeting connection. Georgy, the son of

Olokhova's daughter, Rita, according to the words of his grandfather and grandmother, relates the resumption of acquaintances of Georgy Onstantinovich and Riya Ikolevna to Krzk 1922: "When Riya's parents died in Oltva, Ion moved to Insk to St. to my older sister Olina, whom by that time I was already a retired nton and trof novichin. om ukov and nin stood side by side, and the two each - the commander - were practically inseparable. In the 26th year Olina and Anton Commissar Regiment Itrof Novich had a son, Vladimir Dimir. George Onstantinovich and Riya become godparents. Father was delighted with the baby and kept talking about the fact that his big dream was to have a son... That ... also served as the reason for his cooling off towards her ... the bachelor father practically lived with others, was in a civil marriage with Riya and repeatedly asked her to marry him. Oriya a relic of the past. , Ikolevn was an active Komsomol member and considered registering marriage and according to the law, until the 44th year, the registration of marriages was not required at all. Ut, I think, vrssk z Zhukovsky's grandson turned out to be a mistake. However, an "active Komsomol member", who even considers marriage registration a "relic of the past", cannot participate in the rite of baptism, even if together with a loved one. And the commissar of the regiment for the baptism of the child would not have been patted on the head, probably, they would have been expelled from the party and dismissed from the army at the same time. It does not seem that, most likely, these were not christenings, which at that time were in vogue for the "October" - a communist alternative to the rite of baptism. from the "October" of the Yanin child of the uks with riya completely

could.

Ukov and Riia Olokhova, on the other hand, denies that in

In the first half of the 20s in Belorussia, the Ukov maintained a constant connection with Uikova: "Insk George Onstantinovich lived without Lexandra levna. they never had anything in common. all her visits to her father were unexpected for her father. He did not want to live with her, repeatedly repeated that he did not love her. leksandrievn, apparently strdl, tried to move into the house of the uks, and when she succeeded, nothing was left for her father,

to to

go to other places and hide; In order to get rid of Lexandra levna, whom I put up with everything, my father bought many times a train ticket home to the Oronezh province, boats and other gifts, personally burned the train and asked not to return. He dutifully left, but then he

wrote that he could not live without him, that he had already told all his relatives that she had flies, and again returned to Minsk. which of the daughters of marsh I will you order to believe - rei lle or - r rite? I think that all of them are both right and wrong at the same time. - I expect from the first two wives, levn and Riya Ikolevn, the most favorable version of the relationship with the first husband, presenting the rival in a not the best light. I believe that Georgiy Onstantinovich alternately lived with either Solokhova or Uikova, was painfully torn between the two women who loved him, and could not decide which of alexander from them had a stronger feeling. It , whom the daughters received information, built seems that rrit prv when he claims that Leksndr Mitriyevna was only a traveler, spending most of his time with his parents in the Oronezh province. In his autobiography of 1938, Georgy Onstantinovich noted that his then wife Ouikov "in 1918-1919. was a rural teacher, in 1920 he entered and served in the headquarters of the 1st regiment in the Leria regiment of the 14th separate detachment in the Leria brigade until 1922. So, later Leksndrievn did not serve in the military army in any positions: a letter or someone else. Possibly returned to Oronezh province. It is possible that at the Veningrad school the ukovt sought not only to acquire much-needed military knowledge, but also in an attempt to wrest

to be

from a confusing love triangle, from what Georgy Onstantinovich established in Insk. recalls about his admission to school: "The replacements turned out to be easy, rather even formal (of course, formal, and commissars of divisions and commanders and military councils of the respective military districts; accept everything equally before everyone was. - ..). s, the trainees who arrived were divided into departments, with the aim of making the groups more homogeneous in terms of their level of training. was included in the first group. - one group with a commander turned out to be, in particular, the commander of the regiment from the 6th ykl district, onstantin onstantinovich - okossovsky. in other groups of the same department, at the same time, the future rshls of the Soviet — yuz ndrey v novich remenko and vnristoforovich grmyan were enrolled, as well as the commander of the squadron of the 37th strakhnsky regiment of the same 7th mrsky division led Yemenovich yblko, who later became the marshal of the armored forces. they have crossed the paths of the uks more than once in the days of WAR AND PEACE. because shortly after the start of the classes, the Yeningrad high school was transformed into the lerian courses for the improvement of the command structure in the cavalry with a ridiculous breviation and a shortened period of study. The program was tense, I had to do a lot not only at the courses, but also at home. Ukov recalled: "In the autumn-winter period, classes were conducted mainly on mastering the theory of military affairs and political training. Theoretical sessions on the sand box and exercises on plan hycrtchs were often held. , instead of the originally planned two years, it lasted only a year, They were fond of equestrianism, riding and dressage, which at that time the commander of the units needed to know perfectly. paid a lot of attention to fencing with badges and espdrone, but this is already in order with modeling activities, at the expense of personal time. While studying science, he prepared a report "The main factors influencing the theory of martial arts." To

Georgy Onstantinovich admitted in his memoirs that he simply did not know how to approach the assigned topic, "where to start and how to finish." The President noted that "comrades from our party organization" helped him in preparing the report. They were so successful that this product of collective creativity was also printed in the bulletin. Okossovsky, who became friends with Ukov, later wrote in a memoir: "Ukov, like no one else, devoted himself to the study of military science. let's look into his room - everything is crawling on the map, laid out on the floor. but then the case, the duty for him was above

Total".

Later, Onstantin Onstantinovich had to make sure that his friend in some cases did not spare not only himself, but also his subordinates, and sometimes without apparent need. This year 1925 was devoted almost entirely to tactical exercises in the field. These exercises ended with a forced march to the Olkhov River, through which they swam across in horseback formation. swimming in clothes while still driving a swimming horse and not getting the firearms wet at the same time was not an easy task, but the listeners successfully coped with it

curled.

In the place with their silt velyevym and wreckage, George Onstantinovich immediately after completing the course decided to return to his place of service (all three units were located in Minsk) not by train, on horseback. The mileage of eningr dinsk is 963 kilometers along the field roads, m. ruzyaz spent seven days on it - a world record for distance and speed for group horse races. On the road, the mare was lame, but he managed to keep up with his comrades, who were walking on healthy horses. poured wax into a crack in the hoof from bandages for some time led the horse on the reins. he stopped limping. But all the same, the leader often had to dismount

in order to give Ira a rest. to which he did more than the velives and the apples, which therefore n the parking lot hbrlin themselves foraging and caring for the horses. On the outskirts of Insk, the trinity was met by a commissar of the 7th to the division of rigory ih Ylovich Turn, with whom Ukov was to meet another 39-man lkhinole. The turn warned that the last two kilometers must be traversed without fail in the field, in order to prove to the townspeople who came out to meet the horsemen that the participants in the run "have still gunpowder in the powder flasks." signals from comrades for a spur to the tired horses and a spurt to the podium, where they cheerfully told the head of the garrison and the chairman of the city council about the successful completion of the run. The crowd greeted the uks, the blkoi - with a ovation. time mileage losh di lost from 8 to 12, sun days - from 5 to 6 kilos

weight .

Having received a cash bonus from the Ovarkom and gratitude from the command, Georgy Onstantinovich went on a short-term vacation, which was due after the end of the course. The visit to his native Trelkovo region left a heavy feeling. "During the years of my absence, I noticeably lost," reminisced mrshl, "but I still worked hard. his sister already had two children, he also became wiser. Apparently, the post-war years and the famine of 1921-1922 were hard on them. honey mi-nephew mi I quickly established contact. nor, without embarrassment, did they open my suitcase or extract from it everything that was to their liking. The village was poor, the people were poorly dressed, the number of livestock was sharply reduced, many of them did not have it at all. What is surprising, with rare exceptions, no one was caught.

The family correctly understood the post-war difficulties. the streets and merchants kept closed. Apparently, they still hoped for a return to the past, especially after the promulgation of the new economic policy in the regional center - Godsky Voda - taverns and private shops were reopened, with which the novice cooperative system tried to compete ". It seems that the NEP has no particular sympathy for the NEP. Seriously, his poor relatives could not buy almost anything in the newly appeared private shops in the village. rvd, now at least there was no famine in the village, but it seems that the famine of the beginning of the 20s, George Onstantinovich, not at odds with the Soviet propaganda here, considered it entirely a consequence of the civil war and the destruction, not at all politics war communism.

Georgy Onstantinovich helped his mother and sister build a new house - for money and delivered wood. Sometime later, in 1936, this house burned down, ukov snov helped his family to rebuild, and for a while, he took in his sister's eldest daughter, nnu. this is despite the fact that for some reason he did not get along with Riya and her husband, Edor Okin, and they rarely saw each other with their brothers and sisters and almost never corresponded.

On the return to the 7th Marine Corps named after the English proletarian division of the Uks, he was appointed commander of the 39th regiment, but this was already a new regiment, not well known to the Uzuluk. The problem was that the division now consisted of four regiments instead of the previous six, and the new 39th Elekessko-Ugchev regiment was formed from the former 41st and 42nd regiments. In the year 1926, he was the first commander in the division to become a single member. The commander-one-man leader must necessarily be a communist. Under him, unlike the non-party commanders, there was no commissar, there was only an assistant for political affairs. The commanding officers bore all responsibility for combat training, and for political and political work in the regiment.

a member of a piece b regiment of the commanders stl sily mitrievich okolovsky, future marshal I. He then Georgy Onstantinovich worked together in the army before the war, during the Great World War - on the bottom and the 1st Belorussian Front. In the spring of 1927, Georgiy-Onstintinovich met for the first time with - Yemen Yilovich Udenny, at that time - an inspector at the lery | The orders warned that Imoshenko, who had been evacuated together with Yemen Onstantinovich, who commanded the 3rd to the corps (it included the 7th Marine Division), was heading towards him. The rest of Georgiy Onstantinovich's description looked like this: "I'm begging my closest assistants: Deputy for Political Affairs of the Rolls, Secretary of the Party Bureau of the Regiment Elkovsky, Head of the Regiment .. Lyshev. We go together to the entrance and wait. Five minutes later, two cars enter the gate. Udenny and Imoshenko come out first. as required by the constitution, I report and introduce my assistants (only it's not clear where did chsht 6 Okolovsky go? - . .). the lunatic greets you dryly, then something is not right. imoshenko with everyone, then, turning to imoshenko, he says: ", answered:

„ that, not that, their Yemen Ilovich. no culture." several were discouraged wives and he did not know how to understand this dialogue between udenny and imoshenko, and felt that he had made some kind of mistake, that he had overlooked something in organizing the meeting. I rush to the day: - what instructions will there be? — [what do you suggest? Yemen Ylovich asks in turn. —[It is advisable that you look at how our fighters and commanders live and work. - okay, but first I want to see how you feed the soldiers of the canteen and the kitchen. Yemenih Ilovich took a detailed interest in the quality of the products, their processing and preparation, made an entry in the canteen book, declaring his gratitude to the

head of the food service colonel. In the meantime, after checking the course of combat PREPARATIONS, Yemen Ilovich sk 3 L: - y, now show a small horse regiment. yu signal I regiment n "brood". herez

ten minutes the squadrons of drones formed up, including a brood of horses. Onsky composition in the regiment was in good condition, forging is excellent. Having examined the horse composition, Yemenih Yilovich thanked the Red Army for the excellent maintenance of horses, Selvm Shinui said: - Let's go, Yemenonstantinovich, to ours in the Ongrian, - and left for the 6th Ongrian division . When the cars left, we silently looked at each other, then the secretary of the transport bureau, Polk Elkovskiy, said: - what are we - strangers, or what? Rolkov added: - It turns out that after half an hour, a commander of division arrived in the regiment .. midt. to him with exhaustive fullness

reported everything that happened during the visit. . daytime. omdiv, smiling, said 3 l: - = it was necessary to build a regiment for a meeting, play an oncoming march and shout "ur" loudly, you met strictly according to the order. from the world of action. The political regiment of rolls said: "It turns out that don't live according to the rules, live as it pleases the authorities. It is not clear why and for whom our military regulations are written and published. Some inaccuracies in the story of the books are striking. For example, I will never believe that Georgiy Onstantinovich could talk to a person immeasurably higher than him in position almost in an imperative tone: "It is advisable that you look ...". Korean: "Could you look ...". On the whole, the story seems to be similar. The commanders might not have known how exactly to meet the lost, the authorities thought they would understand, and did not explain that a solemn review should be arranged, otherwise you would offend the distinguished guest. Curiously, this unfortunate reception by the high authorities may have later served Ukov in good stead. Surely, practically, in all regiments of the day, it was accepted precisely that, as the commander of the midt said, with a solemn formation, with music, with shouts of "ur". Georgy Onstantinovich should have been remembered by Yemen Yilovich as not the only regiment commander who acted strictly according to regulations. since no shortcomings were found in the Zhukovsky regiment, not only an unpleasant aftertaste from a not too warm meeting was left in the mind of the decedent,

But

and the impression of smoldering about a sensible commander. In the future, the patronage of the future contributed to the rapid rise of our hero to the highest positions in military

department. Oh,

that the first meeting with Ukov and Udenomou pl in the soul is proved by the fact that Yemenih Ilovich also left a detailed account of her in his memoirs: "In the fall of 1927, I arrived with an inspection in the district, in particular, in the 7th to the Larian division, which was part of the 3rd to the corps. . imoshenko. om ndir. midt, which did not take long before my arrival, took over the 7th division from the division. warm-baked, made me a good impression of smoldering. — [May I ask which shelves you will be looking at? asked the commander. - which of commanders, regiment is better than the others? standing nearby. - ns all shelves in good standing. better than other regiments reporting to m. skillfully trains fighters, especially conducts sweat exercises

. imoshenko skz l:

about which I

ktike...

I told Emidt that I would try to visit all the XX regiments, starting from the 39th. soon we entered the territory of the regiment. got out of the car, imoshenko followed me. omndir on the 39th to the regiment we: ukov met me with a clear p port. troy i

rectifier ,, clarity - all this indicated that the regiment commander knew his duties

Fine. - what

will be the instructions? - asked ukov, otvr port. that he is offered by MK to the commander suggested that I go around the armory, get to know of the regiment. George, in turn, I asked the instructions, Onstantinovich the life and work of the fighters and commanders better. - also, according to sen, - skz la. - But first, let's see how the soldiers used to eat in the dining room and in the kitchen, talked with the soldiers and guards, took an interest in the quality of the products, their processing, took a sample.

"It's very good that you carefully prepare food for the fighters," acclaimed IM, also the head of the food service of the regiment, gratitude. and imoshenko suggested that I write in the dining room book. "A pleasure," I agreed.

that checked the progress of combat training. - to say that in almost all respects the 39th regiment was in good standing, and I was pleased with the inspection. - [u, now show me the horses, - with a bow. the commander of the regiment for the signal "on the brood".

in all equestrian sports. Almost all . imoshenko reported to me that esk drones, The regiment excels commanders go in for sports, including with the regimental commander. "[= they have worse things with shooting from weapons," imoshenko added. — why to? the corps commander asked. . — it's hard to say, but I think it's all about training. idim, n to raise it. The squadrons of drones formed up, and a brood of horses . imoshenko shrugged my shoulders: began to appear. Onsky composition in the regiment was in good condition, forging is excellent. I was pleased and also praised the Oaks. soon we left foxes. Of course, Yemenih Ilovich wrote after the publication of the first edition of Zhukovsky's memoirs and, perhaps, borrowed something from there. But here is the statement of the udnogo that . Moshenkov 6th Ong division. the Ukov "offered" him to bypass the guards, sounds much more plausible than the slightly impudent "desirable" in "recollections and reflections". Colonel Yemen Ilovich certainly checked the combat training, not only the horses he asked for at least 3 th, as Georgiy Onstintinovich assures. The regiment declared its gratitude to the commander, although it does not recognize this decree in the memoirs. From the mere fact that the regiment was counting on the solemn formation and the salutatory cries of "ur" in his address, Yemen Ilovich, of course, does not write anything. he was embarrassed to admit to such petty vanity. Moreover, this place was held by censors, and for the first time it saw the light many years after the death of both marshals. about here, it seems to me, the testimony of the uks can be trusted. did he invent a number of the words of the midt about what kind of meeting he was expecting with imoshenko, and Yemenonstantinovich's annoyed remark that there was "no culture" in the regiment - meaning that there was no culture of meeting the authorities. during the years of the Great World War, and especially after it, the teachings created a legend that the generals of the times of the Civil War were absolutely not adapted to the conditions of the Second World War, they believed that the Kvaleria was no worse than tanks,

And

only the commanders of the new school, among the most prominent of which Georgiy Onstantinovich considered himself, were able to defeat the German Wehrmacht. any kinship with the horsemen, like the lost traces, should be obscured. Therefore, ILOVICH Ukov preferred to keep silent about the praise of their names. In general, in "reminiscences and reflections", as well as in conversations with Khonstantin Imonov, he tried to present the command of the 1st not in the best light. Georgiy Onstantinovich directly hinted to his readers that the streak, lost in military affairs, did not understand anything and turned into a purely decorative figure by the 1930s. in connection with the defeat of the yazma region in October 41 of three Soviet fronts, one of which was command ludenny, he led the lemon's reaction to Tlin on the stanza: "Tlin was in a nervous mood and in terrible anger . talking to me, he

strong

in the words of Mionev and Ryomenko, who commanded the last and Ryansk fronts, furiously, and did not mention in a word the commander of the reserve front. apparently, he thought that it was already impossible to ask a person from this. Uteorgy onstantinovich is definitely for the will of his imagination. If in the fall of 1941, Tlin allegedly looked at the person he had been given, the task assigned to him was useless, then why did he suddenly, later again appointed him to command ,, from which to ask

—n

this with the northwestern front and in the direction? t lin ukov seems to be a fool
does not consider I.

I am afraid that Zhukovsky's attitude to the udendnoye was influenced by the envy of one "native rshl" to another. Yemen Ikhilovich was indeed popular and loved by the masses. Ukov wanted the same thing, he counted on the whole native worship of himself, his services in the great civil war. oh, according to the testimony of marshal nov ukov, he became four times a hero of the Soviet union, , when in 1956 onstantinovich sadly told him: "Emenih ilovich, they , udynny congratulated him, and George don't sing songs about me, sing..."

In the meantime, the love triangle continued to tangle. eningr dk ukovu

several different uiks were in charge. Insk Georgy Onstantinovich again had to be torn between two women. In 1928, Leksandrievna, while staying with relatives in the Oronezh province, wrote down birth. According to the statement, the grandson of , that she is pregnant from him and will come to insk Georgiy, who learned about Uykova's pregnancy, his grandfather "was in despair, because he was afraid of losing Riya Ikolevna, to whom he experienced a serious mother and his stepfather A.M. nin rg rit ukov tizl get brought a sickly girl from the feeling". According to the father, further events: "When Lexandrievn maternity hospital, whom he called a swarm, he told George Onstantinovich that he would never leave him again. answer father left his own house and settled with others. O

Leksandrievna continued to demand that he live with her. six months after the birth of ra, in June 29, Riya Ikolevn gave birth to ukovu me. then he told me that I was pink, blue-eyed, just a real rritk

, What
he changed his name to l-rg rita. a month later - on July 6 - the father of the registrars took me all in the capacity of his daughter and issued a birth certificate. I got a f mi

Ukov and patronymic Eorgievn. yn rty rity yorgy adds: "Of course, this (i.e.

ukov's recognition of rrita as his daughter. - Lexndra . .) caused a storm of protest from levna, who is now a fugitive and kolyevna, threatening to pour sulfuric acid on her eyes, then asked to give her rrita. He rebowed and that George Onst Ntinovich returned home, helped with the swarm, which I was sick all the time. edushk

refused, said. then this is not his daughter, and he continued to live for others. The assertion that R was not in reality the daughter of the Ukovs, let us leave Symptiyk Leksandreievna entirely, of son who did not drink. The excitement at that , course, on the conscience of Rrita Georgievna and her time was almost Shakespearean. he just completed it in a completely Soviet way. Nuk Georgiy says: "Having realized that her husband could not be returned kindly, Leksandrievna wrote to Leorgy Onstantinovich an application to the public organization. I asked him to reason with her and force him to sign with her. grandfather did not want to live with Lexandra levna, no matter how they ordered him, and openly declared this when analyzing his personal affairs. The party organization issued a penalty for bigamy and set a condition: if he did not return to the applicant, whom I gave birth to - the first, he would be excluded from the party. Riya Ikolevn was simply shocked and, in order to save the reputation of his beloved, he advised him to return to Aleksandreievna. kzl it

,, what leaves him with m , Although

The decision was painful for her. Later, Georgy Onstantinovich confesses to me that in his life this was the only case when he was left by the beloved of women, "

r rit georgievn clarifies: "that personal case of the father lasted more than six months.

Olin dies of typhoid at the very start of the events. a young juvenile (son of a nin. - ..) is left without a mother. Nin, who has become a widower, offers to take Riya Ikolevna away from

as a baby daughter to Invody, where his father and brothers live. He does not agree, and Nin draws up an official transfer. before leaving, speak like a man to

ukovym: „, you are confused. be about Riya and daughter, I will take care of them with m. so he

riey blagobly took the children and left - first to invody, then - to urgni

r snod r. in 1941, Colonel Ning, having a reservation from being drafted into the army (obviously, before

Mr. Ifrof Novich has already left the army. - a year he will die . . .), volunteers to go to the front. herez under the t lingra house. The 17-year-old son of Nton Itrof Novich, having added a year to himself, also goes to fight. a few months after the Yerchen des nt he died this time in the hospital.”

“Reminiscences and Reflections” Georgiy Onstantinovich found a few kind words for a friend who helped him out in a difficult moment: “I would especially like to note our commissar, Mr. Itrof Novichin. he was a solid Bolshevik and a wonderful person who knew the soul of a soldier

„, who understood well who to approach, with whom

what to require. He was loved and praised by the commanders, political workers and Red Army men.

that this outstanding commissar did not live to this day - he died a death

brave in 1942 in a battle with the Nazis on the Russian front. he went around with his son, whom he brought up as a courageous defender of alone. The piety of the "outstanding" Ukov generally applied to few people. here m rsh In greeted them with an obscure regimental commissar! although the commissar, as is well known, is not too well I. o nin- something was the commissar p special. Could Georgiy Onstantinovich write directly in his memoirs that not only the commanders, political workers and the Red Army men loved Anton Itrof Novichi, but it, for whom Smuk had a “serious feeling”. right” Ning was with my close Zhukovsky friend. and before, nor after such friends, George Onstantinovich had no more. Even in the early 1920s, he kept repeating: "Nton is everything to me." at the end of the decade, fate called them, like 3 moose, but always. For some reason, it seems to me that for the rest of his life, Ukov suffered from the fact that there was no one nearby, the person Kknin. r eorgievn , party affairs „, year, in insk ... mm ... was in a position and felt very bad I. Hundreds of people came to her to help in some way, and simply to visit friends, including women (Riya Olokhov - ..). One result intentionally appeared in the year 29 and r rit was born. they immediately understood from whom - a small society, everyone is in sight of each other. Father then was in big trouble on the party line. idim, he pl lov L s. There was a court case over liments. judging by whose birth was one of the causes of paternal the letters, the father did according to the parents, he gives a completely different version of what happened: “On the 28th not want to pay them, he forced him. Oh, this hobby was momentary, I forgave him for him. Each of the first two wives of the marshals and their children tend to put themselves in the best light, to paint their rival with black paint. However, what the guide says, obviously, according to the mother, to be honest, does not inspire for her father to see her off. much confidence. If George's connection with Riya was only fleeting, why did the entire Minsk garrison manage to find out about it, and why was there no doubt who was Rita's father? and the fact that Riya Olokhov and Leksndr Uykov were friends, Riya's daughter Rrit says nothing. turn, from her story, a strong impression is created that the rivals treated each other,

soft

saying, the bottom is cold. then it seems quite natural and does not cause surprise. it was, let's face it, two women who loved the same man „, no reason

for
mutual sympathies.

Personally, I am inclined to trust Rita Yeorgievna Ukova more here and I am inclined to the version that Georgy Onstantinovich had no less long and serious relationship with Riya Ikolevna than with Lexandra levna. It is impossible to say definitely which of the two, Uikov or Olokhov, is considered the first wife of the Ukov, who is the second, and therefore one has to use the cumbersome turnover "one of the first two wives of the Ukov". But then the actual marriage was recognized as illegal, registered in the registry office. neither with Riya, nor Lex and Droy Ukov at the end of the 20s, he was not yet registered with I. In this sense, both women were in the same position. during the years of the great current war, when correspondence resumed between Riya Ikolevna and Georgy Onstantinovich, the Ukov reported that he was still unmarried, because, in all likelihood, in the 22nd year no one

brk with ouykovo he actually did not register I. If you count by the time of acquaintances
, then Olohova is not recognized as the first wife. but judging by time

birth of a

child, then the first wife should rather be called Uikova. -forehead in the p-trade nization,

v

colloquially referred to as the "cart", as a rule, he wrote that I considered myself a legal wife, a husband to non-mistresses. According to Ry's testimony, Lexandrievna, of course, considered himself, so to speak, an "official" wife, Riya Ikolevna - a fleeting hobby of her husband. But then it is absolutely unbelievable, as R's daughter asserts, that Golokhov, not Uikov, brought Nukov to the Trade Bureau. I lie that the denunciation was written, according to her daughter, in general, he prefers Lexandrievn. Riya and Kolevnikov tighter to himself ,, did not fight and did not make any special efforts to tie him

br vogo regiment. In

1929, Ukov really received a reprimand on the party line - for drunkenness and promiscuity in relations with women. The decision of the Party Bureau did not directly say, of course, which of the two wives George Onstantinovich should prefer. In the course of the conversation, the party comrades must have clearly understood that it was desirable to return to the applicant. Deal here not in is, that lex ndr ievn has given birth to the first. Ukov's colleagues understood perfectly well: if he stays with Olohova, then the flow of complaints from Uikov will not stop (later he will go to court against the third and fourth of Zhukovsky's wives, demanding that the husband be returned to the family). Therefore, it was desirable for the administrations and the bureau of the trade unions that the regiment should abandon the army and the colony and remain lexandra nevna. Georgy Onstantinovich was aware that the future career depended on his decision. The regiment was going to be

sent to the next improvement courses with the prospect of subsequent promotion to command of the brigade. An old friend Nin helped solve the teaching problem of choosing uku. nton itrof novich had just been widowed, his three-year-old son needed motherhood. oti took the sister of the deceased Olina as his wife and adopted her infant daughter, giving her his last name. their brkria ikolevn with nton itrof novich was not officially registered. So, in order not to put each other in an ambiguous position, Nin decided to leave with his wife and children for a new duty station. The last one, one of the two largest (along with the Krinsky) military districts, had to be replaced by the secondary Everovkzsky one. Here with mynin, he put an end to his military career - a colonel died in the 42nd rank. Riya Ikolevn also helped her beloved to make the right, from her point of view, choice in favor of a career by leaving Georgy Onstantinovich on his own initiative. If, of course, it corresponds to the truth of the story of Ukova's confession that the father confessed to the mother that the case with her was the only time when he left

pitchfork

we love women. maybe here we have another beautiful legend? The fact that the two first wives of the uks behaved differently in a critical situation, their age could also play a role. lex ndr ievn was a whole four years younger

Georgy Onstantinovich was , riya ikol evn - only a year. probably olokhov was a more wise and reasonable woman, did not want to ruin the life of a loved one, since this was a hopeless situation. That's right, he's still strong

he loved George Onstantinovich and was ready to give up his happiness, if only he was well. As we will see in the future, the life of uks with a uik fold is difficult. Leksandrivna did everything to keep her husband, who from time to time left her, leaving for other women. agreed only under the threat of exclusion from the party, as follows

from

r skz rg rita eorgievn. and to his daughter, Reon from the very beginning began to experience the most warm feelings and did not want to part with her. from which, for example, George Onstantinovich wrote to Lexandreievna on 21st December 1929, when she was only six months old on December 16, 1929, rrit was not yet born: "You write that I write more and manage daughter! r zve you this m lo? besides, who can separate yourself from your daughter ... eat your daughter." I note that from this letter one can understand: the wife

was that in one of the previous messages the husband was more interested not in her dissatisfied, but in began the problems, the health of her daughter. after all, this was even before the party bureau discussing the scandal with bigamy, and after which Ukov's love for Leksandreievna must have diminished. No, it is felt that even before the birth of Olokhova's daughter, George Onstantinovich did not experience particularly strong feelings for Uikova, but he was more worried about the newborn than about her mother. The sky gradually faded to nothing, the situation cleared up, and Georgiy Onstantinovich continued his ascent up the steps of the military hierarchy. end of 1929

They were sent to Moscow for advanced training courses for senior officers (). The classes were held in the building of the Defense Committee on Runze Street (now Nmenk). ten uks listened to lectures on tactics and operational art for three months. In the spring of 1930, he returned to the 7th Marine Division, where from January there was a new divisional division commander, the Okossovsky, who was well acquainted in Yeningrad at school. meuks were appointed commander of the 2nd brigade of the same 7th division. the brigade included the 39th and 40th regiments.

On November 8, 1930, Kossovsky presented a test to n Uuk: "ILNOY WILL. resolute. God bless that initiative and skillfully apply it in practice. disciplined n. demanding and persistent in his demands. oh r kteru a little

dry and not quite a bit. bl det a significant proportion of stubbornness. - icy with prayer. militarily prepared well. has extensive practical team experience. He loves the military business and is constantly improving. the ability for further growth is noticeable. secondary. During the summer period, with the skillful management of the combat training of the brigade, he achieved major achievements in the field of combat and tactical-rifle affairs, as well as the growth of the brigade as a whole in tactical and combat terms. He is interested in and knows about the work of mobilization. paid due attention to the issues of conservation of weapons and horse stock, having achieved positive results. well prepared politically. He is quite appropriate for his position. It can be used to the benefit of the affairs of the position of assistant division commander or commander of a mechanized unit, subject to passing through the appropriate courses. Staff and teaching work cannot be assigned - he does not see it organically.

I got acquainted with this certification of the commanders only during the years of the Great World War, when I was already the deputy commander-in-chief. the end of October or the beginning of November 1942, under the tlingra, the main marshal of the army, leksandr vgenievich

Olovnov accidentally witnessed a conversation between Ukov and Okossovsky about this document and outlined its content in his memoirs: "During a friendly conversation between Ukov and Okossovsky, I learned that they, it turns out, are old comrades and colleagues. At one time, when the Okossovsky command of the Lelian division, the Ukov was one of the commanders of the regiments. they remembered the early joint service, and Ukov said that he had recently read the test given to him by Okossovsky at that time. "I can repeat a good and correct test for you then, and I can repeat its meaning now," said Okossovsky. - it said that you were a strong-willed, resolute and energetic commander of the regiment (perhaps, here Onstantin Onstantinovich spoke not about the test that I just quoted, about the previous one, when the commander of the regiment of commanders was promoted to the post of commander ndir brigdy - V.S.). You achieve your goal by overcoming any obstacles. you are highly demanding of subordinates, sometimes he crosses the borders, but demanding of himself is also high. With that test, you presented yourself with a promotion.

"I don't have any claims to you," replied the Ukov. in < memories and reflections," Georgy Onstantinovich, speaking of his command to the marked I:

I was most often reproached with strict exactingness, which I considered an indispensable quality for a Bolshevik commander. Looking back, I think that sometimes I really was unnecessarily demanding and not always restrained or tolerant of the misconduct of my subordinates. Yen was thrown out of balance by t OR Yin by dishonesty in work, in the behavior of a military man. Some do not understand this. LET, I, in turn, apparently was not indulgent enough to human weaknesses. Of course, now these mistakes are becoming clearer, life experience teaches a lot. However, even now I believe that it is not right for anyone to enjoy life at the expense of the work of another. this is especially important for people to realize

the military, who will have to be the first to defend one on the battlefield, not sparing their lives.

In his declining years, having twice known the humiliation of disgrace, the marshal did not at all consider his own "cruel exactingness" towards people as a great sin. turnover, Paul GI,

that it is a thing in military service that I am needed. U, due to the equally high demands on his beloved ... he did not always comply with the requirements that the Ukov made to his subordinates. 6 this same Okossovsky letter,

I recall their joint trip to General Ordov, commander of the Tlingrad Front, in September 1942: It was not by chance that the team composition in the front , dubbed his management "mother". The Ukov, who was present at the same time, could not stand it and began to inspire the Horde that "you can't help here with shouting and swearing; we need to organize which I later heard the fight smarter, not to stagnate." listening to his teaching, I could not help smiling. I involuntarily recalled a case from the battle of Moscow, when the same Ukov, being the commander of the last front, spoke out with the commanders of the armies, no softer than the hordes. revisiting the battle near Moscow? having received an affirmative answer, he declared that it was under Moscow, in addition, at that time he was "only and only" the commander of the front.

Ukov asked me why I was smiling. I don't remember

Georgy Onstantinovich was sincerely convinced that it was not shameful for him to do what others, in rank and, as he considered, abilities below him, are forbidden. The "mother style" of leadership was widely used even when he was commander of a regiment and brigade. the prickly pleading did not allow the future marshal to admit his own wrongness, even in obvious cases. The "warlord with the formidable name of Georges" firmly believed that he had to do everything that he considered going for the good of the army alone, even to humiliate, in wartime, and shoot soldiers and officers. others, on the other hand, are not recognized in I. It is not surprising that the number of Ukov's enemies grew as he ascended to the top of the micro-riera. In February 1931, our hero became an assistant inspector to the lery of the city of Udenny.

Yemenih Ilovich emphasized in his memoirs that he had asked for this post. Georgy onstantinovich assures in his memoirs that he did not aspire too much to oscow: "he was very used to his division and considered himself an indispensable member of the friendly family of smrats ... one evening he called me — onstantinonstantinovich okossovsky and said, that an order was received from Moscow regarding my appointment to a new position. —[How long does it take to get ready? - he asked.

- with two, - I answered (all the property of the Ukov family at that time fit quite well ..). in one suitcase - - we'll let you go, - skzl.

. okossovsky, because you are the wind of the 7th division,

and we carry out in with, as it should be, such is the general desire of the command-political composition in the second brigade.

, r of course, was very touched.

A few days later, a dinner was held for the entire command and political staff of the 39th and 40th regiments, at which the division commanders were present. I heard a lot of good, warm words in my address. whether they are from the bottom of their hearts and remembered for the rest of their lives. We don't know how much vodka was drunk at that comradely dinner and what the red quellerists ate it with - salted mushrooms and cucumbers or red caviar for a blik. There is no doubt that Kossovsky treated Ukov with sympathy. The evidence here is the above test of the divisional commander for the brigade commander, which, obviously, contributed to the next breakthrough in the Zhukov quarry.

What

commanders and commissars of regiments and squadrons of drones did not say about the bad word -

does not come as a surprise. Firstly, the solemnity of the event did not at all lead to criticism of its main character. secondly, okossovsky and colleagues, in fact, spent his

the future is low. For example, the assistant inspector of the cavalry could well turn out to be an inspector in his native division, and it will largely depend on him what assessment the soldiers of combat training or the actions of the neurons will receive. The next evening, after the

banquet, his husband, Leksandrievn, and their two-year-old daughter, R, left Minsk with some simple belongings and went by train to Moscow. Here they were settled in a roundhouse in a wooden bar. The future leader and future St. George Onstantinovich Leksandrkh Ilovich Silevsky, in a conversation with Onstantin Imonov, recalled how much better the living conditions of the regiment commanders in the provinces were compared to those that they received in Moscow after the appointment of more high position: "at that time the commander of the regiments - I was the commander of the regiment in the company - good conditions were created; there was a decision according to which each commander of the regiment had a car - a "fordik" of the then issue - they received apartments

- in some cases, separate apartments, in others even mansions, had a riding horse, had, in addition to the car, a ride. after all this, I was appointed to the administration (Silevskiy since the spring of 1931 worked in the combat training administration, which included ..), so instead of three stubbles, the commander of the regiment, and they told me the address where I was to be assigned in the inspectorate to the lerium. - by position, there were no ranks then, would live. Ooh, having found the roundabouts, I found this house - a new house with cramped apartments (he also settled here

ukov. - ..), I found my apartment number - an apartment of several rooms, my son (riy, the future allotted one, ns four: I, the wives of the .., mother-in-law, first husband of ry ukova. - ..). ott km I had to live after the conditions in which I went to Colonel Commander What was the situation in the decrees when he was also appointed there ,to this administration...". The future daughter-in-law of the Silevsky hand described the life of that time in this way:

many military families lived there. or in a communal flat, where I occupy two small rooms, furnished, as was the custom at that time for the majority of military personnel who wandered from place to place with my simple state-of-the-art furniture. I liked to tell how, having received another salary, pp went to the center to buy a bookcase for books, there were already many of them, according to mum, even in those years. Having drunk this crazy etzherka - I also remember it very well for some reason - I carried it in my arms all the way. I remember that it never occurred to him to take a car. After all, in those years it was only possible to get around by tram. kkvtv mv yset zherkoy? By the way, at that time there was a future Mrshl - .. Silevsky, who went home on this tram. Nevertheless, this purchase brought a lot of joy - it was possible to arrange all the necessary books in the right order.

Probably, the unsuccessful marriage with Riyem Silevskiy left Ury Yeorgievna and some unpleasant aftertaste in relation to the ex-father-in-law. In her story, he does not look the best: he left a friend alone to carry a heavy, clumsy whatnot to himself, and he promptly went home in a light tram. Let's give the floor to my Lex and Dr Ilovich. He told the researcher Imonov a little differently: "I remember, one day I go out of the

George with a large shelf for books. I say:

— are you standing tight?

- here's the apartment, I'm empty, there's nothing in the room, even though I took it here, I ordered myself a bookcase for books, so that there was where to put the books. I'm already standing for half an hour - I missed three or four trams, I can't get into any of these trams, people are crowded, you see, they hang.

- uh, I bottom, I'll wait, together with you, let's go. We waited, we waited, we waited five or six more trams, but we couldn't get into any of them. ogd ukov says.

- uh, you go, I'll go on foot.

- ud, in the roundabouts?

- ud ,vokolniki, what to do with this, with the rack, it's not the same to carry it back. Then I told him that it's fate, let's go on foot together, I'll help you protect her. kmyi walked with the ukov through the whole city, to the okolnikov, carried this etzherka to the place of his new residence. The poison of details makes one recognize Silevsky's message as more plausible than

for the eldest daughter of the uks. Most likely, Georgy Onstantinovich did not buy the etzherka in the store, received it in . After all, there were almost no clothes, furniture and other industrial goods in free sale. a suit, table, or wardrobe could only be bought with a warrant issued by an enterprise or institution. The employees of the Central Defense Committee were probably taken away right on the spot by the local administrative and economic department (or part). to go on foot through the whole - the oskva ukov decided only when he was convinced that during the "peak hours" with the floor in the tram you couldn't get into the tram - this also looks quite plausible. so that - Silevsky would not help him in such a situation, but then he would still remain a friend - it's hard to believe. The art of the 30s was sparse. basic foodstuffs and industrial goods - on the cards. The question was acute in Moscow. the same high-ranking military in the colonel's and general's ranks had to huddle

V

commune lx x. there was also a big trouble with the Uk family. from which p sskzl . Ilihin: "In 1932, George invited my family to the eye, to the rest house. when the uks returned, they found that their apartment had been robbed, not ok

elk and

fur coat of his wife Lexndra levna, and a number of other things. George appeared on 12 (@) taki could not find the missing items. Somehow my wife, Lvdiya Lyinich, was walking along Toleshnikov Lane. n the meeting goes women vp lgo lexandra ievna. Lvdiya lyinichny with the help of the militia detained this woman ... owing to the fact that the women had been bought in a consignment shop. "Let it be returned to Ukov." The trail coat was of great value in those days. His return became for the uks a consolation, though faint. ukov invariably helped all of his relatives m. whistle of threats of whining. about the memoirs of their llovna Ilikhina, then Ukov sent a paper that the Ilikhas were not subject to reaping. After that, they returned, but they forgot to return the previously selected cattle. On the other hand, after the death in 1934 of Liga Vrillovna, the family was all evicted from the house. ut and ukov did nothing to help. Georgy Onstantinovich, as best he could, defended the native elements of collectivization; which cost the Soviet peasantry millions of deaths from famine and repression. However, there is no evidence that Marshal ever, even in the most intimate conversations, spoke out against the policy of forcible organization of collective farms. Perhaps this was due to the fact that, although Ukov was from the village, he never had to be a peasant? and the fellow villagers lived not, mainly, by seasonal trades - where could there be love for their land. the day was very satisfied with the work of his assistant. Yemen Ilovich noted in his book "The Path Traveled": "... Ukov quickly got on track. It is no coincidence that at the general meeting of communists of all inspections and the combat training department of the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs, we unanimously elected the supreme secretary of the Rem and Trade Bureau (without the recommendation of the former, such an election could not take place.

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.) ... the uks very soon won the authority among the command staff. What I didn't like about George Onstantinovich was that he deeply delved into the issues of combat training for military units, showed initiative, devoted himself entirely to the cause of strengthening the might of the Red Army. Mukov recalled how, during his service in the inspectorate at the valery, he got to know Ukhchevskii better, who held the post of first deputy people's commissar for defense:

"A man of athletic build, he has an impressive appearance ... as the first deputy people's commissar of defense, Ikolevich Ukhchevsky did a lot of organizational, creative and scientific work, and we all felt that the main guiding he plays the role-playing committee." Georgy Onstantinovich in his memoirs tried to emphasize his closeness not to Udenny, but to Kukhchevsky, in particular, in connection with the work on the combat equipment of the army:

"In the summer of 1931, being in the camps of the 1st Cavalry Corps, with the participation of the Commander of the Cavalry Regiment and the novice, the Deputy Commander of the Polkersims and other comrades from the 1st Division I rzz 6 tyvl projects of the military installation in the cavalry (part of the Gi part of the P). In the fall, after discussion in the inspectorate, they were submitted by the inspector of the office for approval to the People's Commissar of Defense, .. Oroshilov. However, having lain for a long time in his secretary, they were then before now considered. spot with the vigilante inspector. Osogovs, .. wow. I often had to defend certain provisions of the statutes. O, I confess, we were often disarmed by weighty and. Ukhchevskii and were grateful to him for those brilliant logical objections. provisions with which he forward in the foreground in his enriched the drafts of our statutes. Why, then, did Ukov prefer to put "recollections and reflections" not quite a real closeness to udenny, his relations with Ukhchevskii, in any case not as close as to theirs Ilovich? - right, a certain role here was played by Nukhchevskii's fashion, which arose in the 60s after his rehabilitation, when he was working on memoirs. oh, I think, even in the past there was an internal kinship of souls between George Onstantinovich and their il Ilovich. On October 31, 1931, Lukov received an excellent test. He emphasized that Georgiy Onstantinovich "did a great deal of work on compiling guidelines

on the training of fighters and small units of the cavalry and carried out all the instructions in a shock order, successfully and on time. Yemenih Ilovich confirmed that Ukov is a commander "with strong willed qualities", demanding of himself and

subordinates, with a sense of responsibility for the assigned work, tactically and operationally

tively

grumpy. noted that "having no academic education, he works hard on his personal military and political development." The general conclusion was very favorable for Georgiy Onstantinovich: "a trained combined-arms commander-one-man commander, fully corresponds to his position and the position of commander of a division and head of a normal military school." Yemen Ilovich saw the only shortcoming of his assistant in "a certain harshness and rudeness." On the other hand, in the eyes of the former command of the 1st Army, this was a completely tolerable shortcoming. m after all, he could in the hearts of x go to a subordinate in the face. The commander of the division was obviously counting on placing the commander as division commander. The best opportunity for this appeared after two years of Georgiy Onstantinovich's work in the inspectorate. From what the udenny one remembers this: "Sometime in the spring of 1933 I was invited by the People's Commissar of Defense .. Oroshilov. I went to his office and immediately noticed that the sprinklers were in a bad mood... - = look for a new commander of the 4th in the Lerian division ahead of time, - sklon. - What's happened? Oroshilov reported that the other day the 4th division was inspected by the commander of the Belorussian military district. In other words, the divisional commander destroyed the division, there is no discipline in it, there is no proper order. . Borevichi was dissatisfied with her condition. about him

"You understand how painful it is for me to hear this," Liment Fremovich continued.

- the division bore my name! .. - irrigated got up, walked along to the binet. — otk let down, °? Borevich asks to immediately change the divisional commander. I already agree with this ...

Lush I Oroshilov, this I thought about whether the krsky borevich had thickened. asked for is Liment Fremovich. oroshilov sc 3 l:

- I believe Borevich. eats no, he, the commander of the district, says THn of his divisional commanders?

"Sure," I agreed. Oroshilov vst l.

—[Wow can you suggest this position? - he asked. replied that it was time to think, although I can now name one comrade. - 10?

- Ukov Georgy Onstantinovich, - speaking. - He used to serve in the Belarusian military district, was the commander of the regiment, commander of the I brig doi ... listening to me, irrigated skzl: "wait, the tour is suitable. Talk to the commander in person, then prepare an order.

During the conversation, the stranger gave the impression that Georgy Onstantinovich "was pleased with this appointment."

- I am sure that you, Comrade Ukov, will straighten things out in the division. who's opinion and rkom. He instructed me to convey this to m, - Lemen Yilovich of the new divisional commander was parting.

- I am careful to do everything so that the Fourth Cavalry Division regains its worthy reputation, - I promised bows.

Meorgy onstantinovich in his "reminiscences and reflections" stated that the suspicions of the suspect that Borevich had exaggerated too much were, in general, fundamental: "In 1932, the division was hastily transferred to the Belarusian military district, to the city of Lutsk . Later it became known to me that the redeployment was explained by extraordinary operational considerations. However, at that time there was no need for a hasty transfer of the division to the completely unprepared 6th zone.

Ukov, of course, was not privy to the intricacies of high politics: by the end of 1932, Deputy People's Commissar Ukhchevskii, probably with the sanction of irrigators and Tlin, had developed a large to the division in Lutsk, located fifty kilometers from the Polish border - that's all "extraordinary operational considerations"! hotels to take advantage of the global economic crisis and crush an old enemy, believing that due to financial and economic turmoil

And

the growth of social tension England and France will be afraid to come to the rescue

Ilusdsky. however, for such a war, benevolent neutrality was necessary

Germany, if not an alliance with it. The Germans, who were afraid that after capturing only almost a million troops, the army would easily crush the 100,000-strong Reichswehr, then it was not possible to agree, and the Soviet invasion of Olysha did not take place. about the 4th Onsky division, as well as other, newly transferred units, were left at the Polish borders of the Research Center "just in case".

Georgiy-onstintinovich spared no paint, drawing the deplorable state of the 4th

K in Leriyskaya: "For a year and a half, the division was forced to build salaries, stables, headquarters, residential buildings, warehouses and all training facilities. As a result, a brilliantly trained division turned into a poor working military unit. Lack of building materials, rainy weather and other unfavorable conditions did not allow to prepare for the winter in time, which had an extremely serious impact on the general condition

division and its combat readiness. pl disciplines, h hundred became sick horse di.

The command of the 3rd corps, which included the 4th cavalry division, could not help in any way, because other parts of this corps were in a logical position, hastily transferred to the district. t also

in the spring of 1933, commander of the Belarusian military district. . borevich after

a brief inspection of the parts of the division found it in a state of extreme decline. before

notice that at one time the commander did not provide proper assistance to the division in question
X

construction and did not take into account the conditions in which the parts were located. now he

hastened to identify the main culprit in the poor condition of the division - its commander

Letkin.

Of course, the commander is responsible for the division, but he is also the sole member. A top boss in his line of duty and a senior comrade must be objective, attentive and fair. about his characteristic ardor

Borevich reported to his native defense commissar .. Oroshilov about the state of the 4th division and demanded the immediate removal of the division commander. deficiencies occurred. . Letkin. of course. in the division. borevich nevertheless thickened his anger, stating that

the division has lost all its good traditions and is not combat-ready. It's hard not to agree with Ukov here. ed, however, in the fact that he did not always follow the principles that he called on others to follow in his memoirs.

X.

during the years of the Great Technological War, George Onstantinovich Nerzi never had a chance to

to shoot the commanders and commissars of divisions who fell under the hot hand. after all

often, to ki in the case of the EU. . Letkin, their guilt in the failures that had occurred was not very

great in comparison with the guilt of superior officers, including my own commanders. relations between the new division commander and .. borevich snchl did not work out. ukov

He told Limonov: "Borevich, in his usual, resolute tone, called Oskov Oroshilov and asked: "Ovrishch Commissar, give me the division of the Ukovs, Imoshenko.

recommend him to me

Oroshilov replied that he had been inspected in Leriya near Udenny. about borevich
n stood his ground:

- There are many people inspecting, and you can find another one, I need a division commander, please fulfill my request. When they called me, I, of course, was ready to go to the division and left for the Belorussian district ... But my relations with Borevich did not work out well. Approximately six months after I took over the division, he slapped me with a reprimand on someone's unfair report. I had some kind of inspection check in the division, it turned out that something was missing, as a result - a reprimand in the order for the district. The reprimand is unfair, because it is impossible to put a division on its feet in half a year. six months you can only get to know her and start taking action. I could not do

everything that was required to bring the division into full order for six months, with all my desire. here is a reprimand; rhythm is full-time. that was

the first reprimand for my entire service (here is George Onstantinovich Lukvil - we remember the reprimand of 1929! - ..), and, in my opinion, I repeat, completely unfair. was indignant and for a telegram: "To the commander of the troops mi district

Borevich. You are an extremely unfair commander of the troops in my district in you I can't serve and I ask you to send me to any other district. ukov". Two days passed after the telegram. Borevich stinks and calls me to the telephone. — [I received an interesting telegram. Are you unhappy with the reprimand? answer u:

— how can I be satisfied, comrade commander, when the reprimand is unfair and not served by me? - Well, do you think that I am unfair? — „yat ksechit yu. I would not have sent a telegram to me. — [Are you asking the question of leaving the commanders with? - I mean the question. - wait with that. In two weeks there will be an inspection trip, we'll talk about it. Can you wait with your port until then? - otu. — ut to wait. this ended the conversation. Borevichn happened to take me aside on an inspection trip and said: "I checked the materials on which I was reprimanded, and I see that it was issued incorrectly. keep on serving. Let us consider the question settled.

- can I consider the reprimand withdrawn? I asked. —[Of course, rzyask says that he is unfair. this ended the incident. Subsequently, the division became the best in the Army. For two years, I fixed it up. relations with Borevich were good. I felt that he was working before me. He looked at me, gave me different buildings, pulled me out of the reports. That is why he instructed me at the meeting at the headquarters of the district to make a report on the actions of the French cavalry during the battle on the river in the First World War. That report was an unusual and difficult matter for me (but how then to understand the admission contained in the "reminiscences and reflections" that even on the course of Khveningr de Ukov had to prepare a report on the main factors of the military arts „, which was also published on

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course bulletin? - a report . . .). Moreover, I, the division commander, had to do this in the presence of all the commanders of the military branches of the district and all the commanders of the corps. o I prepared for the report and lost my head only at the first moment: I opened all the cards, stopped near them; don't do it, I stand and keep silent. Borevich was able to help me at that moment, with his question he called me into conversation, then everything went fine, and later he rated this report as good. I repeat, I felt that he was patiently working for me." Doubts are raised here by the assertion that Borevich was the first to name the candidature of the uks, which he was supposedly prompted by the commander of the 3rd to the imoshenko corps. I note that in his "reminiscences and reflections" Georgiy Onstantinovich does not write anything about his quarrel with Borevich, nor about the fact that Eronimetrovich wanted to see him as commander of the 4th Division. I personally feel much better

There seems to be evidence of the incident that it was he who recommended the future commander to the division to I Oroshilov. It is natural that Liment Fremovich asked the opinion of the head of the cavalry inspector here. and the above test of orders proves that two years before he opened a position in the 4th division, Yemeni Ilovich looked at Georgiy Onstantinovich as the future commander of the division. I think it was no coincidence that Ukov wanted to convince lmonov that he led the Kvalerian division thanks to the recommendation of Imoshenko and the request of Borevich, not at all on the initiative of the udden and the oroshils. The point is that after the Great World War, Georgiy Onstantinovich tried to create the impression that the former leaders of the First World War were only capable of swindling, they knew little about modern warfare. It is they who are to a large extent to blame for the fact that in the 41st year the Russian Army was not ready for war with Germany. did the new commanders, like the uks, win this war,

who perfectly understood the role of the Itnks. For this scheme, the circumstance turned out to be very inconvenient that it was the udyonny who intensively promoted Lukov in his service. something else Ylovich succeeded, if we adhered to the myth too stupid, he noticed and singled out such an outstanding commander in the future created by the masters, he was not

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or, in fact, the lost and the learned, were two different things, and the author of "reminiscences and reflections" in modern military theory and practice understood as little as the author of the "traveled path". Imoshenko and Borevich were quite suitable as recommenders to Ukov. He responded very warmly to Imoshenko to the same Imonov: "In some works, they evaluate Imoshenko completely incorrectly, they portray him almost as a weak-willed person and fawning over the long. then cont. imoshenko is an old and experienced military man, a persistent, strong-willed and educated person both in tactical and operational terms. In any case, he was a much better commissar than Orosilov, and during the short period that he was, he managed to turn something in the army for the better. It so happened that after the Kharkov catastrophe he was no longer instructed to command the fronts, although in the role of front commander he could be much stronger than some other commanders, such, for example, as Kryomenko. o t lin was angry with him and

after the rkov, a hard and in general, and this is the story of his fate throughout the war. n was man, and the krzon never succumbed to him with a curiosity in front of the dwarf; if he had done this, it is quite possible that he would have received the front. Yemenonstantinovich Imoshenko, although he commanded a division in the Civil War in the 1st Army, was only a year older than the Ukrainians. or feeling like peers, people of the same generation. Therefore, for George Onstantinovich, Yemen Onstantinovich was not identified with Orosilov and Udenny, although he was a member of the Army. Ukov tried to give the imons the impression that they were doing almost everything possible with Imoshenko to eliminate the pernicious consequences of Voroshilov's leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense, but there was not enough time. rvd - you don't really believe the ukov that Yemenonstantinovich really didn't fawn over Osif Issrionovich. k-nick imoshenko became a saint of stalin: his daughter klerin, after the Great Patriotic war, married the son of tlinsiliya. This marriage was probably not made without calculation - Yemenonstantinovich thus granted himself from outbursts of anger of an aging tyrn (after the death of Tlinsilius, they were imprisoned and Klerin was left by her husband - an alcoholic). and fight imoshenko after rkov supreme all the same d ow. Yemenonstantinovich coordinated the actions of the fronts in the Soviet-Ishinev operation, for which he was awarded the highest military order of dinner. Borevich also complains, then Georgiy Onstantinovich and Eronim Etrovich eventually became friends. oznik yet another non-surprise. If Borevich allegedly fought by all means to ensure that the 4th division was headed by the Ukov, then why, one might ask, did he reprimand the freshly-baked divisional commander on the first occasion, provoking him to the port to withdraw the command? se st no n his place ukov borevich recommended l udenny. It is now fairly widely known that in the 1930s, among the highest commanding officers of the army, there were two main groups that competed with each other. days united oroshilov, udenny and other horsemen. The composition of the second included Ukhchevsky, Kir, Borevich and other commanders, who were not connected in any way with the 1st. When Borevich found out that a former assistant, Yemenih Yilovich, had been appointed to him as division commander on the recommendation of the detainee, for suspecting something was wrong. friend new divisional commander called to look after him? Eronimetrovich tried to get rid of the marks of V, gave him an unreasonable reprimand in order to eventually attribute to him an official inconsistency and quietly replace him with his own person. However, the behavior of Ukov, , if we accept the truth of the assumption that who immediately posed the question point-blank, seemed to convince Borevich that Georgiy Onstantinovich would not intrigue against him. soon the commander of the district realized that the ukov was an intelligent commander and professed views on the education and combat training of troops close to his, borevich, the view of m.

, then could

the commander of the 4th Onskoy, hoping to drag him from the stn of the konrmeytsev to the stn of Ukhchevsky. y, Zhukovsky's report, which Borevich allegedly liked ... we will see later that reports to Georgy Onstantinovich were usually written by subordinate staff officers. I suspect that either the head of headquarters of the 4th division, or one of his employees, had to work hard to report on the topic of the actions of the French cavalry in the First World War. Borevich, kkiukov, paid the main attention to the training and tactical training of fighters and commanders, Georgy Onstantinovich spoke kind words about him to the writer Imonov:

"Borevich was more concerned with issues of operative arts and tactics.

he was a great connoisseur of both, and an unsurpassed educator of the troops. In this sense, in my opinion, he was three heads taller than Ukhchevskiy, who was

everyday work. this was reflected in his origin and upbringing."

Obviously, Borevich, who came from a poor family of Lithuanian peasants, was closer to the Ukov than Ukhchevskiy, who came from an impoverished but noble family. However, Eronimetrovich's attempts to attract the divisional commander of the 4th to the side of Ukhchevskii's group ended in failure. Otherwise, it would be difficult to doubt that Georgy Onstantinovich in 1937-38 would have shared the sad fate of thousands of repressed commanders. Ukov maintained good relations with Oroshilov and Udenny. In 1935, the 4th Air Division was awarded the Order of Enin for achievements in combat and political training. The division commander also received the same award with the wording "for the performance of a special mission" in August 1936. The special task, obviously, was to improve the health of the division entrusted to him. the 4th creek to the Lerian Order arrived contingently. Namely them, Yilovich turned to the soldiers with a brief parting speech: "Be worthy of those who during the years of the civil war glorified our division. — There are still a lot of enemies, and we should be on the alert. Rden Yenin is a city for all your labors, but he leads, comrades, to new deeds in the name of the interests of our labor republic ... ". Therefore, the commander spoke on behalf of the personnel in the division and asked the detainee to convey to his family and government that "the 4th division, sacredly guarding and multiplying combat traditions, will always be ready

execute

any prik s alone. memurkh georgy

onst ntinovich, however, having described that visit of the day, not . The detainee knew how to talk with the soldiers exercises or staff games with the and commanders. wished for irony: "<... . Of course, he did not conduct classes, personnel.

no one blamed him for this. although, of course, this was a big minus in his activities. I guess he thinks that Yemeni Ilovich is now more

political figures than military." he immediately contrasted the "bad military commander" with the "good" one Borevich: "He was a real Soviet military commander who perfectly mastered the operational-tactical art. He was in the full sense of the word a military man. appearance, ability to carry himself, the ability to briefly express his thoughts - everything indicated that Borevich was an outstanding military leader. troops, he appeared when he was least expected. - Each of his visits usually began with the raising of units on combat alert and ended with tactical exercises or commander's studies. Perhaps, from the views of Leorgy Onst ntinovich to udenny, that he knows how to talk with the soldiers, to look into their souls. Yemen Ilovich was a civil commander

war, ie the ability to convince subordinates that they were going into battle for a just cause, often depended on the outcome of the battle. It was difficult to get along with the Red Army men and commanders from the Ukovun. I am used not to convince, to force. in the portrait, Borevich, the commander, seems to have depicted his own ideal military leader. But if you think about it, how in every myth we will see a lot of absurdities here. Why should the commander of the district, one asks, by all means have to turn on his subordinates like a snowball? If he is an experienced and knowledgeable person, then he will distinguish the show from the true state of affairs in parts and no "Potemkin villages" will mislead him. How did Ukov come to the conclusion that Eronim Petrovich "perfectly" mastered the "operational-tactical art"? Georgiy Onstantinovich had a chance to fight together with Borevich only during the suppression of the Mbo uprising, but between them, the commander of the squadron and the deputy commander of the troops of the provinces, there was a huge distance, the commander could not appreciate the mastery of the future commander of the Belarusian military district. then Borevich did not have a chance to fight anymore. it is impossible to judge whether he was a coryphaeus of the military arts or just "an unsurpassed educator of the troops." Georgiy Onstantinovich was clearly trying on the epithets with which the eronymous Yetrovich applied to me. besides, he never had to compete with Borevich. I certainly didn't feel any hostility towards the commander of the Ukov. istk same 1937-1938

And

years, the victim of which pl Borevich opened before our hero previously unseen opportunities for promotion. In 1935, after being awarded the order, the Enin-Zhukov division from the 3rd to the corps, which instead of Imoshenko, who became deputy Borevich, was led by the commander ..iner, was transferred to the 6th, headed by standing. . Oryachev. In connection with the introduction of personal military ranks in the Russian Army, in November 1935 Georgiy Onstantinovich was awarded the title of "brigade commander". In the end of 1936, the KPCM was again allowed to serve in the army, a number of KV Lerian formations were made to be theirs. The 4th Cavalry Division was renamed into the 4th Onsk Kazch Division, and the Kzchi uniform was introduced in it - blue scars with red lamps and blue caps with red bands. by no means all the fighters actually came from the former Cossack class. In the autumn district maneuvers in 1936, the Zhukovsky division again flashed good preparation. There were a lot of irrigators on the battlefield, otherwise the 4th division crossed the erezina, and tanks -5 from the mechanized regiment that was part of the division crossed the river under their own power. Liment Fremovich was satisfied. in the analysis of the exercises, he highly appreciated the actions of the uks, and with satisfaction informed the udenny that

the 4th onsk kaz whose division had regained its former glory. added: "It's the servants of the uks, of which there would be more commanders." a promising division commander could clearly count on a higher position. — However, an unforeseen incident delayed the promotion of — George Onstantinovich in the service. from which p sskzyvl . . llykhin, who, at the invitation of the BRT, stayed in Lutsk during the maneuvers of 1936: "So George invited my family to Lutsk during his vacation. In 1936, they began to conduct field exercises. It was sunny, it was stuffy. uk and nch flax pcs b were treated upon return to osc to cold milk. The next day they felt bad - they were ill with brucellosis. They first left Minsk, then went to Moscow to the Central Military Hospital, where they were treated for seven to eight months. All this time we have been with Lvdia Lyinichnaya and George the Prophet. riehl lex ndr ievn with her daughter rochka. or they unsv ryusovsky lane. rt got better, he was sent from the hospital with his family to the south to rest home, rested and returned to oscow...". in the same case, remember eti - the daughter of the uks r:

ont m good

"In 1936 in Lutsk - I remember this very well - after drinking, he suffered a serious illness with which it was brucellosis. In the garrison there were two raw milk cases of this most serious disease ... in connection believed that both of them, perhaps, were deliberately contaminated. n hardly died. severe illness and

serious complications forced him to lie and be treated in the hospital for a long time. day he completely overcame his illness. As the doctors thought, only thanks to their strong organism, strength and willpower. During his illness, he lost incredible weight. scrupulously following all the instructions of the doctors, he was able to return to work. when he always quit smoking."

in the 1950s, when relations with her husband finally broke down, lexander

levn spoke ironically about that Zhukov's illness to his close friends: "Orzh turned out to be prudent at that terrible time of repression, prolonging his stay in a hospital bed." mind, here the role of her insults was played by her husband. The defendants in the city were experienced and the simulator would have been quickly exposed with all the ensuing consequences of this fact. and brucellosis, a serious infectious disease transmitted to humans from domestic animals and causing fluctuating fever, enlargement of the liver and spleen, abdominal pain and other unpleasant symptoms, does not really require long-term treatment. if in the eyes of the eyes with brucellosis suspected CT

sabotage , vr gvr g tr then George Onstantinovich created a kind of libi. eat no witz with rye milk!

In the end, 1936, indeed, began a new stage of repression in the army, and this time it affected, first of all, not former tsarist officers, as it was before, who seemed to be quite benevolent commanders — communists and commissars. nor, if they served in the imperial army, then in small ranks, like the Bolsheviks, they entered, like Kukhchevsky, back into the civil war, or even, to the head of the army political workers

mnik, had a pre-revolutionary party life. But at that time, neither the Ukovs, nor anyone else from the military could have foreseen the vast terror, which deprived the Russian

army for the most part of the then higher command and political staff. In 1936, of the well-known military members, only . . rome cov, .. utn, .. mMIDT AND AND pancake. ukov once studied at the woofer of which he was

Rimkov, and commanded a regiment in the 7th Division, when it was headed by the midt. But in similar relations with the rest were dozens, if not hundreds, of commanders of such a zherng, kkiuks. Georgy Onstantinovich should not yet have felt a special danger for himself personally. from when they took borevich in 1937, ukov could have 3 waves. George Onstantinovich's close relationship with the former commander of the district was quite widely known. However, at that time, the period of stay in the hospital was already coming to an end. the theme is a sntorium, and in July 1937, a little more than a month after Kzniuchevsky and his comrades, with the outbreak of repressions in the hostile army, the ukow rises to a new step in the military hierarchy.

just through

he is the commander of the 3rd military corps, located in the area

insk ,, and produce in divisional commanders. uk's predecessors in this post, .. yneri erdich, were already restaurated by that time. soon, they were shot. Georgy Onstantinovich recalled who was appointed commander of the corps: "About a couple of weeks after the rest of the commander. Erdich I was called to the city of Insk in the race of the commander of the troops of my district. having entered the race, I was not the commander of the troops, whose duties at that restov time were performed by the corps commander. okrug ulin was also . street in two months nkk , „vrgn rod“, it was none other than an old bolshevik who spent many years in the tsarist prison for his bolshevik prison. olikov (future activity. in the rut I was received by a member of the military rsh I ovetsky union council of the district.

, which the uks had quite sharp clashes in the years

great current war. — . .) ... was not used instead of the rest member

military advice. . Mirnov, a courageous and ingenious military leader.

e in me a series of questions of a biographical order, . any restoratives from . Olikov asked if I had among relatives or friends. replied that he did not know that he did not keep in touch with his numerous relatives. If there are close relatives - mothers and sisters, then they currently live in the village of Trelkovka and

work on the collective farm. Signs of people and friends are many restorants.

- exactly? asked. . olykov.

— well-known restovny borevich , komkor erdich , komkoriner, komkor ovtyukh , commander of ducks , commander of wasps , commander of Erkhovsky, commander

ribov , commander of okossovsky.

— = which of them were you friends with? asked. . olykov.

- fought with Okossovsky and Nila Erdich. Okossovsky studied in the same group in the course of improving the command structure of the army in the city of Eningrade and jointly working with the LV7th Marine Division. fought with the corps commander osogov and the commander of the division

Erkhovsky during the joint work of the inspection to the lerii. I considered these people to be big trio of us alone and the most honest communists," I replied.

— [what do you think about them now? Looking straight at me, he asked

OLIKov.

— „,iseych s.

Olikov abruptly got up from his chair and, blushing to the ears, said rudely: "Is it not dangerous for a future commander to praise an enemy clan? answered that I don't know why they were restoring, I think that some kind of error had occurred. . Olikov immediately tuned into an unfriendly tone, apparently, he felt paper and read it for about five that . remained dissatisfied with my answers. rummaging through his voluminous folder, he took out a minutes, then said:

—[In the report of the commissar of the 3rd Cavalry Corps of the NG, it is reported that you are brutally cutting with subordinate commanders and political workers and that sometimes you underestimate the role and significance of political workers. is it true?

- erno, but no k, k writes ng. I am not harsh with everyone, only with those who are vigilantly fulfilling the work entrusted to him and irresponsibly carrying out their duty of service. As for the role and importance of political workers, I do not appreciate those who formally fulfill their party duty, do not work for themselves and do not help commanders in solving educational tasks, those who who criticizes

demanding commanders, after him

etsya

demogogy tm, where it is not necessary to show Bolshevik firmness and perseverance - answered I.

—[There is information that, not without your knowledge, he baptized his daughter Lla in the church (he was born on April 8, 1937 — . .). is it true? - cont. . olykov.

- that is a very stupid idea. I wonder if anyone, being an intelligent person, could report such nonsense, especially since he would have to conduct an investigation before writing.

The subsequent conversation was interrupted by the arrival of the acting

commander of the troops mi district. . owlin ... after the preliminary conversation. . ulin
skzl:

- The military council of the district proposes to appoint the entire post of commander of the 3rd cavalry corps. — How do you personally feel about this proposal? answered, I am ready to do any work that I will be entrusted with. — uvot and excellent, — skzl. . Olikov held out. . street . report of the commission of the 3rd cavalry corps .. NG . street.

. street,
some places of which were

underlined in red red. ulin, read into this report, said:

- to invite ng and talk with him. I think that there is a lot of wear here. Ollikov MOLCH L.

- go to the division and work. I will report my opinion to Moscow. mind yu what's in m

will soon have to accept the 3rd Corps, - kzl. saying goodbye, I left for . street
the division. At least a month has passed since the
meeting and conversation with . . Olikov, apparently, informed the street people, no . olive and
that . his negative opinion about me, which he formed on the basis of a false report ~~from~~ decision was received from Moscow. considered
NG. frankly speaking. I was partly pleased with the fact that

He was appointed to the highest position, since someone was especially active in hunting for top commanders from the side of the state security agencies. before they manage to nominate a person to the highest position, you see, he has already been taken under the protection of the kk "enemy of the people", there is a poor fellow in the basement ... But soon, however, an order was received by the People's Commissariat of Defense on the appointment of me as ndir of the 3rd cavalry corps. Some known incorrectness of speech, such as "irresponsibly carries out his duty", in this, on the whole, competently, according to the built-up dialogue of dramaturgy, indicate that the instructions are reproducing some real conversation with olive. However, in the content of this conversation, the memorist simply made up a lot of things. We can more or less accurately date when the Ukov met Olikov and Ulin and discussed the denunciation of NG. It took place already after the Borevich rest, this rest took place on the 29th. before the appointment of the orders by the commander of the 3rd

the Clerian corps, which followed in July, remains for about a month. So, Georgy Onstantinovich's conversation with the leadership of the district

took place in June 1937, most likely after Ukhchevsky and Borevich had been convicted and shot. But in this case, it was only by the power of his own imagination that it was possible for Olikov to speak about the Okossovsky carpet. June, just like in July 1937, Onstantin Onstantinovich was in freedom and in good health. they mourn later, in the month of August. Forcing the conversation with Olikov, Ukov most likely came up with that part of it, where a member of the military council of the district asks about connections with the enemy, the Ministry of the clan, the brave divisional commander, a knight without fear and reproach , openly declares that he does not believe in the guilt of his friends, does not consider

eat them

vrmi n gen. mind yu that iLIPP in a newbie really asked George Onst Ntinovich

..., whether he was friends with the enemy and rod Borevich. Ukov honestly answered that he communicated with the former commander of the district mainly on official business and concepts

didn't have that Eronim Etrovich was thinking about the conversation. other military leaders, called ukovs, were still walking freely in those days. For example, Peter Leks ndrovich Mirnov was restored only a year later, on June 30, 1938. From the Belarusian district, he was transferred back in 1935. in the summer of 1937, Mirnov took the high post of head of the political administration | Olikov was directly subordinate to him, who, consequently, could not replace the "courageous and perfidious military leader" in Insk.

By the way, people who are familiar with the order of militar movements in the military army will immediately note: to the representation of the military council of the Belarusian military district, it is the meaning of the orders by the commander of the 3rd corps that probably preceded the order from the side iroshilov and udenny (it is unlikely that the appointments of commanders-to-leurists were made without consultations with their Semyon Yilovich). Soon, clouds really gathered over George Onstantinovich's head. from what he wrote in "<recollections and reflections" at the beginning of the service in the 3rd building: "about

On arrival at the corps, I was met by the chief of staff of the corps. m rsky. The first thing he reported to me was the obrestekk , „vrg n gen kommissar corps ng, , who wrote a slanderous report against me. , from my . Olikov. internally i

who was pleased that the slanderer received 3 servants. Here I would like to emphasize that the scammer suffered only because Oroshilov had already managed to make his choice in favor of the Ukovs. Ikol I Lbertovich was shot safely in 1938.

The situation, according to the instructions, was gloomy: "... most parts the corps, in connection with the rerests, sharply increased combat and political training, political composition in bl , the exactingness decreased and, as a result, the command and

disciplines AND ALL PERSONAL SERVICES. In a number of cases, degogi influenced their heads and tried to terrorize demanding commanders, labeling them with "enemy approach to the education of personnel ... were also those who were involved in him

malicious slander on honest commanders in order to undermine the confidence in them on the part of the soldiers of the participating staff. I decided to intervene sharply in the state of affairs, resolutely rebuke some people and raise the question of whether the interests of affairs required this. rvd, at the same time, in a number of cases, I personally allowed increased harshness, which was immediately taken advantage of by some unprincipled workers of the corps. The next day, I was bombarded with reports to the district with pity for .. Olikov, letters to the state security agencies, "on the military education of the firewood" from the commander of the 3rd Cavalry Corps of the Ukrainians>. Further, Georgiy Onstantinovich tells how he interceded for

the commander of one of the divisions of the corps .. @lokoskov relations , who was accused of being close with the just exposed enemy miners rod borevich, erdich, ngomi and others. Ukov, on the other hand, allegedly emphasized that the relations of the Yelokosks with these people were purely official in nature, and suggested that the discussion be limited to without any

organizational conclusions. ki did. rshl does not directly affirm, but the teachers of "reminiscences and reflections" get the impression that the subsequent repressions along the party line could be caused by his principled behavior in the case of elokoskov. besides, ukow det

to understand that the party meeting, at which he was almost expelled from the Bolshevik ranks, took place a year or a year and a half after this case, when he already headed the 6th Cossack Corps, stationed in Sipovich: In the evening, the commissar of the corps (6th, - ..) omin came to my office. He walked around and around for a long time, then said 3 L: "Eat it, tomorrow the communists of the 4th division, 3rd and 6th corps are going to

gather, they will sort you out in party order. asked: "What did I do that such a big asset will take me apart?" then, how will they sort me out without bringing any false

accusations against me in advance, so that I

could

prepare an appropriate explanation? -[= selection will

be made according to the material of the 4th to the division and the 3rd corps, without being aware of the phenomena received, -skzl omin. "Well, let's see what they want to accuse me of," I replied to Omin. The next day, about 80 Communists actually gathered, and I was invited to the meeting. frankly, I was a little worried, and I felt uncomfortable with someone,

moreover, at that time it was very easy to attach the label "enemy of the genus" to any honest communist. The speech

began with the reading of the statements of some commanders and political workers ... it was said that I had undeservedly offended many commanders and political workers and did not promote them to higher positions, deliberately freezing experienced cadres, than deliberately harmed our armed forces. In other words, the case led to admitting that I used enemy methods in educating children. After reading a number of statements, the

debate began. As it turned out, it was first of all those who were under the apparitions that spoke out. my question is, why is it so late for us to come to me with statements, since one and a half to two years have passed from the events mentioned in the statements, the answer was the following: - we were afraid of the Ouks, now the time is different, now we have opened ch z rest mi. Second question: about the attitude towards Borevich, Erdich, Yiner and other "vrgrm n genus". The question is, why did Borevich, when checking the division, lunch luvs, comrade ukov, why did erdich, yner and others always treat kvm so well? the head of the political department of the 4th division spoke. . Ikhomir... his speech was a vivid example of opportunists. He lied between the accusers, resulting in an unscrupulous attempt to avoid a direct answer to the questions of what is right and what is not right. Ikhomirov evaded a direct answer. I told the Communists that I expected an objective evaluation of my activities from the Ikhomirs, but this did not happen. Therefore, I will say what I was wrong about, what I was right in order to reject the false claims that

to me.

The first question is about rudeness. this issue; I must say frankly that I had breakdowns, and I was not correct in speaking sharply with those commanders and political workers who here were catching and offended by me. I don't want to justify the fact that there were many shortcomings in the work of the personnel in the division, misdemeanors and other emergencies. As a communist, I, above all, was obliged to be more restrained in dealing with subordinates, to help more with a kind word and show less nervousness. good advice, a good word is stronger than any bullshit. Then there is the accusation that I have lunch L borevich - "vgeniy", I must say that I have lunch with the commander of the troops mi district Borevich. then izn szn I that he vrgrn genus? and who. As for the good attitude towards me from the side of the erdich and the manager - I can say that we all have to fight to have good relations between superiors and subordinates. s pr you, criticizing my bad attitude towards

some commanders, but do not criticize me for the good attitude towards me erdich and yner. this should rather be praised than throwing ambiguous allusions and unsubstantiated accusations. Concerning the remark made by the head of the political department of the 4th division to the Ikhomirov division that I underestimate the political workers, I must say frankly: Yes, indeed, I do not

I love

and do not appreciate such political workers, for example, Ikhomir, who helped me badly

V

work in the 4th Division and always shied away from solving complex issues, showing unprincipled gentleness, undemanding, even to the detriment of business. Some political workers want to be good uncles at the expense of deeds, but this is not the Bolshevik style of work. Tough political workers who help their commanders successfully solve the problems of combat training, know how to work with the world by rolling their hands in „, unsteady

no

carrying out the instructions of the party and the government, and without hesitation, they tell their commander where he was wrong, where he made a mistake, so that the commander would take this into account in his work and not allow any mistakes. The organizers of this meeting apparently

calculated whether to expel me from the

Party or, in the worst case, to impose a strict Party penalty, but the Communists did not

went

n this.

After critical speeches, the meeting adopted a decision that was of great help to me. The decision of the p ractive was said: "limit the discussion of the issue and take into account the explanation of the comrades of the comrades. .>". frankly speaking, for me the speech of the head of the political department of the 4th k in Leri. ihmirov was somewhat unexpected. —we work together

near the division. four years old. or in the same house. The head of the political department and my deputy for political affairs, he certainly replacing

did not satisfy me (I wonder why, then, for four years, Georgy Onstantinovich never raised the question of ikhomirs? - ..), but in the middle In private life, as a person, he was good in all respects and always treated me with great tact and respect (I suspect that the dissatisfaction of the uks with the work of his deputy arose only after the ill-fated party meeting. - ..). I always emphasized

that as a single leader I am a full-fledged political leader and enjoy real party authority among the team, including political workers. When the meeting was over, I could not resist and asked Ikhomirov: "Ergeyetrovich, you didn't talk about me today like you always did, when you worked

together in a division. Does that correspond to the truth - to our previous judgments about me or to the characteristics that I have been in today?

n replied:

— u of course,, what he always said. about what he said today - it was not necessary to say.

flared up and replied:

— = I really regret that I once considered you a comrade of principle, you are just an opportunist. Since then I have ceased to consider him my comrade. At meetings

with him, he answered only official questions. five in front of us is a fairy-tale hero, easily defeating enemies, including a werewolf - a former friend - commissar r. Imonov, Ukov, on this

occasion, was already telling something completely pokrythic. It would seem that Lin, when Imoshenko called him "the commander of the military corps of the Ukrainians" (in fact, then - already the deputy commander of the district) as a candidate for the post of commander in Ihinol, said: "Ukov ... Ukov ... I don't remember this name. " At times Oroshilov recalled: "That is the same smyukov who sent a telegram to me and to me on the thirty-seventh that he was unfairly brought to party responsibility." "Uh, and how did it end?" Tlin asked. Oroshilov, who approved Ukov, replied that everything ended happily: it turned out that there was no

BASIC NIY. I

don't know exactly how that memorable party meeting took place, I don't know if its protocol has been preserved somewhere. ezn yud, protrusion llin it. . Ikhomirov is one of the few political workers who managed to avoid repressions in 1937-1938. I know for sure: about the time, the course and outcome of the party meeting and about the telegrams sent to Tlin and Orosilov, allegedly leading to the cancellation of an unjust decision, Georgy Onstantinovich is frankly lying. why don't you tell. because in the autobiography, dated June 13, 1938, the ukow directly wrote: "I have a martial penalty - "reprimand" dated 1/28/38 for rudeness, for criminology (? - that

meaning this brkdbr in party jargon - I don't know; Clamp of criticism - you can still understand: it does not allow subordinates to criticize the commander, but what is the "clamp of criticism"? Did Ukov not allow others to criticize him with him, or did he somehow suppress his own impulses for mobbing? - political work, for an insufficient fight against fraud. ties with vr g mi nor me, , .), underestimation

neither

My wife didn't and doesn't. February 25, 1938 was nominated commander of unit 6323 (i.e.,

Commander of the 6th Commander of the Leri Corps.— . .). passed the test at the department leading the p-rganov

(6). No. 063 was nominated as Deputy Commander of the Troops of the Mielorussian Military District (in connection with this, an autobiography was written. - . .) ".

It is easy to make sure that the party meeting, about which the story is told in his memoirs, took place on January 28, 1938, when Georgiy Konstantinovich was still commander of the 3rd

to the corps. disassembles for sure not the events of one and a half or two years ago,

results of the semi-annual command of the corps. Evidently, during this time Ukov managed, with his rudeness and rudeness, what is called, to "get" many commanders and political workers, who initiated the discussion of his

behavior at the meeting. The party organization, contrary to Zhukovsky's assertion in "reminiscences and reflections," by no means "limited itself to discussing the issue," issued a full-fledged reprimand to the corps commander. Only now there were no political accusations against the Uks. Otherwise, no one would dare to nominate him as commander from my powerful

Belorussian district corps. By chance, Ukov noted in his mem- under the leadership of Zhukovsky, taki did not manage to become advanced).

On the other point of the accusations, on account of fraud, Georgy Onstantinovich preferred not to write anything in his memoirs. about all appearances, it was about the fact that the reports

from

Parts of the corps, embellishing whether the indicators of combat and political training, the uk sometimes treated such reports uncritically.

For irrigators, however, rudeness towards subordinates has never been a great sin. and eyewash was a common occurrence in

rnoy army, to ki throughout the country. row 3rd to the building to someone stood out here

v

the worst side. the same applies to the accusations reflected in the reprimand of "underestimation of political work" and the cryptic "clamping down on criticism", then in comparison with hundreds and thousands

condemned "from talkers" and "spies" it was a real nonsense. people to fill the highest command positions vacated by the restorative "enemies of the people" were drastically in short supply. For this reason, a commander with an outstanding reprimand, but still in good standing with the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense, at that time was a completely acceptable candidate for promotion to new steps in the military hierarchy.

the forerunner of the uks in the 6th corps commander lisei vnovich oryachev was one of those who tried Ukhchevsky, kir, borevich and other participants in the imaginary "military fascist conspiracy". Eight months after the trial, he received a promotion: he was appointed deputy commander of the Iyevsky military district, imoshenko. However, soon at one of the party meetings, Oryachev was reminded of his friendship with the same Borevich,

Erdich and others "vr g min genus". Lisei, as a newbie, did not want to lie, did not want to be in the shoes of Ukhchevsky and experience death humiliations.

just shot. At that time, the leadership of the Belarusian military district had time to change. successor borevich team nd rm 1-gorng. 1938 new commander. . Ovlev, command of the 2nd rank (one of the few . The spruce was rested on January 7 carriers of this high rank who escaped repression) selected personnel to replace the vacant candidates at the headquarters of the district. Ukov was appointed as the lieutenant of the commander of the corps.

There is a version that Georgiy Onstantinovich was involved in the discovery

"enemies of the people" and thanks to this he received an indulgence of all sins, including a powerful acceleration of his career. In 1989, of the n rsl Soviet Union in No. 10 of the magazine ill-fated reprimand ,, "nmya" writer I dimirrrov published a denunciation

mountains of the following content:

« TOV.

the concealment of vile, treacherous, vile work in the ranks obliges everyone to check and remember all the struggle that we, under the leadership of the Party, have carried out for 20 years. to check with the fact that we all went sincerely and honestly in the struggle for the cause of the party - ; How is it befitting a party and non-party Bolshevik, and are there among us fellow travelers who have come and go for a raunchy, perhaps another, wrecking and espionage goal. Guided by these considerations, I decided to tell the following fact, which today, I believe, has a political

value.

In November 1917, at the entrance of the 1st Army in Tokmzgof, where I was a delegate, I heard a speech by the then Right Socialist-Revolutionary Lieutenant Colonel. who, in his speech, called comrade in naturist, an envoy of the Germans. Ultimately, his speech boiled down to telling the soldiers not to believe in the emancipation of the working class and the peasantry. After his speech, a Menshevik spoke, who, despite being hostile to the Bolsheviks, even dissociated to a revolutionary fighter fighting for himself from his speech. dear comrade, dear Omiss, maybe it's too late, but after talking

today with a comrade , rrshil tell this to M. (6) (.)”.

signature - autograph f - "ukov" (with the text of the denunciation imprinted on a typewriter).

Rpov decided that the second denunciation was our hero, George Onstantinovich Ukov. there were grounds for such a conclusion. After all, the “Comrade Yulenev” mentioned in the text of the letter is actually Yulenev, who then held the post of deputy inspector of the army. Well, the second letter was almost certainly the commander-k in the lerist. .. ukov, as you know, served in the inspectorate in Leria for two years and Yulenev knew well. when georgy onst ntinovich was tm

the secretary of the rem prorganization, then Vnl Dimirovich was the deputy secretary. besides K 3 Elk, THAT this DENUSION well explains the subsequent rapid climbing of the ranks by Georgiy Onstintinovich. Rpov, acknowledging that the quoted letter "does not embellish the instructions", ATTEMPTED to justify the scammer. “Skzl kkto ukov about the performance of the mountains to Yulenev. now I’ve lost my mind suddenly Yulenev will report this to where

should?.. the same will happen? Ukov does not tell me about this, so ... whitk further. Well, if completely innocent people were "sewn" with a spy and terror, then in the presence of such a conversation you will not escape. then he turned his attention to the last line of the letters; it is emphasized once again: "after talking with comrade Yulenev, I decided to inform." okay, that's all

Time tormented the Ukovs - did Yulenev report or not? So, having talked to him again, and I understand that if he keeps silent now, then the “concealment” will certainly be accused ... Well, “I decided to tell”.

drew attention to the fact that the letter of the uks arrived at the office of the People's Commissar on January 26, 1938 (dt in the margins , though not very clear). Gorov back in May 1937 of the letter a month before the process of Ukhchevsky, the head of the general

piece b, soon restov n and died. to which the fate of the mountains was sealed long before the letters - uks. Here, the dearest L Dimir Silevich was mistaken. The development of Leksandr L'ich Gorov did not begin at all in 1937, but much later. 10 My mountains really left the post of chief of staff 6 ... in order to take a higher position of first deputy people's commissar of defense. n kk rz released after removal

Ukhchevsky, who has only a month left to live. The stanza for Lexandr Lmch was at the very end of January 1938, when the marshal was unexpectedly removed from his high post in order to command the far from important Kvzsky district. On February 8, four days after the Mountains arrived at their new duty station in Tbilisi, they arrested his wife, Lintonovna Eshkovskaya, accusing her of being a spy for Poland (a week later, the exhausted woman signed the required testimony). a month and a half later, 27 m Hg, they also took Lex ndr lich from my mogo. let's shoot the rshl on the day of the red army, February 23, 1939. It was precisely Zhukovsky's denunciation of the head of the mountain that was scrapped. If this letter were possible, tlin would have kept mrshl alive. there was never any opposition to either Tlin or Oroshilov, Leksandr , Lich, on the front of the Civil War was together with Osif Issrionovich and never had any conflicts with him. it is clear that tlin hesitated at the expense of the mountains, in the opinion

but in the end he preferred to part with the not too endowed, by his

commander, and even with a tarnished biography. not only did he publicly call Enin a nturist (which is unfair) and a German gent (which is close to the truth, but what is curious: there were hundreds, if not thousands of delegates at that congress, if not thousands of delegates, only one reported!). Leksandrlich, when he was still serving in the imperial army in the military, took part in the suppression of the revolutionary uprisings of 1905-1906. after all, even after the restoration of his wife, but still being free, after the first clashes with the already restored guards, the minister of the family, marsh I wrote to Oroshilov: I live now I will live until the end of my

life - this is our great party - the general course ... not , its principles, fundamentals and without sin ... I will say with all decisiveness that I would immediately cut the throat of anyone who dared to speak and call for a change in the leading political person not splashed with a single drop of dirt and remains clean, as it was during all 20 years of my stay in the ranks of the Khprtii of the Russian Army ... if I had at least one iota with me, in my conscience and soul my guilt in relation to political connection with a gang of enemies and representatives of the party, the homeland of the foreigners, already

I not only

now, even in the first minutes, when the party, through the mouth of the leader, comrade, announced that those who , confessed would not be punished, even without this, he directly and frankly stated this, first of all to comrade and m. my fact for recognition, no

questions of my political guilt before the party and the motherland as their enemy, traitor and traitor. The style of Gore's letters surprisingly resembles the style of the denunciation that came to him.

The scammer and the marshal use the same words to swear political loyalty and recall their twenty-year tenure in the ranks of the party. rz "I would immediately cut the throat of anyone who dared to speak and call for a change in leadership

»

it would have been quite suitable .. forged in 1957, in June and October. nchl when he helped I

Rushchev to smash "Lenkov, Mr. Novich later, when , olots and epilov who joined them, " he got wet in the shoes of members of the "anti-party group."

about the second letter to Oroshilov, Gorov, who had already been expelled from and was waiting for the rest, addressed "to the leader of our party, the teacher of my political youth in the ranks of our party, Comrade Tallinn", believed that "he would not refuse from the evidence ... my devotion

Soviet power", recalled that in the army he shed his blood "in the fight against the enemy on the battlefields", swore "at the cost of his life" that he was not a traitor and not a traitor. in the first letter he said: "I want to tell him (Tlin. - .) in a personal conversation that all that bright past, our joint work at the front remains for me with my dear moment of life and that this is the past I have never allowed anyone to denigrate, all the more I have not allowed and cannot allow that I could change this past even in my thoughts and become not only in fact, but also in the thoughts of the enemy of the party and the people. Leksandrlich clearly expected that Oroshilov would show his letter to Tlin, and the leader would believe in the sincerity of the colleague in the fight against Yenikin and Ilsudsky and order to stop the initial persecution. Gorov, apparently, was not presented with a denunciation. In what case, the marshal would hardly have ventured to assert that his political face "had not been splashed with a single drop of mud", would have preferred to confess (which, however, would not have been saved either).

Tlin something denunciation, there is no doubt, he read the price of Yegorov's assurances.

The publication in "name" was responded to by the daughters of George Onstantinovich and

II. In the 02nd issue of the same magazine in 1990, their angry letter appeared: "You were in a state of shock. It is thought that the author, who allegedly "could not continue working for some time", could use him to establish the authenticity of the document that so shocked him. "But you couldn't believe it for a minute, knowing my father's directness and honesty, he

What

could have written such a paper because of the "mouse-preservation instinct", as suggested by

rpov. Most of all, I was convinced that this was a fake signature. grows into that it has nothing to do with its
ch z , original painting. also the fact that

This kind of letter is printed non-typewriter. something could have kept watch. rpov 1!"

r eorgievn and II eorgievn achieved a forensic examination.

The conclusion of the expert .. the rule stated that "the differing features are stable, significant and form a set sufficient to conclude that this signature is not simi- lar . by another person. the external resemblance noted above, the coincidence of certain general and particular features ... can (probably) be explained by the execution of the signature with the authentic signatures of the Ukovs. O CONCLUSION: "signature on behalf of the Ukovs. ., located in a letter in the name of the native Omiss R of Defense comrade. Oroshilov dated January 26, 1938, right from the words, was made not with George Onstantinovich Mimukov, by another person, probably with imitation „, linen (6)", of the original signatures of the uks. .".

I dimir silevich rpov was struck down by the results of the examination. The unfortunate denunciation did not include the reprinting of his books about the decree, in a letter to the then chief editor "nmeni" rigory-kovlevich klnov stated: "If this is really so (i.e., the signature under the denunciation is not George Onst ntinovich — . .), I will be happy!" It can be justified: "I have on my desk photocopies of many documents written and signed personally by a sign. the signatures under them are not always identical, this often depended on the mood of the marshal and on the situation in which he signed the document.

oh, of course, I am not a graphologist and cannot (and do not want to!) refute him
switch.

therefore, I ask readers and relatives to understand that this letter was published but without malicious intent, my boundless respect and love for Georgy Onstantinovich, I hope, are visible and understandable to everyone from every page of my story. inclusion of a former front-line reconnaissance officer. The hero of the Soviet Union called on the competent authorities to "deal with" those who wanted to defame the light Zhukovsky name: "So it's fake, I hope the law enforcement agencies will investigate and establish who wanted to compromise rsh lukov this letter. - from after all kky psychology of the Soviet people! If the document confirms the attitude he has developed towards one or another historical hero, then check it,

Moreover, it is not worth refuting. If the document is inconvenient for the prevailing in the mind

Unfortunately, the conclusions , then it is easiest to declare it a fake.

of the expert do not at all clarify the mythological image, they only further confuse the question of who was the second denunciation of the Ngor. Any more or less experienced criminal list knows that forensic examinations based on signature alone do not have evidentiary force in

judicial process. too little material is then at the disposal of the expert. - the description of individual letters in the autograph can vary significantly depending on the mood of the one who signs the document: whether he is healthy or ill, worried or

calm. 6b this can be read in any textbook criminology. The second denunciation must have been agitated when he composed it, and his signature, therefore, could differ significantly from the usual one. then in 1938 it might have occurred to someone to forge the signature of George Onstantinovich under such a document, not a single sane person would believe. In those circumstances, the denunciation of the ngor was a non-compromising document, evidence of good faith and an application for career advancement. There are catches from the text of the examination that the signature on the document was made "with the authenticity of the signatures of the decrees. .>", krz can only reinforce the suspicion that the second denunciation was Georgiy Onstintinovich. it is completely incomprehensible why the expert keeps repeating that the signature was made "on behalf of the Ukov. .". After all, only "uks" is read in the graph, in its typewritten interpretation - ". ukov". second initial "< ." nowhere is there, just like a knot and an indication of the position of a second denunciation. from if it were written but: ". Ukov, commander of the 3rd Corps of Leria, "everything would be clear and no doubts would arise. because before the expert lies a document signed by a certain. ukov, judging by the mention

Yulenev ,, - a clerk, but not necessarily - Georgiy Onstantinovich Ukov. to assert that the denunciation was carried out "on behalf of" my hero, strictly speaking, the expert did not follow. However, at the expense of "directness and honesty", I thought ... I think that from the previous analysis of the "<reminiscences and reflections" section, readers have already understood: Georgiy Onstantinovich in his memoirs deviated more from the truth than follow her. On the other hand, the second of many other memes is a little more primal. At the same plenum, when the Lenkov, Gnovich and other oppositionists were smashed, he had to open the execution lists signed by members of the "anti-party group". Here, according to Onstantin Imonov, who was present at the plenum, one of the oppositionists interrupted Georgiy Onstantinovich and declared that "there was a time when you had to sign some documents, whether you wanted it or not. sm ukov knows this well. if you dig into the documents of that time, then, probably, you can find such ones among them, no, you won't find them. which is worth the signature of the uks. Ukov turned sharply and answered: Oy! oh signature you are not going to." Of course, Georgiy Onstantinovich knew perfectly well that no one would allow and their associates to rummage through the archives. Can we really rsh lin etr zsolg a rogue Gnovich, Olotov I? I will try to establish the second document not with the help of a graphological examination, the results of which in this case cannot serve as evidence. I will try to analyze the facts of the biography of George Onstantinovich Ukov and compare them with what the second letter tells himself. In November 1917, the carrier was a delegate to the congress of the 1st Army of the northern front in Tokmzhof. That congress opened on October 30, 1917 in Lithuanian, part of which was the tokm zhof manor. . . Gorov was a delegate from the 33rd division. The exit ended on November 6th. Ukov, as we remember, was a junior non-commissioned officer in the 6th marching squadron of the 5th cavalry regiment of the front. —This regiment was stationed in the area of u200bu200bLklei, more than a thousand kilometers from the Livland tokmzgof. In his autobiography of 1938, Georgiy Onstantinovich noted that during the "October Revolution", along with the squadron, there was a station in the Vintsa of the Everonetsk railway

roads in the Rkovskaya province. Let's not forget that Ukov invented how later he had to hide for several weeks from pro-Ukrainian officers who wanted to take revenge on the chairman of the squadron committee for disrupting the "Ukrainization" of the squadron. let us assume that Georgiy-onstintinovich left the squadron literally immediately, as soon as it became known about the capture of the Bolshevik

mi power in the metropolitan area, say, on the 26th or 27th. Seriously, he would have drastically not had enough time to get to the current congress. ednen aeropl didn't he fly? and why would a non-commissioned officer of the uks suddenly suffer being iffland, and who in the 1st army would have elected the army congress overnight? In addition, in his autobiography of the 38th year, Georgiy Onstantinovich punctually indicated that he was the chairman of the squadron committee, but did not say anything about his participation in the army congress.

„ and a member of the regimental council

what could he do with such a flattering fact for himself? I paid attention to the date of receipt of the denunciation of the Ngorov in the office of the People's Commissar - January 26, 1938. There are no details in my text of the letter, it is only said that the last time I spoke with Yulenev, the second spoke "today" - it means that the letter to Narkom should have arrived on the same day it was written, and before I its most likely with m scammer. Consequently, on January 26, 1938, the commander, by the name of Ukov, should have been in Moscow. I remember that on January 28 of the same year the party meeting reprimanded Georgy Onstantinovich. Was it just two days before that to send a commander to Moscow? I'm going to tell you, the last doubts have already disappeared from the teachers that the authorities were not involved in the denunciation of the mountains and ISM did not see this denunciation in the eye. about who was the second fatal letter for lex ndr lich? The answer to this question will be helped by "remembering and thinking." - Speaking about my service in 1919 in the 4th regiment of the 1st Moscow army division, Georgy Onstantinovich devoted a whole page to a meeting with his

namesake: "<... got acquainted with the commissar of the division, my brother-in-law, Ukov Georgy Silevich. This happened under the following circumstances. Early one morning, passing by an open field, I saw that SOMEONE was "driving out" a horse. came closer, I see, with m commissar of the division. I'm good at driving

”

And
dressage, I wanted to see what the commissar r. Not paying attention to me, the commissar was sweating all over the raising of the horse into a lop with his left foot. Okkni was trying, the horse was always failing and instead of the left, periodically throwing out his right leg. could not resist and shouted: — [Short the left rein! Omiss R, without saying anything, translated the horse, rode up to me and, jumping off, said: — [Come on, try it. there was nothing left to do, how to adjust the stirrups and sit in the saddle. after walking a few circles to get to know the horse, I picked it up and raised it to a troop with my left foot. a circle has come - good. another one came up - good. revel with the right one is also good. revel on the left — goes without a hitch. - to bring the horse stronger in the legs, - I remarked indeed. Omiss rr laughed: "How long have you been sitting on a horse? - four years. What? — k, nothing. you're going well. they talked. Commissioner asked where I started my service, where I fought, when I arrived in the division, when I joined the party. he told himself that he had been in the office for ten years. lenp rtii since 1917. rivel in the red army a significant part in the Leri regiment from the army. It was clear from everything that this was a real commissar r... commissar rukkuv I met more than once afterwards, we had conversations with him about the situation at the front in the country. One day, he suggested that I switch to a political bot. pobl for a year, but said that he was more inclined towards combatant. When he recommended that I go to study at the courses of red commanders. readily agreed. However, it was not possible to carry out this.

Here, several details immediately strike the eye, making Georgiy Sil'evich a very real candidate for the repetition of Ntiegorov's denunciation. Zon joined the party in 1917 and directly from the army and again led most of the regiment in January of the 38th, as a scammer, should have been in the series x (b) and 20 full years. also George Onst Ntinovich was smaller. At the beginning of 1938, the future marshal was in the party for 18 years and 10 months, in the Russian army - 19 years and 4 months. It can be assumed that .. Ukov was the chairman of the regimental committee. In this capacity, he really could lead the Bolsheviks to a majority of fellow soldiers and a delegate to the Army Congress. George - Silevich was much older than George Onstantinovich - he was born

in 1882. follow the future rsh l the advice of a senior comrade , choose a rrier

a political worker - and not only would he not have reached the highest rung of the Soviet hierarchy, but he would hardly have survived at the beginning of a great technological war. A lot of botniks in 1937-1938 destroyed the bottom especially mercilessly. George Onstantinovich preferred to remain a combat commander. Oh, what's interesting, George Sil'evich also left the commissar. After the civil war, he commanded the 9th Rymysk division, since 1927 he was the head of the Orisoglebsk-Yeningradsky Kvalerian school. Probably, they took into account the extensive experience of serving VK in Leningrad. Ukov graduated as a member of a military group for the runze demy. However, he did not make any outstanding rally. February 1938 George - Silevich was just a brigade commander. On February 22, 1938, he was awarded the Order of the Red Star. Possibly, it was a plot's denunciation of the mountains. I have almost no doubt that it was Georgiy Silevich who was the second of that ill-fated letter. For the final proof of this fact, it is only necessary to establish documented whether I also note that the "co-author" denunciation, . . Yulenev, the rewards were much more generous - he accepted the district that had been vacated after the mountains. Perhaps one more belated retribution for compromising . . ukov at the congress of the 1st Army in November 1917. The Gorovs was the promotion of Georgiy Silevich in June 1940 to lieutenant general. dnko meanness is not a consequence of repression. During the years of the great current war, he was arrested and sent to a camp. Georgiy Sil'evich was lucky enough to live to see his rehabilitation. June 1953 then Secretary of Defense

Ulginin sent a number of previously convicted generals to the submission for review of cases. their list was a list of uks. . it is very likely that its namesake, . . ukov, at that time - the deputy Ulginin - prompted this name to "and the military marshal", remembering

warm conversations with the commissioner of the 1st to the division. After his release, George Silevich lived a long life. died in 1972.

, I can state with confidence: George Onstantinovich Ukov did not write denunciations. There are no rekhs on him, but this is not a sin. z . . the instructions of the rshl t ystvo I only because unknowingly denounced the mountains. carriers did not catch the sheet, and tried to expel them from the army. Although Georgiy Onstantinovich did not believe in the party and served the . . , was a member of the Bolshevik criminal communist regime of Enin-Tlin, but there were traces of a certain moral principle.

og humiliate a person of . . , j to destroy, but openly, not with the help of intrigues and denunciations.

Commanded the 6th Corps of Commanders for less than four months - until the appointment in June 1938 as deputy commander of the Belarusian military district for the office. he was also in charge of the mechanized units that were just being formed. Ukov was forced to move to Molensk, where the headquarters of the district was located. June 1939 was followed by an unexpected call from Minsk to Moscow. . then arrived in the capital greatly agitated, fearing to share the sad fate . Ilihin remembered that ukov

ukhchevsky, borevich, gorov, erdich and many others: "...June 1, 1939 his. Oroshilov. Ukov arrived LKNMV his suitcase and went Ryusovsky. I didn't know that I called the osqwook. waiting for him. put down to the Defense Committee. he returned very late, his first words were! , hungry for the wolf".

We didn't feed him or give him water, but in the morning he left the aerodrome. Growing with us, he said 3 I: "whether I return with gifts, or do not remember me dashingly."

lavdiya linichnich said: "Return only with gifts". When he left, we did not ask if we soon learned from the newspapers that the Commander of the Command was in command of troops defending friendly Mongolia from the Japanese invaders.

A lot of rocks lie on the Lhinal River, where the Soviet and Mongolian troops with difficulty held back the line of the Japanese in the Ntun army.

Ichin-ol

Years after the end of World War II, Ukov, recalling Lhinol, confessed to the writer Konstantin Imonov: "I still love this operation." from the lips of the one who led the defense of osca in the 41st mibr I erlin in the 45th, these words are worth a lot. Why is it that a battle in which a reinforced corps fought on each side is so heartbreaking for a commander who commanded fronts in a great civil war with hundreds of thousands and millions of fighters? because it was the first performance of Georgiy Onstantinovich on the battlefield as a military leader. the first under command of the uks in combat conditions turned out to be not a squadron, several divisions and a brig, but most importantly, the debut turned out to be very successful. In a conversation with Imonov, he described the circumstances as a result of which Lhinolya found himself in the following way: "Lhinolya went to — I was later told how it all happened. When we suffered the first setbacks in May-June, Tlin, discussing this issue with Oroshilov in the presence of Imoshenko and Onon Renko, then secretary of the Party of Belarus, asked Oroshilov: - Totm, n lhinol, com nduet mi troops? - ombrig eklenko. - uh, who is this eklenko? then he represents himself? Tlin asked. Oroshilov said that he could not answer this question precisely now, he did not personally know Eklenko and did not know what he was like. t lin said displeasedly: - the same this one? people are fighting, you have no idea who is fighting with you, who is in command of our troops? to appoint someone else to fix the situation

And

was able to act proactively. So that he could not only correct the situation, but also in case of two Japanese, M. Imoshenko said:

- I have one candidate tour - the commander of the clerical corps of the uks characterized me on the good side, said that I was a resolute person, I could handle it. Onom Renko also confirmed that it was a good ac ndid tour to accomplish the assigned task. ... was in the area on a field trip. I was called to the phone and told: tomorrow I will not be in Moscow. called Usykov. He was at that time a member of the military council of the Belarusian district. Thirty-ninth year, after all, I think: what does this challenge mean? asking: —[You don't know why they're calling? answers: - no. but one thing: in the morning you must be in the waiting room of the sprinklers. - well, there is! I left for Moscow, I received an order: "Fly n lhinol" - the next day I flew out. This 39th was the time of the "Beria thaw", which came to replace the "Ezhov frost". - Are now mostly Chekists from among the adherents of the former People's Commissar of Internal Affairs. among the military rests, the mountains became much smaller. However, the army has not yet had time to realize the turn that has taken place from mass terror to the subsequent rehabilitation (mostly already in the 41st, on the eve of the war) of part of the convicted military men. ukov, to

ki

many others, were still afraid of sudden calls to Moscow, to krkom. I remembered that those who were later shot were also summoned to Oroshilov on urgent matters, and the summons ended in wrestling, trial, and punishment. But still, in a conversation with Imonov, Georgy Onstantinovich exaggerated somewhat: "The relevant documents were being prepared for me, apparently, there were already enough of them, someone was already running somewhere with a briefcase in which they were . in general, things went to the fact that I could end up the same as then

ending many others. after all this, suddenly a call and an order to go to Lhin-Ol. let's go there with joy." It should not be thought that a secondment to Mongolia with services from an almost inevitable rest. After all, he received a party penalty, moreover, without any political overtones, back in January 1938, and in the next year and a half he had no troubles in his service, he made a very successful career. The new appointment not only allowed Ukov to act as a commander

for the first time, but also opened the way to the highest posts in the military army. Only here with the meaning is unlikely to have happened either to, to the copy of the words from the words of Toli Imoshenko, or Onom Renko. Why would it suddenly be necessary for Tallinn to discuss the situation in Lkhin-Ole with the commander of the Iyevsky district, Imoshenko, and the Belarusian party secretary. without the commander of the Belarusian district .. ov lev and the chief Inik enisht 6 pshnikov? What inspires more confidence is the story told about how exactly the question of assigning commands to Mongolia was resolved - at a meeting of Neutlin, the Commissar of Defense. Yemenih Ilovich . onom renko, but was present at this meeting; - apparently, eklenko does not understand to whom they are supposed to act, - skzlnm irrigated. - no doubt, there is no time for the last post in the Lerian chief. - ogle sen sv mi, liment fremovich, - supported the sprinklers of the partisans. — You can't say that Eklenko doesn't know how to fight, but in Mongolia they really need a good clerk. in my opinion, it's up to send the brigade commander there (by that time, Georgiy Onstantinovich was already a division commander. - they supported the Poshnikovs. Georgiy Onstantinovich, who repeatedly inspected the maneuvers of the Belorussian military district, had evidently already noted for a long time that the intelligent and resolute commander wrote about his "reminiscences and reflections" about his arrival in Mongolia: "on the morning of June 5, we arrived in mtsk-ulk, in pc 6 on the 57th

. .)". present proposal

special corps ... 3 The report was clear that the command corps did not know the true situation ... it seemed that none of the command corps, except for the regimental commissar rikishev

„ there were no events in the region. offered the commander to immediately go to

forward and then carefully sort out the situation. On the grounds that he could be called to the airport from Moscow at any moment, he offered to go with me to Ikishev ... assessing the situation as a whole, we came to the conclusion that with the forces at our disposal It will be impossible for the 57th Special Corps to stop the Japanese military in nature, especially if active operations begin at the same time in other areas in other directions. having returned to the command post and consulted with the command of Corps B,

We

sent a report to the defense commander. It briefly outlined the plan of action of the Soviet-Mongolian troops: to firmly hold the bridgehead on the right (east - the bank of Lhinol) and at the same time prepare a counterstrike from . .) the depths.

day the answer was received. The rkom was in full agreement with our assessment of the situation and the planned actions. the same day was received by the order of the sign of the release ... eklenko from the command of the 57th special corps and the appointment of me as commander of this corps. As for me, Ukov told Imonov about his first shghnlkhinole: "The initial order was this: "get together in the situation, report on the measures taken, report on your proposals." arrived, sorted out the situation, reported on

taken chi about my suggestions. received in one day one of the other two ciphers:

the first is that we agree with the conclusions and proposals. secondly: that I am appointed commander of a special corps stationed in Mongolia instead of Eklenko >". here the code can be trusted.

Most likely, already at that time he proposed to the Church to start gradually building up forces for the future counter-work. From just where and where to wear this counter-work, he still, of course, could not say anything definite. about who exactly

proposed and planned the counterattack that the Soviet troops carried in August, disputes have not subsided to this day. The instructions in the memoirs do not directly write that the specific idea for the offensive operation belongs to him. It is limited to vague phrases: "The command of the Soviet-Mongolian troops carefully prepared to conduct a general offensive operation no later than August 20 with the aim of finally defeating the troops that had invaded the borders of the Mongolian native republic. for its implementation, at the request of the military council, into the 1st army group of troops (the 57th special corps was transformed into it

On July 9, 1939, four days earlier, the front groups were formed under the command of . flax east armies. —
. turn And obeyed the troops in onglia and both separate
. .) hastily transferred from the Soviet Union new

forces and means, as well as material and technical records. In addition, two rifle divisions, tanks and brigade, two artillery regiments and other units were brought up. bombardment and fighter aviation was pouring out. However, even in the days of the last battles at Lhin-Ole, rumors circulated among subordinate uks that he was not only the executor, but also the second plan for the encirclement and destruction of Japanese troops. Constantin Imonov testifies: "Someone during one of my trips to the Mrba, I had to face for

the first time in a military environment with the same disputed abilities and abilities, and, moreover, in almost the same irreconcilable form, in which who they come from with the brothers of writers ... sat in one of the staff headscarves and talked with the commanders of the clerks. one of them, a colonel who had served with a commander almost since he was in the army, confidently and sharply said that the entire plan for encircling the Japanese was a plan of orders, that he had compiled and offered his orders, the turn had no to this plan it doesn't matter that the ukov is TL NT, the turn is nothing special, and that it is precisely so, because - he knows this for sure - no one but the ukov, and immediately after it the marshal used to to attribute to himself the development and implementation of almost all the successful operations of the Red Army, even those for which he had a very weak connection. Tlin denounced the boasting and fantasies of the UKs in a special

had nothing to do with it." later, in the years of the great current war

ze.

more about this. Now, at the expense of Ichinol—[did Ukov not exaggerate his role? There are other opinions about the origin of the plan for the Lhinol operation. the well-known dissident general Etr Rigorievich Rigorenko was in Lhinol

an officer in the staff of the beront group, which command I tern. The only graduate of the general TB epidemic, then only a major, in memoirs written in America in forced emigration, claimed that it was Grigory Ikhilovich who played the main role in the defeat of the Japanese. rigorenko recalled how, shortly after arriving at Lhinol, in early July 1939, he had to put a signed order on his mouth: <... I tried to figure out what to write in the order to fill in two

five

m typescript pages. three pages - that's all right, twenty-five! ut something I understood. rick z

army formations, various temporary formations: „ someone's platoon of someone's company, someone's battalion, someone's regiment, of some division with one anti-tank gun, someone's platoon then someone's regiment would defend such a line, not allowing me to break through the enemy in someone's direction. Other paragraphs of the order were formulated similarly. rigorenko came to a disappointing conclusion; "In general, there was no army. n rspls n detachments. command nd rm command I not divisions, brig dmi, separate

mi regiment, mi detachment. Flags of divisions, brigades, regiments, battalions stood on the map, around them there was a sea of detachments subordinated directly to the command ... I remembered the Russian-Japanese war and the commander of the Uroptkin ... the Ponians are very active. they don't get close to someone's area and start to seep into the rear. In order to eliminate ... danger, Uroptkin pulls out a subdivision from a non-woven area ,, creates from them

temporary formation - detachment - and the throwing of a dragged area. The next time the Japanese forge the area from which this detachment was taken. Uroptkin here also puts the situation to rest with a temporary detachment, but he does not take the one that was taken earlier from here, another, from where it is more convenient. As the army gradually loses its usual organization, it turns into a conglomeration of military detachments. That Kuroptkinsky "experience" was known to any military officer. This torture was so caustically ridiculed in military history literature that it was hard to imagine that someone would ever repeat it. Ukov, who had never studied in the classrooms, apparently had no time to study the experience of the Russo-Japanese war on

his own, went after miuroptkin. The Ponto turned out to be very active in this war as well. In dreams, this activity was fought by temporary detachments. Peter Grigorievich went with his mouth to the turn. he chuckled: "uh, work hard at your places m, sh gomm rshl!" the Japanese ...

will have to give the command: "" the next day, rigory their ilovich arrived in 6 units and spoke for Rigorenko testifies: "Ukov came out after the a long time with the commander alone. conversation annoyed. ordered to prepare an order for ... n the regrouping of troops and the withdrawal from the direct subordination of the army of all detachments, to return them to their units.

Later, in the autumn of 1941, near Moscow, when to repel the German offensive, improvised detachments had to be created from the first units and subunits that came to hand. This method made it possible to solve momentary tasks of defense, but created insurmountable difficulties in the control of troops in the preparation of an offensive and the concentration of forces and means in the direction of the main strike.

rigorenko asserted: "Turn immediately began to prepare an offensive with the aim of encircling and destroying the Japanese troops that had invaded the territory that we considered Mongolian ... I saw old Chinese and Mongolian maps, on which it is quite clear The border goes along the river Ihin-ol. Of the newer ones, there is a map on which the border in one small section passes on the other side of the river. By demarcating the border,

the Mongols used this card. the borders from Nchuria and inner Mongolia, also occupied by the Japanese, were not yet guarded at that time, and the troops of outer Mongolia (the Mongolian native republic. — . .) without resistance post vili

border, to whom you wanted. When the Japanese also decided to stand on the border, they went to the Lhinol River, easily driving into the border guard of the Mongols. Soviet troops interfered, bloody battles ensued , And over a patch of sand dunes, which lasted almost four months. now the turn was preparing to fight to resolve the dispute. In reality, the events on the borders of Hongol and Hong Kong, two puppet states dependent respectively on the Soviet Union and on the Japanese Empire, developed in the following way. Mongolian-Chinese border of the river

Lhinol was never demolished until 1939. Here was a desert, of little interest to either side. In early 1939, the Mongolian border patrols crossed the eastern shore of Lhinol and advanced to the town of Omong n. to the name of this place where the first armed clashes took place,

The Soviet-Japanese conflict of 1939 is referred to in Japan as the Omong Incident. the phrase "events on the Lhinol River" was also in use. There were no Japanese and Manchurian troops in the disputed territory of the SN. After the Mongol border guards invaded here, the command in the Ntun army decided to advance to the Lhinol River in order to keep the contested lands. Ukov was right when, in a conversation with Imonov already in 1950, he assessed Japanese intentions in the following way:

lhin-ole: "I think that on their part it was a serious yar star in battle. it was important then to feel whether we were able to fight with them. in his first article on lhinol, which appeared back in 1940, he noted that the plpdrmn lhinol was supposed to cover the future strategic highway: "Because the Lun-Rsh N-Nzhur railway was to be laid, providing food for the troops operating against the Mongolian native republic of Byklya." In the escalation of small skirmishes of border guards into a full-scale military conflict, the Japanese turned out to be of interest, first of all. Neither sought to establish a border along the Lkhinol in order to cover the strategic railway. However, far-reaching plans for the occupation, in the case of success in Lhinol, Mongolia and the Soviet 6th century, were not at that moment. The operation on the Mongolian border was organized on the initiative of the command in the Ntun army.

The Imperial Army Tank Corps in Okio, in principle, was against the diversion of forces from the main front in the south, against the Itya. The attack on Lhinol was conceived as a local action, and the military leadership in the Japanese capital deliberately withdrew from the planning and conduct of the operation.

donkey

The defeat of the command in the Ntun army and the 6th army directly operating on the Lhinol River was displaced. When Ukov said to Imonov: "I think that if the lhin-ole of their (Japanese. - . .) things had gone well, they would have launched a further offensive. their far-reaching plans included the capture of the eastern part of ongolia and access to ikluikite, to the tunnels, and to the interception of the siberian highway, smm rshl, of course, believed in this. In practical terms, the aims of the Japanese were much more modest. The Japanese generals calculated that due to the remoteness of the battle area from the railways and the vital centers of the Soviet side, the conflict would not go further escalation - to accept the Japanese version of the outline of the Mongol-Manchurian border. Otlin was not going to back down before the Japanese demands. although he did not want a full-fledged war with the country of the descending sun at that time either. Just now, on March 1939, Hitler seized Echoslovakia. A crisis was brewing in Europe, culminating in the Second World War. Under these conditions, Osif Issrionovich preferred to have — agrees the main forces of the red army in the western regions of the country in order to throw them down at the right moment. It was very difficult to supply parts of the military army during the fighting. Article 1940 of the Code acknowledged: "The nearest railway station was 750 kilometers away from Lhinol (cargo turnover 1,500 kilometers). This really created enormous difficulties in the delivery of ammunition, fuel, weapons, equipment and food supplies. but itendo firewood was delivered no closer than 500 kilometers. memurkh mrshl also stressed that "the main difficulties were connected with

the issue of material and technical support of the troops. sparingly admitted that "in overcoming these difficulties, the military council of the 6th ykl military district and colonel general (then - command 2 mg. - . .) helped me well with his

pp r vol. more specifically about the crucial role of the turn in establishing the right

supplying the troops with which the bow commands, Rigorenko wrote: "Another knot has untied the turn. By the time he took command of the front group, the supply of troops in Mongolia was completely disorganized. The turn ordered the front group to take over the delivery of all combat and supply cargoes to the army base - mts k-ulk. The supply was good and until the end of the fighting it was not broken even once. it was in the uninterrupted supply of everything necessary that the key to victory was. why did the ukov first fail to solve such important tasks as organizing the correct entry into battle and supplying the troops of the grouping, in its own way

numbers

at that moment did not exceed your body ? Probably, here the lack of experience in commanding large formations, as well as Georgiy Onstantinovich's dislike for staff work and influencing the rear, had an effect. in the Belarusian military district, the commanders of the commands of one of the Larian corps within seven months, the other - within three seconds

half. He did not have time to achieve any noticeable success in this field, as he was nominated as deputy commander of the district for the office. In this post, he was primarily engaged in combat training for the army and the newly formed mechanized units - separate tank brigades. And for many other nominees of the late 30s - early 40s, The career turned out to be a lack of operational and organizational training and a lack of experience in commanding large masses of troops. rigorenko rightly noted: "... two years before the war, he (Ukov. - .S.) made a dizzying rise ... radiance or patronage? In any case, he did not find any servants during these years. takeoff was. probably games

lo

its role is the patronage of the udnogo and those close to it. George Onstantinovich more than compensated for his lack of experience and military education with cruelty towards his subordinates. - He considered shooting and demotion in rank or position as the most effective means to achieve strict execution of orders. Rigorenko testifies: "Eargy onst ntinovich ukov tied knots. One such knot was the death sentences. - the turn achieved that the residium of the supreme council for the military council of the front group of the right to pardon. By this time there were already seventeen sentenced to death by firing squad. non-lawyers were shocked by the content of the criminal cases of those sentenced. "Each such case had either a report, the head of someone received something in which he wrote: an order, he did not comply" and a resolution on the port: "ribunl. to fish. shoot!" someone received from me personally t someone prik z. e fulfilled. to fish. shoot!" sentence. ole nothing and at all. One day, interrogations, no checks, no examinations. there was a boom and a verdict. After all, an expedited trial "in hot pursuit", as a rule, only leads to the fact that either the guilty person is punished too severely, or the punishment generally overtakes the innocent. no one asks whether it was possible to carry out the order. We often wait for the information that the order was not executed, subsequently turns out to be untrue. oh, the man is already dead, and you can't help him in any way. - Shch rigorenko gave an example of only one "r shooting" case in Ihinol: "yyor. We went to the Demiya on the same day - June 10, 1939. n on the same day flew n -3. he flew to the mr-bu (location of pcs 6 uk. - . .) on June 14. Appeared to his immediate chief - the head of the operations department brigade commander ogdnov (in fact, . . once was the head of staff of the 6th 57th corps, then the 1st army group. - . .). redst twisted. Once again, a very "concrete" building for him: "Take a look!" Naturally, a person who finds himself in a combat situation for the first time and is not assigned to any business makes an impression.

smoldering

"Hanging out" in the trenches for a long time, whether he looked briefly, a sign appeared in a cap pulled down in the usual way over his eyes. yyor introduced himself to him. from nothing skzli went to old new. toya in the trench, they were talking about something, glancing in the direction of m yor. otome remembered him with his hand. Yor approached and saluted. ukov, glancing sullenly at m yor, said: "The 306th regiment (and in my case - the 603rd - . .), leaving positions, fled

from

to someone a platoon of Japanese. move the regiment, put it in order, restore the situation! You will receive further instructions from Comrade. ohd new >. the ud flowed. Iyor stared inquiringly at once. o he just shrugged his shoulders L: "can I still tell you? olk was right here. de now, I don't know. Take my armored car and drive yr zyskiv th. "You go, return the armored car here and in front of you with the driver, where the regiment is in any condition."

The sun had already set by this time. these places x gets dark quickly. Yor went to the armored car and thought - where to look for the regiment. he did not take his mouth. Ogdnov explained to him that he was useless. oyn z stl topographic service unprepared. surveys of this area were not made (which is not surprising, since the eastern coast is Lhinol

was effectively a "no man's land. - . .). Yor was able to take from the map of his chief only the direction to the district where the regiment operated. It's a good idea to go in that direction, not counting as the presence of roads. It was not the lack of roads that prevented this region, but their abundance.

the coaly soil of the steppe made it possible to drive in any direction, as in the fall, the absence of maps forced us to drive in winter or in the direction. Therefore, the roads and tracks crossed the river Jon fighting in all directions. Yor was not mistaken in

determining the direction, and he was lucky - he searched for the regiment quite quickly. unarmed people mouth

lo

brelin zpdk redirection to the lhinol river. it was a crowd of civilians, not a military unit. x thrown into battle, j not uniforms c. military uniforms were only able to be put on by officers called up from the army. old you were dressed in your own, house clothes. most of them abandoned their guns.

jumping out of the armored car , the major began to shout menacingly: "That one! toy! I will shoot!"

he pulled out his gun and fired upwards. then someone struck him in the ear with stars, and he fell into some kind of sandy pit. lie down a little, he realized that shouting here will not achieve anything. he singled out the call: "Communists! Omsomol members! omndiri - to me! Calling me, he moved along with the crowd, and people gradually gathered around him. most of

they are ok with weapons. When, with their help, he began to infuse the disorganized crowd. In the morning, the personal composition of the regiment was assembled by n. The moose had to pick up most of the weapons.

omndir all izz ps. Only the commander, commissary chief of the 6th regiment - to the wood officers. All three were killed during the ensuing panic. n the snicks were lost.

no one remembered the composition of their subdivisions.

Therefore, the major divided the regiment into units at his own discretion and

smzn chil commanders. allowed the entire regiment to sit down, the officer ordered me to draw up lists of his units. After that, he intended to push the regiment to its previous positions by units. while people were enumerated, he lay down to rest after a sleepless night. I didn't get to rest. The rumble of an approaching bus could be heard. drove an armored car. st novilsya nevd leke. The major came out of the armored car and went to the regiment. met in m yor. The former showed an extract from the order of the 306th regiment.

, that he was appointed commander

- you return to the slope of the city. yor. wanted to explain what he had done and what the sword would do next. about that, with an impregnable air, he announced: - I'll figure it out.

. went to the armored car. Lieutenant and junior commander were waiting for him. then he showed me your order rest:

- We are resting, I ask you to hand over your weapons.

knock this new post to death. They brought him, now no longer to a separately located platy and dugout town - counterintelligence, tribunal, prosecutor's office. Diner called the investigator. the ice maker asked:

—[why didn't you follow the order from the corps commander? My answer was that he had been doing all night and what he had achieved. protocol was not kept. some time later, a trial took place.

—[Do you plead guilty?

—[go, don't... not at all...

—[Do you plead guilty to the criminal failure to comply with the order?

— [No, I don't admit it. carried out rule 3. did everything that was possible, everything that was in human strength. If I hadn't been replaced and if there hadn't been rests, I would have completed it to the end.

- [I am proposing a specific question and I will forgive you to answer it directly: did you follow the order or did you not follow it?

- I can't answer that question. performed, performed in good faith. Rick was in progress.

- was the order to restore the situation carried out after all, or was it not? Or not?

- eat...

- ost exactly. it's clear. lead! Half an hour later they introduced into the same hat of dreams:

— ... mortal to death through a shot ...

I only remembered this. — more space. something is caught. grew up everything remains beyond the limits of consciousness." RVD, this time everything ended

happily, Rigorenko ends his story 3: "The Military Council of the Front Group on behalf of the Residium of the Supreme Council

pardon me. Did the remaining sixteen convicted by the Tribunal of the First Army Group receive the death penalty? Turner was the initiator of petitions before the Residium of the Supreme Council for a review of the cases of all those sentenced to death.

and pardoned them, showing reason and mercy. All former suicide bombers showed themselves excellently in battle, and all were awarded, up to the assignment of the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. what are the results of mercy." Almost the same case, as we will find out later, happened with another nameless Major during the years of the Great Patriotic War. It just ended tragically. At that time, the power of the UKS was already immeasurably higher than in 1941, and there was no one to pardon the unfortunate who experienced outbursts of the wrath of Georgy Onstantinovich. from the breakthrough of the Japanese, which led to the flight of the 603rd Regiment, the beginning of the broken Inga battle, which ended in favor of the Soviet troops and became the first major success in the commander's career of the UKS. meorgy onstantinovich very

loved to remember those battles. Imonov, he told: "Ingneun with such a situation that the infantry retired. olk emizov (in reality - the 24th motorized rifle regiment, major . . .) retired. There was one more crossing left. the Japanese their 107th division (in fact, the main body of the 23rd infantry division and one regiment of the 7th motorized rifle division. - I realized that the eastern bank of the river, despite Soviet and Mongolian claims, was "theirs", i.e., Japanese and Manchurian. "We finished early in the morning. They captured 21,000. Only some of the second echelons were still left on that coast. They captured the division . . .) is already high on this, on our shore and organized a double anti-tank defense - passive and active.. 'As soon as their infantrymen went to this coast, so now they've been bursting into their round anti-tank pits ... hitting shields with

with all its anti-tank artillery, over a hundred guns. Threatened, they will crush our parts on this shore and force us to leave the bridgehead What
rm tm, zlhinol. n him, n this square rm, unsbyl all n hopes. mind about the future, this could not be allowed. decided to forge the
Japanese with the Kovlev tank brigade. nl that without the support of the infantry he would suffer heavy losses, but we
deliberately

shlin it.

rig d was strong, about 200 m tires. nr turned around and went. suffered very heavy losses from Japanese artillery fire, but, I
repeat, we were ready for this. I lost half of the personnel in the brigade killed and wounded, and half of the vehicles, and even more. But we
went to this even greater losses suffered armored brigades, which supported the tank. the lights burned on my eyes. In one of the sectors, 36
tanks turned up and soon 24 of them were already on fire. Oz tomy rzd fortified the Japanese division. rubbed. When all this
started, I was in the mts g-street. In the wrong place, they reported that the Japanese had crossed over. I immediately called Mr. Buiotd LR
with an order: "Nkov brig de kovlev to go into battle." There were still 60 or 70 kilometers left to go, and they passed them straight across the
steppe and entered into battle. When at first a difficult situation arose, when the Japanese came to this bank of the river at Ing,
they demanded to remove the evidence from that bank, the artillery - the artillery would be lost, they say! I answered him: if so, let's
remove the infantry from the submarine. the infantry will not be left without artillery. artillery

from the remaining unstm plcd rm

- the backbone of the defense, what - the infantry will be lost d t fashionable? cd in ite remove everything. In general, he did not obey, refused
to comply with this order and conveyed to Moscow his point of view that I consider it inappropriate to withdraw artillery from the platform.
this point of view prevailed. "Memories and reflections" gave a no less vivid picture of the battle: "but on the morning of July 3, the Soviet
command arrived in the area of

Mount Ing in order to personally assess the situation on the spot and clarify the task chi troops mn carrying out counter-trade on the
move ... the situation was complicated by the fact that the 7th motorized armored brigade and the 24th motorized rifle regiment were several
times slowed down with the approach. It was impossible to slow down with a counterattack, because the enemy, having discovered the approach of
our tank units, began to quickly take measures for defense and bomb the columns of our armored tanks. there was nowhere for them
to hide - for hundreds of kilometers around, the area was completely open, and the bush was devoid of poison. At 9:15 a.m. we met with
the
commander of the 11th tank brigade, Kovlev, who was with the main forces in the guard battalion and directed its actions. After discussing the

situation, we decided to call in all the aircraft, speed up the movement of tanks and artillery, and no later than 10 hours and 45 minutes to strike
the enemy. At 10:45 a.m., the main forces of the 11th armored brigade retreated and immediately forged the Japanese troops.
rigd n n o w r r from the north-west; one of its tank 6 tons, interacting with the armored battalion of the 8th Mongolian
army division and the battalion of the 185th heavy artillery regiment of 150 tank brigds, with the support of 40 aircraft, rapidly rushed vr
g ... the Pontes were stunned by the swift

, t cov l enemy sug.

hit by a tank brigade, they fell silent in their anti-tank holes and only after 10 minutes opened artillery fire on our tanks. Japanese. nor opened heavy artillery and machine-gun fire. the battlefield was already burning up to 15 of our tanks. No one could see and the fire of the enemy could not stop the combat impulses of our great tankers. it was about

12 o'clock. he was counting, from minute to minute the 24th motorized rifle regiment should come up and join the battle. was extremely necessary for interaction

tank brigade, which I suffered unnecessary losses without infantry. oh wow this is sometimes the case
etsya

in the war, the 24th motorized regiment went out by mistake not to the lake Uhu-su-ur, but to the lake Uhu-su-ur. having returned to battle formation, at 1300 hours 30 minutes south of the Uku-Suur lakes, the 24th Regiment went on the offensive, carrying the attack to the east. A little later, the 7th motor-armed brigade colonel - Esovoy entered the battle. The Japanese fought back against the Soviet soldiers

clearly. Threatening tanks with screws, with armor of tires and infantry, it moved forward farther and farther, breaking and smashing everything that fell under the tracks of the tanks, artillery fire, under the blow of the infantry. The Japanese threw all their troops against the current of our

troops, but it was also met by the collapse of the Nazis. It continued with unrelenting force throughout the night. In the morning, having thrown up fresh forces overnight, the Japanese tried to go on

the offensive, but this attempt was immediately suppressed ... This continued day and night on July 4th. Only by 3 pm on the morning of July 5, the enemy resistance was finally broken, and the Japanese troops began to hastily retreat to the crossing. Ukov cited an entry from the diary of a Japanese non-commissioned officer about how, on the night of July 4, Lieutenant General NT Mtsubr returned to

the east coast of Lhinol. "Recollections and reflections" Ukov refers to him as the commander of the 6th Japanese Army, probably to exaggerate the scope of the Japanese operation to cross the western coast of Lchinol. In reality, as Georgy Onstantinovich correctly noted in an article in 1940, Mtsubr was the commander of the 23rd Infantry Division, which bore the brunt of the fighting and had the smallest losses - over two-thirds of the personnel in killed and wounded. This description is not devoid of the tragic poetry of war: "Iho and carefully

moving car tire generator I m cub r. un illuminating etr inside, light, by day. very quiet and tense as well as we are. The light is illuminated by the moon, and it reflects the fires of lighting bombs thrown by the enemy. rtin already sleep. At the end, we found the bridge and successfully completed the return crossing. It will be said that our units are surrounded by a large number of enemy tanks and face complete annihilation. to be on the alert. it should be added that the order of the representative of the People's Commissar of Defense of the future

mrshl. evidence of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the eastern shore of LKHINOL, which, SEPARATE. contrary to the opinion of the decrees, led to a stampede of the 603rd regiment to stop had to the ill-fated Major. The Japanese took advantage of this and captured a range of dominating heights. to get them out of there was then a big loss. Tlin canceled an official reprimand and forbade him to interfere in the order of he received the evidence, the activities of the Front Command and the 1st Army Group. On July 31, 1939, next military rank of "Comcor". George Onstantinovich was so busy that he told his family about this happy event only on August 21st.

By the way, then the 603rd regiment was put in order, and it fought quite worthily. th

new commander Mor .. Yulyev, who replaced. He was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. After all, how many fates of a person depends on the case. This time, everyone was determined to win by the chief Inik - Ukov. Georgiy Onstantinovich m yor didn't like something, and instead of the gold medal, which, most likely, he received,

shots. If he remained commander of , the poor fellow only miraculously escaped LR the regiment, among other things, the retreating units were stopped not only by the major, but also by other commanders, and in exactly the same way: alone in an armored car. . . Artenberg, at that time - deputy editor of the newspaper "Rsnya Vezd", commanded by Nlhinol to prepare a book of memoir essays of participants in the battles, at the same time

who also edited the front-line newspaper "The Heroic Red Army", recalled how he ordered him to stop the fugitives on an armored tire: "The indication told me: he knows what ... they are running ... - get into the armored , ert car and - to the crossing. get up, what's the matter! to stop NEW..." totch with go l. Indeed, the picture was not a

cheerful one: our

fighters fled along the pontoon bridge thrown over the fast waters of Lhinol. jumping out of the armored car, I shake hands with them and shout: "that one! ud?... zd!.. ukov prik s !!.. oonin don't look at me. I was completely at a loss: the front was running, from minute to minute wait for the Japanese bombers. I see a friend: a good dey is rushing across the bridge a field kitchen with a smoking chimney. it dawned on me. ordered the driver to deliver an armored car at my ferry, and the kitchen rested against the entire lining of the car. now turning the kitchen onto the bridge, that is, in the opposite direction, was no longer difficult ... now, as soon as the fugitives saw that the "food block" was turned to the front, they suddenly stopped and, as if by agreement, with us, without prik s

, went from the kitchen to their positions.

Unfortunately, the pnick was not right. then a rumor started that the Japanese cavalry allegedly broke into our positions. the fighters who had just arrived at the front in the second echelon, still unfired, trembled and rushed across the river. When everything calmed down, I returned to mr-6y, reporting to the court on the circumstances of x cases.

Georgy Onstintinovich interrupted me with a smile: "I already know... I've seen it..."

Here I told him the story of the field kitchen. He laughed: "That's the rule. I remember him from the previous war ...".

In appearance Osifovich was far more fortunate than M yor. The orders were set up in good faith, and order z rtenberg managed to carry out quickly. Onstantin Imonov, who was in Lkhinol during the days of the fighting, written in lngnian

Compare the poem "nk", where there are such lines:

from here he went.

three rows of
cops. ep wolf pits with oak bristles. from the
trail where he backed away when the
caterpillars were blown up by a
mine. o there was no doctor at ,
hand, he brought in, from lameness I was
stranded, beaten iron was dragging
I had a wounded leg, from
here he, all scrap yakktrn, crawled
along his own trail, collapsed, exhausted,
repulsed, having drunk a difficult
victory for the infantry. if only the
monument would have told me

to raise up all those who died here in the desert, on a granite cramped wall, leave the windows empty; the excavation would be easy, to the horse there, holes x, in the sheets of glands of torn ones, - the military honor in these scars, in the charred regions. the pedestal, having climbed high, as the witness will rightly confirm: "It was not easy to win. ,vr gbyl chr br. eat more sh sv.

The Japanese really fought bravely. Vlukov admitted in conversations with the same Imonov: "<... Japanese firewood divisions fought very well. to admit that it was a good infantry, good soldiers... the Pontians fought fiercely. opponent of speaking derogatoryly about the enemy. this is not contempt for the enemy, this is an underestimation of him. as a result, not only an underestimation of the enemy, but also an underestimation of himself. The Pontsi fought exceptionally stubbornly, mostly infantry. I

remember how I interrogated the Japanese who were sitting in the yonder of the river Il Styn-ol. x took t m prisoner, vk mice x. the horses were all so eaten up by the comrades that there were literally no living places for them. I ask them: did you allow yourself to be eaten with someone? they do not answer: watch and do not move. We didn't move." Indeed, they were imprisoned from a distance, then they were about them. The situation changed, and their battalion was pushed back, they were still sitting there, for „ also the second day, and did not move until we captured them. x were eaten half to death by „ m prikz whether to sit in comrs, but they continued to carry out the order of z. then you are really worthy soldiers. If you don't want to, you have to take them away."

some fighters were considered ideal for the Ukov. Georgy Onstantinovich needed soldiers who were ready to unquestioningly and accurately carry out any order, without hesitation and reasonableness and reality.

How did Ukov see the reasons for the defeat of the Japanese at Lhinol? First of all, in a relatively low, in comparison with the red army, the equipment of the imperial army with tanks and guns. Georgy Onstantinovich said to Imonov: "The Pontians all the time only once crawled out against us with their own tanks. We had information that their tanks from the brigade were arriving at the front. Having received this information, we deployed artillery in the only tank-accessible direction in the center in the Omon-n-Hourdbo area. the Japanese turned back and went to the krzn in this direction. Shi rtillerists hit NIM. see saw this fight. We burned and knocked out tanks near the tanks ... - the Japanese, in fact, did not have tanks deserving this name. don't mess with this

brig doy once, then no longer let a single NK into action. here ukov was pr. The Japanese army at that time had mainly light tanks "-th", whose weight did not exceed 7 tons. The 37-mm cannon was not a formidable weapon, the 12-mm fronts and armor did not protect even from large-caliber machine-gun bullets. "-go" did not have viewing devices, and wide viewing slots were used for review, into which a rifle bullet freely flew. there were no dio n Japanese tanks. poor visibility and poor positioning of weapons with a large "dead space" made the "th" easily vulnerable in combat with enemy tanks. opposing him, the Soviet -7 possessed superiority in all respects. He weighed almost twice as much, but in terms of speed he still outperformed the main Japanese tank tank by one and a half to two rz, he had a 45-mm cannon, and 22-mm frontal armor. Roughly the same characteristics were in another Soviet tank, -26. The heavier Japanese tnk "<i-x" (there were not many of them on lhinole) weighed as much as

-7, - 14 tons, had almost the same thickness of frontal armor - 25 millimeters and surpassed the Soviet tank only in terms of gun calibre - 57 mm. The Soviet average tank-28 with a 76.2-mm cannon, used in Lhinal, was superior to the II-X. The Soviet success was also facilitated by the rather low, in comparison with the German or British army, the level of training of the middle and senior command staff in the Imperial Japanese Army of the Commanders was right when Tlin said in the middle of the 40th: "fitzsky composition in (in the Ntung army -), especially the eldest and highest, is poorly prepared, lacks initiative and is inclined to act according to the template of the technical state of the Japanese army, I consider it to be a backward Japanese army type of ours -1 (Soviet tank 1927 - August 20, 1939, the decisive Soviet offensive began against the Japanese positions on the eastern shore of Lhinal-rigorenkot, which described its course and outcome: "The army group ... surrounded the on the Mongolian territory of the part of the 6th Japanese division (in reality - the army. - completely destroyed. The Ponto did not give up, they could not break through. Firstly, because they did not . .) are clearly obsolete, poorly armed and see lymz p som move " have an order to withdraw from their positions. o Secondly, the numerical and technical superiority was too great, and we suffered huge losses, primarily due to unskilled command. In addition, it was said x rkter georgia

. .). subsequent battles, these parts were

onst ntinovich who did not know how to fly people. did not stay long with him in the army, but from this time he managed to serve his dislike with his reports to the mitern. he is a cruel man

vindictive, so in the war I seriously feared to fall under his beginning. oi n lhinoie were described quite seriously. This is a large team of officers, operators from the headquarters of the front group and the first army group. was not part of the second team. Therefore, I can consider my assessment of this work objective. ores exclusively business. it very well hides shortcomings in the training of troops and officer corps. Combat actions are described in detail and analyzed. It turns out that the use of military branches, rear bows and pokhvlternu, but everyone who reads will understand who is worth what. onyal this and Ukov.

, shortcomings of the command. there is no direct n n docn

The book was written immediately after the events and was presented in Enshtein 6. The book was read and warmly welcomed. Commanders at that time commanded the Lievsky military district (meaning that books about the battles in Lkhin-Ole were submitted to General Staff 6 somewhere in the middle or in the second half of 1940 - „ .). Ok books went on reviews prepared for printing, Ukov was appointed chief of staff. The first thing he did upon assuming this position was to demand a book on Ichinol. murmurs I from cover to cover and n damn I: "they were nit to me and did not understand anything. - Archive.

nig , about which rigorenko wrote, has not been found so far. It should be noted, however, that Etr Rigorievich does not directly state that the turn, not the command, the front headquarters, is not

the army group were the second plan for the final operation to encircle the Japanese. Ukov, of course, was of the opposite opinion on this score. "Memories and reflections" he does not say a word about the role of the turn and his staff in shoring the offensive. notes only that "in the device, the rear is very

„ in the organization delivery n m

the Baikal military district helped (but not the front group - the Biisk district! - the shortest time in the composition in which he for the material and technical was a member. .). Without it, we probably would not have managed to create in reserves necessary for the operation. "The idea of the offensive was reduced to striking from both flanks ngs to encircle the Japanese grouping. The score was built on the suddenness of the concentration of Soviet troops and the enemy's lack of tank and mechanized reserves for inflicting counter-attacks on the current. memurkhukov emphasized that on the morning of August 20, the offensive began "according to a carefully worked out operational-tactical plan", placed next to his mouth "the decision of the commander of the 1st army group during the joint

operations in August 1939, "so that readers do not doubt who was the second intention

By

encirclement and destruction of the 6th Japanese army. Unfortunately, almost all Soviet documents relating to the battles at Lhinol still remain unpublished. Therefore, it is not yet possible to give an unambiguous answer about the priority of the command or turn headquarters.

The role in the development of the offensive plan for Lhinolen is completely unclear. It seems quite reasonable to assume that his relationship with Ukov did not work out. Lhin-ol ogGd Nov

He received no awards, he did not make it into the generals of the Don Member of the Great World War. For the most part, I have folded my fate in a new way. He was taken prisoner, joined the Russian Liberation Army. ogd new, it seems, in expiation of guilt, according to , was a member of the artillery.

silly

Organize an assassination attempt on the , but more Soviet liaisons did not come to him. forests After the war, they once shot. I started thinking whether to judge together with slovoy and other leaders, they found out in the but then they changed their minds, and quietly, without publication in the press, same 1946. Georgy Onstantinovich described the beginning of the offensive in his "Memories and Reflections" in such a way: "It was a Sunday. I was warm, I was quiet weather. the Japanese command, confident that the Soviet-Mongolian troops did not think

preparing for

him, allowed the generals and senior officers m Sunday vacation. Many of them were far away from their troops that day: who is Yl re, who is nchzhure, who is njin-ume. We took this unimportant circumstance into account when we made the decision to start the operation on Sunday. It was very important for us to start it then, when most of the main commanders were absent, the troops would be in the hands of less experienced commanders at every difficult moment. The commander's memoir draws a picture of the Soviet tactics, passing almost through the exercises, without a hitch: "The other rifle and artillery was so powerful and successful that the enemy was morally and physically

could

during the first hour and a half, return artillery fire. observation points, communications and firing positions of the Japanese artillery were defeated. tk took place in strict accordance with the plan of the operation and the battle plans, and only the 6th tank brigade, unable to completely cross the Lhinol river, took part in the battles on August 20 with only part of its forces . The retransmission and concentration of the brigade were completely completed by the end of the day. On the 21st and 22nd there were stubborn battles, especially in the area of the big esques, where the enemy put up more serious resistance than we expected. In order to correct the mistake made, it was necessary to additionally bring the 9th motorized armored brigade into action from the reserve and strengthen the artillery. having defeated the flank groupings of the enemy, our armored and

By the end of August 26, mechanized units completed the encirclement of the entire 6th Japanese Army

(In an article in 1940, hot on the heels of events, the Ukov claimed that the Soviet armored groups had cut off the Japanese retreat route by the end of August 22, which, it seems, is closer to the truth. —[. .), and from that day the crushing began
n

parts and the destruction of the encircled enemy grouping was complicated by loose sands, deep pits and pits. Japanese

parts fought to the last man. More blissfully about the last offensive against the Japanese, Lukov Imonov told: "The third day of our August offensive, when the Japanese grabbed onto the northern flank of the height - the left and the case slowed down, I had a conversation. . turn. the turn was tm, and, by order from above, his role was to, as commander of the Baikal Front, provide the pin, provide the group of troops that I commanded, everything necessary. In the event that hostilities were transferred to other sectors, escalating into a war, it was envisaged

What

nsh rmeisk i groups goes into direct submission to the front. but only in this case (here Georgiy Onstantinovich Lukvit: in fact, by order of the People's Commissar of Defense of July 9, 1939, the formations of the 57th Corps of the 1st Army Group were left under the command of the Front Group Turn, what, pr wd,,

not excluded from strength

operational issues. - they were independently and directly . .). So far, we have been active in resolving subordinated to the oskva (in fact, the uks had a double subordination - ternui oroshilov. - . .).

the turn came to me and told me that he recommended not to explode, to stop, to build up two or three days of strength for subsequent blows, and only after that

continue encircling the Japanese. he explained his advice by saying that the operation was slowing down,

And

we are suffering, especially in the north, heavy losses. Therefore, in response to this, that wars are wars, and there cannot be no losses in it, and that these losses can be large, especially

when we are dealing with such a serious and bitter enemy, like the Japanese. But if now, because of these losses and because of the difficulties that have arisen in the situation, we postpone the implementation of our original plan for this

, then one of two things: or we will not fulfill

plan at all, or we will carry it out with enormous delay and with enormous losses, which, due to our indecision, will ultimately be ten times higher than the losses that we are now incurring, acting decisively. if we take his advice, we will multiply our losses tenfold. so I asked him: does he order

me or advise me? If he orders, let him write a written order. I warn him that I will challenge this written order in Moscow because I do not agree with it. He replied that he did not order, he

recommended, and there would be no written order for me. skzl: "Ztk, toya rejected our proposal. The oisk are entrusted to me, and I am in charge of them here. We are instructed to support me and provide my rear. I'll forgive you not to leave the r mok of that

What

in m entrusted. There was a harsh, nervous, not very pleasant conversation. the turn is gone. then after two or three hours he returned, apparently, he consulted with someone about this time and said to me:

"Ugh. oh luy, you're right. I'll withdraw my recommendations." ih il yodorovich orotnikov, former n lhinol dyut ntom ukov,

in their

The memoir tells the story of the turn's conversation with the commander of the 1st Army Group in a slightly different way, but the essence of the dispute is conveyed in exactly the same way as George Onstantinovich's kkism.

the thorn seemed to say: "The ovary of the uks, as you can see, our troops have pulled together. yly deviated. It is not possible to hit the enemy with stronger reserves. I recommend not to rush. temporarily, for one or two days, suspend the offensive, create a strong barrier from the east and northeast, pull up troops and rear, then carry out the final

ud r". day ko advice turn ukov rejected. letter to Orotnikov February 18, 1967

Georgy Onstantinovich stated: "... if I had listened to his (turn - . .) advice and stopped the offensive, the Japanese units could have avoided encirclement."

before deciding who was right in my case, turn or uk, I want to

Tell me how the battles at Lhin-Ole ended. Five, let's turn to Zhukovsky's memoirs, m. rshl wrote: "On August 31, 1939, the last points of resistance of the 6th Japanese Army, which invaded the borders of the ONGOL native republic, were liquidated ...

The crushing rebuff of the Soviet and Mongolian troops, the unprecedented defeat of the elite forces of the entire Japanese army forced the then Japanese ruling circles to reconsider their views on the power and combat effectiveness of Soviet armed forces, especially on the moral stamina of Soviet soldiers. In an article in 1940, Ukov spared no color to describe the last battles: I was whole epic. Near each height, our troops met fierce resistance. The general man tsubra exchanged the encircled units, offering them by radio and via pigeon mail to hold on, promising support. The Japanese, misled by their command, stubbornly fought back. waiting for the height had to be attacked. Our heavy artillery no longer had the opportunity to fire, because the iron ring of our troops was closing more and more. Occurrence of danger pop d

nia

in their. The artillerymen, under enemy fire, pulled their cannons forward into open positions and hit the enemy trenches with direct fire, then the infantrymen with bayonets and grunts of a militka, breaking into the trenches.

remarkably effective Inshvition. He constantly patrolled in the air, not with Japanese aircraft to bomb and storm tens of troops. Our pilots do 6-8 sorties a day. neither dispersed the enemy's reserves nor stormed his encircled units.

Japanese fighters suffered defeat and defeat ... On August 30, the last center of resistance remained in the hands of the Japanese - the hill of the Emiz ... this hill gathered the remnants of the troops of the imperial army. almost all of the Polish artillery was put out of action by this time. Therefore, the Japanese conducted mainly mortar and machine-gun fire. Our parts, seized with the greatest enthusiasm, narrowed and narrowed the ring. On August 30, on the hill of Yemizov, for the lilac banners.

Ukov immediately summed up the results of the battle: "The August offensive was brilliantly finished. brkhnhi dolin x lhinol was defeated and destroyed by the 6th japanese army.

As a result of the fighting from me to September, the Japanese, according to a conservative estimate, lost 55,000 soldiers and officers, of which at least 25,000 were killed.

In the last operation, we took huge trophies ... during the fighting, the Japanese lost 660 aircraft. the losses of the Soviet regiment amounted to 143 smolts>".

Later, Soviet historians were not as modest as George Onstintinovich, and increased the total loss of the Japanese to 61,000 people. the loss of the army army was determined by the number of 9,824 killed and wounded. meanwhile, already in the 80s, it was increased almost

twice - up to 18.5 thousand people. However, in this case, it turned out that the Soviet losses were 3.3 times less than the Japanese. end, in 1993 in the book The Reef of Secrecy

filmed", official figures of Soviet losses at Lhinol appeared, significantly exceeding those previously published. As we will see in the following chapters, the data in this book on Soviet irretrievable losses in the Great Patriotic War are understated by several times. However, in the battles in Lhinol, the size of losses was several orders of magnitude less than in 1941-1945, in square absolute terms, on average, on the day of hostilities. Therefore, it can be assumed that information about the losses of the

armies in the short Soviet-Japanese war of 1939 are more accurate, although there must have been some underestimation of irretrievable losses.

Do not blame me, reader, but there will be many more different figures in my book. I am quite solid, with the thought and I have touched that "all shades of meaning are conveyed by a smart number." It can be said that the number of those killed in the battles led by the Ukov is the main thing in his fate as a commander. how many enemy soldiers and officers were

destroyed with his participation, how much military equipment was destroyed, and at the cost of what losses the red army was paid for. Georgy Onstantinovich, until my death, had a greatly exaggerated idea of the losses of the armies opposing him and a significantly underestimated, embellished idea of the losses of his own troops. of course, this helped the marshal feel like a great commander. Today, a quarter of a century after his death, one can honestly take a look at what was accomplished on the battlefield in Chapter 3. So, according to the data given in the book "Secrecy Revealed", the

Soviet and Mongolian

troops in Lhinol in the period from September to September 1939 lost 6830 people killed, 1143 missing, 15251 wounded and sick - 701 people. I must say that the number of patients here is significantly underestimated, since only those who were treated in hospitals of the 6th Ikl military district were taken into account. book by the former head of the main military and military directorate of the Russian Army. of all Soviet military personnel who fell ill with Lhinol, including those who were treated in hospitals on the territory of Mongolia - 2225 people. I also note that the vast majority of the missing should be considered killed.

. mirnov "oyn and military medicine. 1939-1945" provides data on

japanese captive pop lo 89 soviet fighters and commanders and | a soldier of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army, who died in captivity, without waiting for an exchange of prisoners that dragged on for almost a year. consequently, approximately | 053 missing in action actually died in action. Thus, the losses of the Russian army and the Mongolian troops in killed amounted to 7,884 people, the total losses in killed, captured, wounded and sick reached 25,660 soldiers and commanders. trn by November 1939, 720 krno rmeians died. At that time, the outcome of treatment in about two-thirds of the patients had not yet been determined. —it can be assumed that some of these latter also died and that the total number of deaths from

rn was about 1 thousand people. Thus, in total, about 9 thousand Soviet and Mongolian military personnel died in Lhin-Ole. rvd , it is necessary to make a reservation that the Mongolian losses were tens of times less than the Soviet ones. However, less than 5 thousand Mongolian soldiers and officers took part in the battles, and then

mainly in secondary areas, while the number of Soviet troops by the end of the battles significantly exceeded

I

80 thousand people.

how much did the Japanese lose? After World War II, the Japanese military archives became available. The American historian Lwin Uke, in his book Omong N, published in 1985, provided the most reliable data on Japanese losses in the Omong incident. The army troops lost 8,629 people killed, 9,087 wounded and 2,350 sick. losses in the personnel of the Japanese regiment reached, according to some data, 141 killed and 89 wounded, according to others - 116 killed, 65 missing and

19

r. Since only 2 Japanese pilots returned from captivity, most likely it was 179 people. , the total number of people killed in Japanese which number best describes x the losses of the Japanese regiment by the wounded, I do not presume to judge. The number of deaths from various diseases can be approximately determined in the following way. In September 1942, a monument to Japanese and Manchu soldiers in the Ntung army, who had died in the war by that time, was unveiled in Uilre. Of the 10,301 names engraved on the monument, 9,471 are those who sailed during the Omong incident. From this number one should subtract the loss of killed ground forces - 8629 people and - 179 people. When the total number of deaths from various diseases is approximately 663 people. captured poplo 160 Japanese and 44 Nzhur soldiers and officers. the total losses of the 6th Japanese army and the aviation units that supported it in killed, captured, wounded and sick reached 20,264 people (or 20,334, if we accept a higher figure of losses by the wounded in the Japanese regiment). It should be emphasized that the underestimation of irretrievable losses in the Imperial Japanese Army was minimal. The traditions of the Buddhist religion require that

And for each dead, a funeral rite of burning was performed, an urn with ashes in front of the people. After the armistice was concluded, the Japanese, in agreement with the ukow, removed almost all the bodies of their dead soldiers and officers who remained in the territory occupied by Soviet and Mongolian troops. on the other hand, it can be assumed that a small number of 1,201 soldiers and officers of the ground forces, originally listed

missing, remained alive. it was not only those who returned from captivity

, but also

poked "zombies". Lwin Uke writes that some servicemen experienced a nervous shock from continuous shelling and bombing from the air and went to rear.

In doing so, they did not have their name, they did not know who they were and where they came from. later these "zombies" were included v

the number of those killed, although in reality they eventually came to their senses or were placed in mental hospitals.

There is no doubt that the underestimation of irretrievable losses in the military army was greater than in the Japanese imperial army. to which the true loss ratio is perhaps even more unfavorable for the Soviet side. Oh, and the numbers that we have today are impressive. It seems that there was no complete defeat and

destruction of the Japanese 6th Army, about which Soviet historians wrote about it, and there were no three times as large Japanese losses as compared with the Soviet ones. total Soviet losses exceeded Japanese

almost 1.27 rz. especially unfavorable for the army was the ratio of the number of wounded - 1.67 pz not in her favor. The soldiers of the parties were almost equally divided, in terms of the killed and captured, the Rsnya army also had an advantage - respectively, by 1.12 and 2.27 rz. why the Soviet troops took more prisoners is understandable. go big japanese group pop l surrounded. The greater number of those killed by the Japanese is not surprising, although, on the contrary, they had significantly fewer wounded than in the 1st army group of uks. The problem is that, once in a hopeless situation, Japanese military personnel, in accordance with the Bushido code

of military honor, prefer not to surrender, fight to the end, or commit suicide.

The Soviet troops on Lhin-Ole won a victory, capturing almost the entire disputed territory and rich trophies. step, the 6th Army abandoned almost all of its heavy weapons, Japanese sources generally confirm the figures of losses in guns and machine guns that Ukov cited in his article. dn to the ratio of losses in

people, the Soviet side can also be considered losers. especially if we take into account that due to the underestimation in the military army of the irretrievable losses of those killed in the Soviet troops, the losses could in fact be no less than in the ranks of the Ntun army.

what were the reasons for the defeat of the Japanese? After a truce was established between the Soviet and Japanese troops by September 15, 1939, a special commission was created at the General Staff of the Japanese Army to investigate all the circumstances of the Omonk incident. the command of the Ntun army and the leadership of the military ministries also changed. The commander of the most injured was also dismissed. 23rd division general m. tsub. At the end of November 1939, before the commission for testimony, the commander of the 1st regiment of heavy artillery, Colonel Ishim - Ichiyru, who was wounded in the battles at Lhinol. Many years after the Second World War, the retired „, talking with Lvin Vux, as he stated the essence of his considerations, the general of our submitted to the court of the commission:

1. The end result for Omonk affairs in general and the military operation carried out was the fact that the officers and soldiers of the Japanese Imperial Army did not know why they were dying in the desert, where the borders were not clearly marked. While the army found itself in a stalemate in death after many years of struggle, it was a form of mockery of common sense to "beat the tide" and sacrifice the life of even one soldier on the Mongolian border. resolving the conflict with it required a big war in the south, not in the north. "I never saw a reason to fight tsu among n," Lishim said.

2. obviously conducted military leadership „, moreover, not with my highest, not lowest

level. The highest commanders were in the obl. did not plan operations with too

large scale, not taking into account the limited capabilities of the Japanese troops. tb in the Ntun army, having carried out aggressive plans, felt independent of the high command, then, in turn, could not control the leadership

in the Ntun army.

3. Organization and supply of Japanese troops did not meet the requirements of the fight against the Soviet Union in the conditions of this region. especially, the use of mainly horses for the transport of supplies was an indisputable mistake. Even a lightly wounded horse was immediately rendered useless, while the vehicles could still be used even after serious damage until their engines were destroyed.

4. Abundance was of decisive importance in the conditions of vast flat spaces. tons of infantry were of little use here. As the days were not long and the nights were short, the deployment of new forces and the delivery of supplies required the use of motorized means.

5. The main shortcoming in the tactical training of the Japanese army was that it was left at the level of representations of the last quarter of the twentieth century, when the former emperor of the Prussian army, Kobekkel, was the military adviser. No importance was attached to such questions as moral compatibility between military personnel in the subunits or after what time should the change of units on the front line be made.

eckel emphasized the need to strike where the enemy is weaker, but in modern conditions with the striker commanders should create weaknesses in the enemy

positions with a concentration of superior firepower in certain areas. they didn't even try to do it right. then impressive troop maneuvers were used, which looked excellent on paper, but in practice brought nothing but disappointment. Such maneuvers would only make sense in suitable terrain, where there were shelters for artillery, which I could effectively cover the infantry at a considerable distance, the infantry would be motorized. Among, there were no suitable shelters from artillery fire.

6. Successful supply was critical, creating a vicious circle.

7. The attempt at war played a cruel joke on the command. It is not customary to expect that the enemy will always be defeated when the forces of the Imperial Japanese Army decide
T

weave it. dnkov among not the Japanese pushed against the "brick wall". The Russians tried to approach the same way as the Chinese. Of course, the moral factor must also be taken into account here, but the material power of the Russian army was even more important.

8. The absurd adherence to the Bushido code played an extremely negative role. In order to achieve the necessary support from subordinate commanders during the battle, the superior commander had to address them extremely politely, literally with compassion, and observe a lot of formalities. All this led to delays in issuing orders and in their execution. subordinate commanders did not have the right to act independently. In itself, the idea of the "way of the warrior" was excellent, but the trouble was that the emphasis should be on achieving victory, not observing the formal rules of feudal ethics.

Ishim's warnings were not taken into account by the generals sitting on the commission, who relied more on the "spirit of something" and the disapproval of the laws of modern warfare. In the same way, the Soviet military leaders, including the Ukovs, shelved the critical study of the experience of Lhinol. None of these cardinal changes were made in the Japanese imperial army, nor in the military army.

an assessment of the shortcomings of the Japanese armed forces, this is what Ishima, absolutely accurately reflects the real state of affairs. For example, there were 2,705 horses in the division of the general m tsub ryknch of battles. Of which 2,005 died or were wounded, another 325 were disabled due to disease. Thus, by the end of hostilities, the Japanese had almost no

it was not in vain that in his memoirs he mentioned the drivers with a kind word for the delivery of supplies to his troops who fought in Omong not for nothing. conditions of sweltering heat, withering winds, the transport circuit of 1300-1400 kilometers lasted five days!"

The Japanese side was significantly inferior to the Soviet one not only in quality, but also in the number of tanks. In 1939, at the beginning of 1939, the army produced approximately 17,000 mitts, and the annual production reached 3,000 tires. However, in 1940, when measures were taken to boost production, Japan produced only 573 tons of NK. the only tank corps in the Japanese army, which operated on lhinol, had a total of 182 combat vehicles and approximately corresponded in strength to the Soviet tank brigade. By the beginning of the Vgustov offensive, the commanders had at their disposal 498 tanks and 385 armored tires. In addition, after the failure on July 6, when the Japanese tanks were fired upon by Soviet artillery (it was this battle that Lukov lmonov described), the command

in the Ntung army withdrew its tank corps from the front line and no longer used

him against the army.

about how many tanks were irretrievably lost by each of the parties on Lhinol, I could not find reliable data. the ratio of losses of armored vehicles can only be judged on the basis of information about the irretrievable losses of personnel in the Soviet

and Japanese tank units. The Nkists of the 1st Army Group lost 659 people killed, 36 missing and 864 wounded. the Japanese tank corps lost 9 times less - 77 killed and 83 wounded. dn to here n to take into account

that in the composition

Soviet

tank and motorized armored brigades included motorized rifle units, which acted like infantry and therefore suffered heavy losses in people (then Japanese motorized rifle units

Not

was). In addition, the Japanese tankers did not take part in the most violent

August battles. However, it can be assumed that Soviet losses in TNKH and

tire armor x exceeded Japanese ones, but not 9rz.

In terms of their combat qualities, Japanese fighters and bombers, unlike tanks, were not inferior to the Soviet ones. Ukov, in a conversation with tluny, admitted in 1940:

"<... At the beginning of the campaign, the Japanese air force beat our air force. x with
"and -16. surpassed ours until we got an improved "when a group of pilots arrived - yYki's planes
heroes of the Soviet Union, our

air supremacy became evident. It should be emphasized that we had to deal with the elite. .. PARTS OF
THE JAPANESE ARMY.

Imonov mrsh I said that the Japanese had good diving

bombers. The account

of the reasons that led to the dominance of the Soviet forces in Nebend-Ikhnol, Georgiy Onstantinovich, was a little mistaken. -16 and -153 ("yk") aircraft did not surpass the main Japanese fighters of that time "ipubishi" 5 and "< kjim" K1-27 in their tactical and technical data. k, "yYk" developed a maximum speed of 443 km HF, "k dzim" - 450 km. The uncertainty of these aircraft was approximately the same. however, the weakness of the Japanese 3 key I < In the strophic lack of pilots. - thirty years of existence of the Japanese vision,

with

1909 to 1939, only 1,700 pilots were trained. this despite the fact that in 1936 it was planned to produce 3,600

combat aircraft. The same loss of 230 pilots killed and wounded in Lhinol created a critical situation for the Japanese. and in terms of the total number of aircraft, the superiority was on the Soviet side. At the beginning of the August offensive, the uks had a head 515 with moths, while the Japanese had no more than 300 tires. This number alone shows the absurdity of the data given by Georgiy Onstantinovich in the article of 1940 about 660 Japanese aircraft allegedly shot down by Soviet pilots. The removal of pilots also made it even more difficult for the Japanese to use aircraft and increased Soviet air superiority. more or less

a close-to-true idea of the ratio of losses in air can be obtained, cf.

vniv

human losses of the Soviet and Japanese. The regiment of the 1st Army Group lost 100 men killed, 59 missing and 102 wounded. The Ntun army lost 116 killed, 65 missing and 19 wounded (according to other sources - 141

killed, 89 wounded and 2 captured). the ratio of irretrievable losses turns out to be approximately equal (according to one of the scores, the score is 1.1: 1 in favor of the Soviet ones; in another, exactly the same, 1.1: 1, but in favor of the Japanese) in favor of the Japanese side at a ratio of 5.4:1 (or 1.1:1). It can be assumed that the losses of the Soviet aircraft in aircraft were somewhat greater than those of the Japanese. If the indications are correct that the Soviet aviation lost 143 planes on Lhinol, then Japanese losses could be less than 10-20 percent and amount to 115-130 planes. However, here we must not take into account the unfortunate circumstance that the Japanese pilots made several

fewer sorties than Soviet ones, especially in the last period of hostilities. In relation to the total number of sorties, Japanese losses in aircraft technology were much higher than Soviet ones. Therefore, the effectiveness of the actions of the 1st Army

The group turned out to be significantly higher than the enemy's position in and Soviet domination the air already in the thick of it was undeniable. the same applies to the ratio, the number of troops who fought on Lhinol, then here the advantage was on the side of the red army. throughout the conflict, the forces and means of the parties constantly increased. in total, 75,736 people took part in the battles in the 6th Japanese army, which included the Manchurian units. I resisted her 1st

The army group, consisting of Soviet and a few Mongolian troops, constantly received large replenishments in people and equipment throughout the conflict. how many servicemen passed through it during the events of n Lhinol is still unknown. among Soviet and Russian historians, the opinion is widespread that

What

Before August 20, there were 57,000 fighters and commanders under the command of the uks. the same figure is given by the second book of the book "Secret Reef Removed". However, other figures are immediately given, which make it completely different to estimate the number of Soviet-Mongolian troops. It seems that the average monthly number of Soviet troops alone in Lhinolez in June-September 1939 was no less than 69,101 people .. but at the same time

v

In June, the 57th separate corps had only 12,500 soldiers and commanders. but if we admit the completely unbelievable: as if already in July the grouping of Soviet troops reached its maximum strength and maintained it until September, then even then, in order to achieve an average strength of more than 69 thousand

people for 4 months, this maximum

I

the number was supposed to be about 88 thousand. But since the build-up of troops occurred gradually and continued until the beginning of September, the actual maximum number of Soviet troops was certainly much higher. Most likely, it reached at least 100,000 people by the end of August. You have to add about 5 thousand Mongolian military personnel, as well as those Red Army soldiers who by that time had been killed, wounded or ill. Considering that some of the wounded and sick managed to return to

duty by September, the total number of those killed and the wounded and sick who had not yet returned to their

units could hardly be less than 20 thousand. In this case, at least 125 thousand Soviet and Mongolian military personnel took part in the battles on the Lkhin-ol River, which is almost 1.5 times more than the total number of the Japanese and Manchus who opposed them. since the number of rear units on both sides was close to each other, the numerical superiority of the red army in combat units was even more significant. Thus, the Commander won his first victory, as well as all subsequent ones, in conditions when the troops under his command had an overwhelming superiority over the enemy in people and equipment. and the combat effectiveness of the Japanese soldiers was not so high. George Onstantinovich was right when he told Tlin that the best units of the Japanese ground forces fought against the 1st Army Group. the 23rd division of the general Im tsubry was one of the elite. imperial command

the army was going to make it motorized, but did not have time to implement this

Intention to the beginning of the Omongsky incident. Denmark was an island nation. The existence of the Rising Sun Transceiver depended directly on the strength of its navy. specifically to the fleet, also to the naval aviation and

landing units intended for interaction with the naval forces directed the best shots. To ensure primarily the needs of this part of the armed forces, the Japanese military industry was oriented. Later, when in December of the 41st, a member of the war in their ocean, the production of tanks was sharply reduced. In 1944, it dropped to 342, in 1945 - to 94 altogether, compared with the maximum level of 1,024 meters of tire reached in 1941. The Japanese ground forces, including the Ntunsk army, were oriented to fight against a relatively weak enemy, kkity. The Skitian army was very easily dealt with by the army during the conflict in 1929 (at that time, friend Ukov Okossovsky was especially distinguished). Soviet troops were trained in the basics of European tactics. neither possessed modern weapons, military equipment and vehicles. The personal composition was relatively close-knit, thanks to the communist ideology intensively promoted in the Russian army. The Japanese army could not cope with such troops. Nevertheless, he bought the victory at a high price. In the eyes of his superiors, this was by no means a sin. udenny cites the words of the oroshils about the battles in Ikhin-ole:

"Ukovs are young men. — there were losses. Or link in the war they do not exist? Obviously, the enemy has been defeated, thrown back from Soviet (more precisely, from Mongolian. -..) territory. The fact that the defeat of the Japanese at Lhinol was not as comprehensive as it could be, played a role and the requirements of the Tling to prevent a significant escalation of the conflict. according to Udennoy, "during the preparation of the decisive August operation in 1939, there were proposals to transfer the actions of our and Mongolian troops abroad in order to cover and

encircle the enemy troops deeper and wider (wouldn't Turner was the second such pln? - ..). oh .. tlinn this proposal answered you want to unleash a big war in ongolia. The enemy's response is something like this: "Nour detours will throw additional troops, we will be drawn into a long war. "to break the Japanese backbone on the river gn (another name for Lhinol. is . .)". Then, when the Ouk troops were carrying out an operation to encircle the Japanese in the interfluvium of the Lhinol and Il Stynol, on August 23, in Moscow, a Soviet-German non-competence pact was signed with a secret protocol providing for Sphere of follow in the next few days, Influence in Eastern Europe. It was clear that the attack of the Wehrmacht would such a development of events inevitably led to the outbreak , and, thus, we are forced of the

Second World War. Under these conditions, Tallinn needed to concentrate the maximum forces of the Russian army in the European part of the country. It was necessary to be ready to seize part of the booty in Olysh, Umynia, Finland and the states of the Baltic states, so that later, at the right moment, hit in the back "friend Hitler". Osif Issrionovich did not want to be drawn into a major armed conflict and decided to limit himself to capturing the disputed territory on the Mongolian-Manchurian border. The Soviet-German rapprochement made the conclusion of a truce with the German ally Poland inevitable. Finally, the conflict was settled after long negotiations only in May 1942, with the conclusion of an agreement on the demarcation of the border in the disputed area. At that time, he was waging a hard struggle with Germany, and Poland with the Rita Empire. clash with each other was not in the interests of either side. As a result of the borders, Lhinol passed through the line of actual control. Almost the entire disputed area, including Omong, remained part of Mongolia. only small districts to the southeast of

among n ,3 captured as a result of the offensive of the Japanese troops, undertaken at the beginning of September 1939. During the negotiations, the Japanese sides vainly referred to the Soviet trophy to the mouth, where the border was drawn along Lhinol. about here outweighed "right to the winners." After all, the battle at Lhinol was won by the army, which the Japanese side could not but recognize.

During the negotiations that immediately followed the armistice, the Japanese insisted that unarmed Japanese soldiers be allowed to collect the corpses of their compatriots in the territory occupied by the Soviet troops, but this was countered by the need to observe Buddhist custom, according to to whom the body of the deceased must necessarily be burned, the urn with ashes is handed over to the family of the deceased. At the same time, reconnaissance goals were also pursued. The command in the Ntung army calculated that the Japanese search parties would be able to assess the scale of the concentration of enemy troops and the location of the newly erected fortifications. The Soviet representatives at first refused to allow the Japanese to cross into Mongolian territory. ogd m yor

goshi from the intelligence department of the headquarters in the Ntung army whispered to the interpreter major

yumure: "we use religion" the Japanese immediately accused the Russians of theism and stressed that the laws of Buddhism require that relatives be able to bow to their parents

the dead. After that, the members of the Soviet delegation asked to wait two hours with , pok
They
consult with their team. but after an hour and a half, with the consent of the uks, it was received. With this, the Soviet commander of the conquests won the sincere respect of the Japanese officers. Humur recalled many years later that he and his comrades then decided:

Ukov admitted that religion is of the highest value, which means that he was, first of all, a military man, not a "real communist". Subsequently, other foreigners who met Mrshl also saw him as a soldier first, and only then as a follower of the Marxist ideology.

Ukov remembered the captured Japanese. memu r hon remember I:

"The Japanese soldier was told that, having been taken prisoner, he would still be shot, but first he would be tortured to a pulp. It cannot be said that such an impact in that period achieved its goal. I remember that at the dawn of one of the August days, a prisoner was brought to the observation post, disfigured by the bites of mosquitoes (one of those two Japanese soldiers, about which the marshal admiringly told Limonov. - we I needed information about the Japanese troops to give half a glass of in the area where this prisoner was captured, in order to loosen his tongue, I ordered the prisoner vodka.

"I rush in with, take a sip, I'm afraid of rejecting you, the only son, the father has an instoried store, his only heir."

w the translator w noted that, according to the mint, which the Japanese

soldiers and their superiors, they must die boldly with the word "bnz" on their lips. Laughing, the prisoner replied: "Father nkzl I should return home alive, not dead."

Georgy Onstantinovich, from his acquaintance with this memo and the protocols of interrogation of prisoners, probably knew that upon returning from captivity to their homeland, the Japanese would have a hard time. not wrong. Vukh pilots who returned from Soviet captivity, previously declared heroically dead, were forced to shoot. maybe the pilot was captured

wounded and physically unable to commit suicide when they were discovered by enemy soldiers. the rest were tried and sent to prison, where the unfortunate had to languish for several years. The bushido code considered captivity as the greatest shame for a warrior who should rather kill himself than surrender to the mercy of the enemy. r kzn t,

Not

Japanese traditions were guided by Ukov, when, at the beginning of the Great World War, he signed the "Dragon" order No. 270, declaring Soviet prisoners traitors to the motherland and providing for repressions against their families. r vd ,, zhukovsk i

the signature stood there last, as it was supposed to be according to the rank of the only general of the army who signed the document - after tlin, his deputy for the state committee of harrowing olotov im rshlov, udenny, irrigated , um, in the future here was not a Japanese example with m in itself, the internal spiritual kinship of the imperial ponias imoshenko and poshinikov. and Soviet Russia. a person's life was valued much less than his willingness to sacrifice himself in the name of the communist idea. Soldiers and commanders were required to inflict maximum damage on the enemy, regardless of their own losses. This was reflected, in particular, in the verses of Konstantin Imonov. In the Khalkhingol poem "Lekon Ostok", he wrote about the dead nameless hero: they say that he, in a flattened tank, before his death, managed to explain to the crew with a burnt mouth how the last grenade could be blown up by the three of us, so that the enemy don't get it alive

The command of the Imperial Japanese Army demanded the same from its soldiers and officers.

If we take into account all the shortcomings of the Japanese troops, we must admit

the justification of the turn proposal to slightly slow down the August offensive and conduct a more rational concentration of troops in the most dangerous directions, where the resistance of the Japanese was especially strong. With our help, it would be possible to reduce the losses of the military army and increase the losses of its enemy. After all, in the conditions of the almost complete absence of motorized transport of armored units, the Japanese command would definitely not be able to take advantage of the pause and transfer significant additional forces to the threatened areas. And the desire to hold hopeless positions to the end would not allow the Japanese to withdraw the encirclement troops. the turn knew the strengths and weaknesses of the Japanese better than the uks. rigory their ilovich had a chance to fight with them a year earlier at the lakes of sn. When, prvd, the role of the commander-in-chief, performing marshal lyukher, who led his own Lion-Eastern army, the , despite the very real danger turn only at the end of the battles led the actions of the 39th rifle corps, which directly fought with him. On September 38, against a much weaker battle than in Ntun, the Japanese Orean army, the Luher-Turn duet performed much less successfully than the Turn-Uk duet in August 39 in the Mongolian steppes. the Japanese food was simply driven out of the hills they occupied by a frontal offensive, during which the Soviet troops failed to take

neither

trophies, no prisoners. and in terms of losses, the ratio was not in favor of the army. The Korean army lost 526 killed and 913 wounded in the incident at Nkufen (they call the Khsn events), the losses of the units of the Soviet 39th Corps opposing it were 792 killed and missing and 2,752 r unknown. In Lhinole, as we remember, the results for the Soviet side were much better. there were nev3rz enlisted in the troops, to sleep, only 1,7 r s more than the Japanese. there were less than 10 percent of the beaten. The army also captured more than two times more prisoners. Particularly impressive were the numbers of trophies published by the Ukovs in hot pursuit and later mainly confirmed by Japanese sources: 12,000 rifles, 175 guns, including more than 30 heavy ones, 115

ncov

machine guns, 225 light machine guns, 2 million rifle cartridges and many other property. The section on the course and

outcome of the two conflicts was different. According to the evidence of the lost, in the battles near the sn Osif Iss Rionovich called Liment Fremovich to him and angrily asked: "Where is Mrshl Lucher after him? Why haven't Japanese units been thrown out of our territory yet?" - the fate of siliya onst ntinovich was decided. Mshl took all the blame for not too successful actions

r sleepy rmii near lakes sn. shortly after the end of the conflict, he was removed from command in the Least, then arrested and beaten to death during the investigation. in a conspiracy, Lucher confessed to bring himself also just as fantastic

for some reason, the spy did not want to in favor of the pony. from pay and overzealousness. then the stars of the turn ascended, taking the place of the lucher, and the stars of the uks. Gold stars are in direct command of the troops, not success in organizing their supply. Evidently, Rigoriy Ikh Ylovich not only drove cars on the mr-boo, but was also involved in the development and implementation of the offensive plan. By the way, orders, as we remember, required Lottern to give a written order to slow down the pace of the offensive, otherwise refusing to follow the "recommendations" of the commander of the front group, which means that Turnukov all-t ki was subdued. however, not only to the turn, but also directly to the bright oroshilov, in fact, the tlin, without which, of course, no fundamental decision related to the Khalhingol conflict was made. Likewise, among the Germans, under the Tlingrad, the commander of the encircled 6th army, Riedrich Ulus, was subordinated not only to the commander of the group of armies "he", rich von stein (with whom the command did not happen to converge on the battlefield), but also directly Hitler, who concurrently held the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces. Nothing good came out of double subordination either under the Lchinol or the Tlingra. The Soviet troops were not able to completely defeat the 6th Japanese Army, the Germans were not able to organize a breakthrough from the rings of their army then, when it was still possible. True, the turn did not hesitate in his proposal to organize the environment of the Japanese more thoroughly, because he knew: the Ukov would still protest against Oroshilov, who, knowing the opinion of Tlin, reckoned with losses. the same idea was suggested by the idea of encircling the Japanese between the rivers mi Ihin-ol and il styn-ol - uk or

thorn? At different times, the official , prefers to end the battle quickly, not Soviet press answered

this question in different ways. On August 30, 1939, in the newspaper "Rsnya Vezd", the Organizing Committee of the Harrowing, published decrees on conferring the title of Hero of the Soviet Union (total 31 people) on the Turn, Ukov and other commanders and the Red Army a large group of those who fought on Lhinol with orders and medals. an editorial headlined in a clichéd manner: "Toughness and Heroism," stated: "The list of heroes of the Soviet Union deservedly adorns the name of the teams 2-gorng. An outstanding military leader, a talented student of comrades. Oroshilov ,, leader of the battles near the lakes with n, rigory ih ilovich tern brilliantly completed the combat building. One of the remarkable . turn military leaders of our party, a member of its central committee, he is an example of a courageous Bolshevik combat leader of the troops. Love and admiration is evoked by the name of the Honored Commander of the Hero of the Soviet Union Komkor .. Ukov. a recreational organizer, a man of unbending will and immense courage, he managed to put together people called to carry out the military buildings of governments. Here the turn is in the first place, as he was supposed to by position and rank. The commander of the front group is the only one who is named in full in the editorial, by name and patronymic. Now the turn has already been declared the

leader of the operation at the lakes of SN, since the name of the marshlyukher killed in the basement has been deleted from the history of the Russian army. All the failures in the battles of the hills of the lake and the name of the name are now written off the deceased Silius

onstantinovich, all the merit in exiling the Japanese from there is given to the still living thorn, to whom, however, soon Ortun will also turn his back. about pokrigory their Ilovich on horseback. n - "an ingenious student" People's Commissar Oroshelev, who "brilliantly completed" the military building to defeat the Japanese, exemplarily led the actions of the Soviet troops. the orders are simply called "for a well-deserved commander", although defiant of "love and

Delight". n is only a performer, a strong-willed and courageous organizer of the fulfillment of 3 days received from the turn. This article can be read like this: the idea of the operation is a turn, its implementation -

from the servants of the uks. ST TI, words 0 of love for the bow on the part of the troops are probably not far from

truth. Georgy Onstantinovich took out his anger on the privates of the red army, on the commanders: he threatened to shoot him after a short tribunal trial. The old tsarism did not directly feel the heaviness of zhukovsky's hand on himself, if georgy-onstantinovich displaced sensible, but unpopular commanders, then their subordinates could only welcome and greet their comrades from Japanese bullets and shells they did not connected with the Zhukovsky methods of waging a struggle. the account of the will of the editorials of the "Rasnaya Vezda" determined very precisely: the strong-willed qualities of the uks were outstanding. Everywhere, the turn rolled up very quickly, denoting his last name, which means "stars" in German. rigory ih Ylovich was sent to the war with inland to command the 8th army, advancing north of the doge lakes. "That war of no change" the army of the word you did not get I. If the main forces advancing on the rail isthmus against the famous Nnerheim line were successful: at the cost of heavy losses, they finally overcame the Finnish fortifications,

at least formally

That

The turn army lost to the Finns in all respects, outright. one division and one brig d were surrounded. one of the divisions, the 168th, managed to hold out in the pocket until the cessation of hostilities, although at the cost of losing more than half of its personnel in killed, wounded and captured. then another division, the 18th, and the 34th light yankov brig d were almost completely destroyed. After this failure, tlin cooled the turn. June 1940, when the ranks of generals were introduced in the Russian army, rigory Ikh Ilovich still managed to become a colonel general. Most of the teams of the 2nd rank were then tested by the general-colonel mi, because it seemed that the turn should not have been offended. On the same decree, his former subordinate was promoted from corps commanders immediately to army general, and he always overtook his former boss in the ranks. turn, n lhin-ole, which was considered the winner of the Japanese No. 1 (at that time there was only number 2), the next rank, unlike George Onstantinovich, was not promoted. Not only was the

Finnish unsuccessful, but also the displacement with the post of commissar of defense, whose "talented student" was rigory ih Ylovich, was lost. patron saint of the oroshils on June 5, 1940, in connection with the start of the publication of decrees of June 4 on the assignment of general ranks to the highest commanding staff of the army and the military lot (publication continued daily until June 14), in "Red Everywhere" appeared the editorial "Fir-trees are their servants before one." The four- and five-star generals said the following: "Three glorious commanders were awarded the position of General of the Army: the Hero of the Soviet Union .. Ukov - a participant in the civil war, a Ouk, the Hero of the Soviet Union of the Erets and .. Yulenev. General of the Army .. personnel commander, who successively passed a number of senior and higher positions, possessing a broad operational outlook. When the 23rd Japanese division of General Tsubura crossed the river to Mount Ing-n, trying to penetrate into the territory of the friendly Mongolian native republic, it was destroyed by Soviet tank units. here, according to Comrade. For the first time, large tank masses are operating independently on the battlefield. massacre of Inga" - under this

name went down in history with the defeat of the Japanese division. The Army Commander of the Soviets developed a brilliantly carried out operation of the complete encirclement and final destruction of the 6th Japanese Army, which invaded the

enerl rmii. r bots . Eretskov has a vast team experience under his belt. in the army, the experience of modern warfare. He took a leading part in breaking through the Nnerheim line. enerl rmii. . Yulenev - one of the galaxy of famous commanders

First Army, hero of the Civil War, participant in the liberation campaign in the bottom mountain, the most experienced leader of the troops. Among the generals of colonels, we find the names of senior commanders who are popular in the country and the Russian army - .. pn senko,. . horticulturalists, . turn In nie, the General L-Colonel of the Tank Forces was awarded the Hero of the Octions,.

Soviet Union: vlovu. ener l-colonels of the artillery. Oronov and Rendl are widely ., known in the army as remarkable artillerymen, combat organizers of this most important branch of the military in modern warfare, did the readers feel the whole difference between the fork and the turn in this editorial? Now Georgy Onstantinovich is undoubtedly in the first place both in rank and position. and among the other army generals, he clearly has the primacy. This is just a guide to the detailed and least praiseworthy characteristics. What is even more important is that the victory over Lhinol is entirely attributed to him alone. the turn already has nothing to do with it. already that. Among all the generals of the army and the generals of the colonels, only rigory ih llovich had to mention the presence of a hero of the Soviet Union. then - a sign to the formidable. Some things in the central organization of the Defense Committee are not accidental. in principle, this is a harbinger of trouble. If Rigoriy Ikhilovich felt this, he could be sure that he would soon share the fate of Ukhchevskii and Lyukher. Perhaps he should have followed the example of Enrikh Moilovich Yushkov, the former head of the Least East Department, who in June 1938, in the face of the expected

The rest preferred to flee to Nzhou-o, from there to Japan2. fate soon again threw a turn and a lny east. If he were a defector, he would have saved his life, would have avoided torture and humiliation. o rigory ih llovich, probably, until the very last moment, did not realize about the sad fate prepared for him. the turn was still very unlucky, the last time in his life. After Finland, he again commanded the Least Front, where war was not expected at that moment. in the end of 1941 he was appointed head of the newly educated main administration to the troubled rigory ih Yilovich on May 15, 1941. German transport aircraft -52,

unnoticed by Soviet posts, y made a flight along the route Yelostok-insk-molensk-oskov ., landing at the Moscow airfield. that month, that the turn looked , he, with all his desire, could not have time to get rid of the cardinal

the vices of the Soviet air defense system. It remained very weak for a very long time, until the beginning of the 60s, when missile systems were put into service. from. there were no scapegoats to be found. There were swindlers on the "conspiracy of victors", in connection with which a number of generals associated with the vision were arrested, including

turn, also the People's Commissar for Armaments .. nnikov And "who took the lead. participating in the breakthrough of the line . Eretskov ,, nothing to do with the vision nnerheim "who had, rigoria, their Ylovich was taken on June 7, 1941, from the mandate of the first deputy people's commissar for defense, rsh ludenny. On June 27, the turn could not stand the torture and admitted that

since 1931 he was a participant in a military conspiracy and a German agent. However, at the end of the protocol, the interrogation added: "I really showed all of the above during the interrogation, but all this is not true and is thoughtless by me, because I have never really been an enemy, a spy and a conspirator." On October 28, 1941, when the Germans shlin-oskwu, ukow was the last front to save the situation, the turn was shot in the then

"temporary capital" Uybyshev. Let's imagine that, by chance, I would not have a thorn that would have sent a Finnish war. Insk i army - not Japanese army. they were very good troops from the bottom, not the eastern type. (each soldier knew his own maneuver, officers and generals of the war

2nd, the fate of the yushkovs is unclear. After the Second World War, several former Japanese intelligence officers stated in a

number of interviews that in the last months of the war, Yushkov was smuggled
owned in

In August 1945, on the orders of the command, he was shot dead by one of the officers in order to prevent him from falling into

Soviet captivity. However, not a single document has yet been published confirming the fact that a Chekist defector was shot, or at least he was not in Zhuria in August of the 45th. The stories of Japanese officers about his death are reminiscent of legends.

It cannot be ruled out that in reality Yushkov was able to surrender to the American troops, and later hid him in

under a false name as a valuable informant about the Soviet Union.

tactically competent, were independent in making decisions, cared about saving soldiers' lives, if they took risks, then deliberately and prudently. in addition, the area
v

Finland made it difficult to use tanks, especially in the forests and swamps around the Dogi. The strong fortifications also prevented armored and mechanized formations from turning around. The Indian soldiers were born skiers, the Red Army's ski training was lame on both legs. It was the successful actions of the ski units that allowed the Finns to surround the Jon River north of the Doge Lakes of the formations of the 8th and 9th Soviet armies. All the vices of the red army, which the Japanese failed to use in full measure in lhinol, were fully taken into account by the Finnish command. Little Finland was able not only to withstand the Soviet colossus of the Red Army with huge losses, no less than 6 times greater than the losses of the Finnish armed forces. the Finns lost 23,500 people beaten and died from the wound, 876 ,, but u n bear prisoners - 876. 5 thousand people, the Finns captured about 6 thousand prisoners. - in fact, the number of those killed in the Russian army was significantly higher - 10 years later, there was no way to take into account all the dead by name. Perhaps the Finnish Commander-in-Chief Marshal Nerheim did not exaggerate at all when he wrote in his last order following the results of the "winter war", addressing his soldiers and officers: "More than 15 thousand of the troops who came out

field

battle, they will never see the dreams of their eyes, how many of them have always lost the ability to work! ovyt also carried heavy blows to the enemy, and if 200 thousand of them

lie in snowdrifts and look with unseeing eyes at the gloomy sky above, it is not our fault. The aggression against Finland, ill-prepared for modern warfare, was paid a terrible price. ukov, if he had commanded one of the armies on the Finnish front, he could not have changed anything.

perhaps he would have only increased Soviet losses, guided by the principle that if major sacrifices were not made today, tomorrow they would be even greater. —zhukovsk i stars

z ktilsya life to the same, to the stars of the turn. if Georgiy onstantinovich had been appointed, then he, not the turn, would have
, had to take the rap for the Chef
Junkers. sf brikov would then , perhaps the people of the series are not "z vitorov's talk",

"z dialect to in lerists". other, and the turn, as a member of the general management
, I had nothing to do with the military or air defense. oroshilov,
imoshenko and udenny, since people who are especially close to the tlin would not have been injured, several
generals-k in lower rank lerists, including the uks ,, shot the turn, they could well have shot, to to
mushkevich, ychgov and other visionary generals in October 41st. George Onstantinovich knew about
the

Finnish war only from hearsay. He did not represent a large scale of the defeat of the Soviet
troops and was confident that the army was still stronger than all its potential enemies. The ukov explained the
successes in the "winter war" by the peculiarities of the terrain, inconvenient for an offensive, and the mistakes
of specific commanders, not even for him. Against the background of the defeats suffered in Finland, the
Khalhingol victories sparkled even brighter, since the reputation of the turn was undermined,
Tallinn and the leaders of the People's Commissariat of Defense now considered the Ukovs to be the sole
winner of the Japanese. Mu, Turner was entrusted with the honor of describing the course of the
operation in the collection "Oiulchinol", which glorified the successes of the Red Army and was intended
for a wide circle of readers, published by the oenizdt in 1940. Having gone to Lhinol, Georgiy Onstintinovich
did not forget about his family and. ilihin cites a letter from brt from ongolia sent to
31 relatives of x. . October 1939:

« ish , I'm sending you greetings, obviously, I'll be in Moscow in a month and a half, then
we'll talk to everyone, now I'll say it in English. rovel war, to zhetsya, not bad. m is healthy, now
I'm not alive, because there's something for the war

under zbolt elk. I send you a rock that I received from the comm: a suit ... if it is short for you, try to remake it. Mu hand, George.
Kiss for me the Lady Lyinichna and the little pit. The request to send gifts of instructions was thus fulfilled. godut nt .. orotnikov
recalled how he delivered the gifts to oscva: I, pointed out to him: to my brother, their II or Khin, hand over
this suitcase and a letter. And it's not far from the central telegraph office, in Ryusovsky lane, 21. live that I
will certainly come with gifts, give this note to the director of the central agency

„ go straight to my cousin

“

The last request might seem curious. A hero of the Chl-Hingol events, a formidable tamer from the Murysk horde ... asked
to sell a few meters of calico for his daughters

and salted sprat in bnk x. then do? the burden was heavy. there was no wasted abundance in the country. It was not from a good life
that he made such a request to the trade workers.

en ukov and his two daughters arrived in ongolia in september 1939. about it

Ukov regularly writes pis leiv molensk. For example, on July 26, shortly after the battle of Inga, he cheerfully reported: "There are no settlements in the area of hostilities, hundreds of kilometers around the steppe and not a single tree. o the steppe also has its own beauty -

Very

lots of game and other animals. I am very good here. the oses walk straight ahead (it seems that Georgiy Onstintinovich used to go for his favorite hunt in a combat situation . .). uh, bye time. —

, firmly in with a whole lot, many r s. August 21st

v

days of the decisive offensive, sent only a short telegram: "Good. there is no time to read letters. busy around the clock with complex issues. received another title. Oruchents will send in September. eych hundred In- tor d leko. bnem yu all. ukov". In mid-September, before my departure, Lex Ndr levn received another letter from her husband: "He is alive and well. You probably already know from the newspapers about the battles on the Mongolian-Manchurian border. You, now, obviously, understand why I urgently had to leave Molensk. you should also know from the message

, that the Japanese from mur ir were beaten to the ground, ki in the air. about the enemy is very cunning, and you have to expect all sorts of tricks from him. then we are well aware of it and are always ready to his

actions to respond with a double blow ... it is difficult to say how events will develop in the future. We are ready for the complete destruction of all this crap. the boy wanted the kidney to fight - this is now a pleasure with a test. I feel very good in my actions. Or rather, because it was an external civil war. we have losses m Lo ... ".

George Onstantinovich was conscientiously mistaken about the magnitude of losses. In the reports of the red army in reports to the higher authorities, the commanders always greatly underestimated their own losses and overestimated the losses of the enemy. The latter were determined according to the strict Suvorov principle: "See more. his adversary, let him go. To, immediately after the Finnish war, the headquarters of the Beningrad military district published data that the Soviet troops lost 48,745 killed and died from rn, which almost tripled the true size of irretrievable losses. the total Soviet losses in lhinol up to the 80s were determined (probably, according to the initial reports from the troops) as a total of 9,824 killed and wounded. these figures, which underestimated the true losses by almost two and a half times, and was guided by the Ukov when he wrote about his

successes. I still mentally compared them with the equally fantastic figures of reports of Japanese losses of 55,000 people. five more killed "this scum" than lost his soldiers, Comrade Georgiy Onstantinovich would not have believed anyone. enemy soldiers than they lost with us, and only sometimes allowed themselves

the luxury of losing as much as the enemy. Oh never, Georgy Onstantinovich convinced himself, his divisions, armies and fronts did not lose more people than the Japanese or German "adversaries". Fortunately, when Leksandrievn, Rill arrived in Mongolia, there was

no more war. R remembered well the first foreign trip in his life: "For seven days we traveled by train to len-de, from there by bus to lon-tor. not everything was interesting, especially since for the first time we had a separate compartment, all in mahogany and beech, so the little eye was unbearable, and at night he asked to go home. I remember passing Lake Ykl at night, about which pp wrote, we see mine, we couldn't tear ourselves away from the car

window , n dishes, as the white and foamy waves of the lakes are almost approaching the railway canvas. However, it took a very long time - 600 kilometers along a dusty road - to reach their destinations by emke. I met him in a dream, although, judging by the letters, he had such an intention. Having turned to the donor, we arranged our life in the new house with the help of guarantors and neighbors, who met us very cordially. om reponr curled - stands on a hillock, bright, spacious, comfortable. The climate is unfavorable - hot and dusty in summer, cold and windy in winter, and blizzards occur. I had to pull the ropes in the courtyard of the town so as not to go astray during a snowstorm. drinking water had to be transported from afar and poured into a large vat in the kitchen.

"I still remember the taste of this cold clear water, in which pieces of ice often melted."

For the last year I spent in Mongolia, I think it was the happiest time of my life. The 42-year-old commander won a major battle. Not without reason, he counted on a new rise in his career. not wrong.

before "rose"

In 1940, the Ukov was urgently called from Lntor to Moscow. Memurhon wrote about this: "<... In early 1940, I received an order from Moscow to appear at the People's Commissariat for appointment to another position. At that time, a government decree was published on conferring the ranks of generals to the highest command staff of the army. Among others, I was also given the rank of General of the Army. A couple of days later, I was received personally by .. Tolin and appointed to the post of commander of the Iyevsky Special Military District. there is an inaccuracy here. The law on the introduction of the ranks of generals in the army was adopted on May 7, published on May 8, 1940. However, on that day, in the newspapers, from the decrees on the assignment of personal titles, only a decree appeared on the production in the rsly of the Soviet Union .. Imoshenko,. . pshnikov and .. evidence. Together with them, a decree was published on the release of .. Iroshilov from the duties of the People's Commissar of Defense and on his appointment as Deputy Chairman of the Council of Relatives - Commissars and Chairman of the Defense Committee under the People's Commissar. By another decree, the freshly minted Marshal Imoshenko was appointed People's Commissar for Defense. Generals of the Army of the UK was made by decree of June 4, 1940, published in the newspapers the next day, June 5. In this case, Georgy Onstantinovich clearly let down the memory. Perhaps he voluntarily or unwittingly merged several of his encounters with the other in May-June 1940. This circumstance makes it very difficult to find out at least an approximate date from my first meeting of the spirits with the other. In addition to Tlin, other members of the Politburo were also present at the meeting with Ukov. George Onstantinovich was asked

about the fighting honors of the Japanese army, about how the Soviet troops fought at Lhinol. tem linsk zl: "Unfortunately, in the war with

Inland, many of our formations and armies showed themselves poorly in the first period. the unsatisfactory state of the army is largely the fault of the former People's Commissar of Defense

Oroshilov, who for a long time headed the armed forces. n did not provide proper training for the army, and it had to be replaced. imoshenko knows military affairs better. We discussed the results of the war with the Finns in detail at the lenum and outlined a number of measures.

at the end of the meeting, according to the uks, there was a

the following remarkable dialogue:

- now you have combat experience, - skzl .. t lin. - We accept the Teiyevsky district and use your experience in training troops. ok yan went to

, I did not have the opportunity to study in detail the course of combat

actions between the Germans and the English-French Blrk. I took the opportunity to ask:

- to understand the extremely passive nature of the warfare. How will military events presumably develop in the future?

laughing, .. t linkzl:

- The French government, headed by the Lords, and the English, headed by the Members, do not want to be seriously drawn into the war with the Nazis. They still don't hope to push Hitler into war with the Soviet Union. having renounced in 1939 from the creation with us

anti-Hitler bloc of aggression against , therefore, they did not want to tie the hands of the Hitler in his the Soviet

Union. nothing will come of this. We will have to pay dearly for our short-sighted policy. ukow is recognized; that the conversation with the other shocked him: <"Returning to the hotel,, oxg: I

could not sleep for a long time that night, being under the impression of this conversation."

Before moving on to the analysis of the rather strange ending of the conversation, I note that,

perhaps it was George Onstantinovich in those days when he, waiting for a call to Tlin, and

then, before leaving for iev, he lived in a hotel in nverskoy, he smoldered ONST NTIN imonov in the Poem "lekon ostok":

yor, who commands tank units

in battle near the plateau in-GgGnN, now in St. Petersburg,

Nverskaya, with a

woman and

friends, sits at a glass table and

drinks cognac in rzn.

it was hard to imagine this square fen, a glass

table, friends, sparkling

water with ice, when Bargut

horses

darted past the cracked triplex and a

suicide bomber with a 6-mbukov pole rushed

right into the tank.

You are sitting at a table with friends.

neighbor didn't make it.

you went to enza for a week, to his wife, took her hsi

letter with charred edges. a man with five
orders sits at the table in fe:

big Mongolian stars and oloty everywhere.
People follow him with
attentive eyes, they saw him somewhere, but do not remember
where and when. maybe on the first
page of "rvda"?
maybe, right?
maybe just from his youth, from somewhere imzn com?

At first glance, the hero of Imon has little in common with Ukov. Before n mi m
yor-t nkist, not comcor-k in Ierist. it is also specified that the major command of the Soviet
tank units in the battle of Inga. It is well known to them, as well as to the poet, that the
commander of a tank brigade at the Ing- brigade commander died in battle on
July 12, 1939, heading with a grenade in his hand, the body was under enemy fire infantry, the

announcement of the Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded posthumously. here ukov, who
commanded all the miu-ing troops, survived. I could drink Verskoy cognac and drink, sit in a
restaurant with friends and a beloved woman (Jeorgy Onstintinovich returned to Moscow with his
wife). - By that time, he had exactly the same number of people as the mind of Yor from the
poem: five orders and gold everywhere. among the orders there was one red name, dvenin and two
"big Mongolian stars" received from Ihinol: the order of the red name of ongolia and alas. the
last two were indeed very large in size, much larger than Soviet orders, and had the shape
of a star. For the sake of completeness, let us mention the commemorative medal "XX Years",
which the ukov, along with many other commanders of the world army, was awarded in February
1938. Let's try to determine exactly when our hero returned from Hong Kong to Moscow and
when he

first met with the other. It follows from Zhukov's memoirs that the call came from within. -
also in the "Brief Biographical Information" compiled in 1957, but after the end of his service in
Mongolia, April 1940 is indicated, from April to June he is at the disposal of the People's Commissariat
of Defense, from June - Commander of the Iyevsky Special Military District. "Personal sheet for
accounting for firewood", filled in by the code in 1948, the end of service in Mongolia is
dated April, joining the command of the mi troops - a meme of 1940. . "Me 1940, George
telegraphed the LNMV to Moscow: "We will leave on the 15th in Moscow. Strech ite. ukov".

Intobze (. - .), where the botl was, stood the "oppel-k det" rina . ilihin says:
skovoy. asked her for a car - to meet .. uks with a family from Mongolia. I received permission,
and we went with Lvdi Lyinichnaya and her daughter Yita to meet George and his family
at the Nroslavsky train station. rishl m tires and from the rkom t of defense. the train
arrived, and we went to the rut, in which Ukov and his family arrived. The UN was already on its
way to meet me, with the first medal of the Hero of the Soviet Union on his chest and the
Order of the Mongolian native republic. ns hugged n siskl with great joy: we'll wash it all together
again!" A few days later, the decree was adopted. . t long. .. Ukov reported to him in
detail about the defense of Mongolia from Japanese invaders. Tlin offered to take the post
of Commander of the Iyevsky Special Military District. George invited me to spend
my vacation in Kiev. I stayed with him for about a month, got to know the city. we went hunting
with a mountain, he shot excellently. Ukovsky — DYUYUTT nt in Mongolia Rorotnikov writes
that Georgy Onst ntinovich left for Kiev in April 1940. This is probably a memory error character. For
them, Il'edorovich, the departure of the uks
from Lntor was associated with his

with the meaning in jev. Probably the end of April is the actual time of George's departure
onst ntinovich from mongolia.

Och Ukovr recalls: "We flew from Mongolia to Moscow already with a plane, together with pa. For all of us it was the first air travel and we are very excited about where we WAVES FOX. So they were placed in those years, lived for more than a month, until they received a new appointment in Kiev and left there. the famous hotel in

3 elk, between the testimonies of mi h. Ilihin and Isukova there is one glaring contradiction. ih or ih Ilovich tells that his cousin returned to Moscow by train, reorgiyev says that they all returned

with a plane, and it is quite possible to believe that the first air journey could not but be remembered by her for the rest of her life. mind, however, that with my case there is no contradiction here. From In-tor to In-de, the shoes really flew from a plane, so as not to shake 600 kilometers on that tire along a dusty country road. tln-de did you go to oscva by train, comfortably, in one, then in two separate compartments of the first, decorated with mahogany and 6 px volumes. We remember that Lexandrievn and the children traveled from Moscow to London for seven days. apparently the class ss return trip took the same amount. It took another day to get from Lntor to Lnds by plane (the Ukovs didn't fly straight to the departing train!). therefore, the journey from Lntor to Moscow must have taken at least eight days. If George Onstantinovich left Mongolia at the end of April or at the beginning of the month, then he should have arrived in the capital somewhere between the 7th and 10th, but never on the 15th. otya, of course,

could

delay in lan-de or somewhere else on the way. maybe . . Ilihin made a mistake when he spoke about the arrival of BRT in Moscow on the 15th? and the words <.. ukovoy that they lived in oscove for more than a month. before he left for Moscow with his father, which seems to be consistent with the earlier date of arrival in Moscow. edv iev ukov departed about June 15th.

let us examine when the reception of the ukons and lines could take place. In the journal of visitors to the Kremlin's office, the first time Georgiy Onstantinovich was mentioned only on June 2, 1940. ukovbylu ling ying the next day, on the 3rd, then on the 13th. They did not meet again in 1940, according to the visitors' notebooks. However, the journals where visitors to Stalin's Moscow suburban houses were recorded have not yet been published. In

addition, historians are not sure that all notebooks with records have been preserved, and in general that all visitors were recorded in the journal . Therefore, it cannot be argued that Osif Issrionovichi Georgy Onstantinovich did not meet earlier, after the 40th. The Memurkh of the Instructions leaves the teachers with the impression that before leaving for Kiev, he only saw the other once. But it is easy to see that in reality this is not the case, but if we assume that the first meeting took place only on June 2, in total, before leaving for Kiev, Ukov came to Tallinn at least three times. Obviously, in the "reminiscences and reflections" marshl, voluntarily or involuntarily, the content of several of his conversations with the other

alone. Let's try to understand that from what is given in Zhukovsky's memo rx, the interlocutors could talk to each other at one time or another. It is interesting that the Ukov expresses his surprise to Tallinn at the passive nature of the WAR Npde. I remember to the readers that the German offensive here began on May 10, 1940, and already 11 years ago I would have known about it from the newspapers. In this case, the first meeting of Ukov and Tlin should have taken place no later than 11 May. But Zhukovsky's words about the absence of active hostilities between the German and Anglo-French troops would be suitable only for a play of those trumps, not for a conversation with the all-powerful Soviet leader. If Georgiy Onst Ntinovich, indeed, arrived in Moscow only on 15

the 17th of the same . Ilihin, then their meetings with the other could not have happened earlier, as he claims. On month, because both the Ukov and his cousin testify that several days passed from the moment of arrival to the summons to the Kremlin. However, it still seems to me that the most probable date for the first meeting of the lings and the uks is no later than May 11, 1940. about it could happen, given the time of departure of Georgiy Onst Ntinovich from

Mongolia, and before, the 10th or the 9th. that's why. the day of the meeting of Tlin or the German offensive that has already begun, or I am sure that it is about to follow. The Germans informed him of the invasion of France, Elgia and

Holland on the morning of May 10, almost simultaneously with the start of the offensive, but Osif Issrionovich could have learned about the plan and a little earlier, from intelligence reports. It is not uncommon that Tallinn warns that Emberlenuildier will very soon have to pay the price for his short-sighted policy. The engineer still doesn't know anything about this and therefore talks about a "strange war"

n ne.

Tlin also informs Ukov that Oroshilov has been removed from the post of People's Commissar of Defense and replaced by Imoshenko. One gets the impression that Georgy Onstantinovich does not yet know about these important personnel changes in the military department. Whenever the meetings were to take place no later than the morning of the 8th. go by the evening of this day ukov could not

Not

know about the change in leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense. To all appearances, Tlinn, apparently, told him about the signing of the orders by the commander of the Iyevsky district, at a meeting not in May, later, on June 2 or 3. Immediately after these meetings, a decree was issued conferring the title of army general to the commander. The commander of the most powerful military district in terms of the number of troops and equipment had to have the corresponding rank. to say, the commander of the neighboring Belarusian (later

In this special) military district, Vlov became General of the Army only eight months later, in February 1941. it is quite likely that on their first date, T LIN suggested that he should think about the proposal to lead one of the

subsequent meetings already announced to him the final decision.

In his memoirs, the story is told how it was decided to appoint Imoshenko in the evening after the First Day of Prd, at a dinner at Tlin, where members of the Politburo and high-ranking military men gathered for a festive dinner:

- One comrade was nicknamed the Iron People's Commissar by the people. You don't know who I mean? – Tlin asked with a grin in his mustache.

- liment fremovich! - there were several voices (actually, the "iron commissar" usually names Lizhov, but after the removal of Ikolya v novice from the post of head of the electoral department in the fall of 38, this title passed to Oroshilov, however, . .). not long. —

- Oh, so we will ask him to take over the leadership of the entire defense industry, more precisely - all production and the needs of the army. we will offer the post of People's Commissar of Defense ... -

Tlin looked around at those present - we will offer comrade. imoshenko.

Tlin, although he took a bitter pill of resignation for irrigation, appointing the former Lunsy slesry to the head of the newly created defense committee, which oversaw all industries working for military needs, could not resist the hidden irony:

An "iron commissar" can only supervise the production of pieces of iron (well, a locksmith in a civilian profession), not command a military army. warlord something from "friend

lim » nik koi - finnish I wars this is good dokzl.

After the Tlins proposed the candidature of Imoshenko, an awkward silence fell around the table. once upon a time, the new commissar of the command of the division in Budyonnovsk

The first military commander, now became the head of his former command of the army, who held the posts of commander of the Moscow military district and deputy people's commissar of defense. A lingering silence was interrupted by the otlov: "Emen Ilovich can be proud of them. nominee emvn rkoma man ervoy onnoy. ,, educated

- Have you taken this moment into account, - s methyl tlin. - ovrish imoshenko - a former subordinate of martyr oudny (a few days later Yemen -onstantinovich also made a lim rshlom. - . .). silly strategists will, of course, build different

assumptions, but the party cannot be equal to the outliers. ov rishch udenny will not claim. - he carries a large load, and, apparently, more will have to be added.

y, comrade imoshenko and the chief of staff, we will ask for some time to engage exclusively in combat training of troops, taking into account the experience of the Finnish war. "In time, the two lines will work together," Linin summed up the discussion.

Tlin was a master at creating "checks and balances" systems that eliminated any potential threats to his unlimited power. forced to give up the given and short-sighted irrigation, which proved the complete inconsistency of the act of the head of the military departments, Osif Issrionovich put a younger military commander in his place

, of whose personal devotion I was not entirely sure. why is he did he prefer imoshenko to the same ouden one that you sincerely loved? the main role here was played by the lack of familiarity with the conditions of modern warfare. Yemenih Yilovich tells in his memoirs how, during the discussion in the People's Commissariat of Defense, the question of TNK, I hardly understand. Here is a word from what should be the tower of the new tank-34, he honestly admitted: "in specialists. about imoshenko vtnk x understood no more than daylight. it was something else. The command of the first military since the time of the civil war has remained quite popular among the troops and in the genus. shchev 1923

Oroshilov wrote to Lin that the detainee is "too a peasant, too popular and very cunning ... in the future, in the opinion of our enemies, the detainee should play the role of some kind of savior (peasant leader), who leads the "native" movement ... which must be used for the revolution entirely and completely. Lim then anxiously reported that "to the question of the young Red Army soldier, for what he would fight, the last one was lost." Oroshilov, back in the 1920s, described the appointment of the deceived and answered: People's Commissar now, in for Agriculture, since "to throw the deceived into the peasant-land abyss would be crazy." if the 40th, appoint a detainee People's Commissar of Defense, then the Red Army men can go into battle:

"deprived", not tlin. entrusting such a person with the leadership of one of the most powerful armies, the world has collapsed. It is still unknown how events will turn. each will have to go through a crisis such as collectivization or new military failures, like the Finnish one. By then will Yemen Ilovich lead himself? Doesn't he want to send Osif Issrionovich to a well-deserved rest, then go straight to heaven to the enemy Rod Ukhchevsky? It is better to leave him as the second most important person in the People's Commissariat for Defense. Seriously, imoshenko will not be able to seriously command his former commander. The detainee will in fact be independent of him and, in case of anything, will report on any suspicious steps of the new people's commissar.

Imoshenko, in his order No. 120, which set the tasks of the troops for a multi-year training period in 1940, demanded: "to train troops only for what is needed in the war, and only as it is done in the war." In order to fulfill this requirement, he ordered that only live cartridges and shells be used in the training exercises. This led to an increase in the number of killed Iranians in a number of military armies in peacetime. Yemen onst ntinovich was not embarrassed at all. he firmly believed that these losses were inevitable and necessary, since they would allow

reduce the inevitable losses in a future war. The udenny was here in solidarity with Imoshenko and wrote with approval in his memoirs of innovations on toughening the conditions for combat training. Rvd, as evidenced by Yemenih Ilovich, the idea to fire at the troops during the exercises with live shells belonged to me. n as if he showed

imoshenko and other military men:

"Such maneuvers are not recognized, where the soldiers do everything conditionally - and shoot, and advance, and also conditionally dig trenches. People have to learn T to like they are fighting a real fight. for this purpose it is not necessary to fly owl ammunition.

Only in a difficult situation does a fighter learn to act confidently and courageously. something ventured to object: "because they can be." "Maybe," T LIN readily agreed. "We will suffer great losses in a war if now , we don't teach fighters how to use weapons, how to attack, how to defend themselves."

As it turns out, there was no one who was crazy about innovations. during the great current war, the losses of the military army reached stronomical values, would the replenishment prefer to be thrown into battle without any training, whether using combat or

idle n thrones. To the bright and deputy people's commissar, who held such views, of course, the Ukov should have been impressed. probably recommended

imoshenko and the abducted tlininsigned the command of the commands of the ievsky district. ut played his role and became the winner of n lhinol. another winner, - turn, in

osr dear to inland. Now stop in the elk to check what the Ouk is worth. to trust in business,

And

very soon. After all, Tallinn was preparing for a war, before which, as he thought in the 40th, there were only a few months, if not weeks.

while retired, opposing marshal on December 7, 1963, wrote to the writer

silly okolov, as if at the first meeting with the tlin he did one good deed: "... okossovsky was my close old comrade, with whom I studied together, worked

always respect him, to a good commander. asked ling to release him from prison in 1940, to send him to my disposal in the ievsky special military district, where he was soon appointed by me to the 19th mechanized corps, at the head of which he entered the war " . oh, after all, Ukov first met the dictator only in May 40,

Kossovsky was released from imprisonment in the early 1940s in the Finnish war, which he reports in his Last few days memoirs. he who walked in Mongolia could not get the news of the release of his friend. oskve, he really should have

to find out that Okossovsky was clearly released from prison. Not at the very first meeting did he ask Osif Issrionovich with such a delicate request! surety of release

Okossovsky was achieved by the People's Commissar Imoshenko, under whose leadership Onstantin

Onst Ntinovich served for a long time in the 4th division and the 3rd in the corps. By the way, at the same time, in March 1941, the future general of the army .. orbs and several other military men were released. This was done according to the list presented by Imoshenko and approved by Tlin and Eria, not on the recommendation of the Ukovs.

There are some very interesting pieces of evidence about how ukkov left by train for Kiev to his new duty station. . b t lion colonel. . their Ilov, who became a hero of . Orotnikov brings a story about his former commander the Soviet union in Lhinol: "... he blessed everyone who came to see him off to a new place of service.

in conversation was restrained by n. sometimes he joked and said: "we will meet again".

- m, who saw off, - said their yil, - it seemed that the ukov was upset,

some said that he also wept.

"Could be," I protested.

"I didn't believe it either, but ... we couldn't be mistaken." Many years later, Ikhil Yedorovich found confirmation of Mikhailov's message:

, turning on the shr conversation, skzl:

-[no one saw the tears of the uks, I did.

—[Where was this called? I asked.

- esk zhu.

- why? Maybe this is very important. no strong-willed person could

to shed a tear for nothing.

- esk zhu.

He stubbornly stood his ground, not reacting to our arguments. The conversation took place in the presence of her husband, or their Ylovich. He suggested that George Onstantinovich shed tears at the memory of Mongolia. I couldn't believe it, because Ukov was proud of his mission in this country.

Orotnikov decided to solve the mystery of Zhukovsky's tears invisible to the world. He really wanted to understand why Zhenilikhin was hiding something. Ikhil Yedorovich ventured a direct question to my George Onstantinovich:

ev in the realm (actually - in June. - they really "were" - joy or chagrin? . .) 1940. that meant chili tears, if Rshl did not answer immediately ...

- I was appointed to a responsible post - to command one of the most important border districts. conversations with tlin, linin and other members of the olitburo, I finally became convinced that war was close, it was inevitable. and new to me

the post of commander of such a responsible border district is evidence of this (again, the belief in one's own greatness: who, besides him, can Georgia Commander appoint to command a district called upon to play a decisive role in the upcoming war! - do? Here, with a sense of an impending tragedy, I looked at my relatives and comrades, carelessly seeing me off, at Moscow, the people's faces of Muscovites . . .). Okkyaon will be, at wars? are we ready for it? do we all sleep and thought: what will happen to me? I felt uneasy, and I could not restrain myself. I thought that the war was over for me. About, having entered the carriage, I immediately discarded sentimental feelings. At that time, my personal life was subordinated to the upcoming war, although there was still peace on our land ...>. counting his doubts: is the army ready for war, Ukov seems to have added in a conversation with Orotnikov. thoughts of the 40th year: "We foresaw that the war with Germany could be difficult and lengthy, but at the same time, did we consider that the country already had everything necessary for a long war and struggle until complete victory. When we did not think that our armed forces would have to enter the war so unsuccessfully, suffer a heavy defeat in the very first battles and be forced to retreat into the interior of the country. oh here n score

tears

m rshlne modern I. climbed into my business and returned to him. because conversations with other people left no doubts in the freshly minted general of the army: there will be wars very soon. Ukov, indeed, did not want the soldiers' lives to achieve victory,

Not

longed for that gray soldier mass, in which the commander could not discern individual persons.
O

George Onstantinovich was not indifferent to those whom he knew and loved well. he understood very well that in the future war, to which, as he thought, only a few weeks were left, many of his relatives and friends, who were seeing him off now in Kiev, would die. through the years it happened.

Many comrades of the uks according to Ikhnol, with whom he became related in the Mongolian steppes, laid down their heads in the great current. was heavy-loaded. warm relations with whom Georgy Onst Ntinovich maintained until my death. On that visit to Moscow, the Ilihin family took care of the wife and children of a cousin, BRT, who was becoming more and more popular. . ilihin, with my Rook testifies:

<"Ilihins, according to old Moscow custom, were hospitable and always warmly welcomed them. Knowing Moscow clearly, they helped to navigate in a noisy unknown city. Thanks to them, on that visit, we managed to SEE a lot, to visit those three, and we did not really feel the frequent absence of our father, whom we called on business every now and then.

Ukov, upon arrival in Kiev, left for the troops. district of ernopol, vyov, Idimir - olynsky and ubno he conducted a command and staff exercise. Ikov did not know that in the first days of the great war, it was here, on Soviet territory, that a major tank battle would be waged with an unfavorable outcome for the army. Then, in June of the 40th, Georgy Onstantinovich had no doubt that his tankers would have to fight immediately in the German-occupied Polish territory, tkuya Rkovi Yublin. It suddenly turned out that you would have to step in a completely different direction. from what he wrote in connection with this in his "reminiscences and reflections":

"<Shortly after returning to Kiev, the People's Commissar of Defense imoshenko called me and conveyed the decision of the government to create the district; 4 = (©) 59) front B

the composition of three armies for the liberation of the Northern Ukovyna and Essrbia from the occupation of Umynia. I was appointed as the commanding front concurrently ...

After lengthy negotiations, the Romanian government nevertheless agreed to withdraw its troops from the northern part of the country and Essrbia, and, thus, the matter turned out peacefully.

In my case, there were no lengthy negotiations. ut or smukov, or the editors of his memoirs were mistaken. events developed at lightning speed. On June 26, he presented an ultimatum to the Umynia with a demand to clear the territory of Essrbia and the northern ukyna, according to the map presented to the envoy. ukovin in the secret protocol to the Soviet-German pact of non-compliance, however, was not assigned to the Soviet sphere of interests, nor was it ever a part of the Russian empire. However, these circumstances did not bother Tlin at all. Late on the night of June 26, 1940, the Romanian envoy in oscove videscu was invited by Olotov. The Soviet People's Commissar gave him an ultimatum - at 24 o'clock he agreed to hand over to Russia and the northern ukovina. Berlin advised Lukhrest to yield, and by the end of the next day the Romanian government accepted the Soviet terms. 28

June

divisions of the red army at the head of the weight moved from the enemy. Georgy Onstantinovich described this, in fact, a police operation, not without pride: territory, everything that could be taken out. In order to stop these

violations of the treaty terms, we decided to throw two airborne brigades on the river rut and seize all the bridges over the river. The tank brigade was given a mission: to overtake the retreating columns of the Romanian troops and reach the Rut River. having completed a swift march (about 200 kilometers), our armored units appeared during the airborne landings simultaneously with their landing. Panic broke out among the Romanian units, the local authorities, and all those who wanted to get away as quickly as possible. the officers, leaving their units and staff

property, also fled across the river. in other words, the royal troops appeared before the Soviet troops in an extremely deplorable state and demonstrated a complete lack of combat capability. the second day of these events (i.e. June 29. -

. .) I was called .. T line by

t lin asked:

— tove s going on? The king of the mind complained that the Soviet command, violating the concluded agreement, had thrown an airborne assault on the river rut, cutting off all escape routes. It would be as if you would drop tank units from aircraft and disperse the Romanian troops.

"[The intelligence agency established a gross violation of the contract on the part of Umynia," I answered.

"Contrary to the agreement, railway transport and factory equipment are being taken out of Serbia and the northern part of the world. Therefore, I ordered that two airborne brigades be thrown out in order to intercept all the railway lines across the route, and two tank brigades were sent to help them, which approached the designated areas at the same time as the paratroopers landed.

- Why did you send the Rut River from Moletovn? Tlin asked.

"We didn't airlift any of the tanks," I replied. - and they could not transfer, because we still do not have such planes. apparently, it seemed to the retreating troops with a fright that the tanks had appeared from the air

t lynr laughed and said: - pick up the abandoned weapon and put it in order. The current is being donated to factory equipment and railway transport in a protest to the Romanian government. this - take care of him. now with dm indication episode ended peacefully. It never occurred to Ukov that what he was doing in 1940 in Essrbia was

akin to the occupation of the Udet region by the Czechoslovakia by the Wehrmacht in 1938. The army engineer was convinced that he was freeing the Moldavians of Serbia and the Ukrainians of the northern part of the world from the oppression of the "Romanian boyars". although this "oppression" with the future of the Soviet Union is difficult to understand. and the "boyars" - tifundists, after the gray reform carried out in Umyia, are no longer left. Some of them turned, in fact, into peasants and barely made ends meet. Only a minority are lucky enough to become farmers and more or less successfully run a profitable commercial economy. the standard of living in was lower than in the not very rich by European standards, Romanian prisons looked like resorts in comparison with om. Very soon, many new Soviet citizens, "liberated" by the Miuk troops, were to get acquainted with the sinister "archipelago". Georgy Onstantinovich in his "Reminiscences and Reflections" mentions "those who tried to quickly escape into the mind" and who were frightened by the Soviet paratroopers and tankers who suddenly turned out to be in rut. But he is silent about the fact that not only officers, officials and landowners fled from Soviet power. There were few intellectuals, prosperous peasants, small traders and artisans. The Soviet soldiers and employees not only left the transport and wagons on this side of the route, but also took away from the refugees the property that they tried to take with them, up to watches and 3 jiglocks. The commander of the Iyevsky district spoke disparagingly of the Romanian troops, who appeared in a deplorable state, prone to panic and demonstrated "a complete lack of combat capability." Mui in a terrible dream could not dream that

Total

a year later, in absolutely the same words, it will be necessary to characterize the red army, under the influence of the verms, perishing in countless cauldrons and rapidly retreating to the east.

Meanwhile, the Soviet troops then, in June of the 40th, looked a little better than the Romanian ones. ess rabian landowner frosiniya ntonovnersnovskaya, Russian by nationality, shortly after the reunification of essrbia with visiting you, he did not remember the first meetings with compatriots who came from abroad: "about the road through the village passed dirty, armor-colored tires, tons of shoes ... about here, then

They were standing by the side of the road, and the betrayed fighters were fixing something. puddles of lubricating oil sl

visible on the road dust. The bottom of the car's tires went out of order against our house. Something black was flowing from it, poof, I nudged each other with my elbows, giggling and wisecracked: "to the sheep: where is

the stl, tm and puddles ...". or, whispering, nudged the already middle-aged peasant, until he finally stepped forward and asked: "Is that you, guys? Only the border was crossed

and the repair was done? The mechanic grunted through his teeth: - you have been on the campaign for three months

already (perhaps it was a unit transferred from the Finnish front .- . .) ... by the Orok bridge, on the rise, about 50 meters higher, the

bridge is turned over including tires. poison with her - the corpse of a , under the slope lay I soldier , covered with a plaid. itso under

to ska. On the side of the road, a soldier with a rifle was sitting with a sad look. - what happened? I asked. - yell

something to cue! can the brake withstand? I was surprised: what are these "mountains" for?

lazy twist!" Naturally, Ukov could not bear any responsibility for the low

training his fighters - by that time he had commanded the district for less than two weeks.

unit, however, concluded that a year later, in June 41, when George

Onstantinovich and the district for half a year, according to the command of the lin post, the head of the ensht b almost

how long did he stay, training the Red Army, including the levsk district, m
lo
changed for the better.

At the end of his stay in Kiev, he was replaced by the head of the operations department

pc b district gen l-m yor . . ubtsov ,, with whom he was well acquainted since the time

of his service in Moscow in the early 1930s, and he was friends with families. Ubtsov was replaced by a former teacher for the
army of the General Staff Colonel. recalling the history of his appointment: "... George . gr min. from what

Onstantinovich ukov, we obviously know each other. at one time about commanding the military regiments, in
1924-1925 they studied together in eningrad, at the higher military school ... a friend arrives in oskvo with his family my comrade
general l-m yorubtsov . you studied together in the demo, why were the teachers in the teachers ...

—[ukk, where and what are you doing now with? I asked.

\u003d ukov, he replied proudly. - Member of the Operations Department.

-_ Xx, and you are lucky! I can't manage to escape. - disobey Y, - ubtsov was burning, - ask Georgiy
Onst ntinovich. will help. n

knows you well. in a word, write a letter quickly, I will personally address it to him. that was decided. The letter turned out to be
short, in the form of a report: "I served in the army in the army, I have a passionate desire to return to duty ... open to any
position" ... no vacation flashed quickly. days during the rest the thought did not leave me: what will the uks answer me? When I had
already lost hope, a telegram

arrived. The army commander of the uks reported that, at his request, the People's Commissar appointed me to the troops of the
Iyevsky Special Military District. it was not ordered to leave immediately. In Moscow, in the management of the staff, I got acquainted
with the order of the People's Commissar to appoint me the head of the operations department of the headquarters of the 12th army ...>.

The next day, the grimyan was already in Kiev, where he introduced himself to Ukov: "Today,

George Onstantinovich has not changed much. The star is only a little fuller than its root figures, sharper, more severe. The

meeting with a former fellow student began officially. kept strictly in a verbal manner. I thanked the commander

for the fact that he quickly responded to my request. n, frowning, brushed aside: "Street bottom ... did this not only for

you, but also for the benefit of the service. Now the troops are in dire need of commanders with good not only combined arms,
but also operational training. soft wavy hair has thinned somewhat, facial features are still

mind yu, I was not

mistaken in my choice. When there was no trace left of the official meeting and friends began to recall their young

years in Hungary, the citizen hinted that he would like to leave as soon as possible for a new duty station in the 6th 12th Army, located who
lived in the city of t nisl v. ut something and it turned out that the ukov thought not only about the benefits of affairs and the prospects for
career growth

Vnristoforovich. "No,"

George Onstantinovich resolutely objected. - will be delayed. In December, a meeting of the leadership in the Defense Committee and all military districts will take place. but it promises to be broad in composition and at an important later stage... we know that smtlin will take part in it. The main report on the results of combat and operational training for the past year will be made by the chief of the general headquarters. Rapporteurs - Inspector General of the Infantry, Chiefs of the Combat Training and Armored Directorate, General Inspector of Artillery. some district commanders will speak on the question of operational arts and tactics. I was entrusted with a report on the main question - "the nature of the modern offensive operation." We, as far as I know, spent four years in the walls of the General Assembly 6: both studied and taught in it. - he asked anxiously: - when did you take the demo developments with you? - [Have enough, comrade commander, - gladly from the ports of the gry. — wow, — Ukov cheered up, — will you help in preparing the report. Commander of the district, let's say something like this: more, according to the words of the grimyans "... Oin can flare up at any moment. We cannot build our operational plans based on what we will have in a year and a half or two. before calculating those

forces that our border districts have today...". logically, if

Vnristoforovich is not a bow vit here, he was still then in August of the 40th, at the time of the war in 1942 or later, he did not think at all, assuming that the war with Germany was does not

later than the middle of the 41st year. Evidently, the aphids had the same opinion. It is up to the commander of the Zhelyevsky district to decide when to start the war. what are the assertions of many Soviet historians and memurists worth in this case, that Tlin, Imoshenko and the Ukovs hoped to delay the hitler attack until at least 1942. I wonder how one can hope to compel a potential adversary to postpone the attack if he has already decided to start it at a certain time? after all, then, when

grmyany, there was no pln "< rb ross" yet. The simple Soviet offensive that Lukov was thinking about was postponed from the years of 1940 to the summer of 1941. Therefore, the report on the modern offensive operation, which, as Leorgiy Onstantinovich calculated, Vnristoforovich was writing for him, should have become the most important at the upcoming meeting.

"Let's go away to think together," said the switch of the uks. "If you have any questions, come to me without hesitation. Take any commanders from the operations department of the district headquarters to help you. so tuesday an attack of ikr bote.

"[Thursday is Sunday..." the grimyans retorted timidly.

— what about the ears: Sunday is for us, not us for Sunday, — joked Ukov, having found familiarity with the text of Holy Scripture.

GR Myan s sels report: "I immediately got down to business. A great help was rendered to me by a graduate of the army general headquarters who arrived in the district for an internship, a former trooper lieutenant colonel. or I am without a family, r bot I, as they say, from the rise until lights out. Ys in the new . In new one quickly coped with the building. The commander, who worked hard on the report, was pleased with our suffering. At the end of September, George Onstantinovich made the last corrections and additions, and, handing me the materials, he ordered:

— Carefully check again after reprinting. get ready to leave: in three days, a command-staff exercise will begin in the twelfth army. I want to visit T m.

you will go with me. I will introduce you to the commander of the army, in the course of the exercise you will get to know the headquarters in which you will work.

dnko to serve in the headquarters of the 12th army, the grmyan had a very short time. In December 1940, not long before leaving for the conferences in Moscow, he appointed Colonel Gramyan to the general post of head of the operations department of the Shtbiyevsky district. his predecessor, Ubtsov, was appointed to Moscow, which he was also very pleased with. I see the underlying reason for the story with grmyan in the following. when ukov

learned that he was to make a report, he tried to entrust his preparation to Ubtsov.

However, the position of chief of operations, department of the district headquarters was too troublesome, leaving no time for military scientific creativity (by the way, he had no

This

time using microcomputer). Therefore, Ubtsov prompts a clever idea: he encourages his and the same teacher „ to the enshtb demyia, like Zhukovsky's comrade grymen

Ubtsov, ask to be sent to the lyevisky district under the name of Georgiy Onst ntinovich. The position of a teacher in a democracy is, of course, dust-free and has a number of undeniable advantages.

It is more pleasant to live in the capital than in some provincial garrison, especially if this garrison is located in a tidal or desert. luce - at the teacher in the body to the demi

Enshtba high salary, more than the commander of the same rank in combat units, and a relatively large amount of free time. Evie d pout. from only one trouble: there are almost no prospects for the riera. You can freely go to colonel x until retirement. services in the district, moreover, the committee, kkievsky, with the largest in the country in terms of the number of troops, services under the command of the commander, with whom old friendly relations have been maintained, opens up enormous opportunities for rapid advancement

military hierarchy. To write a report for a friend - the boss - these are some trifles, which are not worth talking about. Especially if all conditions are created for this: the newly appointed chief of the operational department of the headquarters of the 12th army sits in Kiev and, with the help of the probationer, re-copies a report, his duties in tnislav are not performed a retired predecessor. r vd,

I didn't hear something so that in verm hte the subordinates write

thi

and books for ommel, stein or uderin, completely but after all, in the rnoy army, it's obvious already different traditions were established. In the

conversation of the signals with the mud, one-sidedness is striking. Quite recently, "Rsnya Vezd"

called for operations to George Onst ntinovich the only creator of the idea

encircle the 6th Japanese Army in Lhinol. —would like to put his mouth in his hands. The mouth of the mouth told the grimyan how exactly he was preparing the famous operation. but suddenly it turns out that the commander needs the latest developments of teachers for the demise, that his own experience of a successful offensive on lhinol, which, in theory, should be carefully studied by the same demic teachers, for the report d is clearly inadequate. To whom does the idea of the Lhingol offensive belong anyway? maybe a new brigade

commander? whether the turn and the people from his piece b ? Someday we will get a definite answer here. ok - the commanding officers of the Lievisky Special Military District, important changes took place in the leadership of the

Defense Committee. In August 1940, the chief of the general staff was replaced by the general of the army .. Eretskov. th recommendations l imoshenko. Shchev in the 20th year on the Polish front, Eretskov served in the headquarters of the 6th division, the head of which was then Imoshenko. In case of breaking through the line of the Nnerheim of the Erets Commands with the most powerful 7th Army, the future People's Commissar of Commands of the Northern Front. irill nsievich previously worked as a deputy

low Inik ensht 6 isht bnuur botuzn I. In the words of the miraculous, the appointment of the heretskov took place in the following way. One day at a meeting of the Chief Military Council, Tallinn unexpectedly said: "I think, comrades, we need a younger chief of staff now. - he explained that he had no complaints about Poshnikov, but Oris Ikhilovich was often ill, and this affected the solution of many operational issues. Yemenih Ilovich claimed that it was he who proposed the candidature of Eretskov, who then took the post of Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and was in charge of the department of combat training and military educational institutions. All those present agreed with this nomination. Eretskov referred to the shortcoming

experience and asked not to appoint him head of the headquarters. Tlin in response said something like this: "I appreciate your frankness, irill fnsievich, but the cases of the POSHnikov are not to be accepted. we will select another for the ndid tour - we will free it. The events were described in almost the same way in his memurkhismeretskov: "After the meeting, on the other occasions, supper lin kv rtyreu .. tlin. We again discussed military issues with the younger chief. hoard of contributors is often easy to catch. in „ „ friend t lin skzl: a general staff with good health. A addition, there was a need to use it in another job. large-scale construction of fortified districts is being carried out. We could make Oris ILOviich the deputy people's commissar for their construction. Do you think, comrades, who can be appointed to the position of chief of the general staff 6? best recommendations." Unexpectedly for me, those present began to call my last name, motivating this by the fact that I had special training, participated in battles, was the commander of the mission district

already operating a bottle in the power plant. t ling asked my opinion. stalk categorically refuses, referring to the fact that this work is super heavy, my experience for such work is still not enough.

< FROM WHAT, - skzl t lin, - we will agree with you t to; you attack

now with, immediately, kr bote, as soon as we select another one for the ndid tour, we will change everything. If we live in a dream, you will receive an appropriate assignment. This is what we will end today."

There is no reason to doubt that the conversation that took place at dinner at Tlin, and the afternoon, leretskov before, was close to reality. I suspect that his scenario was discussed in advance, in fact, in my case, Tlin agreed in advance,

so that the udenny put forward the Eretskov to the ndid tour. How could the unity of military leadership be demonstrated. Eretskov was a steward imoshenko.

Rshl Silevsky told the writer Konstantin Imonov: "The Indian war was a great shame for us and created deeply unfavorable impressions for our army both abroad and within the country. All this was not up to someone to explain. From then on, a meeting was convened by Tlin, he was removed from the post of commissar for irrigation and appointed by Imoshenko. Then Poshnikov, whom Tlin also considered it necessary to indirectly lay responsibility for, was removed from the post of head of the general headquarters under a bland pretext, and was appointed deputy head of the People's Commissariat with the task of supervising the strengthening of new borders. The new work for him was motivated by the fact that it is extremely necessary, state-important and requiring for its implementation precisely

whom

special list ,to con. After

that, the question arose of who should be the head of the general headquarters.

Tlin right there, you say, without talking to anyone beforehand, turned to the new People's Commissar Imoshenko and asked: - [Who do you recommend to the chiefs of the general headquarters?
otz hesitated.

- at which of the senior staffs did you work? Circumstances developed in such a way that to the end of the Finnish war, Imoshenko from the senior headquarters of the bovr bot ls Eretskov. nsk s forehead this. — kkk, suitable as head of the general unit 6 ?

conuvs r bot l? imoshenko ck 3 l, that r bot l is not bad and what suits. the appointment of a new chief of the general staff

6 took place. Here and there Utsilevsky clearly mixes up different events. Oroshilov was removed from his post much earlier than Poshnikov Imoshenko, who Silevsky quotes, most likely took place in the main military council, where the appointment of the Yeretskov was formalized, earlier, in the Politburo, where of the military were probably only imoshenko and poshnikov. It can , still on the 40th. totr zgovor "t lin and be assumed that about this conversation with Lexandr llovich, see Yemenonstantinovich. He only kept silent that in reality he wanted the appointment of his old comrade Eretskov , but, according to all the rules of the hardware art , made it as if Smtlin almost forced him to give the name lryll fn sievich. about osif iss rionovich rzg for imoshenko's game, only mind not under l. He also instructed the faithful udennoy to introduce Yeretskov to the leadership of the main military council. in reality, the leader did not want too much for the new People's Commissar of Defense to have a dedicated person in such a key act as the head of the general staff 6. Perhaps Eretskov knew about the opposition of Tlin to his purpose and played a comedy with a refusal zom from a high position, allegedly due to lack of experience. Although he had already been deputy chief of staff and command of the troops of the least in the country of the Eningrad military district. I think, Irill Fnsievich was simply preparing his own retreat for the future, anticipating that Tlin would not keep him at the head of the general headquarters for a long time. I looked at the water. In order not to give Imoshenko too much power, Tlin simultaneously with the appointment of the Eretskov made the former first deputy people's commissar of defense.

The member of the Ensht b moved to the third step in the military hierarchy, udenny gained more opportunities to control imoshenko's actions. the same applies to the fate of the Eretskovs - then it developed in a very dramatic way. second day of Christmas tree

During the course of the war, he was arrested in the case of turn, ychgov, octions and other military leaders. irill fnsievich was tortured and forced to confess to participation in the conspiracy. from lineretskov spared, did not shoot and sent a representative

attacks in the north direction, then he was appointed commander of the Olkhov front. Ukov told the writer Vgeny Orobyev that in the autumn of 1941 he remembered Yeretskov and decided to return him to the army, saying at the same time: "It's free for him to chill!"

osif issrionovich forgot to clarify that the unfortunate general of the army was lounging in a prison cell, where bone breakers from. 3-3 of this, also due to the dampness that prevailed in the city, Iril Fnsievich could hardly walk after his release. "Something told Tlin about this," said l

George Onst Ntinovich. - maybe they are with m z methyl. about only from that day to Eretskov

one was allowed to sit when we all stood in the presence of tlin. orc i irony:

Eretskov was appointed instead of pshnikov , in particular, because he had excellent

health. now, after two and a half months in prison, irill fnsievich

it was hard to stand on my feet, and there was not a trace left of my former health.

Changes that took place in the top leadership of the Russian Army in August 1940

on the whole meant the strengthening of the positions of udeny and imoshenko, i.e., those who favored

ukovo. Perhaps now Georgy Onstantinovich counted that a successful report would help him advance to the next career step - to become the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, who, in case of war, would be entrusted with the leadership of the troops, who was considered the main state bottom direction.

Ok d deleted the word. At the meeting of the decrees, he told his colleagues about the Soviet offensive on Lhinol: "The command was preparing for this operation quite seriously, it was thought out comprehensively both from the operational point of view and from the point of view of

in terms of material support, in terms of operational and tactical outside
pnost.

That operation was preceded by a stubborn struggle for air supremacy ... a superiority of 3 times superiority was achieved in bombing squadrons, and about 2 times superiority in fighters. the idea of the operation ... was to destroy the enemy's weak flanks with a strike from strong flank groupings, to quickly surround the enemy in the designated area and not further than the state border, because the strike is more was forbidden by the government to surround the enemy in this area and then destroy him ... is it necessary to note the characteristic and instructive in this operation? then, first of all, the question of outwardness. the question of surprise, the question of camouflage was, is and will be the main element in victory as in an operation, in a battle ... The command took all measures ... to create the impression on the enemy that we are not getting ready to step, getting ready to defend. To this end, all measures were taken, including disinformation and the use of a broadcasting station that simulates digging and all sorts of engineering work at night. Various special

leaflets were issued to ensure the conduct of defensive measures, etc. Various reports were transmitted to the radio, characterizing the mood of the command for the preparation of a defensive operation. the Japanese, as it turned out later, indeed, before h with the

O

preparing for the step. special care was taken when reporting to Moscow in

The general headquarters of the operation plan, the date of the strike was reported, in fact, on the eve of my operation ... the operational encirclement turned into a tactical encirclement, and the enemy was actually destroyed in the designated area. An experiment by the enemy to carry out counter-attack in the flank ... met organized resistance, counter-force of the organized defense and tank brigade. During the preparation of this operation, special attention was paid to the issue of organizing the interaction of tanks, artillery, infantry and crew. For this purpose, we worked hard for him for a month in the rear of our troops, 25-30 kilometers away.

In particular, the report was undoubtedly written in vulgar and in a new basis

Materials provided with my George Onstantinovich. Here

"general theoretical" part, devoted to the experience of the second world war and its application in

The red army, in all likelihood, is the fruit of the tireless labor of two

former teachers in tele-gensht bists. he teaches very solidly: "What is the most instructive of the actions on the ground?"

1. that bold and decisive use of tank divisions and mechanized corps in close

in interaction with the air force, mines and the entire depth of the enemy's operational defense.

2. decisive blows by mechanized corps in a meeting engagement and their striving to boldly and independently break through to the rear of the enemy task force.

3. Massive use of parachute landing units and air divisions to capture the most important objects in the immediate and deep rear of the enemy, while the frequent use of these troops in the form of the enemy.

case of a breakthrough (fortified areas. - close . .) the Germans paid special attention 4. in interaction of infantry, artillery, tanks, intensified training for the training

fields in ket x. In general, in this regard, the Germans made full use of the experience of evasion in preparing for an assault on the ground.

the Ukrainians again concluded that modern technical means of combat allow the attacking side to "destroy not only field defenses, but also, to

To

it is shown in practice, to break through the modern fortified zone. At the same time, with the introduction of a powerful mobile group, one can "inflict a decisive defeat on the operational reserves and develop an operational success into a strategic success." enemy aviation must be put out of action by a "powerful and sudden strike" to the entire depth of the planned offensive, ensuring air supremacy.

The speaker proposed a rough plan for a future offensive operation on a front scale: "In the conditions of our first theater of hostilities, a major offensive operation with a strategic goal, it seems to me, should be carried out on a wide front, in

in any case, must be 400-450 km.

the power of the first strike should ensure the defeat of at least one third - one second of all enemy forces and withdraw our forces to such an operational depth, from where a real threat of encirclement of the remaining enemy forces would be created, for this, if On such a front, an offensive operation is organized, the total width of the main strike sectors of the operation being undertaken should be at least 100-150 km.

For such an operation, of course, the concentration of powerful forces and means will be required, and I think that for such an operation on such a front, rifle divisions of the order of 85-100 divisions will be required. 4-5 mechanized corps, 2-3 army corps and 30-35 aviation divisions. it goes without saying that such a number of armed forces must be comprehensively equipped with appropriate means of strengthening artillery, tanks accompanied by infantry, engineering and technical troops and appropriate means of strengthening.

The depth of the operation and the possible pace of its implementation are essential for the encirclement and defeat of the enemy's main forces. the depths of blows continuously following each other and the pace of the operational advance of the attacker, especially his mobile troops, should provide the necessary space and freedom of maneuver for isolating and encircling the main enemy forces before the latter have time to leave from under the beat ditch

The cavalry troops must deploy in such a space in order to undermine the areas of aerodrome observation of the enemy's main mass movement, to disrupt the supply by rail and dirt roads, to bear her defeat, to snipe the entire system of rapid

advancing into the operational depth should hinder the operational actions of the enemy forces in the rear and exclude the possibility of their operational maneuvering ... on average, the depths of the front-line operation, apparently, will reach up to 200-300 km, in some cases

much deeper."

to be in the same vein. the pace, timing, number of troops, the consumption of fuel and ammunition for the front and army offensive operations, which, as they hoped, almost all the participants in the conference. The Russian army will have to do a lot of work in the upcoming victorious war against Germany. Examples from the First World War, from the Finnish War, from the Nation Campaign, carefully selected by hard-working General Staff officers. 'optimistic output at the end:

"The military army, wherever its units are currently deployed, must be ready to fight with a skillful and technically armed enemy. The simultaneous development of the means of combat—visions, tanks, motorized units, assault troops, and others—create a wide range for conducting an offensive operation, making it possible to carry it out at high rates and with great range... Of equal forces and means, victory will be ensured by the side that is more skillful in managing and creating conditions of surprise in the use of these forces and means. The obscurity of the modern operation is one of the decisive factors of victory. Considering the exceptional importance of surprise, all methods of camouflage and deception of the enemy must be widely introduced into the army. skirmishing and exchange should be a

red thread in the training and education of troops, commanders of staffs. The army in future battles must show a high class of operational and tactical surprise. In order to successfully conduct modern offensive operations, it is necessary to have well-trained troops, commanders and headquarters.

Temporary operations, growing at a fast pace, require exceptional coherence, agility and flexibility. lack these abilities; cannot

count on success. especially high demands must be made by the commander of the 6th command of the higher formations. The highest command staff and the headquarters of the higher formations in the near future should perfect their knowledge and skills in organizing and conducting a modern offensive operation. ,, not possessing

The salary made a great impression on the listeners and very favorable for the speaker. k, j the future irreconcilable opponent of the uks. . Remenko, speaking at the meeting, called Georgy Onstantinovich's message "wonderful". Some of those present doubted that the army was really capable of providing superiority over the enemy both in the art of command and control of troops and in the ability to strike suddenly. torment in the memoirs conveys the prevailing mood during the days of the December meeting: "We foresaw that the war with Germany could be difficult and lengthy, but at the same time we considered that our country already had everything necessary for long war and struggle until complete victory. When we did not think that our armed forces would have to enter the war so unsuccessfully, suffer a heavy defeat in the very first battles and be forced to retreat into the interior of the country. Most importantly, the speech of the commander of the Iyevsky District was liked by Imoshenko and the member of the Molitburo who was present at the meeting: . - Lenkov, Dnova and others did not fail! report on the report "The Character of the Modern Offensive Operation" to Tlin. After a conference of senior military leaders, he summoned Osif Issrionovich. to describe this meeting:

". . Tolin greeted us rather dryly, greeted us with a barely perceptible nod, and invited us to sit down at the table. it was no longer the same t lin that I saw. tlin, in his binet after returning from lchinol. rum. whether the members of the olitburo were present.

since he didn't sleep all night, I read the draft final

speeches. . imoshenko at a meeting of the highest commissariat in his amendments. , to give him Imoshenko hastened to close the meeting. - ovrish tlin, - L tried to object to Imoshenko, - I

the plan of the meeting and the draft of my speech and assumed that you knew what I would talk about when summing up.

— do not oblige to read everything that is sent to me, — Tlin flared up.

- imoshenko s silent l.

— uh, how are we going to correct Imoshenko? — addressing the members

olitburo, asked t lin.

— to oblige Imoshenko to take a more serious look at your remarks on the theses and, taking them into account, to submit to the olitburo a draft directive of the troops to m in a few days, — skzl. <. olotov. This opinion was shared by all the members of the Politburo who were present. Tlin remarked to Imoshenko that he closed the meeting without knowing his opinion on the final speech of the people's commissar.

In the dialogue between Tlin and Imoshenko, it is felt that Yemen Onstantinovich is already beginning to cheer the leader on with his excessive, in his opinion, self-sufficiency. the conqueror of the nerheim line seems to be starting to close up everywhere. this is a prerequisite for the star hour to come soon. George Onstantinovich does not miss his chance.

Immediately after the end of the conference, in the period from January 2 to 11, 1941, two operational-strategic games. took place "Memories and reflections" Ukov speaks of only one of them and greatly distorts its course:

"The next morning there were big operational-strategic military games. The strategic situation was based on the alleged events that, in the event of an attack by Germany on the Soviet Union, could erupt on the back border. The leadership of the game was carried out by the people's commissar of defense imoshenko and the chief of the general unit 6 Eretskov: they "played along" in the south-west strategic direction. The other side (the Germans) was conventionally the forward one, the red side (the red army) - the defending one (3 "blue" in the first game of bow games, for "red" - the commander of the first special military district. „

. vlov.- . .).

The military-strategic games mainly pursued the goal: to test the reality and expediency of the main provisions of the cover plan and the actions of the troops in the initial period of the war.

To pay tribute to the General Staff: in all the materials prepared for the game, the latest actions of the Nazi troops in Europe were reflected. The back of the strategic direction of the games covered the front from Eastern Russia to Olesye.

The east of the fronts: the west side ("blue") sides - over 60 divisions, the east side ("red side") - over 50 divisions. The actions of the ground forces were supported by powerful air forces.

Dramatic moments abounded for the east side. they turned out to be in many ways similar to those that arose after June 22, 1941, when the Soviet Union pl Fnashistskaya Germany ...

about the end of the game, the People's Commissar of Defense ordered Vlov and me to conduct a partial analysis, to note the shortcomings and positive aspects in the actions of the participants. Lin proposed to conduct a general analysis in the Kremlin, where they invited the leadership of the Defense Committee. General staff of 6 troops of mi , commanders districts and their chiefs of headquarters. rome to lin were present

members of the olitburo. The code of the game was reported to the head of the general headquarters of the general army of heretskov. After two or three sharp replicas, the line began to repeat itself and break off. Okl Dueretskov was clearly not happy. He no longer had any logic in evaluating events and decisions of the parties. When he gave data on the balance of forces of the parties and the advantage of the "blues" at the beginning of the game, especially in the victory of the victory, Tlin, being in a row against the unsuccessful "reds", cut him off, stating:

—[Where do you get that ratio? don't be that in the war

not only the rhymetic majority, but also the art of commanders and troops.

Eretskov replied that he knew this, but the quantitative and qualitative correlation of forces and means in war also plays an important role, especially in modern warfare, for which Germany has been preparing for a long time and already has significant combat experience.

things into a few more sharp remarks, which I don't want to remember,

Tlin asked: "Does he want to speak out?"

Imoshenko spoke as RKOM. He reported on the operational and tactical growth of commanders, chiefs of staff of military districts, on the undoubted benefits of the past meeting. niya and military-strategic game.

"In the 1941 academic year," Imoshenko said, "troops will have the opportunity to train more purposefully, more organized, because by that time they should already be settled in new areas of deployment,

the commander of the Belarusian special military district, General L-Colonel, spoke at that. . vlov. not a member of the evaluation of the last meeting, but Tlin stopped him.

- what are the reasons for the unsuccessful actions of the "red" troops

sides? - he asked. Vlov tried to get away with a joke, saying that there was something wrong with war games. Tlin obviously did not like the joke, and he noted:

- The commander of the troops of the district must master the art of war, be able to find the right decisions in any conditions, which did not work out in the game.

those, apparently, having lost interest in the performance. asked: . vlov, T LIN

- Does he still want to get out?

asked for words. noting the great value of such games for the growth of the operational-strategic level of the top command, he proposed to hold them more often, despite the complexity of the organization. In order to improve the military training of commanders and employees of headquarters of districts and armies, he considered it necessary to start the practice of large-scale command and staff field exercises with communications equipment under the leadership of the People's Commissar of Defense Ensht 6.

he touched on the construction of the fortified river Yonov in Belarus:

- In my opinion, in Belorussia, fortified lines (s) are built too close to the border, and they have an extremely unfavorable operational configuration, especially in the area of the Jon of the Yelostok ledge. This will allow the enemy to strike from the area of the rest and divert to the rear of our entire Yelostok grouping. In addition, due to the shallow depth, they cannot hold out for a long time, since the horses are shot through by artillery fire.

— = what do you offer specifically? asked. . olotov.

- I don't know, what considerations were based on choosing these particular lines, but I think that it would be necessary to build somewhere deeper, further from the border, somewhere on the rodno-olkovysk-obrin line.

Are the roofs being built correctly? - asked .. -Vlov, apparently dissatisfied with the fact that I criticize his district. - did not choose boundaries for the construction of Nn krine, however

I suppose that it would be possible to build them much further from the border.

Below, he quotes a replica of the sprinklers that they are being built under the guidance of the military commanders and according to approved plans, after which he quotes large speeches. rifle divisions, 16,000 to 18,000 men each, horse-drawn artillery, and the use . ych gov and . . evidence evidence as if the mouths of the lz are large of tanks, mainly for close infantry support. this is the rigor of the newcomer, allegedly critics of Liimoshenko and Tlin, who instigated the formation of tank corps. conclusion t lin sk z l:

"The only thing is that we don't have a real chief of the general staff 6. to change Eretskov. - added: - the military can be free."

The next day, TLIN VZVV Lukov I announced that he had been appointed the new head of squad 6. Georgy Onstantinovich Imonov outlined the course of the game a little more specifically:

"I commanded the Blues for this game, I played for the Germans. vlov,

commands VSHI in the same military district, played for us, commands I

"red", our front. on the bottom front, playing along with him on the turn.

for the real initial data and forces of the enemy - the Germans, I, commanding

"blue", developed operations in precisely those areas in which the Germans later developed them. wore his main udrym, where they then wore them. The rappings developed approximately in such a way that they then developed during the war. The configuration of our borders, the terrain, the situation—everything prompted me precisely such decisions, which they later suggested, and the German battle lasted about eight days. the management of the game artificially slowed down the pace of advancement of the "blues", holding it back. On the eighth day, the "blues" advanced on the road of the newcomers, and, I repeat, at an artificially slow pace of advancement.

In January 1941, this strategic game was analyzed by a clear military council. Before the main report entrusted to me, I decided to dwell on some of the issues that were of concern to us, first of all, on the issue of the unfavorable location of the system of new fortified areas along the new border.

The configuration of the borders made this location unprofitable. It would be much more profitable to place them, moving them about 100 kilometers inland. I realized that this point of view would cause dissatisfaction, because I criticize the systems of placement of fortified districts. Yonov was approved by the council of ores and harrows, ultimately, t lin. Nevertheless, I decided that there was nothing to do. Ridetsya about This sk 3 Th.

Tlin listened attentively to the report and asked a number of questions to me and other speakers. Specifically, he asked why the Blues were so strong, why were there such large German forces in the initial data of our game?

He was answered that these forces corresponded to the capabilities of the Germans and were based on a real calculation of all those forces that they could throw against us, creating great advantages in the direction of their main attack. Tim and explains such a decisive advance of the "blue" during the game.

Interestingly, did KKZ remember this change of games for Eretskov? irill fnsievich is more than n conic in the memoir:

"The first game was extremely interesting and very instructive. At the end of the game, it was planned to analyze it, and a day was allotted for preparation for it. about suddenly a small group of participants in the game were called to

reml. The meeting took place in kbinet tlin. it was not proposed to characterize the course of the December meeting of the highest command team and the January operational game. everyone took 15-20 minutes. When I got to the game

then he managed to stop only on the actions of the enemy, after which the analysis actually ended, because tkk lin interrupted me and asked two questions. They were reduced to an assessment of intelligence information about the German army received in recent months in connection with the analysis of its operations in Western and Northern Europe. However, my considerations, basic data about my

troops x and intelligence information, did not impress smoldering. The time allotted to me had expired, and the analysis was interrupted. I tried to take it smartly. . Tutin. About Ikolyu Edorovich his week. ..tlin turned to the people's commissar of defense. imoshenko will not support me I. None of the military leaders present asked for a word more. Tlin walked up to the closet, stood up, kept silent and said:
"Ovrysh imoshenko

asked to appoint Comrade Ukov as Chief of the General Staff. Let's agree!" (Suddeny also claims that Tlin proposed the candidature of the Ukovs without any reference to the People's Commissar of Defense. - . .)".

I dare say that the Yeretsk mem-ories generally seem to me to be much more truthful than the memoirs of the Yeretsks and many other Soviet military men. It suffices to point out that even a slippery moment, like preparation for war with Finland, he covers quite objectively. Irill Fnsievich, in particular, admits that the Soviet Union had been preparing for a "counter-offense" in this country since June 1939 in case of a "military provocation" from the Finns (such a provocation on the orders of Tlin and was an organizer at the village of Ynil on November 26, 1939). Eretskov, if he could not write truth, he preferred not to write

be

Nothing. For example, due to censorship conditions, he could not talk about his rest, which followed at all times of the war. Therefore, in his book "Service to the People" we read: "On June 23, I was appointed as a permanent adviser to the recruitment of the main command" (Eretskov does not specify that the Lubyanka basement served as the office of the freshly baked adviser). —Further on, the story of the September call to tlin follows immediately. Only the dialogue between Eretskov and Tliny can alert the attentive reader: — Hello, comrade Eretskov! — do you feel yourself? — hello, comrade tlin! feel good. I ask you to explain the military building! Why would Osif Iss Rionovich suddenly worry about the general's health? Well, isn't it a disease I happened to be with Irill Fnsievich? why then does Eretskov write nothing about this disease? until recently, only knowledgeable or very intelligent readers could have guessed that from June to September 1941, the memoirist, to use one of the favorite expressions of the instructions ,, "drank the coffee of the eria". When Eretskov and Ukov wrote their memoirs, all the materials of the operational-strategic games of January 1941 were still marked "top secret". Therefore, Irill Fnsievich did not at all give any data on the goals of the parties, the conditions and the course of the games. Georgy-Onstantinovich, on the other hand, preferred to give absolutely fantastic information both in his memoirs and, especially, in his

conversations with Imonov. It so happened that in January 1941 he was almost playing a prank on the Germans with his comrades "< rb ross". Only in 1993, when the relevant documents were finally declassified, did the main article about them appear in the Military Historical Journal. "An epitome to the t stanza". it turned out that in the first game, which lasted from January 2

to 6, the northeastern front of the "western" ("blue"), indeed, the commands of the l - uks, the northeastern front of the "eastern" ("red sleepy") - vlov. However, the balance of forces and the course of the game were directly opposite to what George Onstantinovich later asserted.

. obylev

According to the conditions of the first game, the "Eastern" as part of the northern front had 51 rifle, 3 cavalry, 4 mechanized and 9 tank divisions and 5 mechanized and 15 tank brigade commanders on the front north of

Olesya and to the Lithuanian Sea. opposing them "zadnyh" in the Northeast

front there were only 41 infantry, 1 cavalry, 2 mechanized and 3 tank divisions, as well as armored brigade "Ostochnye" had 8811 tanks, 5 652 from 974 aircraft

, 6

artillery guns, 3,069 anti-tank guns and 3,846 mortars. The "pdnye" could only oppose them with 3,512 tanks, 3,336 aircraft, 4,850 artillery pieces, 4,048 anti-tank guns and 2,214 mortars. It is easy to see that in all respects, except for the number of anti-tank guns, the Soviet side ("Eastern") had a superiority of one and a half times, potnk m - zhevdu and a half. At the same time, it was believed that to the north of Ripyat, the "western" ones were delivering an auxiliary strike from eastern Russia, while the general offensive was being carried out by them in a southeast direction. Oh, and this erroneous assumption did not prevent the intelligence directorate of ensht 6 from greatly increasing the forces and means of the German ("western") troops in the northwest direction. In fact, on June 22, 1941, the German army group "< EVER" had only 20 infantry, 3 mechanized and 3 tank divisions: in a way, according to the number of formations (if we conventionally count two brigades for one division) the real enemy of the red army at the time of the attack was almost two times inferior to the imaginary "west" on the front of the first of the January games. the same to rtin was also regarding military equipment. The entire German army of the invasion on the front from the Lithuanian coastal sea had no more than 3,582 tanks and assault guns, including the tanks of two divisions until the autumn of the 41st located on the territory of France and ermanii on reserve , case Thus, by June 22, there were no more than 3,300 tanks on the entire German eastern front. to support them, the Luftwaffe was able to allocate about 1,830 combat aircraft. consequently, the army groups "ever" and "< center" could not have

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at their disposal 3,512 tanks and 3,336 aircraft, as prescribed by the buildings for the January game. about the game conditions, the participants received the following introductory information. On July 15, 1941, the "Zapdnye" went on the offensive from Eastern Russia towards Iga and Vinsk (corner of Vpils), Izirionrest and Uvlok — Nrovichi. On August 15, they were supposed to reach the indicated line and smash the Belostok-Volkovysk and Kunsy grouping of the "Eastern". On July 25, the north-eastern front of the "western" on the line sovets-id - un-syauliai was met by a counterattack of up to 50 "eastern" divisions and withdrew to a defensive line near the state border. The eastern front of the "western" also went over to the defensive near the Soviet-Polish border. On August 1, the front and northwestern fronts of the "eastern" came to the line of the state, in fact, in the rank of siigr. borders. At this point, the northern front had the objective of defeating the Western grouping in eastern Russia and by September 3 reaching the mouth of the Isla. Also, the line from the city of Lotsl Vek to the last front by August 20 was supposed to reach the border of Isla. The task of the "rear" consisted in repelling the enemy's offensive, with the approach of reserves after August 10, go on the counteroffensive and by September 5 reach the line of inskvinsk-ig. In the ensuing card battle, the teams replayed the wins on all counts. Using less manpower and means, Georgy Onstantinovich managed, relying on the fortifications of Eastern Russia and the Suvlak ledge, to repel the offensive of the "Eastern", the main attack carried by the northern front in order to cut off Eastern Russia. Once the main forces of fishing overcame the long-term fortifications, the commander carried out a counterattack with his right wing, where he concentrated the main tank and mechanized formations. the front of the troops .. was broken through and the "rear" ones developed success against the omzhu, trying to encircle and destroy a large grouping of the "eastern" - 20 rifle divisions and 4 tank brigades. Mitriy Grigoryevich reacted late to the danger and transferred too much force to repulse the broken connections of the "rear" ones. Gr was interrupted at the moment

When Ukov was about to continue his offensive against the advancing grouping of the Western front, Vlov transferred two rifle corps and several tank brigades in an attempt to prevent disaster on his left flank. about the assessment of obylev in the event of the continuation of the game, all chances are the success of the epics on the side of the "western".

The weakened forces of the "Eastern" would not have been able to occupy Eastern - Russia, their onno-technical army was isolated and could no longer play an active role in the operation. At the same time, sent by a catch to the breakthrough site, it was late because the "western" managed to be the first to take the lines indicated for the exit of the "eastern" reinforcements. The Games were held from 8 to 11 January 1941. this time, a possible course of hostilities in the south-western direction was worked out, where the "western" with the support of the "south-western" (Hungarians) and "southern" (Romanians) carried the main beat r.

the annual front of the "eastern" bow teams, the southern front of the "western" and "south-western" teams - fishing, the southern front of the "southern" - lieutenant general nt. . uznetsov, then Commander of the Ribltian Special

military district. The ratio of forces and means in this area was in favor of the "Eastern". They deployed 81 rifle, 6 cavalry, 4 mechanized and 10 tank divisions, as well as 4 mechanized and 12 tank brigade. "pdnye", "south-3rd pdnye" and "southern" all together had 100 infantry, 4 cavalry, 3 mechanized and 5 tank divisions and 6 mechanized brigades. the ratio was 1,06:1 in favor of the opposing "Eastern" coalition. then the sweat of the NK missiles and the "Eastern" had a tangible superiority - in 2.7 and 1.3rz. there were 8,841 tanks, 5,790 of them, and the enemy had 3 31] and 4,456, respectively. again, Soviet reconnaissance greatly increased the enemy's strength. In fact, on June 22, 1941, the German army group "g" had a total of 26 German infantry, 5 tank, 4 light infantry, 2 motorized and | mountain divisions. In addition, the Romanian troops in the composition of 3 infantry and 1 in the Lerian division and 3 mountain brigade were directly subordinate to it. m battle-capable fortress brigades. Hungary opposed 2 mechanized and 1 cavalry brigade, but they arrived at the front only in July. However, taking into account the Slovak (2 infantry divisions and | motorized brigade) and Italian (3 infantry divisions) troops that appeared in July and August, the Germans and their allies deployed in the south-west in the direction of only 64 1/2 r counting divisions, not 115, to the thoughts of the Soviet general staff bists. I note that all three German army groups in June of the 41st yielded to the Soviet troops opposing them, also in terms of the number of guns and mortars. ki in the first game, the aggressors were again the "backs". According to the introductory data, | In August 1941, the Eastern Front went on the offensive against the Lviv-Ternopil grouping of the "Eastern", but in the area of Lviv, the Ovel broke into a powerful counterattack and, having lost up to 20 infantry divisions, by the end of August 8, withdrew in advance

prepared defensive line on the border. At the same time, the troops of the "Eastern" had already managed to occupy the city of Yublin on Polish territory and advance with the armies of the right wing 90-180 km from the border to the rivers of Isl and Unets. August 8, having reached the nest. In fact, the games ended on the day when the landscape of imaginary hostilities was August 8, 1941. The goal of the year was for the "Eastern" front to defeat the enemy forces on the territory of Hungary and Umynia, covering itself with a front layer, with the main forces of the world, and by September 16 to occupy the city of rkov, udpest, imishor and rayov om blowing with a strong front. . uznetsov decided to continue the offensive of the niche in the direction of the inn, roskurov, otin, ernovitsa, in order to

together with the Eastern Front, encircle the grouping of the "Eastern" in the area of Roskurov, Lvov. The first place of the decision was the diversion of the whole army for the offensive of the Ishinev. success here could in no way affect the fulfillment of the main task

in the Lviv-Proskurov direction. in turn, .. Vlov wanted to move the Gostochny front from the morning of August 13 to the offensive of Ntry, Olochev and Yublin, trying to break the enemy's Lvov and Lublin groups and on August 19 to reach the Nestr and Etsshsh rivers. At the same time, he failed to create front-line reserves and concentrate enough forces in flank strike groups. Instructions to the commander of a good front set a bribe for his troops to defeat the "southern" group advancing on the Roskurs. At the same time, the troops of the front were to take possession of the yon rkov and begin to concentrate forces to deliver the main blow to the pest. A horse-mechanized army, 1 mechanized and 2 rifle corps and 1 tank division remained in reserve. The advance of the missiles, which began three days before the main attack on the "southern" was delivered, diverted the enemy's attention from the southern direction, where, as a result of two concentric attacks, the main forces of the southern front were surrounded. x attempts to break out of the encirclement were unsuccessful. To repel the Ukovsky offensive, the Uznetsov allocated too small forces. Vlov, alarmed by the strike of the "Eastern" Narkovs, reduced the scale of his offensive, now setting the task of encircling only two enemy corps. The failure of the commander of the Eastern front from the encirclement of large forces of the "Eastern" in interaction with the Southern Front allowed the commander to beat the enemy piece by piece. Georgy Onstantinovich, without waiting for the completion of the defeat of the Proskurov group, began a general offensive against the pest. On August 17, horse-drawn fur of the Niziers of the army was introduced into the breakthrough. I managed to go to the rear of the "3 P DNYM" in the area of ukchevo, yi-redkhz, op and connect with 7 thousand mi pryshutists who had been fired earlier, reinforced with tanks and light artillery. Two groups from the composition of the host front were surrounded. The storm ended at the moment when the path ud pest was opened before the troops of the Miuks. The success of the front was facilitated, among other things, by the fact that there was no practical coordination of actions between the "West", "South-3rd" and "Southern" forces. That, by the way, was rather strange. go "z p dnye" and

their

according to the terms of the game, the allies were aggressors and, logically, they had to agree in advance on a single command. Most importantly, the games proved that, as a commander, the Ukov was clearly superior to his colleagues. I note that his opponent in the game, .. -caught and < .. uznetsov, was very unfortunate in commanding his troops in the first days of the great current war. The story of Georgy Onstantinovich about the discussion of the results of the

operational-strategic games of Utlin does not inspire confidence. If the general secretary was so critical of the behavior of the captives during the game, then, the question is, why did he not only leave Mitriy Grigorievich in command of a particular special military district, but also awarded him the rank of army general the following month? How many would Tlin admit that one of the most important districts was commanded by a man whose military abilities he doubted.

the big speech of the Ukovs, full of impassioned calls to build fortifications no closer than 100 kilometers from the border, is most likely the fruit of his own imagination.

Else and previous conversations with the other, and the strategic deployment plans that existed by that time, and finally, with the stroke of the games just held, they proved that the army was going to advance, not to defend . But in the depths of its own territory, only the army that is not going to attack first is needed; when pressed, the enemy plans to keep the main forces in the line of fortified areas at a considerable distance from the border. With the approach of reserves, you can stop the enemy, then reverse the counterattack. oh not at all

act tlin, imoshenkois mukov. The New York Games were by no means a rehearsal. obylev. neither was a Soviet invasion of the second Europe. A rehearsal for the stanza of June 41st, he thinks. future propagandistic stereotype demanded that the army battalion should always wear a puff in response to "imperialist aggression". for this reason, there were given introductory information about the attack on the "west",

"southwest" and "southern". So that the red commanders participating in the games would not have suspicions that the Soviet peace-loving politician was just a front for expansionist plans. albeit senior military officers, like uks, etc. In practice, during both games, only the invasion of Soviet troops into adjacent territories was practiced. the speech about the fortified areas was composed by the marshal in order to create the impression for the teachers that in the games held, the "eastern"

(Rsnia army) defended, "zapdnye" (verm xt) - set foot. The Soviet divisions ("Eastern") were considered equal in combat capability to the German divisions ("Western"), which, as the experience of the Great Patriotic War showed, was a big stretch. In reality, soldiers and commanders of all levels were much better trained in the army than in the military army. All the commanders' buildings during the games were completed on time, and there were no difficulties with logistical support, airborne assaults landed in precisely designated places (which happened quite rarely with Soviet paratroopers during the war). Such an idealization, in general, played into the hands of those commanders who acted faster and more actively, i.e. ukovo. On the whole, it was easier to fight on paper than in real life. oti in his report de o

of the modern offensive operation, George Onstantinovich and his co-authors did not say anything about the real shortcomings inherent in the Russian army in the field of management, combat training of troops and logistics. This

was said by some of the others who spoke at the meeting. However, the turn raised "the question of the capacity and initiative of our commander. This question is of especially great importance after we have gained a lot of useful experience in the war with Finland and Nihinol. This experience shows that our people are very fond of acting in a compact way (in other words, they huddle together, a crowd where you can simply repeat the actions of your neighbors, not think for yourself what exactly should be done in the current situation). novke - V.S.). Ovrishchukov probably remembers how he had to repeatedly prove that the front was not sufficiently occupied (as

Can

understand from context

„ in this case, it was the turn that proved to Lukov that the fighters of the 1st

army group p located on the front too crowded. - they especially love the work of . .). shi people are not combat protection (again, because it requires a lot of action. - afraid of the rear). . .) ... you must teach and educate divisions, not

udenny, who was in charge of all rear services, in his speech

meeting noted: "... they write to the German army when he was operating in the east (obviously, it should be: on the bottom. - in . .), then her rear action lx to a good chronometer;

this I doubt. I don't think that we talk a lot about the rear, now we need to do it. first of all, we need people who are operationally literate and perfectly knowledgeable of the operational rear, so that during the pandemic 6 they take a course on organizing

corresponding rear. now the people do not know how to lower the rear.

I didn't have to in Belarus (during the Soviet invasion of Woltz in September 1939 - . .) ... to transport fuel for the 5th mechanized corps (then it was called . .) by air. It's good that there was no one to fight with. road x from t nkov. —

ovogrudk to olkovysk 75 percent of the tanks stood because of the fuel. The commander said that he can send fuel only by air, who organizes? rg bottom ion

the rear requires knowledgeable

people." it can be added that due to difficulties in supplying fuel, the inability to repair equipment and the lack of communications equipment to control the Soviet tank corps that had trained in the Polish campaign, they lagged behind in terms of the pace of movement

from to in Lorian divisions. all these were those with our "ravs" that in the "paper" games x

Not

were taken into account and about which nothing was said in the written rubbish and in the new report. Ukov, apparently, did not fully realize the shortcomings inherent in the tank and mechanized formations of the army, underestimated the difficulties of logistic support for troops in combat conditions. When I had to fight in the great modern war in a real way, I had to pay for all the shortcomings of peacetime with my dear price - human lives. Yemeh Ilovich doubted in vain that the rear of the Wehrmacht was working etc. Very soon, the savage rmiin had to be convinced of the validity of this assessment in his own skin. It can be assumed that the failure of the "Eastern" in the first game was attributed to the power of the East Prussian fortifications and the Eretski's mistakes in planning the game. the success of the

Soviet side in the second game looked quite regular. This was explained not by the miscalculations of the commanding troops of the "western", "south-western" and "southern" captives and uznets, by the correct choice of the direction of the main strike. oetomun and more close

To the truth, the description of the analysis of games, which is Deteretskov, looks to be true - without performances of catches, instructions, evidence and others, with only one timid attempt by the head of the department of enshtabtutin to intercede for his boss. the meaning of ukov tlin announced

immediately, obviously, having made this decision even before the meeting with Eretskov and other military men. The main role here was played by the behavior of George Onstantinovich during the operational-strategic games and his speech at the meeting. The Germans again played it out, wrote too good a report, and Tlin decided that the speaker was quite suitable for the post of chief of the general headquarters. No one remembered the previous test, signed by Okossovsky, where it was strictly not recommended to involve the staff in the staff work. In fact, Georgiy Onstantinovich would have been best suited for the position to which Eretskov was returned - Deputy People's Commissar of Defense for Combat Training and Military Training. here the uks would bring much more BENEFITS. Georgy Onstantinovich stated in his memoirs that he was not delighted with the new appointment: "I was waiting for everything, but not such a decision, and, not knowing really what to answer, was

perplexedly silent. otom said: - never ner botlv shtbh. was always in service. I can't be an energy manager.

- the olitburo decided to mean in s, - he said, placing emphasis on the word "decided". Understanding that all kinds of

objections are useless, I thanked the trust

and said: - u, if I don't make a good boss, I will ask to go back to the ranks. — take away

agreed. Tomorrow there

will be a post ,—skzl Tin. A quarter of an hour later, I was the un commissar of defense. Smiling, he said:

"Nu, how did you refuse the post of chief of staff. Comrade Tlin just called me. Now go to the district and return to Moscow as soon as possible. Colonel-General Irponos will be appointed commander of the district in your place,

but you don't expect him, for the commander you can provide the chief of staff of

the Urkev district > ". For accuracy, the story with Yeretskov was repeated. five candidates for a

high position asked not to appoint him, and again, he demanded to immediately take over the cases, in case the work did not work, he promised to release him in peace to another post.

The rdox, however, consisted in the fact that, having agreed to Stalin's proposal, Georgy Onstantinovich, without knowing it, probably saved his life. In any case, if Ukov hadn't become the head of General Section 6 in January 1941, the quarry could very soon go downhill.

Then the hero Lhinol would have remained in command of the Kiev district and had every chance to repeat , then his the fate of General Irponos, who died in September 1941 when leaving the Kiev encirclement, or, at best,

find yourself in German captivity. rvd, general of the army in the first months of the war could also be assigned to a higher post - the chief commander of the general direction. some purpose would hardly have prevented the collapse of the main forces of the good front indefinitely. Tlin tried to keep the lev to the last and forbade him to think about leaving. George Onstantinovich could be held responsible for the defeat, and it is possible that in the future, Tlin would be reluctant to appoint him to command the fronts. At the post of head of the General Staff of the 6th Command, he turned out to be more protected from the highest wrath. Tlin understood that it was risky to lay the blame for the defeat of the first months of the war on the leadership of the central defense project - in the public mind, the people's commissar of defense and the chief of staff 6 were too closely associated with my Osif Issrionovich.

On January 31, 1941, having completed the miracle work in Kiev, Lev Osquin arrived the next day and began to fulfill new duties. th priority task of preparing the red army for a future war.

, unfortunately, not in all

George Onst Ntinovich succeeded here.

In February 1941, the formation of 20 new mechanized corps began, although by that time the formation of the first 9 mechanized corps had not yet been completed, the creation of which had begun in the summer of 1940. Ukov, being the head of ensht 6, did not object to this in any way. Meanwhile, it was easy to understand that it was better to have a smaller number of fully equipped corps than a significantly larger number of formations that were not adequately equipped with weapons and equipment. Gigantomy was characteristic of the Soviet military organization and planning.

The new mechanized corps had twice as many tanks as the previous tank corps (1031 against 560). the number of means of communication did not increase, the level of training of personnel turned out to be even lower. drive with such housings and practically

impossible. At the beginning of the great civil war, they turned into a burden. OTHER faulty tanks, stuck on the roads, only hindered the movement of troops, then became easy prey for the enemy. Commander of one of the tank divisions, colonel

once, who later rose to the rank of marshal of the armored forces, on the eve of the war quite rightly claimed that his tank division was weaker than the tank brigade from which he was deployed: "There are very few armor-piercing shells . crew x one or two fighters from recruits. During the formation of the division, experienced tankers were placed in positions of middle command: tank commanders became platoon commanders, driver mechanics became assistant commanders of companies for the technical part. If only two months ago there were regiments of battalion lions ... If a bottle of wine is broken up with three bottles of water, it will no longer be wine ... ". I got a prdox In situation:

how

the more intensively the army was preparing for war, the less combat-ready it became. the number of tanks and aircraft was constantly growing, the provision of their experienced crews miep for. the shortage of fuel also increased, which did not allow proper training of pilots and tank crews. Imoshenko and the Ukovs could not and did not want to reverse this dangerous trend in the development of the Soviet armed forces.

In February 1941, a mobilization plan was also adopted with the ominous name of "roses" (its final revision dragged on until the beginning of the war). It provided for absolutely fantastic terms for bringing to combat readiness and deploying most formations of the military army according to wartime units. to, troops of the first echelon on the ground, which included 114 divisions and fortifications of the first line, also 85 percent of the troops, all airborne troops more than three-quarters and 34 artillery regiments of the reserve command had to complete mobilization in within 2-6 hours from the moment of the announcement of mobilization. This should have been done through the recruitment of affiliated communities and the use of motorized transport from nearby areas. 58 divisions of the second echelon completed their mobilization in 2-3 days. another 60 divisions were to become fully combat-ready on 4-5 days

mobilization, the remaining 71 divisions - on 6-10 days. The aviation was fully mobilized on 3-4 days, and all combat units directly serving their rear units and the first echelon of troops were planned to be put on alert within 2-4 hours after the announcement of mobilization. the absurdity of all these terms was revealed only at the beginning of the war, when conscripts from the newly annexed territories converged on their homes or went over to the side of the Germans, the local transport turned out to be unusable for operation, many aircraft died on the airfield, not having time to rise into the air. It cannot be said that there is no general information about the unfortunate situation with regard to the provision of mobilization. For example, on January 2, 1941, the sht of the Biev Special Military District, when the commander was still listed as the Ukov, reported to the general sht 6:

"Obz p of firearms is extremely insignificant. The district does not provide troops during the period of the first operation ... the district has absolutely no mobz with the materiel of artillery and manual (rifle. — . .) weapons. There are no instructions for accumulation

these szps to ensure the first months of the war. The situation was not better in other border districts. By April 1, 1941, the fuel and fuel stockpiles of the Defense Committee were slightly more than 20 percent of the mobilization norm. The situation with the provision of means of communication was very bad. I felt an acute shortage of tk vtoz pchstei. The situation was even better with assigned personnel. At the beginning of June, the 41st division of the western districts did not have lists of conscripts who, in the event of war, were sent to them for mobilization, which precluded mobilization within the scheduled time frame. "Memories and Reflections" cites a remarkable conversation between ukov and the other, which, apparently, took place in February 1941, even before the mass transfer of German troops: "I remember, once in response and my report to the point that the Germans have stepped up their air, intelligence and ground reconnaissance, .. tlinsk zi: - they are not afraid of us. I'll tell you a secret, our ambassador had a serious conversation personally with the Hitler, and he confidentially informed him: "Please don't worry when you receive information about the concentration of our troops in more. Our troops will undergo extensive retraining for special needs in special needs. the account of "retraining" or sheltering the German troops from the air raids of the English air force (from which version, with reference to the letter allegedly received by Hitler Ukov, told Imonov) - Osif Issrionovich was difficult to deceive. he did not believe these explanations. then he had no doubt that the army was stronger than the army and there were more tanks, aircraft and artillery. Therefore, Lin thought, Hitler should be afraid of him and take defensive measures on his eastern borders against a possible Soviet attack. mtlin, contrary to the widespread misconception, the hitler was not afraid. The yurer and later continued the same game , she has with the general secretary. On May 5, 1941, the German ambassador met in Moscow. von Uhlenburg and Soviet Ambassador to Germany Eknozov. a week before, Ulenburg had seen Hitler and now introduced his Soviet colleague to the Fuhrer's views on the state of relations between Moscow and

erlin. Hitler, in particular, was unhappy that he was trying to spread his influence over the Alks and even signed an agreement with the state directly to the Nung of the German Empire in this country. In his diary entry, "Ulenburg, in his conversation with Hitler, stated ... that rumors about the upcoming military conflict between the Soviet Union and Germany, which, starting from January of this year, have been circulating intensively in Berlin and

v

Germany in general and which the Germans passing through Moscow are talking about, of course, make it difficult for him, Ulenburg, working in Moscow ... his statement, Hitler replied to him that, due to the mentioned actions of the Soviet government, he was forced to carry out measures precautions on the eastern border of Germany. Go, itler, life experience taught him to be very careful, the events of recent years made him even more cautious. after the concentration of wehrmacht in the stock gave rise to rumors of an imminent

German-Soviet war, Hitler pretended that, in the end, he decided to name the true reason for his actions. This is not the retraining of troops for a subsequent operation against England, the fear of Soviet intentions by force or a show of force to achieve their goals. It seems that not only Tlin, but also Imoshenko and Ukov almost completely believed on June 22 in the defensive nature of the German measures near the Soviet borders and continued to prepare an offensive operation. For example, in the report of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Special District Headquarters dated June 5, 1941, German troops were moving near the border. but in the conclusions it was emphasized that the reinforcement of the grouping was taking place "mainly by artillery and visionary units", while at the same time the Germans "forced the preparation of tetras by building defensive structures, installing anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns directly on the line of the state border, strengthening the security state borders by field units, repair and expansion of roads, bridges, for the transport of ammunition, fuel, organization of measures. It was also said that "the anti-war mood in the German army is assuming wider proportions." Such reports, which arrived at Enshtein 6, were more likely to create the conviction that the Wehrmacht was preparing for defense against a possible Soviet invasion, but I was not going to strike in the near future. and who dares to step if the soldiers are about to stick a bayonet into the ground! The propagandist clichés, which had nothing to do with the actual mood of the German soldiers, did a disservice. In March 1941, a new plan was adopted for the strategic deployment of the red army on the front. it took into account the results of the January games. If the previous plan, approved in September 1940, in addition to the main attack of the Soviet troops in the same direction, also allowed, as a last option, the transfer of the main efforts against the eastern Prussian grouping, now the south-west direction of the main strike was finally chosen. The March plan for strategic deployment emphasized: "The deployment of the main forces of the Russian army along with the grouping of the main forces against East Russia in the Russian direction gives rise to serious fears that the struggle on this front can lead to heavy fighting." Lin needed a blitzkrieg. Both new strategic deployment plans, like the previous one, underestimated the German grouping in the rear direction. On the conditions of the operational-strategic games in January 1941, the eastern front of the "western" (future army groups "< Center") counted only 20 infantry divisions, reinforced by several tank and mechanized formations. in the March plan, the most likely scenario was considered to be such a scenario for the deployment of the Wehrmacht in the lower reaches of the river in the lower reaches of the river and the Baltic Sea (on the front of the future army groups "Center" and "Ever") deployed from 30 to 40 infantry, from 3 doeth nkov and from 2

, when north of

up to 4 motorized divisions. In reality, on June 22, the Army Group "Centre" alone had a smaller number of formations: 29 infantry, 9 tank, 6 mechanized and 1 cavalry division and 1 mechanized brigade of D. Imoshenko and Ukov were we are sure that the main forces of the Wehrmacht will concentrate to the south

from rest. here it was supposed to appear up to 110 infantry, up to 14 tank and up to 10 motorized German divisions, reinforced by 30 Romanian and 20 Hungarian infantry divisions and 2 Hungarian motorized brigade. As we have already seen, in terms of infantry the forces of Germany and its allies were exaggerated by 1.5 times, and even more by the air. k, the March plan envisaged that for the purpose of instilling energy, it could concentrate about 10 thousand tanks and up to 10 thousand aircraft, which exceeded the total fleet of tanks and aircraft of the Wehrmacht, respectively, by 2.5 uZrz . On the other hand, the amount of military equipment allocated for the military forces of the Soviet Union was less than the figures that appeared in the calculation of the military headquarters of the army - by almost 5.5 times the size of the aircraft from the March plane of the strategic deployment of sleeping army n p de

it was stated: "Germany, most likely, will deploy its main forces in the southeast of

Go to Hungary, in order to strike Erdichev, and to capture the country. He, with the model of Ukov, Imoshenko and Tlin, did not believe in an imminent attack by Hitler, although he did not admit in the same way: "Documentary data on the operational plans of probable 6 Power supply unit 6 is running low". In the middle of the night, the last of the pre-war plans for the strategic deployment of the Soviet armed forces on the ground was prepared in the headquarters. The document was titled "Displays according to the plan for the strategic deployment of the forces of the Soviet Union in the event of a war with Germany and its allies." It was written by hand by Deputy Tutin Silevsky, some additions were made by Smikoly Yedorovich. At the end of the text, the signatures of Imoshenko and the instructions were marked, but, on the map of March, there are no their signatures on the document.

The "objections" stated: "<... the conditions of the political situation of today Germany, in the event of a fall of up to 137 infantry, 19 tank, 15 motorized, 4 cavalry and 5 airborne divisions , up to , will be able to oppose us - 180 divisions in total ... most likely, the main forces of the German army consisted of 76 infantry, 11 tank, 8 motorized, 2 airborne and 5 airborne (airborne. - from the restemblin line for carrying out shock in the direction - ovel, ovno, iev.

. .), in total up to 100 divisions will be turned south

at the same time, wait for an impact in the north from eastern Russiinilnoi itu, as well as short, concentric impacts from the side of uvlka and rest n-olkovysk,

r newbies. in

the south - and wait until the strikes:) the direction of the merink, the Umyr army, supported by German divisions, 6) the direction of unkch (Ukchevo. - [. .), viv iv) Nok, WWII. Potential allies of Germany can oppose: Finland up to 20 infantry divisions, Hungary - 15 infantry divisions, and up to 25 infantry divisions. This Germany with allies can deploy against up to 240 divisions.

Given that Germany is currently keeping its army mobilized, with its rear deployed, it has the ability to warn of the introduction and inflict a surprise strike. In order to prevent this, I consider it necessary in no case to give two initiatives to the German command, to prevent the enemy from deploying and to forge the German army at the moment when he will be in the stage of deploying and will not yet have time to organize the front and the interaction of the combat arms. The first strategic goal of the actions of the troops of the Red Army was to defeat the main forces of the German army deployed south of the Restemblin line and reach the front of Strolenc ,r. by the 30th day of the operation. roar, ovich, odz, reitzburg, ppeln, lomouc.

the next strategic goal is to defeat the large forces of the center and the northern wing of the German front and take the territory of the former land of eastern Russia by an offensive from the district in the northern or north-western direction. The next step is to defeat the German army east of the river in the direction of the Ilinkovsky, go to the Rev River, explore and capture the area - Tovice, for which:) in the direction of the Rakov, comrade, cutting off Germany from her southern allies; 6) the auxiliary strike wing of the front to carry in the direction of the edletsp, embled with the aim of pinning down in the Rsh grouping and capturing the Rsh, also assisting the good front in defeating the Yublin grouping of the enemy; c) conduct an active defense against Finland, East Russia, Hungary and Umynia and be ready to strike against Umynia in a favorable situation. Kim arr. The early army will start offensive operations from the front izhev, utovisk with forces of 152 divisions against 100 German divisions.

As in all previous strategic deployment plans, the strength of Germany and its allies turned out to be greatly exaggerated. The originality on this occasion lay in the fact that the subordinate commanders awarded the Wehrmacht with four Cavalry divisions instead of the one that the Germans actually had, and

they put at the disposal of Hitler as many as 5 airborne divisions, and even aimed all of them against. In fact, the German army had only one airborne division - the 7th airborne division. the UN stvlshn lknhi against the red army did not act. Only the total number of tank divisions moved was determined more or less accurately. In the 41st year, the Wehrmacht, indeed, was against it, using 19 tank divisions in the east. r vd ,, two of them, 2nd and 5th, up to

autumn

remained in reserve on the territory of Germany. o the number of German infantry divisions, which the leadership of the red army assumed to be located south of the Restemblin line, in reality was equal to the total number of infantry divisions involved in the plan "rbross". rvd, in addition to the infantry, in the east there were 4 more

light infantry and 1 mountain rifle divisions. -Also, the total number of motorized divisions that the Wehrmacht could use in the east was correctly determined by the May plan for a preemptive strike. x, indeed, there were 15. however, the Soviet enshtb mistakenly believed that there were tanks in the German motorized divisions, and therefore significantly exaggerated the number

tanks from the enemy. The forces of the German allies were also significantly increased. I have already spoken about the Hungarian and Romanian troops. about and with the Finnish things were no better. In fact, in 1941, Finland put up against only 12, not 20, divisions.

It is difficult to say whether Ukov guessed that the intelligence data exaggerated the enemy's strength. it is quite possible that he did. After all, the generals, including the fact that they commanded the districts, it was beneficial to exaggerate the number and combat power of the enemy groups opposing them. The stronger the enemy, the more troops and equipment you can hope to get under your command, the more significant the future will be.

I

victories. It is not excluded that with Mimoshchenko and the Ukovs, who previously commanded the Iyevsky district, voluntarily or unwittingly exaggerated the number of enemy troops in the south-west direction. maximum gain would help achieve success

commanders put forward by him, when the next front will deliver a decisive blow.

It should be noted that the Germans brought disinformation to the attention of the Soviet side,

exaggerating the German forces in the wash. to, at the end of February for the 41st ambassador

erm niiv osque. von Uhlenburg, on behalf of Ibbentrop, spread rumors here that the number of German troops in Umynia exceeded 600 thousand people. in fact, in June there were three times less of them. bottom

red army, these data did not have any effect. The main German grouping was still placed by the Soviet Ensht 6 in southern Poland, without washing. I omit that about Onstantinovich did some correction for the love of intelligence officers and their superiors for exaggerations. what they were sure of, because it was that the main forces of the germans

Russian

The command uses the southwest direction. It was here that Hitler could achieve his main economic goals - to seize the krina, which would get him coal, metals and food, and then to the Russian oil.

Ukov played a prominent role in the development of the Kmrtoovsky, Tkymsky pl. n

sought to strike at the most powerful grouping of the Wehrmacht, quickly defeat it, then roll the entire enemy front up to the Lithuanian Sea with this flank strike

And

eliminate the main forces of the Verm xt. If the plan succeeded, putn erlin, rgu, enu,

ud pestid lee - n rizhi - drid would be open.

it is easy to see that the May plan repeated the same ideas that were tested during

the second of the January games. Only now the direction of the main shock was shifted to the north.

The armies of the year's front marched on the pest, n tovice and rkov. obviously

t linr considered that in the event of successful operations of the red army from the very beginning of the war

Hungary will remain neutral and it will not be possible to hurry with the removal of the Udpest. if

The early army defeated the main forces of the Wehrmacht, , then, quite probably, j same wash, where there was already a significant grouping of German troops, not to fight on the side

Germany, turned his weapon against the Germans, which happened in August of the 44th. However, the incorrect definition of the dislocation of the main grouping of the Wehrmacht doomed the Klzhukovsky plan to an inevitable failure, the red army was the worst defeat, but in this regard, the options for action were not considered in the event that the main forces of the Wehrmacht will turn out to be no where the Soviet General Staff officers thought, where they really were, i.e. in the back direction.

In the first half of the year, directives Ensht 6 were sent to all military districts with the requirement to prepare detailed plans for covering the border by the end of the month. Later than others, on June 2, 1941, such a plan was presented by the Baltic district.

purely defensive tasks were set against all districts of the troops. Only for the Iyevsky District it was envisaged: "Under favorable conditions, all defending troops in the army reserve of the district should be ready, at the direction of the main command, to deliver swift strikes to defeat enemy groups, transferring hostilities to its territory and its advantageous frontiers." On March 15, 1941, Udenny and the Ukov received the right to directly enter the government "to resolve issues

rkoment of defense. This introduced additional disorganization into the management of the military department and was an expression of the lack of trust of Tlin to Imoshenko.

And, to make matters worse, the hyper-secret nature of the military plans prevented implementation in practice. On June 22, 1941, a message arrived in Berlin that a plan for a preventive strike was discussed in the Kremlin, but was rejected. Probably, the rumors about the May plan did not reach one of the agents of the German intelligence, but since there was no data on the approval of the plan, he decided that the proposal to carry out such a strike was not supported. line. However, the fact that it was possible to mislead the enemy intelligence could not compensate for the harm from the excessive secrecy of operational plans. the desire to keep everything secretly at all costs did not

allow

Commanders and staff should be trained to carry out specific tasks in a future war.

Possibly, Osif Issrionovich was going to play the "friend Dolph", but he kept it such a secret that the future performers of the gen at the level of the commanders of the armies and fronts could only guess about the existence of plans for the invasion of Western Europe .

The former People's Commissariat of the Naval Forces, dmirl .. uznetsov, notes in the book "Sharp turns":

"Now I can state with responsibility that there were no seriously elaborated plans then (on the eve of the war. - troops, secret to such an extent that they were not really . .) did not have. Were deployment plans put into practice."

secrecy, no doubt, also explained the fact that during the January operational-strategic games, the overwhelming majority of the commanders of the commanders of the commanders of the headquarters of the armies and districts directed the actions of the wrong armies and fronts, which they would have had to command in case of war with Germany.

N logical games Verm xt held in late November - early December 1940. The commanders of the armies and groups of armies of action were on them, where they were supposed to act according to the plan "RB Ross". The German generals who participated in the games left very little doubt that an attack was imminent in the very near future. here and the intensified rumors about the imminent Soviet-German armed conflict, which alarmed the last

ulenburg. The Soviet generals, on the other hand, perceive their games as some kind of abstract action that has more theoretical than practical significance. Well, they had to play for conditional armies and fronts, which they actually did not command. therefore, rumors about the imminent Soviet

After the January Games, there was no sense of strife for Germany among the Soviet military.

The massive pressure on Germany was disguised by references to some "counter-strike" against the German aggressors. In the same way, in 1939, the aggression against Finland was developed as a "countertruder", although no one, even in a bad dream, could have imagined that the Finns would be the first to decide on a misfortune. HERE is what Marshl .. Onev remembered shortly before his death: "... January 1941 ... I was transferred from the Baikal Military District to the commander of the Everovkzsky District ... sometime in connection with a new appointment Imoshchenko received me, he said that they were taking me to the main western direction of the Neverovkzsky military district, the situation could develop in such a way that it would be

in the main shock direction, and finished: scaling the em vs. you will represent a strike grouping of troops in case it is necessary to strike "... the first publicity of this fact ... the end of April - the beginning of

In 1941, the district, under the directive of ensht 6, began to call up assigned personnel for the full staffing of divisions to wartime staff. I was called to Moscow, where the Deputy Chief of the General Staff

Okolovsky handed me a directive on the deployment of the 19th Army. Being the commander of the troops of the Severovkzsky District, the I joined the command 19th Army, and received personal instructions from Imoshenko: under the guise of exercises, to the end of the troops and command of the army, to transfer to the krina in the district of El

church - chalk - erk ssy. The 25th Rifle Corps has already entered the 19th Army under the command of Major General Restokhvlov. The transport of the 19th Army took place in top secret order, no one except me knew where the troops were transferred and for what. They moved out in the indicated area and concentrated in the garrison camp.

I emphasize: three weeks before the war, I was previously mobilized, again

the formed 19th army was advanced in accordance with the directive of the enshtbn

kr inu. There were good troops, kazki, beautiful Russian people, courageous WARRIORS.

Back in Moscow, I received an order from —Imoshenko. kzv r yons

concentration of troops of the 19th army, he emphasized: "the army must be in full combat readiness, and in the event of the Germans attacking in the southwest of the three military operations, niev, carry out a flank attack and drive the Germans into

Ripyat swamps.

TB of the 19th army was located in the erk ss x. Arrived there in early June, on June 18 left the military headquarters of the Biev Military District in order to orientate themselves in the situation and solve a number of issues of material and technical support for the army troops. The army was not part of the Iyevsky special military district and was not intended for operations as part of the annual front. vn tep novice was not a stupid person. He must have drawn attention to some absurdities. First, the commissar says that the troops under the command of

Onev will have to strike, no counterattack, according to the Germans. in the flank of the enemy who invaded the krina from driving him into the Ripyat swamps. Why, then, is an army meant to defend against a German invasion being transferred to the frontier with such precautions and under cover of secrecy? - it would be, the news of the arrival of new reinforcements can only sober up a potential aggressor. The order is to write in the newspaper about the redeployment to the fresh army camp. But it's a completely different matter if the lenses were thinking out of the blue pnoen pdenien itler. When the transfer of troops to the home should be skimmed off until the very last moment. It was precisely because the concentration of verm xt was going on

according to the plan "RB Ross\u003e". in exactly the same way, the divisions of the red army were transferred to the western borders, mind you, he didn't realize that it would be necessary to strike his army not in the Ukrainian Olesye, somewhere in the forest or dexterity. that's why it came to I so

great importance to the reported fact. The fact that the 19th Army was not going to be subordinated either to the Iyevsky district or to the good front is quite understandable. The army was supposed to enter the second strategic echelon, which, probably, was planned to be united into a separate reserve front. The army of this front was to enter into action after the 30th day of the operation and, with a strike from south to north, liquidate the German armies in Poland and East Russia, press them to the Baltic Sea and destroy them. Onev did not deceive the account of the direction of Udrymoshenko, only he did not say that the base for the offensive of the 19th Army would be narrower, significantly behind.

Conclusion of the May Plan Imoshenko and the Ukovs asked Tallinn: "to confirm the presented plan for the strategic deployment of the armed forces and the planned military operations in the event of a war with Germany; timely permit the successive conduct of covert mobilization and covert concentration, in the first place, of all the armies of the reserve command and aviation. All these activities have been carried out since April 1941. It was then that about 400 thousand people were additionally called up, who for some reason had not been called up in previous years. From mid-June, they were joined by 800,000 people called up from the western frontier districts. As a result, the number of 170 divisions deployed here increased from 2.9 million to 4.1 million people. rvd - there was little sense from the recruits. Many of them did not even have time to distribute to military units.

Most of the conscripts served in the army back in the 1920s or early 1930s, when the army was not a firewood, territorial-militia, and the conscripts received rather conditional military training. they had almost no idea about modern warfare. After the German attack, many of the newly called up only sowed panic and, congregating on the roads, hindered the movement of troops. Nevertheless, the formally hidden conscription of such significant numbers of contingents for the red army outnumbers the German group, which concentrated in the east: 4.1 million people against 3.3 million. If we count only the German divisions that were actually part of the Eastern Army by June 22, 1941, then only 2.5 million people could resist the Soviet invasion in the first days. It was from this figure that the chief of staff of the ground forces, General Lder, calculated the losses of the Wehrmacht for the first nine days of the "Rb Ross" operation in his diary. after all, in the rear of the Soviet border districts there were another 7 armies of the second strategic echelon, numbering about 1 million people. The German Army, together with its ally, has deployed in the east no more than 42,000 guns and mortars. a single army could oppose them with 67,000 barrels. the Soviet preponderance of the military aviation was even greater. segov r Ineyrmiik June 22, 1941, there were about 23.1 thousand tanks. of which more than 18.7 thousand (81%)

were considered fully prepared for battle. 12.8 thousand tanks were deployed, of which more than 10.5 thousand (82.5%) were considered combat-ready. there were 1,475 out of 1

864 of the most modern tanks -34i. the German army could oppose this

rm de only about 3,600 tons of tanks (including 230 unarmed commanders) out of a total of about 4,000 tires. how many were fighting at that moment

from moles in the composition of the Soviet , unknown so far. prices in range within x

from 17 to 35 thousand meters of tires. in the western districts x there were at least 10,100 cars, from

of which about 7,200 were considered combat-ready. Yuftveffe to carry out the plan "rbross" attracted 1,830 aircraft, two-thirds of which were assessed as combat-ready.

The same German aviation then had about 3,850 vehicles. low combat level

the training of crews, tank commanders, and aviation commanders on the Soviet side nullified this seemingly impressive advantage. However, this circumstance was not realized by either Tlinny, or by the Great, or by Imoshenko. the last one on January 21, 1941, in the order on the combat and political training of troops for the 1941 academic year, was determined:

"The summer period of 1940 was a turning point in the education and training of the army on a new basis, proven by the experience of combat requirements." It was believed that the shortcomings identified by the Finnish war were basically overcome.

At the beginning of June, the main forces of the Russian army, stationed on the front, began to move to the borders. from the middle of the month, 32 divisions of the reserve of the border districts also moved there. On July 1, they were to take up positions at a distance of 20 to 80 kilometers from the state border. If a German attack were expected, then moving reserves so close to the border lines would be inexplicable stupidity. In this case, they should not be located at a sufficiently significant distance from the future front line, near railway junctions. In this way, not only did possible losses from the impact of enemy artillery and aviation decrease, but it was also possible to throw reserve divisions into the most threatened places, determined by the direction of the enemy's main attacks. from if the army was about to advance, the advance of reserves to the border became quite justified. could not be achieved for the speedy entry into a breakthrough and the development of success. t | July, as the date of their concentration at the borders of the Dells, the , when earliest day of the possible invasion of Germany is Sunday, July 6th. By this time, all divisions, moving on foot at night, would have had time to leave the areas of concentration directly to the line of the state border and start hostilities. However, it cannot be ruled out that Tlin wanted to wait until the seven armies of the second echelon reached the lines of injustice, which should have happened in the period from 3 to 10 July. The armies could take part in the battles later, in order to develop the expected success. For example, 27 German divisions of the second echelon

Destined for the operation "Rbross", appeared at the front only in July and August of the 41st, 2 tank divisions of the reserve - only in October. It is entirely probable that at this time, remembering the failure since June 12, Tlin did not fix the exact date of the start, making it dependent on the actual concentration of troops. In fact, not one of the Soviet pre-war documents known today does not contain the alleged date of the provocations - the date of the invasion of Finland. The last pre-war order of the headquarters of the 6th district of the Leningrad district of November 22, 1939 on crossing the border already set 3 tasks for troops to capture specific points on Finnish territory, but contained a clause that on the day and hour the border crossing would be additionally reported. It is not excluded that such an order was given only orally and was never recorded in the paper. Falling into Germany is an even more delicate matter, and Osif Issrionovich, quite likely, did not want to leave traces for reconnaissance of the enemy and evidence for posterity, planning to personally name Imoshenko and indicate the exact time of the start of the offensive. He was about to strike first. one of the decisive pieces of evidence here is the history of the Polish division.

On June 4, 1941, the Politburo decided to form the 238th Rifle Division of the Red Army by July 1, "staffed with personnel of Polish nationality and persons who know the Polish language, who are in the service in parts of the Red Army ". Back in mid-October 1940, Tallinn instructed the army to find among the surviving Polish prisoners of war those who would express their readiness to fight with Hitler in alliance with the IJE without the sanction of the Polish government in London. November 2, 1940 Vrentiy Vlovich

reported that he had succeeded in selecting a group of "correctly politically minded" officers who saw the future of Poland as closely connected "in one form or another with the Soviet Union." The selected Poles were offered to "provide the opportunity to talk in a secret form with their like-minded people in the camps for prisoners of war for Poles and to select the staff in the future division." which division was supposed to begin to form "in

one of the state farms in the southeast "in -zokhSst not. The Polish division could have reached Tallinn for only one purpose - the war against Germany. There was no point in creating such a division in a year. there were more troubles with it than with the usual division of the red army - special instructions were needed in the Polish language and Polish military uniforms. about combat effectiveness, he would most likely be inferior to most of the Soviet divisions. When the Finnish Red Army Corps was formed before the "Winter War", its soldiers fought very poorly, often took to flight, and from its use the front line had to

open 3 Tsya.

Most importantly, the creation of the Polish division was very difficult to keep secret for a long time. here it would not only be a direct violation of all the secret Soviet-German agreements directed against the revival of the Olsk states. Knowing Hitler about the Polish division, he would immediately understand that Tlin was preparing to occupy Poland. Together with the , 41st, the Germans began to form two reconnaissance and sabotage Ukrainian battalions "Rolnd" and "Htigl". well, Hitler did not attach any importance to these parts, since he was only interested in the "living space" for the German race, but not as nobody political an independent

a state, albeit under the influence of Germany. each of the b t lions was only 350 people. The Germans saw in them only a means for reconnaissance and sabotage operations behind the front line, not an embryo

future Ukrainian Army. The Polish division of the Red Army, according to plan, counted more than 10 thousand people. It was thought of as the core of the future Polish army, subordinate to the pro-Soviet government - the rshve, which would have to be installed by me with red army bayonets. If Hitler had taken it into his head to form a German Liberation Army as part of the army against the attack on the Russian Liberation Army, he would have known about it, would Osif Issrionovich doubt the inevitability of an imminent German invasion of Soviet territory? The Pole division could only be created in front of the most Soviet invasion of Germany. At the beginning of June 1941, Tlin decided that the time for its formation had finally come: a little more than a month was left before the Soviet offensive. Similarly, on October 26, 1939, exactly a month before the provocation near the village of Inil, a decision was made to form the 106th Special Rifle Corps from the Finnish and Krel population. RVD, Finns and Relovs, it turned out to be a minority in its composition. The Russians were the rulers, but there were representatives of other Soviet nationalities, for example, the Uzbeks, who had nothing to do with Finland. On November 23, 1939, the day after the setting of combat missions for the troops of the Meninograd military district, the administration of this corps was created, renamed the 1st Mountain Rifle Corps. At the beginning of the Soviet-Finnish war, it became the 1st Rifle Corps of the Finnish People's Army with nominal subordination to the puppet government of the Finnish Democratic Republic, headed by the secretary Remiintern Uusinen. oh late stepfather, legrigorevich yemtyuzhnikov, one night watched how parts of the Finnish corps in uniforms different from those of the Red Army were passing through Yeningrand.

that was in line with their Russian origin. Similarly, the Polish division was supposed to be formed mainly from Soviet citizens who knew the Polish language, or simply with Polish surnames. At the expense of the combat readiness and reliability of the Polish division being formed, the leaders of the Red Army were not mistaken. It was intended not for fighting, for the movement in the rear liberated from the Germans. If the formation of the division had been delayed, this would not have affected the timing of the start of the offensive. Probably, the beginning of July was in the plan for preparing the attack on Germany at the same stage as the beginning of the 20th of November 1939 was in the plan for preparing the attack on INLAND. At this moment the troops should have

received combat orders and make a covert advance to the border of the dead. In the last few days before June 22, there was also a turn in the propagandist attitudes of army political workers. It began with the speech of Stalin on May 5, 1941, at the traditional reception in the Kremlin in honor of graduates of military academies. Ustov in his memoirs outlines its content: "Having congratulated the graduates on graduation, Stalin dwelled on the transformations that have recently taken place in the army. He said, you left the army 3-4 years ago, now you will return to its ranks and you will not recognize the army. That was a few years ago. We have created a new army for a long time, arming it with modern military equipment. It will come to the army, you will see many new products ... you will arrive in units from the capital, in the milieu the army men and commanders will ask the question: what is happening now? why is the nation defeated? Why does England fail, Germany wins? Is the German army really invincible? wow, the thought of the German army is moving forward. The army was armed with the latest technology, learned new methods of warfare, and gained a lot of experience. At that Germany has the best army both in technology and in organization. The Germans mistakenly believe that their army is ideal, I am invincible. There are no invincible armies. Germany will not be successful under the slogans of wars of conquest, wars of conquest, under the slogans of conquering other countries, subjugating other peoples and states. Stating on the reasons for the military successes of Germany in Europe, Stalin spoke about the attitude of the army in some countries, when the army is not properly cared for, it does not receive moral support. A new sea appears, spreading the army. The military begins to be treated with disdain (as if Ustov was talking about today's Russia! - [. . .). The army must enjoy the exclusive care and love of the party and governments - this is the greatest moral strength of the army. The army must be cherished. Military schools are obligated and can only train command personnel on new technology, making extensive use of the experience of modern warfare. Briefly outlining the tasks of artillerymen, tankers, aviators, horsemen, signalmen, infantry in the war, Stalin emphasized that we need to rebuild our propaganda, agitation, and printing. In order to prepare well for war, one must not only create a modern army, one must prepare politically."

Judging by the synopsis of Stalin's speech preserved in the archive, Ustov sets it out on the whole reliably. However, due to censorship motives, the marshal had to omit some important points regarding the conduct of an offensive war by the Russian army and the definition of Germany as a potential adversary. In the beginning of 1944, the memoirs of the former Romanian envoy appeared in the square of Fencu. It contained the assertion that in his speech to the graduates of the military academies, Stalin, extolling the heroism and fighting spirit of the Russian Army, emphasized that Soviet soldiers should not be limited to solving defensive tasks, they should be ready to demonstrate their ability to advance in collision with those powers that

aspire to world domination (here Germania was meant). preserved abstract compiled by those present at the meeting. Yemenov, such a thesis is present. according to the record of the writer sevobod ishnevsky, tlin declared: "the ring against

We play a decisive role in Germany... 1914-1918 Our participation predetermined the defeat of Germany... Deploys its forces... There are no resources in Europe - they are in Yiwu. These world forces determine the outcome of the struggle. At the same time, the leader directly laid the responsibility for the beginning of the Second World War on Germany. In the banquet that followed the reception, in response to the toast of one general of the tank troops to the peaceful Stalinist foreign policy, Tallinn threw an eloquent remark: "permit me to make an amendment. An important foreign policy has ensured the peace of our country.

I'm a politician - it's a good thing. For the time being, we carried out a line of defense - until we re-equipped the army, did not supply the army with modern means of struggle. now that our army has been reconstructed, saturated with equipment for modern combat, when we have become strong, now it's time to move on to military

politics

offensive actions. We need to rebuild our education, our propaganda, gitation, our press in an offensive spirit. The Russian army is the modern army, the modern army is the army of the forward.

The restructuring of the army propaganda was expressed in the draft directive "Zdchh

political propaganda for the near future". On June 4, 1941, it was discussed in the open military council, on June 20 it was approved to the base, so that after completion it would be sent to the troops.

This directive, in particular, noted:

"Oin directly approached the borders of my homeland. —every day and hour, an attack by the imperialists on the Soviet Union is possible, which we must be ready to prevent with our offensive actions (hidden allusion to the May plan for a preventive strike — . .) ... attempts at military action until I was angry that the defensive strategy against superior motorized units was not successful and ended in defeat. consequently, the same offensive strategy, backed up by powerful technology, must be used against Germany. The main task of the composition of the military army is to study the experience of modern warfare and use it in the training of our fighters. All training of all branches of the military of the Red Army should be saturated with an offensive spirit ...

The German army has not yet encountered an enemy of equal value, equal to it in terms of the number of troops, as well as in terms of their technical equipment and combat skills. I eat those things

clash without mountains.

Similar propagandist installations in the German army were brought to the attention of the soldiers on the evening of June 21, right before the invasion. from, for example, a letter from private 102nd

German infantry division. rank , sent home on July 10, 1941: "... On June 4, our regiment set out on a campaign. We don't know where we're going. Initially, the direction was indicated to olsha, then to eastern russia. about 19 June we

approached the Russian border. - the expectant was asked by the question, what are we looking for here? h whether

to say that they will load into Ossiin and take them to the rk, in order to hit the knees of the Englishman together with the Russians ... On June 21, at about 8 o'clock in the evening, a company was assembled for a political exercise.

shortly about the course of the war with England and the international situation, then spoke about our work near the Russian border. at the end of the lesson, our shkpitn delivered the real speech. nskzl: oh rischi! The Soviet Union is measured on July 18, p. For the sake of our Fuhrer and his wise far-sighted policy, we will not wait for the attack, we will go on the offensive ... ". Konstantin Imonov wrote in his diary: "on the twelfth of June (41st year .- . .) I was summoned to the Diocemittee and offered to write two anti-fascist songs. I felt that the war, which we, in essence, were all waiting for, is very close. after the war

He commented on these words in the following way: "That evening, when the poets were summoned to the diocommittee to write anti-fascist songs, such an extraordinary event took place, as the defector Alfred Skof, who reported h with the attack of the Germans. More ordinary events also took place - the receipt of regular reconnaissance reports from the headquarters of the border districts. According to Imonov, it turns out that the imoshenko line, until the evening of June 21, despite alarming reports from the border, did not dare to give the order to put the troops on combat readiness, nevertheless, they were preoccupied with the urgent creation of anti-fascist writings. Is it more logical to assume that Onstantin Ilovich and his comrades were summoned to the diocommittee in the RMC, which had been developed long before that day, a plan for preparing an attack on Germany, which required appropriate propagandistic support, in including songs?

t lin firmly knew that the rsnya army surpassed the verm ht in terms of the number of personal composition in , that the Soviet troops have more mountains than the enemy ,, and they

in honor they are not inferior to the German ones. The "Remlev highlander", who had never served in the army (except for a short stay in the reserve regiment on the eve of the revolution), believed What

in terms of combat training, the Red Army and their commanders will not yield to the German soldiers and officer m. This was the fatal error. dmirl .. uznetsov wrote in the first edition of his memoirs "to the nun", published in 1966: "... tlin represented the combat readiness of our armed forces or higher than it actually was. Knowing with absolute certainty the number of the newest aircraft deployed on his orders at the border airfields, he believed that at any moment, on the signal of a combat alarm, they could take off into the air and give a reliable rebuff to the enemy. was just

stunned

the news that our planes did not have time to take off, died right on

aerodrome x. subsequent editions did not include these words. Probably, the censors realized that smart readers could come to seditious conclusions: if Osif Issrionovich exaggerated the combat readiness of the Russian army, then he could well have thought of the fall of Germany. what about the uks, maybe he was then of a different opinion than the future supreme commander, about the combat capability and combat readiness of the army? Unfortunately, this is not a shopping mall. It remains only to turn to the speech of Georgy Onstantinovich at a meeting of the highest command staff in December 1941. m he ZYAVIL: "<... is this a sign of the wars in Finland? It is significant that for the first time in modern military history the command of the front on the rail isthmus showed the art of breaking through a zone of powerful fortifications, using powerful modern equipment to break through such a first-class fortified zone, i industry. The offensive actions of the units of the Russian army in the first period were characterized by completely unsatisfactory preparations for the offensive operation, and, as a result, the operations in the first period were disrupted. the conditions for waging war with the White Finns ... were very difficult, especially in terms of the nature of the terrain, off-road,

By

deep snow and severe frost m. these conditions, combined with known slips and unsatisfactory operations in other directions, led to undesirable consequences.

Ukov attributed the failures in the "winter war" only to the first period of hostilities and was inclined to explain them by weather conditions and the nature of the terrain, even to a greater extent than by the poor preparation of the

Soviet troops. decisive offensive on the line

Georgy Onstantinovich regarded Nnerheim almost as a masterpiece of military art, as evidence that the army is ready for modern warfare.

Would it be possible to prepare a plan for attacking Germany if you weren't sure that the army was in no way inferior to the Wehrmacht? In case of failure, you would have to answer with your head. It would be nice to sign on the first day of the war, June 22, a directive on a counter-offensive to three Soviet fronts and to take over by the end of the 24th

Yublin? If Georgy Onstantinovich was firmly convinced that the army was not ready for war, then he should have directly declared this not only to Narkom Imoshenko,

but also

with my t lin. I had to warn them that they were preparing an offensive against

In Germany, in the summer of 1941, it is too dangerous that it is necessary to adhere to a defensive mode of action, to withdraw troops from the border, to occupy lines at some distance from it, so that the units do not suffer losses

from artillery fire from enemy territory. under

v

resignation if his proposals were not accepted. o in May-June 41st George

Onst Ntinovich did nothing of the sort. turnover, when the diplomats of the countries occupied by Germany left Moscow, with which the Soviet government broke off diplomatic relations, according to the evidence. Fenk, saying goodbye to the Yugoslav military minister, Colonel Opovich, cryptically remarked that the state would soon understand her true feelings towards her. here was a hidden hint that after

The beginning of the Soviet-German war Yugoslav émigré government in London

again st no ally of oscva.

In fact, the optimal course of action for a weaker army compared to the red army would be defense, not offensive.

In the 1920s, Shchev Rotsky perspicaciously warned that in the initial period of the war, the Red Army would have to not advance, defend, and even retreat deep into the country in order to gain time to mobilize all forces and means. Only later, "having space and numbers behind us, do we calmly and confidently mark the line where the mobilization provided with our elastic defense will prepare a sufficient fist for our transition to the offensive." However, after the removal of JV Vidovich from all posts and his expulsion from the defense, steels are

considered as a purely secondary type of hostilities. tlin, and they thought about a blitzkrieg, about achieving a quick victory, while it would be much better to start a long war of attrition in an alliance with England and America, without whose military and economic assistance t What kind of war the Soviet Union could not withstand. The early army was more suited to relatively simpler types of combat operations, such as positional defense in

previously prepared positions. It would be better for the Soviet side to use the tanks for direct support of the infantry in small groups, not as part of large mechanized formations. rely more on horse-drawn vehicles, since our roads have tires and tractors often

strev whether and quickly failed. From and the Germans soon after the invasion of Russia were forced to a greater extent than they had calculated, to use horses to transport equipment and goods. German general. üller-illebrand, who wrote the history of the german land army, stated: "in mid-November 1941, it became necessary to economically spend motor transport, for example, by replacing tires with horses, because out of the total number of 0500 thousand wheeled cars tires, which were part of the land forces - east, by the end of the year 106 thousand failed. So it was not right that the evidence was lost and that there was evidence for the preservation of a significant part of the horse-drawn artillery until suitable vehicles and tractors appeared in the required number, roads suitable for them were not built. The problem was finally solved only with the appearance in Russia of the American "Studebakers", which, of course, no one was going to supply to the Soviet government before the war. The rsnya army, in comparison with the verm ht or the armies and england, was the army of a bygone era, the era of the first world war. From the level of saturation with technology, which the Torah of World Wars required, entered into an insoluble contradiction both with the real educational level of the majority of Red Army soldiers and commanders, and with the psychology of the bulk of Soviet citizens. The communist regime, in contrast to the Nazi regime, managed to level the human personality to a much greater extent, to discourage the desire for self-sufficiency and initiative from the subjects, instilling in return adherence to the template. At the beginning of the Soviet-German war, the Bolsheviks had been in power in Russia for 24 years, but the Nazis in Germany for only 8 years, three times less. And the German traditions of the emancipation of the individual from the power of the state were older and stronger than the Russian ones. pit nwehrm ht ilfried trickrickfeldt, who served as a liaison officer and interpreter for the commander of the pro-German Russian Liberation Army, the former Soviet general, andrejandreevich Isove, testifies: "the Nazi regime aspired to that literal, all-embracing power, but it still linizm did not reach diabolical perfection. in the Third Reich, however, some foundations of a structured state and social structure were preserved; private initiatives and private property have not yet been completely stifled; it was still possible to work and live without being dependent on states. The Germans could still express their opinion, if it was not

converged with official dogma, they could, to a certain extent, act like
kk

does he think is the best. Although party pressure increased more and more tangibly ... but this form of lack of freedom in Germany was assessed by the majority of former Soviet citizens by the standards of the Stalinist regime of violence and therefore was perceived nevertheless as freedom. in this there was a great deal of difference between the two."

Below, in a special note for the Supreme Command of the Ground Army under the title "<Russian man" noted:

"The experience of intelligence among Russian prisoners of war showed a very interesting picture. For most of the births, their rates are approximately the same, i.e., 50 percent average, 25 percent below average, and 25 percent above average.

although the average and below the average level turned out to be significantly below the German level, but 25 percent

".

uk, kk and many Soviet generals, including the representative of the Isov

, in their own way

intellectual ability undoubtedly belonged to the "top 25 percent". However, it was mainly the "lower 75 percent" who had to command something, who were significantly inferior to the Germans both in intelligence and in education. To this must be added a strict limitation on the initiative of even the highest leaders in the Stalinist administrative-command system. During the operational-strategic games of the 41st year, the Commanders were much freer in making decisions than in the real practice of the Great World War, where for any fundamental troop movements it was necessary to obtain the approval of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. We also honor George Onstantinovich's obvious shortcomings in both general and military education. All this severely limited the ability to point to the commanders in comparison with the German generals who opposed him. If the principles of modern strategy in the warlike army were applied with due regard, this would certainly reduce the monstrous Soviet human losses and, possibly, hasten the end of the war. For example, tank armies and corps, as a rule, lost a lot of equipment, and they would not have had such losses if they had acted in smaller units and interaction between the branches of the " " subunits. Precisely stamped infantry tanks without proper armed forces, effective reconnaissance and artillery preparation led to colossal human losses, often exceeding the German ones by tens of times. However, both Tlin and Ukov, unlike Rotsky, were committed to the strategy of crushing and hoped to repeat the impressive successes achieved by Hitler in Poland, in the rntiin lk nk. In order to cover the transfer of the last echelon of the Wehrmacht to the Soviet borders, which began after June 10, the German leadership carried out an ingenious combination. On June 13, 1941, an article by the Reich Minister of Propaganda, Osef Ebbels, "Rit - for example", appeared in the semi-official "Jölkische eobhter", with a direct hint that the experience of the pryshute landing in nrite will very soon come in handy to the Wehrmacht at the High Kenyan Islands. night from the 12th to the 13th, the number of the zeta was confiscated and military censorship, but

with

in such a way that in Berlin part of the circulation had time to disperse and reach foreign embassies. On June 14, Ebbels stated with satisfaction in his diary that the English and world newspapers and radio stations were coming to the conclusion that the German deployment against Russia was "pure bluff, with the help of which we calculate the to prepare for the invasion of Great Britain." The reaction to this incident was considered by the Reich Minister of Propaganda and the well-known phenomenon - the broadcast of the order late in the evening of June 13th. Ebbels noted with satisfaction: "Russians, by the way, are still

about

what they don't suspect." the fact that the phenomenon was being prepared for , rsskzl in his memo rx udenny.

On the evening of June 13, he was summoned to the tlin in the Kremlin. m already walked imoshenko, olotov and linin. r ktero that there were no uks. Evidently, Tlin considered his presence in solving political issues unnecessary. Osif Issrionovich allegedly told the audience something like this: "The measures we are taking to prevent a military conflict with Germany are not producing the desired results. oin is inevitably approaching. r gichesk l r vyazk is about to set foot. cannibal itler does not refuse

their plans for the conquest of world domination. turnover, with tenacity mnyak Preparing to implement them. KIM mod? Tlin looked silently at his mouth for several seconds. - concentration of crossing facilities in = nshe, troops and equipment on the coast - ego

no more than a demonstration, counting on the downtime. bargaining for an island is the most stupid step. Big losses are inevitable, what will Hitler get if, say, he conquers England? tm gets stuck, behind the back - a mighty rye army. on the other continent, an ally of England, with their mighty navy, air force and hastily created ground forces of several million people. op zdo

it is more profitable to start with colonies, weakly defended or completely undefended, CAPTURE FRICA, - Tlin circled the continent with his pipe, - strategic islands - of the Mediterranean Sea. to lead troops to the rn, to go to india, to land troops in the air force, in indonesia. Having succumbed to colonies, England will suffocate without bread and raw materials. America's large fleet without sea 6 will become a toy for children, sailors - suitable only for ships. England and in difficult times can turn to the Soviet Union for help. The anti-Hitler colic will become an insurmountable obstacle to fascist Germany in its striving for world domination. it is impossible to make a trip to the colonies, to carry out

linen

expedition is impossible without destroying the red army. Tlin made a pause, moved away from the cards and slowly began to fill his pipe:

— ovrishcholotov recommends that another diplomatic step be taken. I think we will agree with this. We are making a small appearance in the press. Its purpose, firstly, is to make itler understand that his plans are known to him. secondly, to warn the world community that Hitler is going to unleash a war that will cover all the continents

And

continents of the earth's sr and in the fire of which millions of people will die, rivers of blood will be shed. Thirdly, to call Hitler's frankness.

"We can keep silent," said Imoshenko.

- then silence will serve as an eloquent answer, - said Lenin.

t lin under the lzn to olovov:

- wait, please, read it ...

On June 14, the message was published in print. no answer came from him. I remember well how Tlin 03 bochenno said: "War with the Hitler, it seems, we can not avoid."

One gets the impression that Yemenih Ilovich quite accurately conveys the arguments of Tlin , although it slightly adjusts them in view of subsequent events. It is entirely possible that Osif Issrionovich did not believe in the reality of the German invasion of the British Islands in the near future. after all, Luftwaffe's losing the battle to the enemy was a fairly obvious fact. In addition, Tlin could be a sign with a note, Colonel of the Directorate of the 6th Military Command, for a landing in England, Germany does not have sufficient tons of transport ships, nor the necessary forces of aviation. However, the General Secretary was still convinced that, without putting an end in which it was proved that to the British Empire, Hitler would not risk starting a war on two fronts, against the Soviet Union. from the same one quotes Stalin's words, spoken on the eve of the conclusion of the Soviet-German non-influence pact: "Other Germany with us will be preceded by the occupation by the Germans of the whole of Europe." In general, in the presentation of Emen Ilovich Tlin never directly says that Hitler is going to attack Tewebbels, the Soviet leader considered an attempt to divert attention from the true goal of the Germans - the transfer of the center of gravity of military efforts to the area

the Mediterranean, forcing the English command to concentrate its efforts on the defense of the mother country. Hitler, without answering the apparition in any way, gives the impression that he wants to , sought to create y T lin convince the British of the feasibility of his intentions to conquer Russia, then in reality the British islands will be invaded in the near future.

osif issrionovich, in turn, the Fuhrer interpreted the silence as a continuation of a slightly different game: to convince the British that the Wehrmacht would invade in the near future, while in reality the German troops were preparing to forge British possessions on the Mediterranean sea, then take a trip to the rn, rky india. it is excluded that ,

Tallinn took seriously the rumors spread among the German soldiers, who were being transferred to the Soviet borders, that they were going to have a joint campaign with the Russians in India. He could not have expected that after the apparition, Hitler would resume the proposal made to Olotov in Berlin in November 1940 for a joint division of the British Empire and for the assignment of the market to the Soviet sphere of interests. After the Germans did not respond to the phenomenon, which claimed that the rumors of an imminent German-Soviet war were groundless, Linn really did not doubt that the war would start soon. I thought that it would begin with a sudden and powerful blow from the red army. continued preparations for the "rose" - pulled troops to the borders, mummified the located tm airfields and military equipment, turned the headquarters of the border districts into the headquarters of the fronts, transferred close to the western lines Tlin, Imoshenko and Ukov considered the 3rd fuel order of June 13 to be a sign of an imminent German attack, and they should have acted quite , equipment, ammunition owls. If the silence of the itler in response to the phenomenon differently. The next step is to withdraw the divisions and the divisions of the Red Army from the borders as , quickly as possible in order to get them out from under the first blow of the German artillery and the Luftwaffe. o the invasion of the verm xt zst o r army army vr sploh.

1941: oyn , which is not expected

Evening and night from June 21st, June 22nd, 1941, I remember the foreman all my life. From where he described the last peaceful hours in his memoirs: "On the evening of June 21, I received a phone call from the head of the headquarters of the Iyevsky military district, Lieutenant General NT. . Urkev and reported that a defector, a German sergeant major, had come to the border guards, claiming that the German troops were leaving for the initial areas for an offensive that would begin on the morning of June 22.

Immediately he reported to Rkomu Tlin what was in front of Lurkov. - come to the Kremlin in 45 minutes, - skzl lin. Having taken with us the draft directive of the troops, together with the People's Commissar and General Lieutenant Tutin, we went to the Kremlin. On the road, they agreed to achieve by all means a decision to put the troops on combat readiness. t lin met n with one. he was clearly worried. —[= didn't the German generals plant this defector in the conflict? - he asked.

to provoke

"No," replied Imoshenko. - I read that the defector is talking right. Osif Iss Rionovich can be understood. he hoped to complete the concentration in some two or three weeks and unleash a powerful blow on the Germans. now seriously

He feared that the defector had been planted by Wehrmacht generals in order to force the Soviet side to take immediate action and open up the grouping of troops concentrated in the Eich borders. soon the members of the olitburo arrived.

Imoshenko read out a draft directive on bringing the troops of the western border districts to full combat readiness in the event of a war with Germany. —[Which directive is now still premature, — said the general secretary. - maybe

perhaps the question will still be settled peacefully. add a short directive indicating that the attack may begin with provocative actions by the German units. The troops of the frontier districts must not succumb to any provocations, so as not to cause complications.

Tlin still hoped that he would be able to start diplomatic negotiations and, under their cover, complete the concentration of forces for the offensive. Therefore, in the signed

imoshenko and the statutory directive to all border districts on bringing troops to full combat readiness, it was said that on June 22-23 a German attack was possible, which "may begin with provocative actions."

The task

was "not to succumb to any provocative actions that could cause major complications." We were instructed during the night of June 22 to "secretly take the firing points of fortified areas on the state border", to disperse all aviation along field airfields and carefully mask it, and also to concentrate from masking troops ". The conduct of mobilization was not provided for by the directive.

The first deputy people's commissar of defense, astonished by imoshenko, said that war was inevitable and directives should be more specific. imoshenko replied that he did not doubt it, but that directive was set by tlin. Directive No. 1 was completed in front of the headquarters of the districts at half past one in the night, two and a half hours before the German attack. For most troops, directives were not brought to the end of

the war. Only the people's committee of the uznets managed to put all the fleets and flotillas on alert. the land troops and the cavalry were taken by surprise. Many aircraft died on the aerodromes located near my border, before they had time to take to the air.

Later, during the investigation, Gen. that the . vlov confessed to I: "omitted a criminal mistake, aviation was placed on field aerodromes closer to the border, on aerodromes intended for occupation in case of our attack, but not defense at all. When the unfortunate Mitriy Rigorievich did not specify that the deployment of the station in one, including other districts, was determined by the People's Commissar of Defense and the head of the court 6.

Vlov spoke about this and confessed only that he "physically could not" verify the correctness of the reports of his subordinates on the concentration of the troops. o all r obviously not avoided I r shot.

Then, at about 4 o'clock in the morning, Tlin called and reported that the German aviation was bombing the Soviet city of InchlSwar, which had just been awakened by the chief of security

Osif Iss Rionovich demanded that he and Imoshenko immediately come to the Kremlin.

By half-past four the members of the olitburo also arrived. reports were also received about the transition to the offensive of the German ground forces. Ukov remembered this meeting well: "Tlin was very pale and was sitting at the table, holding a pipe in his hand. You reported the situation.

t lin perplexedly said:

—[Is this a provocation of the German generals?

— The Germans are bombing our cities on the krine, in Belorussia and the Baltic. "Who is this a provocation?" Imoshenko replied.

- If it is necessary to organize a provocation, - said Tlin, - then the German generals will bomb their own cities ... with this. -, thinking for a bit, continued: - Itlern certainly does not know about

Tlin prik zl Olotov to call the German embassy. The embassy replied that Ulenburg asked to receive him for an urgent message. Olotov went to meet with the ambassador. In the meantime, Tutin reported that on the back and northwest in the directions

after artillery preparation, the German troops went on the offensive.

Ukov writes in his "Reminiscences and Reflections": "We immediately asked lin dt troops with orders to immediately organize retaliatory actions and inflict counterattacks on the enemy. "Let's wait for the return of the olots," he replied.

Soon Olotov returned and reported that Germany had declared an alliance with the Soviet Union

war. After that, the Ukov proposed to "immediately collapse all the forces available in the border districts into the enemy units that had broken through and delay their further advance. , without holding, destroying," Imoshenko specified. Tlin approved the corresponding directive number 2, but warned that ground troops should not cross the border until further notice. The mission was ordered to "bomb the Enisberg and Emel", but the targets in Umynia and Finland have not yet been forged. However, just a few hours later, on the evening of June 22, directive No. 3 appeared, demanding that you defeat the enemy on its territory. By the end of June 24, the oisk of the last front had to seize the tricks; By the end of June 24, grab Yublin." Member of the implementation of the pre-war plan of narcotics, tovice. Georgy Onstantinovich in his memoirs reports that he learned about this directive already in the field, at the headquarters of a good front, and he was sent by a representative of the army to help the stepping in the direction front command in leading the troops. Articles, the order to form and on June 22 to concentrate the front-line command in - rnpole he otdel still on the 19th

, I don't think at all about the imminent German commotion. ukov writes: "command

The item arrived late in the evening, and I immediately spoke to . . Tutin. From which the story was told to me by Ikol Yedorovich: "At the end of today, despite the energetic measures taken, I could not receive military troops from the headquarters of the fronts, army and accurate

data on our troops x, and about the enemy. information about the depth of penetration of the enemy into our territory is rather contradictory. there are no accurate data on casualties in the air force and ground troops. It is only known that the Vice Front suffered very heavy losses. The enshtb and the people's commissar cannot get in touch with the front commanders uznetsov and vlovy, who, without reporting to the people's commissariat, left for the troops somewhere. For these fronts, they do not know where their commanders are at the moment. visionary intelligence also could not accurately report where what was happening. According to her, the fighting took place in the area of our fortified lines and partly 15-20 kilometers deep in our territory. The experience of the headquarters of the fronts to communicate directly with the troops was not successful, since there was neither wire nor radio communication with most of the armies and individual corps. At the same time, General Tutin said that Tlin approved the draft directive No. Znarkom and ordered me to sign it.

— toetosis directives? I asked.

- the directive provides for the transition of our troops to counter-offensive operations with the task of defeating the enemy in the main directions, moreover, with access to enemy territory.

"We still don't know exactly where and with what forces the enemy delivers his blows," I objected. "Wouldn't it be better to figure out what is happening at the front before the morning, and only then make the right decision."

—[I share my point of view, but the matter is settled.

- ok, - I said, - if the ling requires my signature under the directive -
st vte.

T directives arrived at the commander of the annual front at about 24 o'clock owls. kyai expected, he provoked a sharp objection from the front headquarters. lowered corps for inflicting counterattacks on the main grouping of armies "g", which broke through in the area of \u200b\u200bokiya. Georgy Onstantinovich claims that Tlin ordered him to leave for the wrong front at about one o'clock from the day of June 22. Ukov was supposed to first capture Iverushchev, who was appointed a member of the military council of the front,

then go with him to

rnopol. jeve rushevskzl ukov, That "it's more difficult to fly. German pilots

chasing traffic planes. to go to the tires Xx". to which I had to get to Rnopol by car. about here it turns out an obvious chronological inconsistency. Ukov acknowledges that Viev has arrived at the building of the komp rty krina kikite

Yergeevich only "by the end of the day." I remember that it was my longest day of the year, June 22, when it was still light at 9 o'clock in the evening. about rnopol in cars in the dark, it probably took 5-6 hours to get there. Therefore, in pc b front ukowi

Ruschev arrived late at night, long after midnight. Georgy Konstantinovich could not have had time to talk with Tutin about the directive before this unfortunate directive arrived at the headquarters of the Good Front. Gr Myan in his memurhs

unequivocally confirms that first Directive No. 3 arrived in Rnopol, and only then did the orders with Rushchev arrive there. Moreover, as Vnrstoforovich testifies, the directive was not sent to the headquarters of the front already at eleven o'clock in the evening, Tutin's commanders generally had to speak before ten o'clock. and it turns out strangely: why did Georgiy Onstantinovich so whats up with suddenly doubt the expediency of conducting counterattacks as soon as possible, if in the morning, even before the official declaration of war, he asked Ling to give an order for the immediate organization of such counterattacks? mind yu, ukov once again wanted to look better than it was in my case. He came up with the fact that he learned about the development of Directive No. 3 only from a conversation with Tutin, that he expressed his doubts about its expediency and agreed to put his signature only

then, when he heard that the issue had already been decided by him. However, let's agree, the Chief of Staff, dutifully declaring: "Litlin requires my signature under the directive - put it," looks very doubtful both from a moral point of view and from the point of view of

elementary common sense. Wouldn't it be better to send a facsimile of your signature to Osif Issrionovich so that he stamps it at his own discretion?

ate and surely things were different. on the same day of June 22, before the departure of the uks to Kiev, the question of conducting counterattacks had already been resolved in principle, although the directive had not been prepared in time. Georgy Onstantinovich flew to Irponos to lead the implementation of the counter-strike in the main, south-west direction. probably in case

success and the exit of the Soviet troops into the operational space, he had to be able to lead either a good front, or a suitable strategic direction created soon, coordinating the actions of a good front. It turns out that the Ukov not only did not object to counterattacks, but was one of their initiators. after all, by the time of his departure to Kiev, information had already been received

O

large losses in the border districts, which cast doubt on its ability to gain air supremacy over the battlefield. and there was no stable connection with the commanders of most fronts and armies. In an objective assessment, these circumstances alone made the success of future counterattacks extremely unlikely and forced them to refuse to conduct them. there was still no information about where exactly and with what forces the Germans were carrying out the main blow on the river. In such a situation, the immediate start of a counteroffensive could only aggravate the position of the Russian Army. Instead of covering the most threatened rear direction, where the powerful army group "Center" operated, the main forces of the Russian army, according to the pre-war plan, rushed to the offensive in the southwest bottom direction. With this, we delayed the much-needed transfer of troops to help the lower front, whose situation was becoming even more difficult. The only correct decision, which should have been formalized, if not by Directive No. 2, then by Directive No. 3, was the following. immediate start of withdrawal under the cover of strong barriers to the line of indirect to

meet the armies of the second strategic echelon. It was necessary to evacuate everything that was possible from the concentrated western districts of military stations. when the army didn't suffer huge losses in people,

equipment and equipment in the first weeks of the war; perhaps the Germans would not have taken the city, and the advance of the enemy could have been finally stopped somewhere near Molensk, not on the nearest approaches to Moscow. Otlin, Imoshenko and Ukov wanted to advance, not to defend themselves. right, they believed that during the rapid offensive of the Germans, as a military army, the command was disbanded, the tanks broke away from the infantry, the rear did not keep up with the supply of advanced units. This, the Soviet military leaders hoped, would compensate for the insufficient readiness of the mechanized corps of the border districts to carry out counterattacks. ou verm xt and with the interaction of the military branches, and with the supply, everything was in order. The labors of the Soviet troops only increased the tragedy that befell them. The counterattack of the good front began on June 23, with a significant preponderance of

the Soviet side in people and, especially, military tanks. there were 4201 sekhtanks in the troops of the front. the latest -34 and KV were 761, which exceeded the total number of tanks in the army group "g" - 750. against the 31st division of the army group "g" field 58 divisions. The dominance of the Luftwaffe in the air did not allow the attackers to achieve any significant success. The low level of training of Soviet tank crews was also mentioned. commander of the 8th mechanized corps, which was part of the annual front, lieutenant general nt. . Yabyshev subsequently described the fate of his corps in these first battles in such a way: "the period ... from June 22 to June 26, the corps committed

I

Intense "over-forced" marches without observing the elementary statutory requirements for servicing the materiel and rest of the personnel were brought to the battlefield, having up to 500 km mileage of the combat materiel. as a result of this, the quantitative composition of the combat vehicles was disabled for technical reasons by more than 40-50 percent (this was aggravated by the fact that by the beginning of the war the battles had been reduced by 50 percent). These 40-50 percent of the materiel were left on the routes of movement of divisions. The remaining material unit after such high-speed marches turned out to be technically unprepared for combat. the absence of a regulatory service from the front and the army in the most important operational highways led to the disorderly movement of troops, the creation of "traffic jams", a huge number of accidents and accidents, and also to the useless waste of time on the movement of troops, which led as a result to untimely execution of orders".

part of the counter-work on June 23, which required a special command, did not succeed. Only on the 24th did some of the mechanized and rifle corps of the good front go on the offensive. However, they only succeeded in slowing down the advance of the Germans. but the Soviet troops could not defeat the enemy groupings, introduced into battle in parts. There was also the fact that Ukov and Irponos incorrectly determined the direction of the enemy's main strike. to, June 24 at 17 o'clock, the commander of the 5th army, General. . From Pov reported to Ukov that up to 5 infantry divisions, 2,000 tanks and about 2,000 motorcyclists armed with T mi were operating against his army on the front. front, from the styluge to okla, he counted all | enemy tank division. The command of the army assumed that the main enemy strike was from the Dimir-Olynsky Gonutsk, the auxiliary one was from the Rest Novel with the aim of encircling the 5th Army. Ukov agreed with such an assessment of the situation and the main efforts of the tank formations were directed by the front to the Dimirolynsky-Utsk area, while in reality the groups of armies "g" carried the main blow at the junction of the 5th army from pov and the 6th army .. uzychenko, south of the utsk in the direction of ok lubno. The other direction of the Soviet controversy, from the Ovs to the Vuus, on the contrary, turned out to be south of the main German grouping and also missed the target. Only in the sector of the 5th Army, the Soviet intelligence service managed to count three times more German tanks than there were in the entire "g" group. Also, the distribution of German tanks in directions was determined incorrectly. in reality, I am more powerful

TNKOV I grouping was concentrated to the south, not to the north of the stiluga. As a result, the first strikes of the Soviet tanks fell almost on an empty place and did not justify the heavy losses suffered by the mechanized corps.

It is clear from the memories of the Ukrainians that in those days, in fact, it was not Irponos, Ukov, who commanded the front. in any case, his word was decisive: "Georgy Onstantinovich ... approved the decision taken by the front command and proposed, without losing

time, to issue an order to prepare a counter-force ... after listening to the report of the command rm Uzychenko ... Ukov emphasized how important it is that the 4th mechanized corps (general

I ows— , .) was transferred to the right flank of the army as quickly as possible ... during the conversation, I realized that the command considered the actions of the front command to be insufficiently energetic and purposeful. in his words, a lot of attention is paid to solving secondary tasks and the concentration of corps is going too slowly. it is necessary to determine the main danger and concentrate the main efforts against it. The main task is the enemy's tank and motorized groupings, deeply wedged into the depths of

our defense ... Ukov considered it a mistake that the irponos allowed the commander of the 6th army to pull the 4th mechanized corps from the right flank of the army, where the enemy carries the main blow, on the left flank and bring it into battle in this secondary direction ... control to firmly close the approaches to the oval. In fact, this threat turned out to be an imaginary ... sign that the irponos intends to place the 36th and 37th rifle corps, suitable from the depths, in defense at the line of Ubno-Remenets

och Yuvodogurtsy, ukov resolutely opposed such a use of troops of the second echelon front: ",, you can strike, then with all your forces!"

From these quotations it is clear that the advice and recommendations of the army headquarters and the front could only be perceived as orders. He intervened in the affairs of not only the front, but also the army command, pointing out from Povu and Uzychenko exactly how they should move their troops. Mukkov did not develop the operation directly, but he made significant adjustments to its implementation. The irponos turned out to be not free in his actions, this only worsened the matter. edukov is just as mistaken as ki pcs 6 front , assessing the location and composition of the main groupings of the enemy and his own

Mistakes only exacerbated the mistakes of the front and army leadership.

Georgy Onstantinovich assessed the results of the counter-operations in the south-western direction in the following way: "... the results of precisely these actions of our military forces were thwarted at the very beginning of the enemy's plan for a rapid breakthrough to Kiev. The enemy suffered heavy losses and became convinced of the resilience of the Soviet soldiers, who were ready to fight to the last drop of blood.

The commander, however, avoided answering the question whether the same result would not have been achieved with fewer losses if the troops on the right front had adhered to a defensive mode of action. Albeit countertruders on other fronts

Onstantinovich evaluates it quite critically, admitting the guilt and the command of the command and the main command: No knowledge of the actual state of affairs and the command of the fronts. In its decision, the main command did not proceed from the actual situation and reasonable calculations, from intuition and the desire for activity without taking into account the capabilities of the troops, which in no case should be done at crucial moments in the armed struggle. In the current situation, by the end of June 22, the only correct thing could be only the counterattacks of the mechanized corps against the wedges of the enemy armored groups. undertaken counterforces, with the exception of

good front, for the most part, they were organized very badly, without proper interaction, and therefore did not reach the goal.

striving to present in the best light the deeds on the front to which he was involved, Georgy Onstantinovich is unoriginal. This is typical for the vast majority of military personnel of all times of the Gentiles. and not only military men are sinful

Here. DO NOT every person tends to voluntarily or unwittingly exaggerate the meaning and results of their own activities. If you look at things objectively,

That

You come to the conclusion: on the good front, the consequences of counterattacks were not as strophic as on other fronts, only because in this direction the balance of forces was the most favorable for the army. p disposition

irponos and uks were crushed by the tanks of the nks and the grouping that opposed them

The German army group "g" in terms of the number of divisions and especially the number of tanks was significantly inferior to the neighboring army group "Centre". Therefore, the complete defeat and encirclement of the armies of the first front, as this happened with the second front of the capture, did not happen in the first days of the war. it is difficult to speak of someone special in the art of commanding, in comparison with other commanders, in the organization of counterstrike. Moreover, the result of the tank battles, which ended after the departure of the head of the Enshtb from the front, was disappointing for the Soviet side. On June 30, the annual front irretrievably lost 2648 tanks - almost two-thirds of those that it had.

knch lu war. —by July 9, losses had increased to 3,464 vehicles, and there were almost no tankers left in the Soviet side. By the evening of June 26, the irponos realized the futility of continuing the offensive and turned to Ensht 6 with a request to be allowed to withdraw the mechanized corps from the battlefield and organize the withdrawal of troops to new defensive positions. However, having just returned to Moscow, Ukov forbade doing this. As a result, senseless counter-attacks continued - the good front suffered heavy losses, but the Lvov uprisings could not hold back. Lvov was abandoned on June 30th. On the eve of the retreat of the Soviet troops from there, the inhabitants of the city raised an uprising. — the rebels seized, in particular, the city prison and released from there prisoners who were threatened

I am inevitable death. ordered the destruction of political prisoners in the event that they could not be evacuated. The outcome of the battles in this region was also influenced by the anti-Soviet position of the local population, which organized armed detachments. These detachments and the length of the rear of the troops of a good front. The conscripts from the bottom krina, for the most part, either deserted from the red army, or went over to the side of the Germans. However, this factor still could not have a decisive impact on the outcome of the border battle. The main thing was the significantly lower combat effectiveness of the Soviet troops and the superiority of the German generals in the field of organization and control

phenomena.

When Ukov wrote with a clear command, he had in mind, first of all, Tlin. Although until July 19, 1941, Imoshenko, People's Commissar for Defense, was formally at the head of the military command (from July 10 - the command of the supreme command), created on the second day of the war, no fundamental decisions without the sanction of Tlin, he could not accept. Kzhein the member of ensht 6 -ukov was not free in his decisions. Time was running out to agree with the leader, and the orders were not kept up with the rapidly changing situation. Only on July 19 did he become People's Commissar of Defense, and on August 8 he became Supreme Commander (the Supreme Command was created on the same day), and the structure of military leadership was somewhat simplified. Memurkh Georgy Onstantinovich quite rightly noted that the term "Ozgarmii" was inapplicable to the Soviet enshtbu:

The "backbone" of the Russian army from the first days of its existence was

(6) since no decision on a major military issue was made

without the participation of the Central Committee". about the censorship conditions, the marshal could not clarify that when he was the head of the Enshtb and later, during the Great World War, the "brain of the army" was not only Tlin. former member of tvki .o. Uznetsov testifies that Tlin "had a habit of calling TbNn meetings only to those whom he found necessary. As a matter of fact, complete unanimity was established with my tvke. the style of the manuals... was not military clear. I saw how Tlin was communicating with the fronts from his office by a simple teletype. did not consider it necessary to issue orders,

I follow the order of subordination. He called the direct executor, often without informing even his boss. It is clear that in exceptional cases it was possible to do this, but it is unacceptable to do this as a rule.

The underestimation of the system and organization in the leadership by the Tlins continued until the end of his days.

practically ukov, imoshenko, udenny, poshinikov, - silevsky and other members

The tavki could only act as Stalin's advisers. about this reason

it is unfair to take the blame for the defeat on one order,

imoshenko or others

military personnel. but it is equally wrong to attribute victories to them only, deducing from the bracket t lin.

On June 26, T Ling called the commander in Riopol: "The situation on the bottom front was difficult. the enemy approached the Insk. It's clear what's going on. rsh I evidence is unknown where. rsh I pshnikov was sick. can you immediately

to fly to Moscow?" Georgy

Onstantinovich had a talk with Irponos and Urkov, asking him to gather all his strength for decisive counter-work, and he and Imoshenko should think about what could be done to save the and left the aerodrome. remle t lin prik zl situation in the opposite direction. - The Rkom and the Chief of the Enshtb proposed to take five armies of the second echelon the line of defense from the front of the fault to Olotsk, Itebsk, Rshi, Ogilev and Ozyrya, but at the same time begin to equip the rear line along the Molensk-Osl-VI'omel line, where to advance two more armies of the second strategic echelon. In the morning of the next day, the orders on the "odo" pirt were given to the order of the chief officer of the 6th front, general I-m yoru. . Limovsky to withdraw troops to Olotsk, Insk and Obruisk. At the same time, Georgy Onstantinovich suggested "bearing in mind that the first mechanized echelon of the enemy is very far away from his infantry, this is now the enemy's weakness, heaps from my infantry moving without tanks. If possible, organize first a powerful strike against the rear of the first enemy mechanized echelon, the moving Ninsky Obruisk, after which you can successfully turn against the infantry. what a bold action would have brought glory to the troops of the mnth district. especially great success will come if you manage to organize a night attack on the military unit ... take the female to the Ininsky forests (the distance is 100 km) where the corps operate completely

Not

handy. - attacks on . .) and, relying on yasn insk, ninets, to explore my bold and wide the rear of the units and with the enemy's midfield ›». It is striking that, while tying up the retreat, the command at the same time offers the lower front a counterattack to defeat the enemy's mechanized formations, in case of success, attack the infantry. this order is given in conditions when the command of the front still has to "search V for all the units, contact the commanders

and explain the situation to them. for the Ukov formulated his order, as they say, "for history", in order to demonstrate to posterity: poison in such practical advice, it would be possible to change the situation radically, but vlov and limovsky failed my recommendations tion to execute. and on the sixth day of the war, the commander of the general staff did not yet fully realize the difficult situation of the flood front. believed that tanks and cavalry could still counterattack, if not stop, then slow down the advance of the enemy. Commands on the lower front did not result in „ with which formidable enemy did the army collide, in which either counterattacks on the tank and mechanized formations of the "< Center" army group that had burst forward, or an organized retreat. The main forces of the front were captured in two cauldrons of Khvr Jone Elostok and Insk. Tlin, with the subordination of the newly appointed member of the Military Council of the Grand Front, Yvkhrovich Ekhlis, decided to elect General Army Vlov and other leaders of the Grand Front as scapegoats for the unfortunate start of the war. Imoshenko, Udenny and Ukov did not protest, fearing to turn Stalin's wrath on themselves. Georgy Onst ntinovich also left a resolution in a special message from the special department

People's Commissariat of Defense with a proposal to restock the Commander of the 4th Army of the Front

generator I-m yor. like a . orobkov: "< ov. Lenkov - orobkov need to be rebuilt and judged coward and a representative." On July 4, Vlov was restovn;

. rigoriev and

Orobkov was sentenced to death and death. only a severe punishment befell them for the fact that "they showed cowardice, inaction of the authorities, lack of order, allowed the disruption of command and control of troops, the surrender of weapons to the enemy without a fight and the arbitrary abandonment of combat positions by units of the red army ". During the investigation, the unfortunates were also forced to

confess to treason and participation in the anti-Soviet military conspiracy, but in court they refused these confessions, and it is not possible to include the corresponding clause in the verdict.

doubt that the text of the verdict was tentatively in agreement with the original. probably

osif issrionovich decided not to create a new "Del Ukhchevsky" so as not to generate additional distrust in the troops in wartime. All that was left was to show the generals that official nerdiness could await them to recapture everything

thoughts

take advantage of military defeats for a coup d'état.

Strictly speaking, there is no evidence of the cowardice of the defendants in the face of the enemy

investigation, nor was it presented in court. The same applies to other accusations, then in the 41st, and later, they could with good reason be presented

to a good half of the Soviet commanders. o after Vlov and his comrades, until the end of the war, Tlinn no longer shot the commanders of the fronts and armies, although a number of other generals in 1941-1942, for the sake of sharpness, znil - the head of the headquarters of the northern front

Lenov ,, commander of the year front. . Tukhin, head of the director of military communications. . Rubetsky and a number of others. It is quite possible that Vlov was chosen as the victim, among other things, because, in the past, he was an infantry commander, he had nothing to do with the army group in the military leadership, to which Oroshilov belonged, udenny, imoshenkoi uk.

After the collapse of the bottom front, the armies of the second strategic echelon , in the region of Molensk, they started a counter battle with the tank groups of Uderin and from. Ukov recalled: "On July 16, 1941, Molensk was occupied by the enemy

mi troops. The 16th and 20th armies were surrounded in the northern part of the city. day they
Not

laid down their arms and resisted for almost another ten days, thus delaying the German offensive in the direction of Moscow. The decision of

Molensk was hard received by the judiciary committee of

the harrow, and especially by the harrows. was beside himself. We, the leading military workers, would then experience the full weight of Stalin's wrath. I had to strain my will in order to keep silent and not be indignant at his unjust reproaches. The situation required us to disregard our "I" and restrain ourselves in order to help the lower front overcome a difficult situation. Tlin did not allow the ovinformburo to notify the country about the surrender of Molensk until his special order and demanded that the city be returned at any cost.

This requirement of the supreme in the current situation could not be fulfilled, because the troops fighting near Molensk were surrounded and fought in nervous conditions. It was

possible to return the Molensk Mtkina. The surrender of the city was announced only when our troops were able to get out of the encirclement and unite with the main forces of the front>". Georgy-onstantinovich did not specify that only a minority of the encircled came out of the encirclement and that, according to German data, about 350 thousand people were taken prisoner. the advance of the troops of the lower front, who tried, regardless of the victims, to return Molensk, ended in failure. This further undermined Tlin's confidence in the front commander, Marshal Imoshenko. Ukov recalls how, at the end of July, Tlin called them with Semyon Onstantinovich to his dacha, where almost all members of the Politburo had already gathered: "Tlin, in an old jacket, stood in the middle of the room and held handset

in the hands of x - a sure sign of a bad mood.

- why, - skzltlin, - the politburo discussed imoshenko's activities as commander of the front and believes that he did not cope with the task assigned to him in the molensk region. We decided to release him from his duties. There is a proposal for this position to appoint the Ukov. then do you think? - asked Tlin, turning to me and Iknarky ...

- owrishtlin, - frankly, - partly the change of commanders of the fronts is seriously reflected in the course of operations. The commanders, not having time to get in the know, are forced to fight the hardest battles. Rshl Imoshenko has been in command of the front for less than four weeks. I saw what they are capable of. During the battle of Molensk, he learned well everything detained the enemy in the area that could be done in his place, and for almost a month he

molensk I think that no one else has done foreheads. oysk believes imoshenko, this is the main thing. I think that now it is unfair and inexpedient to release him from command of the front. Linin, who listened attentively, said to L: "Well, perhaps Ukov is right. Tlin slowly smoked his pipe, looked at the other members of the Politburo, and sk 3l:

- perhaps, according to the laws of science?

"You are right, comrade Tlin," a voice boomed, "Imoshenko can still rectify the situation.

Since released, the order to imoshenko immediately leave the front. When we returned back to eneral piece 6, imoshenko said:

- yzryaotgov rivl t lin. terribly tired of his twitching.

"Whatever, Yemen Onstantinovich, let's end the war, then we'll have a rest, now we'll go to the front as soon as possible ...

that case was not the only one. Tlin was not always objective in assessing the activities of military personnel. is meto is tested I. Tlin did not choose expressions - he could easily and undeservedly offend a person, even someone who tried with all his might to do everything he was capable of. Georgy Onst ntinovich is here again in his element: the good ukov corrects the evil tlin

, and he, on mature reflection, agrees with him. Rist does not bother him, etc. that imoshenko here finds himself in an essentially humiliating position and is forced to endure condescending protection from his subordinate. The conversation, as it seems, is determined by the meetings with the members of the Politburo and the discussion of the luncheon and place. it is also true that Georgy the finalization of new appointments at the end of July, it seems that it really took Onstantinovich setovyy said that the choice of expressions was unfair in the assessments of many generals, these accusations are just as solid in relation to the mum rshlu. Ukov, as he states in his memoirs, came to the conclusion that drastic solutions were needed to stabilize the situation. On July 29, when an operation of German troops was deployed in the southwest to encircle the 6th and 12th armies in the area of mni (tm, more than 100 thousand people were captured), in the area of \u200b\u200bMolensk army groups " Center finished cleaning the "cauldron" (fights ended on August 5), Georgy Onstantinovich asked for an appointment

to t line. "On July 29, I called Tallinn," writes Mrshl in "Reminiscences and Reflections," and asked him to accept an urgent report.

- come, - skzol supreme.

taking with you to the mouth of the strategic situation, to the mouth with a grouping of German troops, information about the state of our troops and the material and technical reserves of the fronts and. Oskrebyshev, and asked his report on me. - go. Rik it is good to wait for Lenkov where he went. center, I went to the reception room to and Exlis. ten minutes later everyone was in

collection, and I was invited by silica t lin.

- [y, report yte, what y s, - said tlin ...

- In the Moscow strategic direction, the Germans will not be able to conduct a major offensive operation in the near future, since they have suffered too large losses.

Now they don't have large reserves here to replenish their troops and secure the right and left flanks of Army Group Centre. In the direction of Leningrad, without additional forces, the Germans will not be able to start operations to capture Leningrad and link up with the Finnish troops. In fact, as we believe, the main events can take place somewhere in the Nepropetrovsk-Remenchug area, where the main forces of the armored forces of the enemy army group "g" entered. The weakest and most dangerous area of defense for our troops is the central front. Our 13th and 21st armies, covering the directions to the nechuomel, are very small and technically weak. The Germans can take advantage of this weak point and hit the flanks of the rear of the troops of the great front holding the Joniev region.

- do you offer? - Mr. guarded tlin.

-[First of all, to strengthen the central front, in front of it at least three armies, reinforced by artillery. get one army at the expense of the western direction, another - at the expense of the annual front, the third - from the reserve. leave an experienced and energetic commander at the head of the front. Specifically, I suggest gu tutin.

"What, then," asked Tlin, "are you proposing to weaken the control of the oskva?"

- no, I don't offer. But the enemy, in our opinion, will not move forward here yet, in 12-15 days we can transfer at least eight fully combat-ready divisions from the East East, including one tank division. to the group of troops is not weakened, it will strengthen the Moscow direction.

- flax east otd dim Japanese m? exclaimed exlis. did not answer and continued:

- the front of the year already now must be completely withdrawn from the enemy. - joint

central and good fronts to concentrate reserves of at least five reinforced DIVISIONS. — where yev? - looking at me point-blank, asked t lin. understand L WHAT THE TWO WORDS "sdt iev" mean for all Soviet people and, of course, for Tlin. Oyan could not succumb to feelings, the chief of the general staff was obliged to offer the only possible and correct, in the opinion of the General Staff in my opinion, a strategic decision in the current situation.

"Yev will have to leave," I said firmly. there was a heavy silence ... the report continued, trying to be calmer:

- in the bottom direction, it is necessary to immediately organize a counter-strike in order to eliminate the Yelny ledge. The Nazis can later use the Lninsky bridgehead for the offensive - Osqua.

—kiet m still counterstrike, what nonsense? - Tlin was indignant. - he tried to show L that our troops are not able to advance ...
- he suddenly threw in a high tone: - could you think of the enemy?

could not resist and answered:

- if you think that the chief of the general staff is only capable of talking nonsense, then he has nothing to do here. I ask you to release me from my duties as chief of the general headquarters and the post front. I, apparently, will bring more benefit

alone.

Five n stepped painfully Yap bonds.

“Don't get excited,” said Tlin. - however ... we managed without Enin, we can do without it more ...

- [a military man and is ready to carry out any decision of the attack, but I have a firm point of view on the situation and methods of waging war, I am convinced of its correctness and reported

tk, kdum yusmiener lny piece 6. tlin did not interrupt me, but listened already without anger from methyl in a calmer tone:

- Dieter Boite, we will consult here and then we will call you. arr vkrtly, I went out to the binet with a heavy sense of my own impotence. Rimerno half an hour later, Silik was invited from me to the Supreme.

“From what,” said Lin, “we consulted and decided to relieve the chief of the general staff from duties. this is the place for the supporters.

r vd ,, his health is not all right, but nothing, we will help him. in with we use

n practical work. with extensive experience in commanding troops in a combat situation. you will bring undoubted benefits to the current army. Of course, you remain Deputy People's Commissar for Defense and a member of the TVK.

- Will you order me to leave?

- where would you like to go?

— can do any job. he can command a division, corps, army, front.

- [Don't get excited, don't get excited. We here reported on the organization of counter-labor under linen. and get on with it. - so, after a little hesitation, tlin added: -

the actions of the reserve armies on the Rzhev-Vyazma line of defense are to be combined. s

is significant in the commanding reserve front. when can you go out?

- erezch s.

— the guards will arrive soon 6. give him something to do and leave.

- would you like to leave?

== take a break and drink sn mich yu, - already smiling, KZL T LIN. - We'll talk about something else. They ate at the table and began to drink tea, but the conversation did not work out. the next day

an order to commence took place."

almost Shakespearean I dm, pr wd, with a little Fx rsovyh drinking in the finale! the humble reader will marvel at Zhukov's foresight. —before, back at the end of July, he predicted exactly what would happen near Kiev, Leningrad, and Moscow, exactly where the German troops would act. - vel everything came true, to the letter! In front of us is a smart Ukov, unsuccessfully convincing Tlin, who does not understand military affairs, of the validity of his conclusions. —remarkable, much-cited

Stalin's words: "We did without Enin, we will do without you all the more!" WHAT a wonderful gift for the sixties-antist linists! From, they say, they say that Tlin is the true heir of Yenin - look at the disdain with which he speaks of the creator of the October revolution. Ukov, unable to bear the insult, resigns. Tlin accepts his resignation, but deep down he feels that he was wrong,

willows

At the end, he speaks to Georgy Onstantinovich already politely and kindly. if lin removed the bows of the commander of the commander 6, the bow was embarrassed when he decided that the rzerkhovny did not listen to his recommendations, it is better to directly command the troops and beat the Germans. Only a few, I'm afraid, will pay attention to one absurdity in the report of the scientists, if the chief

of the Germans was expected to beat him along the central front and then in the flank of the good, then why suddenly Was it necessary to urgently organize counter-work in the opposite direction in order to liquidate the Yelninsk bridgehead? Wouldn't it be better to use the forces and means required for such a counterforce to repel the threat to Kiev? one more oddity. For some reason, Ukov prefers to state his own proposals in his own words, without citing any documents. Meanwhile, it is difficult to imagine that Georgy Onstantinovich did not formalize such important discussions about the further course of the war in the form of a written memorandum, confining

himself to an oral report to the

Supreme Commander. and cool, and references for reporting to him should have been

6. After Kk Tutin, on the 9th day of the war, he was appointed chief of staff of the Northern Front, friend Silevsky. The three to whom Leorgy Onstantinovich allegedly reported: Tlin, Lenkov Ishim is closer to the ukovo by a man and Yekhlis did not leave

any memurs. Lenkov, right, when Zhukovsky's memoirs appeared, was still alive, but he had no opportunity to confirm or refute Marshal's statements. Georgy ksimili novich was, not without the help of the instructions, in custody and was firmly excommunicated from the mass media. here is Silevsky's meme. The shift of the orders from the post of the chief of the general headquarters looks a little different than in "reminiscences and reflections": deep defense. tvk images I in the deep Reserved front. On the night of July 30, he was appointed commander of the stl. Tlin preferred to use the command experience of the uks directly in the troops. At the head of the whole headquarters was the one who in those months could, perhaps better than anyone else, ensure its uninterrupted and organized functioning. no conflict between Tlin and Ukov and Iz-3 and his resignation. turnover, t lin decided that the best for the guides was the ensht bom. Well, in some ways he was dissatisfied with the activities - Georgiy Onstantinovich in this post. Perhaps the ling did not like that, under the command of the enshtb, he could not establish operational communications with the troops for a long time and the reports that came from there were often late? appointed the commander of the reserve front and instructed to organize the offensive because he was afraid of the security of the army

, no one zhukovsky

and the knowledge of the winner of the Japanese was Ilin-Oli, an energetic commander who knew how to attack. The situation on the good front had nothing to do with it at all. This is what the then deputy Silevsky in the General Staff recalls

Temenko: "As a member of the reshuffle to the firewood Lidin was appointed to the place of the Limovskys - the head of the staff of the 6th front. part of the energy

pcs b ukov nzn Chile commanding front. ensht b returned the commander of the soldiers ... These changes and movements of the commanders in the first days of the war were

absolutely inexplicable." apparently, and ergei tveevich knew nothing about the reasons x

displacement of
the bows. mind you, no more plausible will be the version of me. written in "Memories and

reflections, "the episode when, at the end of July, Imoshenko and Ukov were presented before Tlin and members of the Politburo, did take place, and on the 29th. that time

Imoshenko led the first front for less than four weeks (since July 2). Possibly, he originally wanted to replace Imoshenko as commander of the first front, leaving only the leadership of one strategic direction to Yemem Onstantinovich. about that, perhaps, taking into account the proposal of George

Konstantinovich about the counterstrike against the Yelninsk bridgehead, decided to appoint commanders of the new reserve front, aimed at LNJ. changed the pshnikov

uk in ensht be.

There may be deeper reasons for the resignation of the commanders from the post chief of staff 6.

Georgy Onstantinovich was a strong-willed and resolute man, firmly standing up for his opinion. which general was quite fit to be a dictator. due to heavy defeats on the front of the threats of a military coup increased. the first weeks of the war, after all, Ensht 6, without fronts and strategic directions, had a more reliable connection with the command of armies and divisions. So, even purely technically at that moment, the head of the general staff had more opportunities to organize a coup than any of the commanders of the fronts or directions. What's more,

the chief of Enshtein 6 was, in fact, the only deputy people's commissar of defense who remained in Moscow.
imoshenko commanded the same direction and front, there were also pshnikovs and were listed as missing

evidence the udenny headed the right direction, the irrigator - the north one. to that in July 41st in the capital, except for Tlin, only the Ukov could give an order to the commander of any military unit. from Osif Issrionovich and decided, just in case of a fire, to replace the not entirely clear Georgy Onstantinovich with Oris Ikh Ilovich, proven in the Ukhchevsky case and not having a strong will. Edrom Ukhchevsky once ironically christened the partisans "to the bandet he is a port." Was there a report by Duke Tlin about the danger threatening Kiev and the main forces of the New Front? Yes, but not on July 29, three weeks later. On the other hand, with reference to the archive of the defense ministries, Georgy Onstantinovich quotes in his memoirs: "The enemy, having convinced himself of the concentration of large forces of our troops on the path to Moscow, having on his flank the central front and the Velikie Luki grouping of our troops, temporarily abandoned He took a hit at Moscow and, having switched to active defense against the front and reserve fronts, he threw all his shock mobile and tank units

against the central, south and south fronts. A possible idea of the enemy: to destroy the central front and, having reached the area of ernigov - onotop - riluk, with a strike from the rear, defeat the armies of the good front. After that - the main shock oskva, bypassing the Ryansk forests and shock n onb ss. In order to frustrate this dangerous intention of the Hitlerite command, it would be expedient to create as quickly as possible a large grouping of our troops in the region of Lukhov-Wernigov-Onotop, so that its forces could strike the enemy's flank by force. . the composition of the strike force must include 10-11 rifle divisions, 3-4 divisions in Lerian divisions, at least a as soon as he begins to enforce his thousand tanks and 400-500 aircraft. you can

allocate from the flax east of the districts. , forces of the Moscow defense zone and internal

Silevsky, however, quotes from the report in his memoirs, but in some passages he sounds differently. lexandr ih iloviich commends the german

command and more specifically speaks of the need to create a counterstrike grouping: "I believe that the enemy knows very well our entire defense system, our entire operational-strategic grouping of our forces, and knows our immediate capabilities .. In order to counteract the enemy and prevent the defeat of the central front and the enemy's exit to the rear of the good front, I consider it my duty to report my views on the need to assemble a strong grouping in the area of the Lukhov-Wernigov-Onotop as soon as possible. the cover of the concentration now with the same throw into the river esn ...>. It is curious, the marshal refer to the same archival file. Therefore, I do not know which of them distorts the text. Possibly, Silevsky cited those phrases from the document that Ukov omitted, although in the text of Georgiy Onstantinovich there are no lines denoting banknotes. However, in any case, it is easy to make sure that Ukovyev did not move the plea. On the whole, George Onstantinovich determined the measurements of the German command correctly, but in the second half of August 1941 it was not too difficult. By that time, the "cauldrons" in the areas of Molensk and Mne were liquidated, and the offensive of the Wehrmacht was clearly indicated in the south of the Krina, Tkiv in the direction of Nechi, Omelya against the central front. Should two sides of the pincers begin to appear, which could close to the east of the obstacle and cut off the main forces of the good front. That danger was seen not only by Ukov, but also by Tlin and Poshnikov. In order to counter the tank group advancing against the central front, Ouderin urgently created an Ryansk front under the command of . . remenko. There was hope that he would be able, if not to break the hold, then at least prevent the Germans from reaching the rear of the good front. Ukov then was by no means convinced of the strophic nature of the situation. The UK's report documented the "turn south" accomplished by the German command in early August, around which controversy rages to this day. On August 4, Hitler convened a meeting of the command of the army group "< Center" in the Belarusian city of Oris.

The person who took part in the meeting recalled:

"Each participant in the meeting was given the opportunity to take turns expressing their point of view in such a way that no one knew what the previous participant in the meeting was talking about. All the generals of Army Group Center were unanimous in favor of continuing the offensive against Moscow, which was of decisive importance. he declared that his tank groups could begin the offensive no earlier than 20 August. I announced that I would be ready by August 15th. Thus, in the presence of all the participants in the conference, the Hitler spoke. nc showed that its first target is the industrial district of Joneningrad. The question of whether to advance on the dark side of the city or the window has not yet been finally decided.

The Hitler was inclined to start the march on the East, because at the present time the army group "Center" also achieved some success. In addition, he believed that the raw materials and food resources of the USSR were not necessary for the further waging of the war and that, finally, the USSR system would be able to wrest the East out of the hands of the Russians, which, according to Hitler, was a wine-bearer Soviet Union, from where the oilfields are flown ^{is}

"wash." In the middle of winter, he did not hope to take over Moscow Irkovo. the final decision on this most important question for us about the further course of the war was not taken on that day.

In any case, hold back and begin to prepare your group for the offensive - Osqua. On August 11, his plan of attack, which provided for the delivery of the main blow from the East to the West, was rejected by the command of the ground forces. When Uderin proposed "withdrawing troops from the already unnecessary Nymelny arc, where we all the time suffered heavy losses. but the command of the army group (the supreme command of the land forces. — . .) also rejected this proposal, which proceeded from the need to save human lives under the absurd pretext that "the front is even more difficult for the enemy in this sector than for us." On August 21, Hitler rejected the proposal he stepped forward = osc and for a directive on the preparation of strikes against Enningrd and Krina. Tanks from the army group "Center" were sent out. Uderi three days later unsuccessfully tried to convince the Fuhrer to advance on Moscow. Hitler insisted on the priority development of raw materials and food resources of the country. Uderin and many other German generals until the end of their days were convinced that due to the turn to the South, a very real chance was missed - to capture Moscow before the winter of 1941, inflict a decisive defeat on sleepy armies and victoriously end the war. I think that there is a deep misunderstanding here. Of course, if the Army Group "Center" had moved to Moscow already on the 20th of August, it would have been able to surround and destroy the main forces of the fronts of the Western direction in the area Ryansk But then, choosing between Kiev and Moscow, Tallinn would certainly prefer to sacrifice the capital of the country in order to save the capital and the heart of Russia. I would have transferred troops from the right front to Moscow, it could have been done much faster than bringing divisions from the Leningrad East. As a result, the Germans would still not have been able to capture the capital, the troops of the good front would have retained their combat capability to a greater extent than after the Kyiv catastrophe. in my case, ^{What} in the variant of winning the war with the Soviet Union, the fabric of the second world war as a whole for Germany in the 41st year did not exist in principle. Strictly speaking, Hitler has actually already lost, if not | September 1939, then two days

Later, when England and France declared war on Germany. It was this event that predetermined the composition of the warring forces, and the course and outcome of hostilities. support for England, but or later they MUST have come out if Hitler hadn't

npIn ling in June of the 41st, then t lin would be all the same in July of the same year. Therefore, the decision to forge the Soviet alliance is possible in itself even before the end of the war with

England cannot be considered a mistake. In any case, the yurer would have received the eastern front in 1941. but for England and America, the lesser evil was the victories of the weaker God in military and economic terms, t lin , potentially representing a less serious threat to them than the Hitler. Anglo-American aid became one of the decisive factors in the Soviet victory. The other Allies not only diverted up to 70 percent of the German air force, almost the entire navy, to themselves in the last year of the war, when

Soviet human resources were already severely depleted - up to 40 percent of the ground forces of the Verm xt. Just as important were Lend-Lease deliveries. after the war, in 1963, already in siege, they highly appreciated lismukov in a friendly conversation that became the property of

"From now on, they say that the Allies never helped us ... but it's impossible to deny that the Americans sent us so many materials, without which we could not form our reserves and could not continue war...

received 350 thousand tons of tires, for which cars !! .. there were no explosives, gunpowder. there was nothing to equip rifle cartridges. The Americans really helped out with gunpowder and explosives. how much they are on the sheet steel. link we could quickly set up the production of tanks, if not for

merik nsk i help st lew. now they present the matter because we had all this in abundance." The marshal said the same thing in a conversation with lmonov: "We ... at the beginning of the war, the fabrics did not have the quantities of high-octane gasoline we needed for our modern aircraft, such as

And. In other words, we must not forget that we entered the war while still continuing to be industrially backward compared to germanium.

Speaking of our preparedness for war from the point of view of the economy, one , cannot hush up such a factor as the subsequent assistance from the Allies. First of all, of course, on the part of the Americans ... we would be in a difficult position without the American gunpowder, we would not be able to produce the amount of ammunition that we needed. Without the American "Studebakers" there would be nothing to drag us to the shurtillery. to a large extent, they generally provided our front-line transport. The release of special steels, necessary for the various needs of the war, was also associated with a number of American deliveries.

With the help of the American and British aid, the Soviet Union was unable to provide itself with aviation gasoline, aluminum, alloying additives necessary for the production of armor steel, sophisticated industrial equipment, communications equipment and many other things that were urgently needed during the war. Without Lend-Lease it was impossible to release the required number of tanks and more from aircraft, it was impossible to wage a protracted war. In which war the defeat of Hitler was predetermined. Purely hypothetically, one can imagine that there were some chances for the victory of Germany in September 39th in the event that a different strategy of action had been chosen. Erm Htu didn't have to make the first blow not more, but in portions. The French army was not ready for war, had not yet had time to mobilize, the British Expeditionary Force did not even land on the continent. Probably, the French would then have fought even worse than they did on the 40th, and in October 1939, rzhby to pitulir l. In the next year, Hitler would be able to attack Russia, which was bogged down in a war with Finland. but if the olyp had survived by that time and entered into an alliance with this, it could hardly have influenced the course of events. Germany would have been able to quickly defeat the rogue army in conditions when in England there was a high probability of triumphs for supporters of the continuation of the Munich policy of "appeasement", Merik had not yet become a member of the military and military industry. It is not excluded that for some time the effective resistance of the Soviet Union would have ceased. a day of coermia would hardly be enough

forces for the occupation of the Volga and rl, not to mention Iberia. but or later, with the support of Merica, the struggle had to be resumed and led to the defeat of her

, Although

even with the use of nuclear weapons. Only wars would have dragged on even longer and would have led to additional victims of world destruction.

But in September of the 39th, Hitler had not yet completely abandoned the hope that England and France would remain neutral, therefore he was in no hurry to attack on the spot. and the fighting efficiency of the French army, the Fuhrer and his generals seemed to be a little higher than he really was, therefore they did not risk hitting it before the donkey was crushed.

This August, the commanders threw the troops of the reserve front into the linen. On the bottom, the Germans managed to beat off the tanks. At the end of August, the 24th Army, which carried the main attack, was reinforced and went over to a new offensive. non-hours on the 30th By 7 September, the forces of the Reserve Front drove out the enemy from the Yelnin ledge with a lot of heavy losses by September 7 (see

flax was released on 6 September). order on the occasion of the completion of the operation,

dated September 7, 1941, wrote:

"The main command of the German army attached a very great importance to the area, as a very advantageous position for a further offensive. The Shi'ist command strove to keep the linen stash in their hands at any cost, not desiring the lives of thousands of their soldiers and officers for this. The 137th, 78th, 298th, 15th, and 17th Infantry Divisions were destroyed by our infantry, artillery, and tanks in the area. Some of these divisions were completely exterminated and found their grave in the field of battle. During the fighting in the area of flax, our troops defeated a total of about eight selected divisions, including one division - the enemy lost at least 75-80 thousand people killed and wounded.

In this order, like in most Soviet orders of those years, the characteristics given to the German troops, with much greater reasons, should be attributed to the Red Army. It was precisely the troops of the storming commanders of the Yelninsky ledge, "without living the thousands of lives of their soldiers and officers." From the German generals, in practice, they took care of saving the lives of soldiers, mindful of the scarcity of human resources in Germany. ukov, even though other Soviet officers, generals and marshals, up to general showed concern for the lives of soldiers only at the level of declarations. Most likely, the German losses lissimo ,, of 75,000-80,000 men indicated by Ukov actually correspond approximately to the losses of the troops of the reserve front. In other words, German losses were much less. and one of the divisions of the Verm kht listed in the Zhukovsky order was not defeated in my case either in the 41st or in the 42nd year. According to the current loss reports reflected in Lder's diary, the German ground forces on the eastern front in the period from August 13 to September 10, 1941, when battles unfolded under the linen, lost less than the commander counted enemy losses under linen alone - a total of 69,587 soldiers and officers, in

volume

only 17,397 people were killed and missing. because at that time
fierce

battles were fought not only on the Nelnin ledge, but also under Yeningrad and Yev, under Omel and Nyartsev in the direction. 8 German divisions accounted for 1/19 of the total number of divisions of the Wehrmacht on the eastern front. if we assume that they suffered losses, say, twice as large as the average division in that period, then the Elnin group will have only about one tenth of all the losses of the German eastern army, - about 7 thousand people, including, 1,740 - killed and missing.

ukov s increased the losses of the enemy by at least 10 rz. in reality, the Germans under the flax lost less than half of the regular strength of one division. and the troops of the reserve front could not inflict heavy losses on the enemy. spruce artillery of the Zhukovsky army hshe popdl in white light kk for a pretty penny. September 5, 1941

noted with satisfaction: opponent

for a long time, after our units had already been withdrawn, he fired at these positions that we had left and only then carefully occupied them with infantry. covered withdrawal of troops from this arc is a good achievement of the command. how many troops of the UKS were lost under the line, we are unlikely to ever be able to establish approximately the same. here it is possible to estimate the total irretrievable losses of the Russian army during the Great World War as a whole, although with great difficulty and not too accurately. George Onstantinovich Ukov made a big contribution to these losses. On the command of the fronts or coordinated their actions in the largest strategic operations. th troops, as a rule, received the most responsible tasks, they outnumbered other fronts, received more reinforcements and, obviously, had to suffer the smallest losses. Therefore, before continuing the story about the biography of the Ukovs, I want to make an excursion into the issue of Soviet military losses. it is extremely difficult to determine how many troops the army lost in the war killed on the battlefield, as well as those who died from rn, diseases, accidents, in captivity and for other reasons, it is extremely difficult. parity and control, which Yenin considered to be important things for weaving, could not be properly maintained until the inglorious triumph of socialism of the end-Soviet power. The number of irretrievable losses (by the dead and prisoners) is extremely difficult for me in itself for any army. During the Second World War, the number of those killed was in the hundreds of thousands and millions, thousands and thousands the authorities about all , of soldiers and officers perished every day. the commanders, not having time to inform the dead and missing, often ended up being killed or wounded. Not all reports of losses reached the highest headquarters, not all were taken into account in the final reports. The higher the level of losses, the worse they were counted. the situation was especially unfavorable, taking into account the irretrievable losses of the military army. I lost more soldiers and officers than any other army in World War II. In addition, in the Stalinist system, a person was a cog whose life was worth almost nothing. At the December meeting of the highest command staff in 1940, the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Marshal Ulik, remarked dismissively: "I listened to the speeches of political workers and did not understand a few of them. In their speeches, they focused on individual cases of indiscipline or excesses in the application of disciplinary rights. someone - drank, T someone - hit him on the head with a crowbar, t someone - shot him. From their speeches, it was possible to understand that if there were no new disciplinary regulations with its article allowing the commander to use force and weapons, then there would be no excesses ... well, new regulations, new regulations new things, and we must not guitar each other, more specifically, rebuild our work as the party requires, as the native commissar requires. There are proverbs: t m, where the forest is cut, t m chips fly. he's up to chips

slightly less.

I ktn d by the fact that someone was shot somewhere is not worth it. rigory v novich did not know that

very soon it will turn into one of the chips. In the 42nd year, he was caught from m rsh lov
v

general I-m yory, in the year 50, he was shot on the standard charge of a military conspiracy. At the beginning of the war,

ordinary Red Army soldiers had neither identity cards nor nominal medallions. then, by the way, it made it easier for the enemy scouts to work.

m

It was enough to get a Red Army uniform and know the number of at least one of the units located in this area in order to calmly conduct reconnaissance in the front line. But the situation was no better, taking into account the personal composition, and in the last peaceful months of the war. In December 1940, at a meeting of the highest command staff in

the military council of the levsky Special Military District, corps commissar .. Tutin told a tragicomic story, as "one Red Army soldier was hiding for four months

v

surrounding villages, during this time he learned to speak Polish, systematically went to church. grievous, and only then it turned out that he was not there in the first place. on the other hand, in the same regiment, Red Army Tepnov was declared a deserter, although he never left the location of the unit.

March 15, 1941, in Germany, by order of the People's Commissar of Defense, the regulation on
in anticipation of the forthcoming

personal accounting of losses and burial of the deceased personnel of the military army in wartime. but prescribing lok | May 41st "to supply the troops with medical records with slips of wartime stamps, headquarters of military districts with forms of notices and forms of nominal lists." After each battle, the commander of the unit or unit was obliged to check the personnel and immediately report to the superior commander about the non-return

th

losses. Headquarters of the regiments, personal accounting of losses was to be carried out "according to the nominal lists of personal losses in the units that are part of the regiment ... on the basis of verification of personnel in some units for a sample." - further lists were sent by command, up to the troop manning board, which was supposed to "keep personal records of the losses of the Russian army from separate units and formations (division, brig d - corps, army, front) and personal loss recorder

V

moy army during hostilities. boom, everything came out smoothly.

However, it was not possible to create an account of irretrievable losses during the life of a harmonious and smoothly operating system. The Russian army books were introduced on October 7, 1941, however, even at the beginning of the 42nd, not all Red Army soldiers received them. e only to | In 1941, but in 1942, many fighters and commanders were not provided with medallions with information about servicemen. an example corresponding to order z was brought to the troops of the southern front only in December 1941. On November 17, 1942, by a new order of the People's Commissar of Defense, these medallions were completely canceled. The remark was published because for many fighters and commanders, the sight of the medallions had a depressing effect, made one think of imminent death. many Red Army men also refused to take them. as a result, the deadweight loss accounting is even more confused. Unit commanders were allowed to submit casualty reports indicating only the total number, not the names of those killed, wounded and missing. It is much easier to underestimate the numbers of losses, especially irretrievable ones, in which the commanders were vitally interested. The lower the losses, the better the unit fights. I obviously,

how

less were the losses in the reports, the more people on paper remained in the ranks, for the dead souls it was possible to regularly receive food rations and distribute them among the survivors. Responsible secretary of the "ovovoy world" during the time of Rlovsky Gorky, Leksandrovich, during the war years, commanded a company of scouts.

He, who knew the Polish language, was taken to Oysko-Olskoe, where he was considered, as it were, a Pole. After the war, he spoke to his critic, L Dimir Kshin. exactly how the reports on the number of personnel in the company were compiled:

"You can go to the Odolsky archive and find three of my reports marked with the same number in the dark. I write on one that there are 38 active bayonets in my squadron, in the other - 65, in the third - 93. ktk? it's just that in the first case I was asked if I could transfer part of my personnel to another company. e motu, I have only 38 fighters. about the second, a certificate of uniform and combat equipment was required - here for sure - 65, no more, no less. in the third case, food allowance was given out - it would be good to get it in the 93rd - the scout had to feed him. let the military historian choose the number he likes." Moreover, the manipulations occurred precisely with deadweight losses, since the wounded were also taken into account with nitrile

institutions, and here there was less room for commanding fantasies.

The leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense was not at all mistaken about the completeness of accounting for deadweight losses. In an order dated April 12, 1942, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Denko, who led the others, noted: Center for Named Lists of the Dead. the results of untimely and incomplete submission of lists of casualties by military units

there was a large discrepancy between the data of numerical and personal accounting of losses. At the present time, no more than one third of the actual number of those killed is in personal records. The personal records of the missing and captured are even more far from the truth." By the end of the war the situation had not improved. two months before the victory, the order of the People's Commissar of Defense dated March 7, 1945 stated that "the military councils of the fronts, armies and military districts do not pay due attention" to the issues of personal accounting for irretrievable losses. In practice, neither the Ukovs nor other Soviet military leaders knew how much personal

as part of the hikkie troops subordinate to them, they suffered losses. only in 1993, in the book "Secrecy Reef Removed", the Ministry of Defense of Russia

finally published official data on the irretrievable losses of the red army in

great current war. 8,668,400 people were killed and died from wounds, illnesses, accidents, in captivity, committed suicide or were shot by tribunals. However, even with the naked eye it is clear that this figure is very far from reality. In those few cases where the data on losses in individual operations, given in the book "The Secrecy Revealed", are verifiable,

their complete failure. to, July 5, 1943, by the beginning of the Battle of Ur

The central front, commanded by Lakossovsky, numbered 738 thousand people, and during the defensive battle until July 11, inclusive, they lost 15,336 people killed and missing and 18,561 people wounded and sick. On July 12, the composition of the troops of the central front remained almost unchanged: one tank arrived and two rifle brigades left. - nkov I brig d then counted 1,300 people, shooters I - from 1,500 to 3,000 people. With this in mind, the beginning of the Lurlov operation, the central front was supposed to have at least 700 thousand personnel. However, as the authors of the book "Secret Revealed" claim, at that moment only 645,300 people were counted in Okossovsky's troops. So, the true losses of the central front in a defensive battle under

Ursk were about 55,000 more than official statistics claim. There could not have been an immediate number of people deserting or simply disappearing to no one knows where, even in conditions of fierce fighting! If the entire undercount is attributed to irretrievable losses (whether wounded were still counted more accurately), then the number of those killed and missing turns out to be underestimated by 4, rz. If we assume that two thirds of the unregistered losses are irretrievable, and one third are nitrile, then the true irretrievable losses will be 3.4 times more than the officially declared ones.

An even more uncotic incident occurred, according to the book The Reef of Secrecy

withdrawn", with the 1st Army of the Oiskolsky in the early part of 1945. In the 1930s, during the slodder operation, which ended on February 3, he lost 1,066 people killed, missing, wounded and sick. At the beginning of the operation in the army, there were about 91 thousand

people, therefore, according to all the laws of arithmetic, about 90 thousand people should have remained in it. The next operation, Ostочно-Omersk, began on February 10th.

The rest of the 1st Polish army had not changed by that time, but the number of personnel miraculously decreased to 75,600 people. Let historians break their heads, where did 14.5 thousand people go!

it is clear that the official data for determining the true size of non-refundable

the losses of the red army in the great current war cannot be used in any way. I tried to go the other way. THIS IS WHAT IT HAPPENED. 1993 . published information on the irretrievable losses . Olkogonov of the Soviet armed forces in 1942 with

broken down by month, they amounted to 5,888,000 people (compared to 3,258,000 in the book "Secret Revealed"). It is known that between the number of killed and wounded

there is a dependence close to directly proportional. how much exactly was some

in the military army during the war, it is still not known exactly. days in the book

Mirnov "Oin and military medicine" gives a graph of monthly losses by wounded with

July 41st to April 45th (as a percentage of x to the average monthly value). I note that the judicious data of the olkogons significantly reduce the value of deadweight losses. However, in the meantime, irretrievable losses amounted to only 422 thousand people and even decreased in comparison with the estimated 13 thousand. In the afternoon, the Krzvmians took about 150,000 prisoners on the Nerchen Peninsula and about 240,000 on the Ryonerks. Therefore, it is necessary to choose a month when the dead were taken into account most fully and there were no large losses of prisoners. I dwelled on a number of considerations in November, when deadweight losses reached 413 thousand people, the number of wounded was 83 percent of the average monthly level for the war as a whole. If we extend this proportion to the entire war period, then the total number of dead can be very roughly estimated at 23.3 million people. From this number, to subtract 940 thousand encircled people who were considered missing, but after the liberation of the occupied territories, they were again called up to the army. There are about 22.4 million who died in battle, died from sores, diseases and other causes. to this number n still add those who died in captivity. According to post-war German data provided to the Western Allies in 1945, the Wehrmacht-Eastern Front captured 5,754,000 prisoners of war in total. but in this document the number of prisoners of the 41st year is defined as only 3,355 thousand

Human.

Meanwhile, other German documents indicate that 3.8-3.9 million people were taken prisoner at that time. I am inclined to

agree with this last, higher figure. The total number of Soviet prisoners can be estimated at 6.3 million people. Of these, about 1.8 million were liberated by the red army or, having already fought in a row of Wehrmacht captivity, already in the Soviet. 250,000, perhaps more, preferred to remain on the side after the end of the war. a few were able to escape from POW camps before the end of the war. In total, according to my estimate, about 4 million fighters and commanders of the red army died in captivity, mainly in the harsh winter of 1941, when they were hardly fed and were kept in camps almost in the open field. The Germans began to take care of the survival of the prisoners somehow only after the final execution of the blitzkrieg. Thus, the total irretrievable losses of the Russian Army in the Great Civil War I estimated at 26.4 million people. tsenk at, of course, I am very rude, with

accuracy not

exceeding plus or minus 5 million. I am afraid, however, that we will never get a more accurate figure. More than half a century has passed since the end of the war. Given the imperfect personal records that were in the army during the war years, hoping today to identify all the dead by name is an absolute utopia. It is unlikely to determine their total number with greater accuracy, for example, plus or minus 1 million

when -nibul ud stsyu. In

addition, approximately 17 million peaceful Soviet citizens died during the war years in the course of hostilities, were executed by the occupiers, or died of starvation and deprivation. The total irretrievable losses of the population during the Great Patriotic War are estimated at 43.3 million people. Is it possible to try to somehow verify the number of 26.4 million dead Red Army

soldiers? In principle, you can. In the first half of the 1990s, search parties in Russia discovered approximately 5,000 corpses of Soviet soldiers, who were able to be identified. The most complete database of data on servicemen who died and went missing in the Great Patriotic War is in the Museum - Oklonnaya Gora. There are almost 19 million names here. However, of the mentioned 5,000 dead, whose names the search engine was able to establish, approximately 30 percent were missing from the data bank. If we assume that

the 19 million soldiers who got there are about 70 percent of all the dead and missing, then their total number can be estimated at 27.1 million people. If we subtract from this the encirclement and the surviving prisoners, then the total number of dead will be about 24 million. Today, the estimate may somewhat underestimate the amount of losses, since the main data are about those 5,000 dead who have kept documents that

allow identification. these

people, the probability of getting into the data bank was significantly higher than that of the average deceased. Therefore, the final estimate by this method may be even closer to 26.4 million.

I also note that the death toll of 26.4 million is about three times the official casualty figure based on personal records. With this, we seem to confirm the opinion of such a competent witness as Kdenko that no more than a third of all irretrievable losses were on personal records.

more. Losses among officers in the Red Army are calculated more accurately than among privates. after the war, groups of employees of the main management of the firewood ministries

harrows for more than 7 years considered the irretrievable loss of officers. By the end of 1960, they were determined at 1,028 thousand people, including 973 thousand people in the ground forces. If we compare this last figure with the total irretrievable losses of the ground forces according to the book "Secret Revealed", it turns out that for one dead officer of the ground troops there were a little more than seven soldiers, i.e.

it turns out

that in the army all departments commanded by officers!

any front-line soldier will confirm that this is not shopping mall. For comparison: in the irretrievable losses of the German land army in World War II, there were a little more than thirty-four privates per killed officer. If we accept my estimates of Soviet irretrievable losses, then for the red army it will turn out to be approximately the same ratio.

how many lost verm xt? For the Germans, personal accounting was, on the whole, not bad and surpassed numerical, anonymous accounting in accuracy. Estimates based on personal (by name) records give approximately 4 million dead military personnel (of which about 800 thousand died in captivity). Of course, the accuracy here is also by no means absolute. the last six months of the war, accounting for losses in Verm Khter was angry, and for

only very rough estimates exist for this period. On the whole, I think the figure of 4 million weeks is far from reality, and its accuracy lies within x plus or minus half a million people. On the eastern front, about 2.1 million German soldiers died in battle and died from diseases, and about half a million more died in Soviet captivity. then approximately 10 times less than the number of deaths in the row of the army. on the other hand, if we assume that the Soviet troops suffered part of their losses in the fight against the allies of Germany, the total ratio

will decrease to 8:1, but will still remain of various orders. the general ratio of losses, taking into account the wounded and prisoners, will be somewhat more favorable for the Soviet side. By the end of April 1945, the Red Army captured about 2 million German troops. There were, according to various estimates, 3 or 4 times more patients from the Soviet side than from the German side, and the ratio of patients was equal. On the Soviet-German front, armies from two different eras clashed. The Wehrmacht focused on the most successful interaction between military branches, the high quality of training of soldiers and officers, and the most efficient use of weapons and military equipment. The leadership of the military army strove to throw as many people and equipment as possible into battle, only secondarily caring about cooperation and combat training.

The Soviet troops were defeated due to the huge numerical superiority in people and equipment, exhausting the enemy with continuous T to mi.

these TKH did not care for either people or equipment. Thousands, tens of thousands of tanks and aircraft with poorly trained crews rushed the enemy. Meanwhile, the Luftwaffe to the very end maintained high standards in the training of pilots, military officers: before they were allowed into battle, even at the end of the war, they basically drove at the training grounds.

3-3 monstrously high losses in the military army, there were almost no experienced soldiers left who could help the recruits to get used to the combat situation. that soldiers, platoon and company commanders remained in the ranks for a very short time before being killed or wounded. German ground forces during the war irretrievably lost

a little over 100,000 officers—nearly 10 times less than the Soviet ground forces. reinforcements rushed into battle untrained, often unarmed. too large a mass of conscripts sometimes did not have enough rifles. remenko to someone skzlo ukove that he "does not know how to fight not in numbers." about "not quantity" did not know how

And

did not want to fight, first of all, smtlin and the vast majority of generals and marshals of the military army, others simply could not survive under the conditions of the Soviet system. After all, in order to fight not by numbers, but by skill, independent-minded individuals were needed, both among soldiers and among generals. such people posed a potential threat to the existence of the Soviet totalitarian system. they were doomed either to death or to hide their "I" deeper, to obey the rules of the game dictated from above. Ukov was, of course, not a timid man, thinking independently (although not critically), capable of non-standard solutions (remember, at least, fabrics of tanks without the support of the infantry of the Ying). o ment litet he still was in many respects Soviet. Georgy Onst Ntinovich sincerely believed that it was possible

today do not reckon with casualties among subordinates, otherwise tomorrow the enemy will be able to inflict even greater losses, and he believed that enemy losses, in any case, were no less than those of the red army. The

Ininsk operation, despite

the fact that it failed to encircle and destroy the german troops, was the first successful offensive operation of the great current war on a front scale. However, in operational-strategic terms, this offensive brought no benefit, harm. okok storms of flax, tanks hold back and smashed the troops of the central and good front. probably several divisions of the reserve front

could at least slow down the advance of the 2nd Panzer Group and more

chances to save the army of ironos. For the Germans, the protrusion of the line was at that moment a secondary direction, and they did not hold it at any cost. This circumstance, of course, facilitated the task of the hunters, but also diminished the significance of his victory. More than less than a month later, when the Wehrmacht launched a general offensive = Osqua, he calmly managed without the Yelninsk bridgehead. After that, look at the instructions as a fireman, able to cope with any fire front.

The "Ever" group of armies approached Keningrad and, capturing STATION G, cut off the city from Moscow. Georgy Onstantinovich recalled that on the afternoon of September 9, a telephone message was received from the guards with a call to Tvka. In reality, as evidenced by documents, including the diary of the stay of the marshlukov on the front of the great techno- logical war, this happened as early as September 8th. On this day the Germans captured Lisselburg and closed the blockade ring. The call was to be called in at eight o'clock in the evening. n late ths. Met at the Tlin and the square. tlin skzl: "< burn under the engrad city in an almost hopeless state. The Germans, having taken Hungary and united with the Finns, can strike around from the northeast to Moscow, and then the situation will become even more complicated. - added: - I will have to fly to england and take command of the front and air fleet from the irrigation troops. He did not expect such an appointment, but he declared that he was ready to immediately fly to Leningrad. Tallinn handed him a note for irrigation with his signature: "Give command to the front to Ukovu, immediately fly to Moscow with you" . According to Georgiy Onstantinovich, Tlin also said that he was going to replace the head of the same direction for the one he had lost, and asked whom he would recommend for his place. He supposedly named Imoshenko, because he substantiated his candidacy: "Rshlimoshenko has recently received great practice in organizing hostilities, he knows the discipline well." Tlin immediately agreed and asked whom the Ukov recommended to place on the front in place of Imoshenko. Georgy Onstantinovich at the call of the commander of the 19th Army Onev. Osif Iss Rionovich meekly agreed with this proposal. Unfortunately, there is no confirmation from independent sources that such a conversation

between lin and uk really took place. I am inclined to think that this is still to a large extent the fruit of Zhukov's fantasy. It is unimaginable that the general of the army in such a condescending tone spoke to the supreme commander of the army, who was just recently appointed post-commissar of defense. Tlin is better than Ukov, Znamen Onstantinovich, and he could easily make a decision on his own to make him the head of the good direction. the statement of the uks that it was he who proposed onev to the ndid tour looks completely unreliable. George Onstantinovich served as a newcomer in the new novice, before together, he served only one month in insk. On July 37, he became the commander of the 3rd cavalry corps and the head of the onev command in that garrison of the 2nd rifle division. ovs of the Minsk garrison, at the end of this month, he recalled Mongolia. he was not involved in the war. Not only certainly, although, were there no friendly relations between them, but they knew each other almost according to him, relations between them in Insk then developed good. But this was hardly enough for the Ukov to suddenly offer Onev to the commanders of the first front. It would be more logical to conclude that the newcomer was named imoshenko as his successor. On August 17, he noted in the order the successful actions of the 19th army onev and set it up as an example to other troops on the front: "Gods, follow the example of the 19th army. develop the offensive more slowly and resolutely." Ukov, on the other hand, wanted to show that even then he was already the first adviser. also to give an extra prick to Onev with whom, after the 57th year, relations were very bad. You, they say, rogue me at the plenum, because it was I who at one time contributed to your career, the first to call you commander of the front. The lost one was removed from the right direction because, seeing the threat of encirclement, together with the ironos, he set up on the immediate withdrawal from the lyi and, the Dnieper arc to the border of the village river. t lin waste s disgusted. After Yemenonstantinovich took command, he realized that his predecessor was right. made a Solomonian decision:

After a bombardment from a plane, Colonel Grymen with a verbal order to start the retreat. In Nuristoforovich, the commander explained that there was no written directive because they could shoot down a plane, and then the secret document would fall into the hands of the Germans. rvd, it is not clear what actions they could take in this case. The direction of a possible retreat of the good front, etc., was obvious. The German troops all the same did everything possible to concentrate the maximum of forces and means in this direction. With my dealer, Imoshenko's account was accurate. If the irponos leaves vitiev, tlin does not approve of this, then it will be possible to get in touch with the command of the commander of the front. If the withdrawal is successful and the supreme commander agrees with the decision, then part of the Lvrov will go to Imoshenko, who issued the order on time. Unfortunately, the irponos, who had previously received directly opposite commands, did not believe the word, and asked for confirmation from the bet. it's gone days. the delay proved fatal. irponos with pcs bom died when leaving the encirclement. More than 660,000 Red Army men and commanders were taken prisoner. Ukov flew to Leningrad on September 9 (in his memoirs he erroneously indicated the 10th). The next day he joined the command of the troops of the Mieningrad Front, Oroshilov, remaining the commander-in-chief of the northern direction, on September 11 he left for Moscow. this day was followed by a formal order for the meaning of the orders. no one knew then: neither irrigators, nor ouks, nor tlin, that as early as September 6, Hitler issued directive No. 35, declaring the eningrad "a secondary area of military operations." The commander of the Sever Army Group, Field Marshal Ritter Ilhelm von Eeb, was to blockade the city and, no later than September 15, transfer both tank groups and a significant part of the aviation to the Center Army Group for the upcoming general offensive n oskva. Turmmeningrad would require greater sacrifices and considerable time, which Hitler no longer had on the eve of winter. he decided to try to capture the main strategic goal - osca, counting on capturing the engrad house later, when

his defenders will be depleted by the blockade. RVD, on September 12, the Fuhrer issued a new directive, in the development of the previous one, which stated that "the aviation and armored forces
Not

must be transferred until a complete blockade is established. Therefore, the transfer determined by Directive No. 35 may be postponed for several days. Actually, the transfer was pushed back only until September 17th. After this period, it was still not possible to begin the transfer to the Moscow direction of the connections of the "Centre" group, which were involved in the crine. The Leningrad front had only a few days left to hold out, after which the onslaught of the enemy, who had captured the suburbs of the northern capital, was bound to weaken. Ukov, I repeat, Hitler could not have known about these directives and assumed that the main goal of Army Group "Never" was still to capture the city. —n concentrated the main forces to repel the German offensive in the region of the Ulkov heights. On September 17, on the day when the Germans withdrew the main forces of the 3rd and 4th tank groups and the 8th aviation corps from the battle of Zeningrad, a formidable Zhukovsky order appeared: "The Military Council of the Leningrad Front orders to announce to all the command, political and private personnel defending the indicated line that all commanders, political workers and soldiers are subject to immediate execution without a written order from the military council of the front and the army of the indicated line. according to the testimony of marshal olnov, the commanders carried out this order - he ordered the machine gunners to shoot at the retreating battalion m. the front from the direction of Lyubna, where they were met by the 54th Army of evidence in order to break through the blockade. he indicated that the enemy was still striving to capture the city, and concentrated the main forces on

defense of near approaches, not a breakthrough. But when, after September 16, tank formations ceased to operate under the united city and the Luftwaffe's activity abruptly ceased, Georgy Onstantinovich continued counter-attacks against one Ulkovo, Neuevskaya ubrovka, towards the meeting of the 54th Army.

On September 15, the Ukovs had evidence of a conversation on "odo". om blowing

The Leningrad Front advised "not to wait for an enemy offensive, immediately organize artillery preparation and go on the offensive in the general direction of G>". — [I see, — said the evidence. - think yu, 16-17th. - 16-17th late! - n st ivl ukov. - the enemy is mobile, n to preempt him.

I am sure that if you make an offensive, you will have great trophies. If you can't attack all the same tomorrow, I ask you to throw all your weapons to defeat the enemy in the area of \u200b\u200boddolovo-ordelevo-correct echk-nnolovo ... it is necessary to direct strikes throughout the day, at least m in loose parties, so as not to let the enemy raise their heads. oh this is a last resort. I ask you very much to forge the enemy and move the cavalry behind enemy lines as soon as possible (about what would be the use of the cavalry in the Leningrad swamps,

Georgy Onstantinovich didn't think twice, the evidence . .).
objected:

- I can't go on the offensive tomorrow, because the artillery has not been brought up, the interaction has not been worked out on the spot and not all units have gone to their original position ... if the enemy does not go on the general offensive tomorrow, then your request for action visions

By

item m indicated by you, I will perform ...

The general commander reported that he was replenishing his units, that the troops of the army had to repulse the enemy's advance in the zone of Lisselburg and Inyavino. ukov was r zdr wives:

- the enemy did not go on the offensive, he conducted night power reconnaissance! waiting

reconnaissance or small actions of the enemy, some, unfortunately, take the offensive ... it is clear that you are primarily concerned about the well-being of the 54th Army, and, apparently, you are not worried enough about the situation created under eningr house. you must understand that

I have to throw people directly from the factories to meet the current enemy, without waiting for the practice of interaction on the ground. I realized that I could not calculate the active maneuver on your part. If you want to solve the problem with me, I must notice that I am amazed at the lack of interaction between your group and the front. oh, in my opinion, in our place, uovorov would have acted differently. call for frankness, but I'm not up to diplomacy. ate all the best." Strictly speaking, in this dispute, there was evidence, not evidence. The entry of the 54th Army, which began without proper preparation, nevertheless doomed the elk to failure. There was little sense in the fact that the Ukov hastily threw untrained and poorly armed workers and sailors into battle, without ensuring interaction with artillery and aircraft on

the spot. the poles and boots were completely destroyed, causing only minor damage to the enemy. For example, already at the beginning of October, all 498 fighters of the Kronstadt sailors detachment led by Colonel .. Orozhilov and the commissar were killed. . Petrukhin, who landed in the New Peterhof with only rifles and grunts. Oulik wanted to organize an offensive according to all the rules of the military arts. Okov hurried him, hoping that the 54th Army alone would be able to break through the blockade. In fact, the correct decision in the current situation would be to throw the main forces of the Yeningrad front against the street, not to exhaust them in the ineffective counter-operations on the approaches to the city. but if the Germans could, as a result, reach the

outskirts of meningr d, for the capture of the city, for

heavy street fighting they did not have the strength. after the blockade was broken, it could be calculated not only to restore the situation in the Leningrad suburbs, but also to push the enemy back from the city. but Koukov continued to believe that the army groups

"Never" is trying to capture the city, although he could not help noticing that the enemy under the city of the city no longer has tanks and much less aircraft. He managed to convince the Tlins and the Poshniks that the Germans were still continuing the assault on the Neva stronghold.

Georgiy Onst ntinovich secured the title of savior of yeningr D.

In early October, Ukov took the risk of starting to transfer forces to break the blockade. to that

the 54th army was already subordinate to him, the evidence was recalled to Tvku. day to time for

the release of the eningrad was missed. The German offensive against Moscow made it necessary to withdraw forces from the Kolkh-Olkhov Front, which had attacked from the outside, to defend the capital.

On September 30, the troops of the Army Group "Centre" of the formations of the Ryansk Front, on October 2, struck on the lower and reserve fronts. In a letter, the decree stated that at the beginning of the German offensive there were "about 800,000 soldiers, 770 tanks and 9,150 guns" in the troops of the three fronts. opposed

xt assault guns and „ according to mrshl , had 'more | one million people, 1,700 tons of NKVs and a force of Wehrmacht 19,450 guns and mortars. In the published text of the chapter in the first lifetime editions of the memoirs, the balance of forces and means of the parties was already spoken of in a different way: in the composition of the three fronts "at the end of September there were about 800 thousand

active

fighters, 782 tons of NK and 6808 guns and mortars, 545 from airplanes ... the enemy ... surpassed all three of our fronts,

taken together, in terms of the number of troops - in 1, 25 rz , sweat nc m—
V

2.2, for guns and mortar m - in 2.1 and for aircraft m - in 1.7 rz. it follows that
V

army group "Centre" was counted | one million personnel in 1,720 tons of tanks and assault guns, more than 14,000 guns and mortars, and about 930 aircraft. However, in the latest edition of "Memories and Reflections", published in 1995, with reference to the volume "History of the Second World War" published in 1975 (it is interesting how the Marshal, who died in the year lower?), the figures were already completely different: in

the composition of the eps, the reserve and ryansk fronts "in the combat troops x ... at the end of September, there were 1 million 250 thousand people, 990 tanks, 7,600 guns and mortars, 677 from airplanes." The forces of the Army Group "Centre" were estimated as superior to the

Soviet troops by 1.4 times in terms of people, in 1.7 times in terms of tanks, in 1.8 times in terms of guns and mortars2

rz posmolet m. Nchit, now the Germans suddenly had 1,700 thousand soldiers and officers, about 1,680 tanks, about 13,700 guns and mortars, and about 1,350 combat aircraft. where is the truth here? Obviously, at the expense of the number of Soviet troops, there are no reliable

figures of 1,250 thousand people (in 95 divisions and several brigade units). And taking into account the "active fighters", such as the personnel in the rear units. day of reservation , that

He

refers only to "combat units", makes it possible to assume that part of the rear services in
This

the number is not included and that in reality the number of personnel in the three fronts exceeded a million and a quarter. the same applies to the size of the army group "Centre", then, most likely, the original Zhukov's estimate of 1 million people (in 77 divisions and 1 brigade) is correct. Subsequently, the editors of Recollections and Reflections increased it to 1.7 million in order to convince readers that the Germans had superiority not

only in

technology, but also in people. the

count of the number of tanks, which were distributed by three fronts, with the maximum number of digits looks underestimated. The summary of the German command following the results of the battle of Yazemsky spoke of 663,000 prisoners, 1,242 captured Soviet tanks, and 5,412 guns. if we assume that the Germans managed to destroy and capture all the Soviet tanks operating in the same direction (which is hardly true),

then 1,242 tank tanks is certainly significantly more than 990. - Since the "Centre" captured more than 5,400 guns from the army groups alone, then

their total number on the one, reserve and Ryansk fronts could well have reached 9,150. The Soviet troops should have had significantly more than 10 thousand guns and mortars, so that according to this indicator, most likely, the forces of the parties were

r out. how

many tanks did the German troops have that attacked Moscow? The head of the General Staff of the German Ground

Forces, Colonel-General Rntzlder, noted in his diary that the 2nd tank group of the Uderin at the time of the start of the offensive was equipped with 050 percent tanks. the remaining groups had a manning of 75-80 percent with tanks, and the best situation was in the 4th tank group &ppner

„, where there were four fully manned tank divisions. With this in mind, the total number of tanks in the 5 tank divisions of the

2nd tank group in the 4 tank divisions of the 3rd tank group from and in the 4 tank group Uderin, divisions of the 4th tank group &ppner could well be 1,700 tires (by piece in different divisions there were 147 or 209 tanks). It can be assumed that in terms of tanks near Moscow in early October, the

Germans still had some numerical superiority. Moreover, already after the offensive near Moscow, 350 tanks were transferred in two divisions of not forget that the three the reserve. Rvd, qualitative superiority remained on the side of the red army, with navy tanks -34 and let's

Soviet fronts had only 677 with aircraft, the German troops opposing them - 1350 vehicles. The last figure seems to be too high, considering that at the beginning of the war the Luftwaffe had only 1,830 combat aircraft. taking into account the fighters that defended Moscow and were used against the troops of the army group "Center", the forces of the parties turn out to be even in the air. Ryansk front of the command I Remenko, on the bottom - onev, reserve - udenny. no one coordinated their actions on the spot. in addition, the German divisions had greater mobility. In the direction of the main strikes, the German command was able to create superiority in forces and means sufficient for a breakthrough

X.

From where he described the German offensive, Onev: "It is to be regretted that even before the start of the offensive, the enemy and during his general staff 6 did not inform the front of the reserve front (just like the command of the reserve front did nothing loo . .) and did not sufficiently coordinate the actions of the fronts ... the goal of the whole. - versions of the reserve front (24th and 43rd) were located in the first echelon in one line

With

with our armies ... the same time, three armies of the reserve front (31, 49 and 32 + I),

those who were on the strip of the bottom front (on the rear defensive line. - did not obey us (with such a "layer cake" in the control . .), of the troops, the mikt of stanzas was

inevitable | - . .) ... due to

huge losses, the enemy managed to break through our front and by the end of the day on October 2, move in depth of 10-15 kilometers ... on the morning of October 3, at my order, the forces of the 30th, 19th armies and part of the forces of the front-line reserve, united

v

a group under the command of my deputy general .. oldin ... a counterstrike was launched in order to stop the enemy who had broken through and restore the situation. However, the introduction of front reserves and strikes of army reserves did not change the situation. Our controversies were not successful. the enemy had a clear numerical superiority and our grouping, which was carrying out counter-labour by R. Olmirkovskiy, rushed to the Neprui and went south of Ulyshov, where the 32nd Army of the Reserve Front was defending. The result was a breakthrough to the yazma from the north. The second blow was delivered by the enemy in the S-Demen direction against the left wing of the reserve front. oisk of the 4th German tank group and the 4th army, pushing the formations of our 43rd and 33rd armies to the east and north, on October 4, the time of Jon p-semensklnya came out (the German mpon achieved only three days to return the linen, which ukov storms l three

weeks. - the . . .). breaking the enemy in this direction created an exceptionally difficult situation for both the 24th and 43rd armies of the reserve front and for the front. Shi 20th, 16th, 19th armies were under the threat of capture from both flanks. what position

pop dl and 32nd army of the reserve front. There was a threat that a large tank grouping of the enemy would come out from the south from the side of the reserve front of the Yon Yazma in the rear of the troops of the large front and the north of the Olmirkovskogo. In connection

with the situation that had arisen, on October 4 I reported to Tlin on the situation on the bottom front and on the breakthrough of the defense in the sector of the reserve front in the Psemensk region, as well as on the threat of a large enemy grouping entering the rear of troops m 19, 16bi 20th army of the bottom front from the side of Olmirkovskoye. Tling listened to me, but did not make any decision. The connection was cut off and the conversation stopped. he immediately contacted the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal Poshnikov, via "Bodo", and reported to him in more detail about the breakthrough of the bottom front in the direction of Olmirkovsky and that a particularly threatening situation had been created at the standby front. asked for permission to withdraw troops from our front to the Ngzhtsky defensive line. The guards listened to the report of the discus l that he would report to the meeting. However, no decision was made on that day. Then the front command made a decision to withdraw troops from the Ngzha defensive line, which was approved by the government on October 5. In accordance with this, we give instructions on the organization of the withdrawal of troops of the 30th, 19th, 16th and 20th armies. On the same day, October 5, when the Soviet Union agreed with the late withdrawal of the troops of the second front, Tlin

called the Commander in Eningrad: "I have only one question for me: can you get on a plane and come to Moscow . In view of the complication on the left wing of the reserve front, the new tvk would like to consult with us on the necessary measures. Ukov asked permission to fly out at dawn on 6 October. In the meantime, Onev received a directive, on the night of the 5th to the 6th, to withdraw to the line Stshkovelizh-rovo-lenine-ulshevo and further along the eastern coast, not far from Orogobuzh and Yedernikov. With the same directive, as Onev notes, "but unfortunately, with a great delay, he subordinated the 31st and 32nd armies of the reserve front to the 31st and 32nd armies. if this was done before the start of the battle, we could use them as a second ,,

echelon ...

Fulfilling the order, the troops of the front, mainly the 19th and 20th armies, not having strong pressure on the advancing enemy from the front, covering their flanks, began to consistently retreat from line to line. The first intermediate line was marked on the continuum, where positions were prepared by the reserve front.

If I decide to withdraw, I was well aware of all the difficulties of its implementation ... withdrawal is the most complicated type of military operations. more training required

troops and strong administration (neither one nor the other was available. - they comprehended . .). experience we this art. In this connection, I involuntarily recall the words of Volstoy. of their notes on the Khorym war (meaning "Evstopol stories ". - ..) he wrote that "untrained troops are not able to retreat, they can only run." Very aptly and correctly said. Unfortunately, we must admit that before the war our troops We rarely studied this type of action, considering withdrawal as a sign of weakness and incompatible with our doctrine. and the army is trying to drive the Germans into the Ripyat marshes, which in fact will have to fight from the very first day in .

I must note that the withdrawal of our troops passed under difficult conditions. Since the artillery and all the convoys of the bottom front ... had only horse traction, they were unable to break away from the enemy troops, since the superiority in mobility was on the side of the enemy. On October 7, 1941, the enemy tank and motorized

corps approached the yazma: the 56th from the northern direction - from Olmirkovo, the 46th and 40th from the south - from psemensk.

In this difficult situation, it was very difficult to perform a neuro retreat. The rapidly advancing Hitlerite motorized corps cut off the escape route. As a result, by October 7, 16 divisions from the 19th, 20th and 32nd Army of the Front, as well as the remnants of the divisions of the 24th Army of the Reserve Front, and part of the Aldin group that suffered heavy losses, were surrounded. formations of the 30th army, having suffered heavy losses, since the horses took over the main force of the blows of superior enemy forces, in separate groups we retreated to the east through the forest, later around Moscow time. On October 8, I issued an order to the encircled troops and broke through in the direction of the Zha...

making the decision to leave the encirclement, we succeeded in miraculously breaking through the enemy front in the direction of Zhtsk , north and south of the Yazm-Oskov highway , without combining the armies into one grouping and not assigning a continuous section of the breakthrough. - Our goal was not to allow the enemy to narrow the encirclement and, having a vast territory, to maneuver forces, to contain the superior forces of the enemy by active struggle. Of course, encirclement is a complex form of combat, and, as the experience of the war showed, we had to prepare for this type of action, which, unfortunately, was not done before the war. The dangerous warfare is not an exception, and modern military art does not exclude it either. It was his mistake that he abandoned the attempt to gather the encircled troops into one fist, creating a powerful strike force with the support of the remaining tanks on the move and all the troops at hand, with the involvement of the forces of the oskva, try to break the still loose encirclement on a narrow front. instead of this, strikes with splayed fingers turned out. The 19th and 32nd armies were ordered to break through, depending on the situation, either to vychyovka or to the junction, the 20th army, as Onev reports, "there was an order to break through to the southwest in the bottom direction, with the exit to the rear of the German group, which by this time the main forces advanced during the plague. Evidently, the commander of the small front was still dominated by the idea of carrying out counterattacks with the aim of inflicting at least a partial defeat on the enemy, in order thereby to facilitate the retreat of the rest of the troops of the front to new lines. The practice of "active struggle" and "maneuvering" of the Soviet armies that found themselves in the "cauldron" led to the fact that they came under attack from the main forces of the Center group and were destroyed. almost no one came out of the encirclement. When in 1966 a collection of memoirs about the battle near Moscow was being prepared, Ukov, having read the article onev, made a number of remarks. George Onst Ntinovich

rightly pointed out that the newcomer in vain does not include the 16th Army among the encircled. The only one outside the rings turned out to be only her unit 6, headed by Okossovsky. ukov not agreed with the opinion of onev ,, that "everything is to blame for TVC, the power headquarters and the neighboring reserve front." Ukov argued that "the balance of power was the ability to conduct a successful fight against the advancing enemy, in any case, to avoid

encirclement and complete destruction ... ". Between those rifles and enshtb in defeat, indeed, was dumb. not only did not organize the coordination of the actions of the three

fronts, but for a day they delayed permission to withdraw the troops of the second front. - after all, these days, part of the formations, tens of thousands of fighters and commanders, could possibly avoid encirclement. despite the mistakes of onev, udnogo and remenko also played in

damage under the yazma and Ryansk is a very significant role. ukov in a letter to

The publication dated August 15, 1966, rightly criticized, did not care about the words contained in the manuscript: "There was nowhere to go - from behind the windows": "As you know, the battle is not fought by the flight method (this remark cannot be denied be witty. - . .). then, when a difficult situation (threats of encirclement) is brewing, an experienced commander must withdraw the troops to the rear line, where they again offer organized resistance to the enemy.

Onew wrote that "the enemy's breakthrough in the reserve front section made it possible for the enemy to go deep into the rear front." Ukov reasonably objected: "What kind of claim could Oneev and udenny make. Some of the reserves in this direction are the fault of nothing less than the given. If they did not provide for the location of reserves in threatened areas.

In an earlier edition of his memoirs, Georgy Onstantinovich wrote that the first telephone conversation with another from the Leningrad region about the events in the other direction took place on October 6th. In the later version of the "Memories and Reflections" of the ukow, the correct date was October 5, since a record of these negotiations was found in the archive, where this number was exactly. However, here, too, Georgy Onstantinovich continued to insist that, with the permission of the Supreme Commander, he left for Moscow only on the 7th, he could not fly out on the 6th "due to some important circumstances that arose at the 54th station. evidence (in fact, the evidence was withdrawn on the 29th army, which was - . .), and the landing of seamen commanded by September, and by the army commanded by .. ozin. of the fleet on the coast in the city of Eterhof > ".

The rshl claims that immediately after landing he went to the supreme home: "Sick with the flu, tlin works in the apartment. recovering his health with a nod of his head, tlin, pointing yang to his mouth, saying:

- from, see the fruits of the command on the front. in these words one could hear the bitterness of emotions, and I heard a note of reproach for my recommendation that he be the commander of the front.

"I can't get a front report from the military council on the true state of affairs," Tlin told me. - if you can, go now with the same in piece 6

oneev , carefully investigate the situation and call me at any time of the night. I will wait.

I took the orders from the troops to the mouth from the other direction, found out that the headquarters of the front front is currently located where the headquarters of the reserve front used to be and left lkoneva.

Eorgy Onst Ntinovich arrived at the front , late in the evening. he recalled: "The commander's room was twilight, as it was lit by sterol candles, and only around the table at which they sat. . oneev,

okolovsky and. the . ulg nin. I was walking all overworked, it was felt that current situation at the front seriously affected their general condition. Ukov said that he had arrived on behalf of Tlin to deal with the situation. oneev situation

unknown I. Ukov asked what he was going to do. onev supposedly replied that with none from

the encircled units have no communications, the front has no forces to close the road to the enemy - oscva. at half past three in the night Ukov called Tlin and said:

the enemy's armored forces cannot be granted a sudden appearance in front of the city of the Ozha line (Ukov poorly edited the first version of the memoirs;
V

At this point, he clearly meant that the weak cover of the Nozhskaya line could not ensure the defense against the sudden appearance of German tanks near its walls. - . .). pulling up the Tanzha line of defense of the troops as soon as possible, from wherever possible, to rescue Moscow. Tlin asked the Ukovs where the 16th, 19th, 20th, 24th and 32nd armies and the Aldin operational group were located. - [encircled northwest of the bottom of the yazma, - from the ports Im rsh I. —[are you measured to do? Tlin asked. - I'm leaving now on a day-to-day basis, I'll sort out the situation and call m. the chief asked.

— No, I don't know, — admitted Ukov. Georgy Onstantinovich went in search of the 6th reserve headquarters, nchvikhs polustank bninskoe, where the leadership of the reserve front was located until the beginning

German advance. Here I would like to

quote "a short extract from the diary of the stay on the fronts of the World War of 1941-1945 of the Russian Soviet-Union of the FA: Ukov", made with M. George Onstantinovich: with a catastrophic position near Moscow, where the pdny, reserve and Ryansk fronts were defeated by the enemy. On the same day (at 20.00) Tlin ordered the departure of the 6th Front to clarify the situation and possible measures to organize defense. On October 8, 1941, from the unit of the 6th front, the bus left for the unit of the reserve front in Bninsk. On October 10, he took command of the last front (shtbvr dreamnovo). On the same day, pcs b moved lv l bino, then after 3 days to erkhushkovo. If only, the harmony of "reminiscences and reflections" with the document would be complete. oln i, d not really. military historian .. sev in 1991 published in the "Military History Journal" "chronicles of the activities of the Russian Union of Soviet Union .. uks during the Great Patriotic War", the main document of the Central Archive of the Ministries of Defense () in Odolsk, including number and on the same diary of my stay at the front. in this publication, the date of the recall of Georgy Onstantinovich from Leningrad and his arrival in Moscow is clearly

indicated on October 6, 1941. On this day, at the direction of Tlin, he returned to the capital due to the deterioration of the situation in the western direction. Then, on October 6, a directive appeared with the signature of the partisans (it was also noted in Zhukovsky's diary), which read: ukov as a representative of the tvki. Tvk offers to acquaint comrade. UUkov with the situation. all decisions of comrade. instructions in the future, related to the use of front troops and on issues of control, are mandatory for

fulfillment".

marked this directive 19.30 6 October. No one would take it away, if Ukov still remained in Eningrad. Surely it could be delayed indefinitely by bad weather , or, if not, the "Messers" of nd-Dozhsky would have been shot down from a plane with a bow

lake. and would not allow a long day to be delayed in Hungary for more than a day due to a tactical landing in the Windhof and local battles on the front of the 54th Army at the moment,

when the fate of osca was decided! Obviously, Poshnikov wrote the text right at the time

meeting with the commander and handed him a copy, since there was no connection with the headquarters of the reserve front.

Georgiy Onstantinovich was not needed then as a representative of Tvka on the bottom front. On October 5, there was a whole team of high-ranking Tvkas and Enshtb. from what Silevsky, who was then the deputy of the partisans, recalled:

"< TO ASSIST THE TEAM OF THE DOWN AND RESERVE FRONTS AND FOR WORKING WITH

them concrete, prompt and effective measures for the protection of the capital and the government of the district of Zhetsk and Ozhsyk of their representatives -., Oroshilov and. <. olotov. to the capacity of a representative of the Tvka, he also left there together with a member of the mission ... October 5, 1941

In the year we arrived at the headquarters of the bottom front, located directly east of Zhetsk. place with the command of the front in five days, with our joint efforts, we managed to direct the Nozhskaya line from the troops retreating from the Rzhev, Sychev and Vyazma directions, up to five rifle divisions. The decision to send loots and irrigation to the front was taken on the night of October 5th. Evidently, at that time Linn methyl Ukov, as a representative of the reserve front, was only able to get out of the besieged Eningrad on the morning of the 6th (the night flight was associated with too great a risk). Well, it turned out to be a rather confusing situation: a member of the corps was appointed as a But representative of the corps to go to the front to another member of the corps. Probably, Tlin had already decided to replace Yemen Ilovich with Georgiy Onstantinovich. An important role could also be played by the fact that Ukov was a native of the Krz from those places where the troops of the Reserve Front fought. About the same principle, imoshenko was raised by the chief commander of the city direction, which defended the krina, uded a little later - by the commander-in-chief of the verovkzsky direction, which defended the kryna, where it was once created erv i onn i. Tlin believed that his generals would defend their native places with special zeal, a good knowledge of the theaters of military operations would help make the right decisions. The headquarters of the reserve front, whose location in Moscow was known, the command 3 went only to try to find out where the army and the army of the reserve front were. The first edition of "Memories and Reflections" described his search for the lost: "Driving at dawn to the bninskoye half-station (105 kilometers from Moscow), I saw two signalmen pulling cable from the side of the bridge across the river Rotv, - [You're pulling, guys, — it's ordered, we're pulling there, — answered in a cold voice a soldier of enormous height with a thickly overgrown beard. I had to name myself and say that I was looking for the headquarters of the reserve front and the remote one. Pulling himself up, the same soldier answered: "Call us, we don't know in the face, so we answered. Have you

already passed the front. Two hours later, he arrived and stopped in houses in the forest on the mountain, to the left behind the bridge. my security will show you where to go. "Oh, thank you, friend, I helped out, it would take a long time to find it," I answered the soldier. Turning back, after 10 minutes I was in the room of the ex-lis and there was the and asked: head of the 6th front, General connection? Ogolyubov. exlis spoke with someone on the phone and someone was spec l. question: "Who is the commander?", the head of the staff of the front, Ogolyubov, answered: "I don't know. he was in the 43rd army. I hope that whatever bad happens to Yemen their Yilovich.

, which one

Have you taken steps to find him?

"= , sent officers, but the officers have not yet returned. - is it known from the situation? I asked General Ogolyubov. Yekhlis, turning to me, asked: "Seek kimiz dch miknm?" "I came, on the instructions of the Supreme Commander, to sort out the situation," I replied. -

[from, you see, in what position we found ourselves. eych with the collection of non-organizations outgoing. demn collection points x re-equip and form new units from them.

In a conversation with Ogolyubov, I did not learn anything about the position of the troops of the reserve front and about the enemy. I ate a car and drove through Loyaroslavets, going in the direction of Khnov, meaning that I would soon find out the situation from here. roezzh I rotva, rzezdka Bninskoe, I involuntarily remembered my childhood and youth. This trip sent me, a 12-year-old boy, to my relatives

m

in Moscow - in learning furriery. already a master, after 4 years of study
V

boy x, I often came from oscow to the village to visit my parents, childhood friends and

familiar to the girls, this area,

where events unfolded, I knew well, because in my youth he was walked along and across by me. 10 kilometers from Bninsk, where the headquarters of the reserve front has now stopped, my village is a trelkovo in the Godsko-vodsky district, where my mother, my sister and her four children are located. The question involuntarily arose: what will happen to them if the Nazis come there? what will , they do with the mother, sister and nephew of the front commander? Of course they will shoot or burn alive. Apparently, we should not send a deutscher to take them out of the village to Moscow, which we will not rent, no, we will not rent! Defend until the last breath, Roeh in the center of the city of Loyaroslavets, I did not meet a single living soul. Either people were still sleeping, or they had already fled further, to the rear of the country. In the center, near the building of the district executive committee, I saw two asked the sleeping driver. Offer, waking up and passenger cars of the Illys type. - And these are tires? I often morgue, answered: - Tom Shin Yemenih Ilovich, Comrade General of the Army. - where is their ilovich? —[rests in the room of the executive committee. — [= clearly you are here? I asked the driver, who had finally woken up. - we are standing with three, we don't know where to go. going to the executive committee, I saw a slumbering man. haggard. We warmly greeted each other with their friend Yeilovich. It was evident that he had gone through a lot in those tragic days. - from where? - asked the udonny.

. day, apparently, for more than two or three days he had not shaved and

— t oneev , I replied.

— uh, what's wrong with him? I haven't had any contact with him for more than two days... I've been sitting here and don't know where my staff is 6. Emen Ylovich hurried to give them a shoutout: - Don't worry, your headquarters is 105 kilometers from Moscow, in the forest to the left, h

railway bridge over the river rotv. m are waiting for you. just talking riv ls

echlis and ogolyubov. they are doing very badly. a large part of the front was surrounded, and worst of all, the paths were cleared for the enemy with almost nothing covered.

- (I don't sleep better. The 24th and 32nd armies are defeated, and the front of defense does not exist. The enemy almost hit the flies between Khnov and Yazma. The side of Yazma

yesterday there were large tank and motorized columns, apparently with the aim of bypassing East .

- whose hands x hn? Yemen asked them Yilovich.

- I don't know, - answered the udenny. - hell, there were up to 2 infantry regiments and native militias of the 33rd army, but without artillery. mind yu that xnow in hand x opponent .

- Uh, who covers the road from the khnovs and loyalists?

"When I came here," Yemen lilovich said to them, "except for three policemen, I didn't meet anyone in the meal. The local authorities have left the food.

- go to the headquarters front, - I told them to Yemen llovich, - deal with

situation and report back to the press about the situation at the front, I will go on time. postpone our meeting in Linguon and say that I have gone to the meadow. good to know what's going on.

in the city of Edan, where, according to the strange man, he saw three policemen yesterday, we did not find anyone, with the exception of an orderly woman, whom I was looking for something in a house destroyed by a bomb. You asked: — bushk, what are you

looking for here? The woman stood

with wide-open, wandering eyes and disheveled gray hair and did not answer me. - tos mi, b

bushk? The woman silently began to dig, without

answering anything, to my

question. Somewhere, because of the ruins of the houses, a friend of mine

approached, half a child of women with a bag, half stuffed with some things. - having asked Yte her, -

said the women who approached me, - he went

crazy from grief. - maybe someone grief? We asked the woman - he won't answer anything

who came up. "Yesterday,

German aircraft flew into the city, bombed and fired from aircraft. a lot

of people. We were all going to leave here for the loyal Slavs. A lot of women lived as a young grandson

and granddaughter, pioneers, in this house, during the raid, he stood by the wells to draw water, and

not before the bombs floated into the house. that's all you see is left of him. Blocked my house somewhere

brought her grandson. otinsh house is destroyed. to leave as soon as possible, but I'm not going under the

rubble of shoes and clothes. Tears flowed down the woman's cheeks, but he was apparently strong in the spirit of

women. We asked if our troops had entered the city. - a very loyal Slaver passed several cars, then several wagons with the

wounded, and there was no one else, - answered the same women. having said goodbye, we

went towards the khnovy ahead of the terrain, so as not to enter the lair of the

enemy>. on the road, he stumbled upon the 17th tank brigade, which he commanded. roitsky. From

him Georgiy Onstantinovich found out that he was a colleague in Ichinol. xnow 3 nyat

german mi. The instructions recommended that the „, stopping from time to time for inspection

brigade commander contact the remote and move the brigdun to protect the food. -

further, according to the torments, events unfolded as follows:

« rayon meadows me caught up In m bus officer of the staff of the reserve front

and handed over a telephone message to n chgensht 6 workers , in which it was said:

"The supreme leader ordered the commander to immediately arrive at the 6th front. You are now appointed Commander of the Great Front."

having reversed the car, we immediately went in the opposite direction - vsht 6

bottom front. on the 10th of October I arrived at pc 6 n the bottom front , which

Now it was located 3-4 kilometers northwest of Ozhyisk. sht ber botl commission of the judiciary committee - harrows composed of:

olotov , Oroshilov, Silevsky, - understanding the reasons for the catastrophe of the troops bottom front. I don't know what the commission was reporting to the State Committee for the Harrow... During the commission and my conversation with her,

Ulginin said, addressing me:

- t lin just called and said: as soon as you arrive at pc 6, so that

called him immediately.

called, answered the phone personally t lin:

- You decided to release Onev from the post of commander of the front. it was his fault that such events took place on the bottom front. It was decided to appoint the commanding front with. will you rise now?

"No, comrade Tlin, what objections can there be when you are in such mortal danger?" I answered the Supreme Commander.

- what are we going to do with him?

- put him on the bottom front as my deputy. I will entrust him

leadership of a group of troops in the direction of Lenin. then the direction is too remote, and I need to have tm auxiliary controls, - I reported to the supreme.

- okay. The remaining parts of the reserve front are in order. - Zhyskaya line and reserves, which are in motion to

Ozhyisk line of defense. take matters into your own hands and act.

- okay. I undertake to carry out the instructions, but I ask you to urgently bring up larger reserves, since you should expect a strike on German Moscow in the near future.

going to the room where the commission worked, I relayed my conversation to her with

t line. the conversation that was before my arrival, resumed. oneev accused

Okossovsky in that he did not withdraw the 16th Army, as he was ordered, to the forest, east of the yazma, withdrew only the headquarters of the army. okossovsky sk z L:

- ovrish commander, there was no such order. It was ordered to withdraw the army headquarters to the forest east of the yazma, which was done.

obchev (member of the military council of the 16th Army):

- I fully confirm the conversation of the front commander with

Okossovsky. was sitting next to him.

history of this question , I said, it will be possible to figure it out later,

now, if the commission does not object, please stop work, because urgent measures must be taken.
First: move the piece b front to the bino; second: Comrade Onev to take with him the necessary means of control and leave to coordinate the actions of a group of troops in the direction of Linin; third:

The military council of the front leaves in an emergency in Ozhysk to the commander

Zhysk defense Ogdnov, in order to sort out the situation in the Moscow direction on the spot.
The commission agreed to my request and left for

osc.

, a sly writer perished in the marsh le ukov. rskz abounds
dramatic moments, genuinely tragic notes, like the story of an unfortunate chick trying to dig up the rubble of a collapsed house - grandchildren.

A code-meme writer corrects the mistakes of others. He gives advice and instructions to everyone, which unconditionally carry out and udenny, and onev, and olots, and irrigators. Dzhetlin listens to the opinion of the Ukovs and, instead of ignoring the unfortunate front, a later version of the memoirs preserved in the appointing him as the deputy of the new commander of the front.
archive of the Ukovs, Georgy Onstantinovich directly spset vntepnovich from the harsh Stalinist ref you: "I have a call to the phone. Tlin rang out: - TVK decided to release Onev from the post of commander and designate all commanders of the front.
now rise? — = what objections can there be! — what are we going to do with it? Tlin asked. The defeat by the enemy of the bottom front, which the command of Lonev, the supreme one intended to bring him to trial. only my intervention saved them from a difficult fate. - to say that before the battle of Ur, he was not in good command of the troops, and repeatedly removed him from command of the front. Onevuk described lmon's rescue scene even more picturesquely: "Tlin was in a nervous mood and in terrible anger. Speaking to me, he furiously scolded Mionev and Ryomenko, who commanded the second and Ryansk fronts, in the strongest terms, and did not mention in a word the commander of the reserve front. apparently, he thought that it was already impossible to ask a person from this. He told me that he was appointing me commander of the front, that he had been removed from this post and that after the government commission sent to him at the headquarters made his conclusions, he would be tried by the military tribunal I. it was I who told t'lin that by such actions you will not fix anything and no one

revive. that this will only make a heavy impression of smoldering in the army. he remembered that at the beginning of the war the commander of the first front was shot, what was it for? nothing to do. yloz previously it is well known what fishing is, what he has

ceiling division commander. all this you know. Nevertheless, he was in command of the front and failed to do what he could not do. onev is not a vlov, he is a smart person. still useful. Then Lin asked: - [What do you propose to do?

He said that he was offering to leave him as my substitute. Tlin asked suspiciously: "Why are you protecting onev?" toon, w buddy? answered that no, that Onev and I had never been friends, I know him only as a colleague in the Belarusian district. t lin d l concordance. I think that this decision, taken by Tlin before the conclusions of the commission, played a big role in the fate of Onev, because the commission, which I went to the front with him at the head of Olotov, would certainly have proposed a different solution. well knowing the golds

„ Not doubt it."

The main thing for the orders was to show oneself as a savior of one of the almost certain execution. Here we are, he is still rebuking the newcomer: I saved you from death, how did you repay me in the 57th?

The feelings that moved George Onstantinovich can be understood. in fact, everything happened differently. From which Onev reports: "During the change of the front command post on the night of October 6, Ulgnin, a member of the military council of the front, arrived at vryonzhtsk and first of all decided to meet with the commander of the reserve front, marshal udenny. The command post of the reserve front was located in a dugout in the forest to the east of Zhtsk. the day the victim was in the village, on the outskirts in a small house under the guise of a tank.

well tsk , to report on the current situation and find out about the measures that the command of the reserve front is taking in connection with the difficult situation that has developed in the 43rd Army sector. about the data we had obtained from the enshtb at the second frontier in ,

The district of Ychevk - Zhtsk should be located in the 49th army of the reserve front. Oh, as it turned out in a conversation with the officer, by that time the 49th Army had already been loaded into echelons and sent in the wrong direction. kim image, 49th army,

Located on the Yazemsky defensive line, a day before the onset of the main forces of the army group, the center ... was removed and transferred to the south. There were no other troops of the reserve front at the line of Zhtsk-Kychevk. okossovsky with the control of the 16th army at that time had already concentrated in the area of zhtsk. Contacting me, he reported that the 50th division, with two regiments and an artillery regiment, had reached the pit, the rest of the forces of this division had been cut off by the enemy. okossovsky was ordered to take under his command all the units leaving the rear of the border of the tsk and those that would come from the rear, two tank brigades arriving, from the reserve to align the area, and to organize „ in particular, the defense at the line of chychevk - zh tsk and south. tb p n d n d front wk wk resolution was transferred to the district r snovkovo

zp day zhsk . A new command post arrived on October 10 from the haul of Olotov, Oroshilov, Silevsky and others. On the instructions of the Tlinnolots, it was stubbornly demanding the immediate withdrawal of the troops that were fighting in the encirclement, the Ngzha line, withdraw five or six divisions from this grouping and transfer them to reserves for deploying the Mozhska line. reported that he had taken all measures for the withdrawal of troops even before the arrival of the olots at the headquarters of the front, and ordered the commands of the 22nd and 29th armies to allocate five divisions to the front reserve and transfer them to the yonzhysk. however, due to the prevailing situation, only one of these divisions was able to reach the Moscow line

it was not clear that Olotov did not understand everything that had happened. demands for anything

neither

it was a mistake to quickly withdraw the troops of the 19th and 20th armies. oh for

Olotov is also characterized by a subsequent lack of understanding of the situation developing on the fronts. his arrival at the front, in all honesty, only complicated the already

difficult situation...

On October 10, it became quite clear that it was necessary to unite the forces of the two fronts.

- p one and one reserve - in one front under a single command. Olotov, Oroshilov, Silevsky, I, Ulgnin, a member of the military council (the chief of staff of the 6th front - Okolovsky at that time was in Zheve), having discussed the situation, came to the conclusion that the unification of the fronts must be carried out immediately. position of front commander, we recommend whether the general

army of uks, appointed on October 8 as commander of the reserve front. from our proposals submitted to Tvku:

"Screenshot I'm risking the line.

We ask you to take the following decision: in order to unite the leadership of the troops in the opposite direction to Moscow, unite the front and reserve fronts into a second front. mean commanding the front of comrade. ukov. - means comrade. onev as the first deputy commander of the nth front ... s. order to take command of the front at 1800 hours on 11 October. Olotov, Oroshilov, Onev, Ulgnin, Silevsky. taken according to "bodo" 15.45. 10/10/41.

The TVK agreed to this proposal, and immediately followed her order to unite the fronts (it was marked 17.00 on October 10 - the issue was decided in a quarter! - took command of the front. "Now the most probable course . . .). on October 12, we reported to the TV that I had done, of events It is lined up as follows: late in the evening of October 6, the commander of the headquarters arrived in a dream, but no one met him the previous night, and then they were relocated to the headquarters in a dream On the morning of the 7th Georgy Onstantinovich went out in search of the headquarters of the reserve front. It can be assumed that he found the lost one only in the evening. An order for delivery was sent on the night of October 8. Apparently, by this time, the Ukov and the Ukov had managed to meet and report on the establishment of contact with Moscow. Otherwise, the directives could only confuse the matter even more. would know that he was suspended, and

could

To give orders that contradict the order of the new commander, the troops would not know which order to follow. According to the first edition of the memoirs, Ukov preferred not to say anything at all about his appointment as commander of the troops of the reserve front. Only in the later version of "Memories and Reflections" was he forced (under the influence of editors familiar with the documents) to come up with something absolutely fantastic: (it is not clear to whom - the head of the general unit 6 to arrive on October 10 at the headquarters of the reserve front. On the end of October 8, I again landed at the headquarters of the reserve . . .) and handed me a telephone front. The head of the unit 6 front, message in which the Supreme Commander ordered me who met me, reported on the received order for recall of the detainee and appointment of me as commander of the reserve front. stink Poshnikov. my question is, what order to follow, oris Ilovich

answered:

- the point is that the National Harrow Committee is considering now the question of

in the formation of a reserve front and the transfer of its units and defense sectors into a single one. The candidate is being considered for the position of Commander of the Great Front. On October 10, sort out the situation on the reserve front and do everything possible so that the enemy does not break through the Ozhysk-Yaroslavets line, as well as the Zhevryoneleksin in the Serpukhov direction. here I am obviously not sour. than an urgent telephone message on the 8th to call for instructions to the 10th in the headquarters of the front front is unknown for what and at the same time appoint the commander of the reserve front? Georgy Onstantinovich didn't need someone to justify his appearance in the dream on the 10th, and not a day later. Incidentally, attentive readers should have noticed that in the early edition of Zhukovsky's memoirs, one of

these

the dramatic October days were generally missed. On the 8th, Georgiy Onstantinovich went out in search of what he had lost, found it the same day, then sent Duroitsky's brigade to cover the food, then met with the communications officer, who handed over the directive on his appointment as commander of the lower front. After this, Oukov immediately withdrew the car ... and arrived at the headquarters of the bottom front on the 10th. it turns out, from under the meadow to r dreams, one more than a day. That's right, it was possible to walk this time on foot! no one was going to shoot. The whole matter with the meaning of the codes was as described by the newcomer. Oroshilov, Olotov, Ulgnin, Onev, and Silevsky came to the conclusion that it was necessary to unite the reserve and front fronts and put the uks at the head of the new front. nothing higher, and has the resounding reputation of the winner under the flax and the savior of Leningrad, it is significant that he never mentions his meetings with the commander in the headquarters of the front before the appointment of Georgiy Onstantinovich The commander of this front, perhaps, was the hostility of the newcomer to his successor here? You can't suspect Zhukovsky's brother-in-law Silevsky in a bad attitude towards George Onstantinovich. However, in the memoir there is a version of the appointment of the uks, according to which the decision was made without the participation of Georgy Onstantinovich "On the evening of October 9, during a regular conversation with the supreme (members of the commission and the military council of the front .— .) was adopted the decision to unite the troops of the second and reserve fronts into the second front. All of us, including Colonel-General Onev, agreed with Tlin's proposal to appoint the Commander of the United Front the Army General of the Commanders, who by that time was in the troops of the Reserve Front. On the morning of October 10, together with other representatives of the government, he returned to Moscow. On the same day, the TVK issued decisions on the unification of the troops of the lower and reserve fronts ... "Lexandr lkh Ylovich is a little confused here. The decision to unite the fronts and appoint the commanders was taken almost immediately after receiving the commission's proposals, not the next day. It was wise to delay making such an important decision. the proposal for the appointment of the uks came from the commission and the leadership of the second front, not otlin. then documents are proved. The signature of Silevsky and other members of the commission is on the proposals sent to Tlin at about four in the evening of October 10, which means that they were still at the headquarters of the front, had they not left in the morning, as Silevsky claimed. Okosovsky's rebuttal with the members of the commission, which was mentioned by Ukov, describing Okosovsky's memoir, moreover, it is definitely dated October 11: "the front headquarters were found in a small one-story house." While waiting, comrades Oroshilov, Olotov, Onevi Ulgnin Liment Fremovich immediately asked the question: - - Who are you with the headquarters, but without the troops of the Sixth Army, found yourself under the yazma? - The commander of the front said that the parts that I have to accept are here. - Strange ... showed the commander the ill-fated order with the signature of the command. Oroshilov, there was a stormy conversation with the Onev Ulgnins. At the same time, at his call, the bow generator entered the room.

- then the new commander of the first front, - he said, turning to them, sprinkled, - they set up a new task for me. Consequently, everything happened exactly as Getonev put it. On the 10th, a decision was made on the appointment of the decrees, in the evening of the next day he actually

began to fulfill the duties of the commander of the first front. It is no coincidence that in the commission's proposals the deadline for the command to take command was 6 pm on October 11, that is, a day later. Georgy Onstantinovich still had to give the necessary orders to the troops of the reserve front and roll it up. Of course, Nesmeorgy Onstantinovich burst into the room with the members of the commission, abruptly cutting off their conversation

What

Okossovsky, announcing his appointment and not too politely asking his comrades to get out. sure, everything was as it should be in accordance with the chain of command. Iroshilov first rounded Onev with Ulgnin, then he summoned ukov and presented it to the only commander of the army who was available at that moment. By the introduction of a new commander of the front, the commission, indeed, considered its mission accomplished and left for Moscow. Will we ever find out exactly why Onev and Ulgnin irrigated speckled. Liment Fremovich clearly suspected that Okossovsky, together with the staff, had escaped, leaving the 16th Army surrounded and to the mercy of fate. o - Konstantin Onstantinovich presented an order dated October 5, which ordered the headquarters of the 16th Army to arrive in Yazma on the 6th and take command of the troops that had advanced there. The subsequent anger of the oroshils could be caused by two reasons. for Onevi Ulgnin, according to Lukov, tried to falsely accuse Okossovsky of fleeing the battlefield. for Oroshilov suspected that he was deliberately issuing this order in order to save the command sympathetic to him from death in the encirclement. memurkhonevk krzy cites the "ill-fated order 3", protecting Okossovsky from unfair nudges and proving,

What

The order was handed over to the command by a certain lieutenant colonel Ernyshev, who died on the way back. Therefore, I want a more plausible second version. Oroshilov considered that the order was dictated by non-operational considerations, by the desire to save Okossovsky. a number of times with my case it was shopping mall. On the 5th, he did not yet imagine the scale of the 6th catastrophe and could not know that almost no one would leave the encirclement. Oh, in any case, this Konevsky order largely determined the further fate of Okossovsky. If it were for him,

Onstan ntin onstan ntinovich, most likely, would have died surrounded or taken prisoner. There would be no future word, there would be no dinner, which he commanded, there would not be a marshal for him. To some extent I owe it to

my future enemy, Onev. From there, he came up with a legend, offensive to the newcomer, about allegedly almost shooting and his

role as a savior. In reality, however, he did not blame him for what had happened. In 1965, suddenly novich told lmonov about the events of those days: "It was then that he (Tlin. - . .) called the front with almost hysterical words about himself in the third person: "ovrisht linne representative, comrade tlin is not a much in the clerks, comrade tlin traitor, comrade tlin is an honest man, his whole mistake is that he trusted too will do everything in his power to correct the situation position" Memurkhonev relates these words of Tlin to the night of October 3rd, 4th, when the supreme commander did not dare to authorize the retreat to the Gzha line. , from here onev felt l, - comments lmonov, - kr Inuyu r confusion , lack of strong-willed nchl. when the front arrived with a commission of gold, tons

who, generally speaking, is a really stupid person ... then, with the participation of the olots, they tried to shift all the blame on the military, to declare them responsible for the current situation, - here they got the feeling that the tlin did not correspond ...

to the idea of something infinitely strong." If such a conversation between Linonev and Linonev really took place, then it turns out that in the defeat of October 41, Osif Issrionovich blamed, first of all, the "clerks" - udonny, Ryomenko and, perhaps, com nd rm -16 okossovsky, not onev -

artilleryman and infantryman. It is not excluded that it was the Okosovo olotov who was labeled as a scapegoat. Luckily, Onstantin Onstantinovich, on the advice of his chief of staff 6 ylinin ,3, took the "ill-fated order" with him to headquarters and dispelled suspicions. the lucky one was not lucky. Onev was the first to contact Tvka and, reporting on the breakthrough, laid the main blame on the reserve front. Oh, to be fair, it must be admitted that for the command of the front, Yemenih Ilovich was not a suitable figure for me. ever since the civil war he had been accustomed to being directly in the troops, with the fighters. a memoir, describing the Nevra of the 40th year, he ingenuously told how, when he saw that the shells of the weaving tanks were exploding far from the target, he ran into the lead tank of the NK and personally led the tank . The nkedv did not contact the ravine, but was able to be the first to reach the

positions of the "enemy" artillery. When he drove up to the observation post on the tank, Imoshenko angrily threw out: "Then did you allow me to participate in the tank?" "The commander fled, we are looking for him here," the guardsmen grinned. In defense of the remote insertion of the Eretskovs: "The Nkists, having found out who was in the lead car, significantly increased the pace." Yet, during the analysis of the exercises, Imoshenko gently scolded the udennoy: "M, Yemen their Yilovich, I advise you not to NK to fight, be and lead the troops. Comrade of the civil war with a sword on the head, we rushed in the wind. those times have clearly passed, dit nk - not a good thing. However, even in the great current war, the lost one strove to be in the battle formations of the troops in order to see the course of the battle with me. oti in October 41st he left LV 43rd

the army to help the command to organize the reflection of the German offensive. As a result, a breakthrough was prevented in the sector of this army, the army of the reserve front then managing others was

violated, and they were defeated. Namely, their Yilovich was a national hero and an unconditionally devoted person. it was impossible to call him. Remenko, on the other hand, was seriously wounded on October 13 during the bombing of him. FISHING a wounded general was also not very convenient. and three armies of the Ryansk front were surrounded, but managed to bring to their mountains more people but than the troops of the bottom and reserve fronts, and also a certain amount of military equipment. something happened, etc., not because of some particularly skillful actions of Ryomenko, only because

relatively fewer enemy troops, especially infantry, turned out to be against the Ryansk front than against neighboring fronts. However, the fact that a significant part of the Silyansk front managed to escape made it possible to create a powerful defense approach to the ule. The NKVD army failed to capture the city, and the plan to bypass Moscow from the south failed. none of the generals was convicted or even demoted in rank 3 to a stanza under yazma and ryansk. When Ukov took command of the 11th front on October 11, the position of the Soviet troops was invisible. the main forces remained surrounded, and the chances of their successful breakthrough were being broken every day. command of the troops in the "cauldron" was attempted

by the commander of the 19th army, lieutenant general. . ukin. Ukov recalled: "The enemy's rear of the troops ... were still heroically fighting the encircled troops of the 19th, 16th, 20th, 24th and 32nd armies and the operational groups of Aldin, trying to break through to connect with the troops of the peaceful army. During the 3 days of the command of the reserve front, the command of the 43 th army. —[. .), and their attempts to break through were unsuccessful. The command of the front and the military-industrial complex helped the encircled troops in their struggle with aircraft bombardment of the enemy, dropping food and ammunition. o neither the front nor the tvk then could do

anything more for the encircled troops in their heavy

situation. The hard work and heroic struggle of the encircled grouping held up the main enemy forces for a significant amount of time, and we took advantage of it to better prepare the defenses to repulse the expected attacks from the Osquarians. In a later version of his memoirs, Georgy Onstantinovich added: